TALIBAN NARRATIVES

THOMAS H. JOHNSON

with Matthew DuPee and Wali Shaaker

Taliban Narratives

The Use and Power of Stories

in the Afghanistan Conflict

A

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Copyright © Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee and Wali Shaaker 2017

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee and Wali Shaaker.

Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict.

ISBN: 9780190840600

Printed in India on acid-free paper

I would like to dedicate this book to Lt. Col. John Darin (JD) Loftis, a student,

friend, and outstanding military officer who was murdered while helping the

people of Afghanistan whom he loved and respected dearly.

I also dedicate this book to Ryan and Courtney,

whose love and inspiration maintain me.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

ix

List of Figures and Tables

xv

Foreword

Ambassador Peter Tomsen xvii

Preface

xxv

1. Introduction

1

2. An Overview of Taliban and Other Afghan Insurgent Stories

and an Assessment of their Master Narratives

15

3. Target Audiences of Afghan Narratives and Stories

35

4. Taliban and Afghan Insurgent Magazines, Circulars,

and Newsletters

43

5. The Taliban’s Use of Shabnamah (Night Letters)

53

6. The Taliban’s Use of the Internet, Social Media Video,

Radio Stations, and Graffiti

85

7. The Afghans’ and Taliban’s Use of Poetry and Taranas

107

8. The Layeha, the Taliban Code of Conduct

171

9. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) Propaganda Activities

195

10. The United States’ Afghan Information and PSYOP Campaign

and a Comparison with the Taliban’s Campaign

217

11. Conclusions

265

Appendix A: How Afghans Identify the Types of Taliban

285

Appendix B: Summary of Taliban Night Letters, 2008–10

289

Appendix C: HIG Official Peace Proposal and Translation

293

Notes

299

Bibliography

345

Index

365

vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book was initially conceived at the US Naval Postgraduate School

(NPS)’s Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS), which I direct. The

research associates and assistants on the program played an indispensable role

in the conceptualization of data and notions concerning many of the analyses

presented in this book. I would like first to thank Matthew DuPee. I came

across Matt’s tremendous self-taught knowledge of Afghanistan by reading his

articles published on the influential blog, the Long War Journal. I found his

articles full of data and knowledge concerning Afghanistan that appeared in

no other media outlet. It was very evident that he had valuable Afghan con-

tacts and used them extremely effectively. I was so impressed with his scholar-

ship and his writing that I eventually contacted and offered him a research

position at CCS and a stipend to enter the MA program in National Security

Affairs at NPS. He proved to be an outstanding student, graduating with

highest honors, as well as being a tremendous colleague and researcher. His

self-initiative, smarts, and outstanding analytic and writing capabilities proved

invaluable. He co-authored a number of peer-reviewed journal articles with

me and made invaluable contributions to nearly every chapter presented in

this book. He now serves as an important Department of Defense Afghan

analyst. The country is fortunate to have his services.

I would also like to thank Wali Ahmed Shaaker, an important and well-

known Afghan-American poet who was initially hired as a translator for the

CCS. I quickly learned that his intellectual tool chest relative to Afghanistan

was vast. He basically taught me the essence of Afghan poetry and its many

variants, as well as important Afghan poets that we needed to consider in

assessing the role of poetry in Afghan IO. Wali’s research was critical for those

sections of this book that deal with Afghan and Taliban poetry. His transla-

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

tions of Taliban materials, especially poetry, proved extremely important and

are presented in this book. In addition, his support of my field research in

Afghanistan proved extremely valuable.

Other CCS members also played critical roles in the research presented

here. I would like to thank especially Ahmad Waheed and Amina Kator-

Mumbarez. Ahmad, a Kandahari Afghan, now a US citizen, who initially

came to study in the United States as a Fulbright Scholar, helped to bring

Afghan nuance to almost all of the analyses presented in this book. He served

as a CCS Research Associate for over five years, and his contributions to the

research presented here were numerous. Like the other CCS members sug-

gested above, his self-initiative and dedication was infectious. Like Matt

DuPee, Ahmad served as my co-author for peer-reviewed journal articles on a

variety on subjects relevant to Taliban information operations. He translated

most of the Pashto materials assessed in this book, including the hundreds of

shabnamah whose summaries are presented in Appendix B (available online

at www.hurstpublishers.com/book/taliban-narratives). Amina Kator-Mumbarez, another Afghan-American, was hired shortly after her graduation

from the University of California in Berkeley where she organized important

conferences and workshops on Afghanistan. Amina served the CCS as an

invaluable colleague, proving to be a very gifted writer and researcher. She, like

the other dedicated CCS colleagues, played a critical role in assessments of

Taliban IO materials, data collection, analysis, and review. Keely M. Fahoum,

a former NPS student, also played a significant role in educating me concern-

ing the early US IO and PSYOP campaigns in Afghanistan. She had a wealth

of knowledge concerning early OEF IO and PSYOP, some of which is

reflected in this book. Elizabeth (Betsy) Hulme, an outstanding student

intern from the University of North Carolina, made valuable contributions

during the final push of finishing the book. Finally, I would like to thank

Matthew Dearing, one of the first CCS research assistants, for supporting

some of the early research relevant to this book.

Very importantly, most of these CCS scholars proved also to be tremen-

dous friends and colleagues and played significant roles in the production of

this book on their own time.

This book also benefited from conversations with NPS’s Center of

Excellence for Information Dominance. I would like to thank especially

Professors Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla. I was told that John once stated

that the war in Afghanistan would eventually become a “battle of poetry,” and

I believe the reasoning underlying this statement is quite prophetic and

extremely relevant to the major thesis of this book.

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Chris Mason, Harold Ingram, Graeme Smith, and Larry Goodson also

helped to frame my ideas on many subjects presented here. This group of

Afghan scholars regularly communicate with each other and me via emails

discussing a variety of important Afghan subjects and personalities. They are

also all valued friends. Chris Mason played an especially important role in my

understanding of Afghan messaging and narratives, as well as the naiveté of

US messaging and information operations.

I would also like to thank all my students at NPS that I have had the oppor-

tunity to interact with over the years. Many of these students have had multi-

ple deployments to Afghanistan, and their experiences taught me valuable

lessons concerning Afghanistan. In addition, many of my students had unique

and real world experience with information operations conducted by both the

US and the Taliban that proved important to developing my knowledge and

ideas concerning Afghan IO.

The research presented would not have been possible without the data I

gathered from numerous individuals interviewed over the course of my

research. Such individuals included (please note that position and ranks,

where known, reflect those at the time of the interview): Joanna Nathan

(Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group), Joe Auger (Local Stability

Initiatives Team Leader, DAI), Col. Woodsworth (Canadian PRT), Maj.

Perey (Canadian PRT), Karen Swails (USAID officer), Sharif Noorzai,

Dr Jouri, Whit Mason (Regional Justice Coordinator, UNAMA), Sarah

Chayes, Louis Palu (freelance photographer and journalist), Abdul Bari (tribal

elder from Maiwand, Ishaqzai Pashtun), Mohammadullah Barakzai (tribal

elder from Panjwayi), Nimat Arghandabi (Head of National Islamic Society

of Afghan Youth, Mohammedzai tribe), Qadir Khan Durrani, Alex Strick van

Linschoten, three anonymous Kandahari District Taliban commanders, Qari

Yousef (Taliban spokesman, southern Afghanistan), Zabidullah Mujahid

(Taliban spokesman, eastern Afghanistan), LTC Eric Edin (Commander

CJ-POTF), Col. Jeff Jaworsky (TF-Paladin/CJTF IO), Cdr Jon Young

(TF-Paladin), LTC Dean Burbridge (CJTF IO), Edward Mooradian (COIC

Red Team), Sgt Martinez (2/7 Marines, Helmand), Tom Targus (State

Department Political Officer), Bruce Dubee (USDA advisor), Ted

Wittenberger (USAID officer), James Fussel (TF Paladin), Dr Jeffery Bordin

(Red Team Leader), Alisson Blosser (Assadabad PRT officer), Cdr Dan

Dwyer (Assadabad PRT CO), Cpt. Rose (TF Paladin), Cpt. Beasley (EOD),

Lt. Matt Myers Assadabad (PRT), MSGT Foreman (TF Paladin), various

political party representatives: Sayyaf, United Front, Northern Alliance,

xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Kunar Governor Wahidi, LTC Paul Donovan (Nangahar PRT Commander),

Maj. Brad Adams (TF Paladin), LTC Herb Bilewski (CIED JAF), Maj. Mike

Jackson (CIED JAF), Sarah Rahimi (TF Paladin), Chancellor of Jalalabad

Medical University, Haji Mohammed Hasan (Nangarhar Provincial Council

Representative, Khogiani tribal elder, Sayyef Party representative), Dr Nijra

Habib (Nangarhar Provincial Council representative), Abiba Khaker

(Nangarhar Provincial Council representative), Lal Agha Kaker (Mayor of

Jalalabad, Nangarhar), Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai, Masood

Ahmad Azizi (Chief of Staff for Nangarhar province), Nujayed Ahmad

(Political Assistant, Jalalabad PRT), Fazil Hadi (Speaker of Nangarhar

Provincial Council, Sayyaf Party Representative), Mirwais Ahmadzai

(Director of Eastern Office, AIHRC), Cpt. John Morash (JIOC Jalalabad

PRT), Sean Waddups (Jalalabad PRT Office), Gen. David McKiernan (ISAF

Commanding General), Frank Curry (Assymetric Warfare Group, US Army),

LTC Robert Spath (CJ POTF), Col. Dietger Lather (CJ POTF), Barbara

Sotirin, (Deputy Director, HQUSACE), Bjorn Delaney (Lincoln Group),

Todd Wilson (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,

US State Department), Brian Goodman, LTC Patrick Kearney (CIED),

Christian Harstad (NORNAVSOC), Greg Reichman (CENTCOM), Col.

Roger N. Sangvi (Director CJ2 CTSC), Ray Valez (JIEDDO), Alan Yu

(Political Officer, US Embassy, Kabul), Paul Fishstein (Director AREU

Kabul), Mohammad Yousef (Aschiana), Col. John Agoglia, Ayscha Hamdami

(Political advisor, ISAF HQ), Abdullah Amini (Cultural Advisor to

COMISAF), LTC Wood (TF Paladin XO), CWO Stephen Pierce, LTC

Elders, LTC Jarkowsky, MAJ Dvorsack, Col. Michael Langley, Col. Ronald

Sheldon (Senior Mentor and Team Chief, 201st ARSIC-IO), Cpt. Charles

Johnson, Afghan MG Rahim Wardak, BG Edward Reeder, Jr (Commanding

General Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command,

Afghanistan CFSOCC-A), Col. Kevin Davis (Deputy Commander,

CFSOCC-A), LTC David Markowski, CWO Steven Pierce, Col. Arthur

Tulak (Director USFOR-A Information Operations), Col. Kevin Davis

(Deputy Commander, CFSOCC-A), Col. Brian Sweeney (Director of

Strategy, J5 Strategy and Plans, CFSOCC-A), LTC Lisa Miller (Task Force

Phoenix IO), LTC Greg Elpers (POTF Task Force Siren Deputy

Commander), Commander Christopher Hurley (SO2, Key Leader

Engagement), Maj. Cas Benavidez (Chief IO Plans, USFOR-A Information

Operations), Maj. Katherine Doyle (Analyst, USFOR-A Information

Operations, USFOR-A IO Working Group), Michael Innes (JIC), BG

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Jonathan Vance (Canadian Commander of Kandahar Task Force) and his HQ

Staff, Col. La Croix (Deputy Commander KTF), Col. Hammand (KTF J-5),

Col. Burt (OMLT Commander), LTC Paul (Canadian Battle Group

Commander), Maj. Kevin McLoughlin (KTF J-5), Ken Lewis (Representative

of Canada in Kandahar-RoCK), Ms Renata Pistone (CIDA), LTC Carl

Taurren (Canadian Camp Nathan Smith PRT Commander), Ms Deborah

Chatsis (Canadian Civilian PRT Director), Maj. Luis Carvallo (Canadian

Camp), Nathan Smith (PRT Deputy Commanding Officer), Maj. Claude

Villeneuve (Civil Military Cooperation-CIMC), Capt. Roy (CIMIC), Capt.

Stepanie Godin (PAO), Maj. Chris Brooke (US PMT Commander), Khalil,

Khan Mohammad Jan (Peace and Reconciliation Commission-PRC, Chief,

Kandahar), Hajji Mullah Amadullah Khan (Zhari district shura member),

Mullah Massoud (former District Chief for Maywand district, Kandahar),

Anonymous Panjwaii district shura member, Jorge Silva (freelance photogra-

pher and journalist), David Beriain (documentarian/journalist), Anand Gopal

(journalist, Christian Science Monitor), Ghulam Haidar (Mayor of Kandahar

City), Maitullah Qati Khan (Provincial Police Chief for Kandahar), Khan

Mohammad Jan (Peace and Reconciliation Commission Chief, Kandahar),

BG Edward Reeder, Jr (Commanding General, Combined Forces Special

Operations Component Command—Afghanistan, CFSOCC-A).

I would also like to thank various US and Canadian governmental organiza-

tions who enhanced parts of the research presented here. Finally, I would like to

thank two anonymous reviewers whose constructive criticisms and suggestions

have made this a much better book than the one they initially reviewed.

Thomas H. Johnson

Monterey, California, 9 May 2016

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

Figure 1.1

Leaflet designed by the author

xxx

Figure 2.1

Taliban narrative targets

23

Figure 2.2

“The US evil soldiers are defiling our Muslim

sisters…”

29

Figure 5.1

Taliban night letter, Kandahar, 2003

59 and 60

Figure 5.2

Warning letter to the people of Ma’ruf and

Arghistan, Kandahar province

67

Figure 5.3

Night letter, Wardak

70

Figure 5.4

Warning from Taliban Islamic movement,

representative of Parwan and Kapisa provinces

75

Figure 5.5

Taliban night letter from Ghazni

77

Figure 5.6

Night letter from Kandahar

80

Figure 6.1

Alemarah cartoon, June 2011

86

Figure 6.2

Screen dumps of Taliban Twitter accounts

91

Figure 6.3

Photo purportedly showing Taliban spokesman,

“Zabihul ah Mujahid”

98

Figure 6.4

Taliban wall display

103

Figure 6.5

Taliban graffiti

103

Figure 8.1

Taliban organizational structure

188

Figure 9.1

HIG spokesmen and representatives

201

Figure 9.2

HIG on Facebook

203

Figure 9.3, 9.4 Stills from HIG videos

205 and 206

Figure 10.1:

Partnership leaflet

233

Figure 10.2:

Peace and partnership leaflet

234

Figure 10.3:

Mul ah Omar as a dog

235

xv

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 10.4

American family and Afghan family

236

Figure 10.5

World Trade Center leaflet AFD 189

237

Figure 10.6

Mutawakkil, bin Laden et al.

239

Figure 10.7

Eid wishes and dates

240

Figure 10.8

IED fatalities, 2001–11

244

Figure 10.9

Hostilities will not be tolerated

244

Figure 10.10

Report illegal weapons

245

Figure 10.11

Working for the future of Afghanistan

246

Figure 10.12

Transport control protocols

247

Figure 10.13

Bil board

248

Figure 10.14

The Constitution of Afghanistan

250

Figure 10.15

Poppy eradication

251

Figure 10.16

ANA continues to defeat Taliban

252

Figure 10.17

Afghan National Police

254

Figure 10.18

Poster: The Taliban are cowards

256

Figure 10.19

Counter Taliban

258

Tables

Table 3.1

Local population that is neutral/undecided toward the

Taliban’s cause

36

Table 3.2

Local population that supports or is sympathetic to the

Taliban’s cause

38

Table 3.3

Local population that is opposed to the Taliban’s cause

39

Table 3.4

Neighboring population

40

Table 3.5

International population

42

Table 5.1

Thematic lines of operation for night letters

55

Table 6.1

Primary Taliban Twitter accounts (as of summer 2011)

90

Table 8.1

Tables of Contents of 2010 and 2009 Layeha

176

Table 8.2

Overview of 2010 Layeha thematic changes

177

Table 8.3

Mul ah Omar statements in Layeha

182

Table 8.4

Responsibilities of the Taliban chain of command

189

Table 10.1 345th TPS (A) “Product Book” objectives

243

Table 11.1 Themes used in Taliban narratives and stories

275

Table 11.2 Terms used in Taliban narratives and stories

276

Table 11.3 Taliban narrative targets

280

Table 11.4 Temporal differentiation of Taliban messaging

281

xvi

FOREWORD

Ambassador (Retd) Peter Tomsen

Throughout history, military strategists have often stressed the importance of

motivation in warfare in relation to military might. Napoleon looked back in

exile at his military career of victories and defeats to observe: “There are but

two powers in the world, the sword and the mind… In the long run, the sword

is always beaten by the mind.”

A thorough understanding of the enemy, including his will to fight, was

highlighted by Sun Tzu, a Chinese strategist who lived in the sixth century

BC: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results

of a hundred battles.” Sun Tzu and Napoleon must have viewed their guide-

lines as applicable to all warfare. They have been especially relevant to guerrilla

wars in modern times, pitting a militarily stronger side against a determined

yet weaker foe on home turf. Vietnam comes to mind in this regard, as does

the nine-year Soviet–Afghan war. In both conflicts, the guerrilla’s main goal

was to mold military and informational operations into a unified, effective

strategy to resist and outlast a superpower’s will to continue fighting an end-

less war.

In the end, the US and Soviet withdrawals from (respectively) Vietnam and

Afghanistan represented more of a policy failure than a military defeat. The

Soviet military in Afghanistan never lost a set-piece battle. After the Vietnam

war, a Vietnamese general in Hanoi famously commented “That’s irrelevant”

xvii

FOREWORD

when a visiting American retired officer stated that the US had never lost a

battle during the war.

Since the initial withdrawal of US Coalition ground combat forces from

Afghanistan in 2012, the outcome of the Afghan war has remained in doubt,

even though the Pakistani-supported Afghan insurgency—collectively, the

Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hisb-e-

Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)—has gained the upper hand in military and infor-

mational areas. The Coalition-backed Afghan National United Government

(NUG) suffers from the same ailments that inflicted the South Vietnamese

Nguyen Van Thieu government when I served as a District Senior Advisor in

the Mekong Delta 1969–70, and later, in 1973, when I returned in the capac-

ity of a ceasefire monitor. Pervasive government corruption, dating back to the

Ngo Dinh Diem government and continuing to the 1975 defeat of the Thieu

regime, reached down to the district level from elites in Saigon. Vietnamese

leaders scuttled free and fair elections. The Vietnamese government’s popular-

ity was higher than the popularity of the Communist insurgency in rural

areas, but that was only a matter of degree. Most of the rural population just

wanted the war to end—a sentiment that appeals to many rural Afghan com-

munities today.

The American experience in Vietnam is not a good precedent for judging

what lies ahead in Afghanistan. The two countries are vastly different, as is the

regional geo-strategic context that has surrounded each conflict. Still, it bears

noting that the South Vietnamese Thieu government lasted three years

(1972–5) following the US withdrawal of ground forces. The Moscow-

dependent Najib regime in Kabul likewise lasted three more years (1989–92)

before collapsing. In both cases, the insurgency had better synchronized,

highly sophisticated information operations, with military strategy. Each

benefited from a secure rear area to prepare and supply military offensives

while—equally important—planning and executing a well-coordinated infor-

mation campaign in the battle zone. In Vietnam, the insurgency in the South

was permanently buoyed by the coming of military age of a quarter million

North Vietnamese every year. They were armed with Soviet-supplied weap-

onry and sent south into a seemingly endless conflict.

In Pakistan, the 3–4 million Afghan refugees have offered a similarly large

pool of highly motivated jihadist fighters, accurately described in Professor

Thomas H. Johnson’s Narratives as comprising the great majority of the

Taliban leadership, as well as Taliban fighters inside Afghanistan. For over

three decades, Pakistan’s powerful military intelligence agency, the Inter-

xviii

FOREWORD

Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, with funding from Saudi Arabia and

support from Pakistani extremist sects, has funneled young Afghan refugees

through a network of radical madrasas inside Pakistan preaching obligatory

Holy War, to be followed by covert military training in ISI-managed military

camps, and subsequent movement to a fighting front, jihad, in Afghanistan.

A roughly equal number of Pakistan Pashtuns in poverty-stricken, uneducated

families on the Pakistan side of the border continue today to make that same

journey under the banner of ISI-created Pakistani religious paramilitary

forces—Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-i-Mohammed, Harakat ul-Mujahidin—all on

the US government’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.

As indicated in this book, nearly the entire propaganda production platform

for the Taliban’s information campaign carried out inside Afghanistan is

located in Pakistan and overseen by ISI: the magazines Al Somood, In Fight,

Shahamat, Elhan, Murchal; the monthly pamphlet Srak; and media studios

and video production facilities of Alemarah, al Hijirat, and Mana-ul Jihad.

Afghan Taliban media spokesmen inside Pakistan provide a Taliban interpreta-

tion of events and news releases about developments in the Afghan war to

international as well as to local journalists. The media output of other radical

Afghan insurgent groups operating from Pakistan—the anti-American fire-

brand Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the brutal Haqqani Network—are also dis-

seminated into Afghanistan and internationally from Pakistan, in most cases

from the Peshawar region where their leaderships live and freely operate.

When I served as American Special Envoy to Afghanistan (1989–92),

Hekmatyar regularly attacked the United States, equating it with the Soviet

Union, in his official newspaper, Shahadat. Shahadat routinely lashed out at

me as well for being “an uninvited guest with cheekiness, stubbornness,” and

“implementing a satanic plan.” Today, Hekmatyar’s media empire inside

Pakistan is considerably larger. In addition to Shahadat, it boasts three maga-

zines, a second newspaper, a website, Twitter and Facebook online operations,

and an official spokesman. Hekmatyar and the Taliban insurgent media outlets

are in close touch with extremist Pakistani and Arab publications, including

those operated by al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates, sharing and disseminating

propaganda videos and printed materials with each other across Eurasia.

As is thoroughly documented in the pages of this unique book, the ISI-

supported Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, and HIG informational cam-

paigns mounted from Pakistan have proven far superior in quality, quantity,

and effectiveness to those organized by the American Coalition and the

Afghan government. In sum (and expanded on later), “the US military and the

xix

FOREWORD

Afghan government have continually failed to offer a credible narrative and

stories that resonate with the Afghan people. The Taliban, on the other hand,

have crafted a strong, simple, and culturally relevant IO (Information

Operations) campaign to energize, coerce, and control the Afghan populace.”

Over the past nearly four decades, since the 1979 Soviet invasion, the

Pakistan-fueled Afghan insurgency inside Afghanistan has transited through

different military propaganda phases. Fluctuating information messaging has

been closely aligned with adjustments in military operations and vice versa. As

is well-documented in Taliban Narratives, the propaganda themes remained

basically the same during the Soviet occupation (1979–89) and the post-9/11

American intervention in Afghanistan (October 2001-present). Taliban

information operations aimed at mobilizing popular support behind the

insurgency, motivating and recruiting fighters, have highlighted:

•  The Muslim Brotherhood, Qutbist mandate making it obligatory on every

Muslim to conduct violent jihad to defend Islam (the radical Islamist so-

called sixth pillar of Islam);

•  The call to emulate past Afghan defeats of foreign invaders, with a special

accent on ethnic Pashtun historiography, traditions, values, and mythology

toward that end;

•  Afghan and Pashtun nationalism;

•  Foreign sponsorship of an abusive, corrupt Afghan puppet government;

•  Warnings to Afghans working in or supportive of the Afghan government

and foreign occupiers.

The Mujahidin propaganda campaign during the anti-Soviet war changed

along with military objectives when it became clear in early 1988 that the

Soviets were leaving Afghanistan. ISI began preparations to install its favorite

extremist, Hekmatyar, in Kabul. It shifted the great bulk of financial, propa-

ganda assets, and CIA weapons supplies to Hekmatyar. Simultaneously, it

drastically reduced support to major non-extremist Afghan commanders

Ahmed Shah Masood, Abdul Haq, Haji Latif, and Ismael Khan. Together,

moderate Afghan Mujahidin had inflicted the majority of casualties on Soviet

forces during the anti-Soviet jihad. The Soviet departure led ISI to pivot from

a defensive to an offensive posture to eliminate or degrade the moderates. On

9 July 1989, a Hekmatyar commander murdered thirty of Masood’s sub-

commanders in northern Afghanistan. Hekmatyar’s radio station in Pakistan

blamed Masood. ISI maneuvering disrupted American efforts to investigate

the massacre. A month later, Haji Latif, a prominent tribal moderate who had

xx

FOREWORD

been feuding with Hekmatyar, was poisoned near his base in southern

Afghanistan. Many believed that Hekmatyar killed the renowned commander.

ISI funds for moderate Mujahidin information operations dried up. ISI cut

off support to Ismael Khan and Abdul Haq.

From Pakistan, Hekmatyar’s media promoted him as the top leader of the

Mujahidin drive to topple the Najib regime which the Soviets had left behind

in Kabul. This did not stop Masood from capturing Kabul in 1992 before

Hekmatyar’s forces could get there. ISI assisted Hekmatyar in bombarding the

city, killing thousands. In 1995, Pakistan switched its support from

Hekmatyar to the Taliban as the most promising Afghan extremist vehicle to

expel Masood from Kabul. By this time, an Afghan Muslim versus Afghan

Muslim civil war had replaced the jihad against a foreign invader. The ideo-

logical solidarity that had unified the Mujahidin during the jihad was fast

dissipating, resulting in a battlefield stalemate.

To gain the initiative and in an unusual departure from the Taliban’s radical

Islamist messaging, Taliban propaganda featured the “return” of the secular

and moderate ex-Pashtun king, Zahir Shah, then residing in Rome. Zahir

Shah’s popularity throughout most of the Pashtun tribal belt in the south and

east gave impetus to Taliban military progress against Masood’s Mujahidin

forces in control of Kabul. Taliban formations carried aloof huge portraits of

Zahir Shah as they marched through Pashtun provinces on the way to the

capital. After Pakistani-assisted Taliban assaults forced Masood to abandon

Kabul on 26 September 1996, the Taliban’s propaganda associating the

Taliban with Zahir Shah quickly disappeared, replaced by a stream of religious

fatwas establishing the rigid new Taliban order based on a strict, Wahhabi

version of Qur’anic law. In early 1997, the Pakistani foreign minister nimbly

compared the Taliban’s advent to the 1789 French Revolution and announced

Pakistan’s diplomatic recognition of Mul ah Omar’s Afghan emirate.

In the wake of the disastrous second Anglo-Afghan war (1879–81),

Britain’s commander, Field Marshal Frederick Roberts, had suggested that, in

the future, the British should seek out internal Afghan al ies rather than uni-

laterally attempting again to invade the country:

•  I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us, the less

they will dislike us.

•  Should the Russians attempt to conquer Afghanistan, we should have a bet-

ter chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid all interfer-

ence with them.

xxi

FOREWORD

A century later, Soviet commanders in Afghanistan would encounter a

similar Afghan religious–patriotic uprising reminiscent of the Roman writer

Virgil’s comment in the Aeneid: “Their rage supplies them with weapons.”

During the Soviet occupation, American Cold War strategists did not need to

coordinate arms supplies to the Mujahidin with an informational PSYOP

campaign. Afghan fury required no American encouragement. As with the

covert weapons supplies to ISI, the Pakistanis ran the propaganda war, build-

ing up the al-Qaeda-connected radical Mujahidin groups, particularly

Hekmatyar, at the expense of Mujahidin moderates. Washington lost interest

in Afghanistan during the mid-1990s following the late 1991 col apse of the

Soviet Union.

That left Pakistan with a free hand to shape an extremist sequel to the

Afghan war in the form of the Taliban, while keeping outsiders duped or at

bay about Islamabad’s intentions. US policy-makers ignored warnings from

some scholars and diplomats that “Arab terrorist organizations … could shift

their bases to Afghanistan” (Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, p. 323).

Outsourcing America’s Afghan policy to Pakistan backfired. Afghanistan

became a launching pad for al-Qaeda attacks on the US, first targeting two

American embassies in Africa (1998), then against the warship USS Cole off

the Yemeni coast (2000), and again on 9/11 directly against the American

homeland.

The post-9/11 American military intervention in Afghanistan in October

2001 drove the Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s Arab forces back to the

Pakistani base areas from which they had emerged after the Soviet withdrawal.

As widely accepted in hindsight today, the Pakistani commitment to cooper-

ate in the struggle against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Islamist terrorism proved

duplicitous. ISI revamped the Taliban. It reorganized three jihadist fronts on

the Pakistan side of the Afghan–Pakistani border: Mullah Omar’s Afghan

Taliban above Quetta in the west, the Haqqani Network in the center, and

Hekmatyar’s HIG on the western flank. The insurgency’s ultimate goal was to

outlast the American will to conduct the war. A retired ISI director general

predicted that the US would be gone in five years. A group of Pakistani gener-

als decided in a private meeting that it would take ten. The US withdrew its

combat forces after twelve years of inconclusive guerrilla warfare planned and

supplied from Pakistani safe havens. A large-scale sophisticated Taliban propa-

ganda campaign emanating from Pakistan, detailed at length in Taliban

Narratives, reinforced the insurgency’s gradual expansion to most other

regions of the country.

xxii

FOREWORD

As of mid-2016, some 13,000 American-led Coalition troops are training

and assisting the Afghan army and air force and conducting counter-terrorism

operations. The Soviet military in the 1980s had only sporadically conducted

cross-border air raids into Pakistan. The US adopted a more forward posture,

hitting Taliban targets across the border in Pakistan, launching hundreds of

drone strikes inside Pakistan’s tribal areas, with the silent compliance of

Pakistan’s military. A drone strike on 21 May 2016 killed Taliban leader

Mul ah Mansour, traveling by car in Pakistan’s western Baluchistan province,

undertaken without Pakistani clearance. US Special Forces raids have also

periodically covertly penetrated Pakistani territory, including the 2 May 2011

killing of Osama bin Laden, also undertaken without notification to Pakistan.

There is much to be pessimistic about when looking at the situation in

Afghanistan today. The Taliban have yet to take over a city and hold it, but

the movement has expanded into many rural areas, especially in the Pashtun

belt adjoining Pakistan and near Kabul. Haqqani Network suicide bomb-

ings rock Afghanistan’s capital. The Islamic State is establishing small foot-

holds in the east and north-west. It attempts to create more bases across the

Amu Darya in Central Asia. Iran and China oppose the continuing US

presence in Afghanistan, as does the Taliban’s patron, Pakistan. The Afghan

National Unity Government in Kabul is corrupt and inept. Ashraf Ghani is

more concerned about keeping American pressure for reforms at arm’s

length than governing well. The Ghani government’s poor image among

Afghans reduces its potential to become an effective partner in the critical

motivational contest for the Afghan mind. Another Vietnam policy failure

is not out of the question.

On the positive side of the ledger, American and Coalition combat forces

have been withdrawn. The Taliban message to end the American occupation

is less credible. The conflict is now primarily an Afghan war: Afghan extrem-

ists based in Pakistan versus the anti-extremist government in Kabul. The

Taliban are divided vertically and horizontally, tarnished with being the

Pakistani proxy that they are. Soviet ally Najib skillfully divided the Mujahidin

for three years after the Soviet departure had weakened the unifying call to

jihad. It was the conclusion of the US–Soviet negative symmetry agreement

depriving Najib of Soviet arms, not Mujahidin military pressure, that eventu-

ally precipitated his regime’s collapse in 1992. The US-led Coalition has

apparently recognized that Afghanistan is just one theatre in the ongoing

struggle across Asia and the Middle East against Islamist terrorism. It is likely

to remain committed to a non-extremist outcome in Afghanistan.

xxiii

FOREWORD

Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban is clearer than ever after the killing of

Taliban leader Mul ah Mansour. Rumors that the ISI murdered Mul ah Omar

and suppressed news about Omar’s demise for two years after his death had

already stoked angry resentment in some Taliban ranks. The ISI’s dominant

role in choosing first Mansour, then Haibatul ah, to be the next Taliban emir,

not to mention selecting their deputies, will likely heighten Taliban annoy-

ance about Pakistan’s interference in Taliban leadership politics.

Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban record in ruling Afghanistan (1996–2001)

has left a bitter legacy among most Afghans, especially the non-Pashtun

minorities who make up a majority of the population. Should the Taliban

again overrun Kabul, the Northern Alliance of mainly Tajik, Uzbek, and

Hazara forces will fiercely resist Taliban expansion north of the Hindu Kush.

Backing from Russia, Iran, and India would assist their capability to prevent a

Taliban conquest of Afghanistan.

The most important challenges that the US, its Coalition, and Afghan

partners must overcome are conveying a persuasive message to the Afghan

population to buttress their military strategy; countering Taliban propaganda;

and harvesting the many opportunities available to exploit Taliban and

Pakistani vulnerabilities. Taliban Narratives methodically chronicles how and

why the Taliban have to date “won the information war against the US coali-

tion and the Afghan government”—or, paraphrasing Napoleon’s dictum, the

battle for the Afghan mind. This sobering predicament confronted me during

a 2012 military briefing on Afghanistan at a military base in the US. I asked a

military officer why the traditional “strategic communications” topic had been

dropped from the agenda. “Because it failed,” he replied. His answer stunned

me. The Coalition’s eleven-year information effort, as depicted in Professor

Johnson’s book, just “did not work.”

A fulsome description and assessment of what went wrong with the US

attempt to win the hearts and minds of Afghans follows here in the pages of

Taliban Narratives. Its conclusions and recommendations are based on field-

work inside Afghanistan over a seven-year period by Professor Johnson and

his two colleagues. They interviewed hundreds of Afghans and compiled

thousands of documents, videos, and other originally-sourced materials. This

book’s incisive analysis of Taliban and Pakistani vulnerabilities will prove

invaluable in informing a future, more successful US strategy to counter the

radical Islamist message, and not only in Afghanistan; for the ideological–

military struggle between the majority moderate Afghan Muslims and the

radical Islamist brand espoused by the Taliban and its offshoots will continue

for decades in the Islamic world.

xxiv

PREFACE1

In mid-September 2001, I was asked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) to assist in the formulation of the United States’ initial “Information

Operations” (IO) campaign in preparation for the US invasion of

Afghanistan. The stated policy aim of this invasion was initially to pursue and

destroy al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

This initial goal would change significantly over the course of the war in

Afghanistan to a primary focus on the destruction of the Taliban as well as

nation-building. For three weeks I feverishly researched and worked on nar-

ratives that I believed would help tell the “story” of why the US military was

attacking al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. I was especially interested

in the formulation of narratives and stories that I believed would resonate

with the Afghan people in a nuanced way.

I had first traveled to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s during the Soviet occu-

pation, and over the course of years I had the pleasure of visiting and meeting

many Afghans, both rural and urban, during my numerous trips to the coun-

try. Having studied and written on Afghanistan for nearly two decades, I felt

I had a fairly sophisticated knowledge of the country and its people. Yet, not

expertly knowing their languages hindered my deep structural understanding

of certain aspects of the country, cultures, and peoples. Nevertheless, I

immersed myself in data and Information Operation’s ideas that I believed

could be used effectively during our coming invasion of Afghanistan.

I was startled by the frazzled and hectic pace I found in OSD in preparation

for our coming operations in Afghanistan. From endless meetings to running

into numerous expatriate Afghans I had known for years walking and cam-

paigning in the halls of the Pentagon, I was nearly overwhelmed by the sheer

volume and variety of opinions expressed concerning the “best” way to explain

our forthcoming actions to the Afghan people.

xxv

PREFACE

I was also unprepared for the lack of detailed and nuanced, substantive

knowledge among military leaders and OSD personnel concerning the coun-

try and people which the US was about to attack. It was very evident that

since the US had ended its considerable support of the Afghan Mujahidin and

their anti-Soviet jihad (the largest intelligence covert program in US history)

and our goal of “bleeding” the Soviets a decade earlier, our government had

lost most of its legacy of information on Afghanistan. Moreover, the eventual

withdrawal of Afghan support by both “superpowers” created a power vacuum

that the Pakistan military had tried to exploit by using their Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) directive to sponsor the Mujahidin’s attempt to overthrow

the post-Soviet Afghan government. From the relative importance of the

Pashtun community in the governance of the country, to the biases of the

Kabuli Afghan elite to the explicit make-up of the Northern Al iance, I was

taken aback by the lack of up-to-date, relevant data on Afghanistan within

OSD as well as with the military leadership. While I found more sophisticated

knowledge concerning Afghanistan within the intelligence community mem-

bers with whom I interacted, I also found their knowledge of the country

lacking in important aspects, especially considering the immense Afghan

knowledge I had witnessed in this community a decade earlier. I found myself

agreeing with the many critics who argued that after the Soviets withdrew in

defeat from Afghanistan in January 1989, the US basically abandoned and

forgot about the country. And this had a significant impact on how the US

approached their initial Afghan information campaign.

As the date for the US invasion neared, I had flag officers and senior civil

servants standing over my shoulder as I prepared PowerPoint slides of possible

information leaflets and word documents for possible broadcasts through EC

130E Commando Solo (at the time the US military’s only airborne psychologi-

cal and information operations mission platform). It is actually interesting to

note that while working on this initial Afghan information campaign, I was

told that the initial air operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban were sup-

posed to commence on Wednesday 3 October 2001. However, because the

initial IO leaflets and Commando Solo broadcasts had not been fully produced

and vetted, the start of the war was delayed until Sunday 7 October 2001.

I spent the majority of my time developing messages and narratives aimed

at the Afghan Pashtun population. While the Taliban at this time were almost

exclusively Pashtun, I believed that the key to our information efforts should

be directed at winning the trust and confidence of the Pashtuns, especially

those rural Pashtuns I expected would eventually be central to our campaign

xxvi

PREFACE

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In my opinion, the key to a successful

Afghan IO campaign was to separate the rural Pashtun population from the

Taliban and their draconian policies. Indeed, I believed that the best way to

defeat al-Qaeda as well as the Taliban was to make them “irrelevant” to the

Afghan villager.

From my perspective, the Taliban represented a political bastardization of

traditional Pashtun village life. While the Talib (“seeker of knowledge, or

student” in Arabic) has been an important fixture in society ever since Islam

was introduced in the seventh century to the area of present-day Afghanistan,

they had never been a formal political entity. For centuries Talibs traveled the

countryside as ascetics, often living off the land and tithings from Afghan

villagers, in search of religious “truth.” The Taliban (plural of Talib) would

later become an extremely important part of the Afghan social fabric, run-

ning religious schools (madrasas), mosques, shrines, and various religious and

social services, and serving as Mujahidin when necessary, but the Taliban had

never represented an explicit Afghan political movement until 1994.

Moreover, the vast majority of the Taliban foot soldiers had lived most, if not

all their lives in refugee camps in Pakistan. Many had never spent time in an

Afghan village and were not familiar with many of the key aspects of rural

Afghan village politics and culture, including Pashtunwali (literally the “way

of the Pashtun”: the unwritten rules that drive and significantly influence a

Pashtun’s life, honor, and conflict resolution, especially in rural Afghanistan).

The violence of the Afghan civil war after the superpowers left Afghanistan, and

the criminality of supposed Mujahidin turned warlords who raped, plundered,

and extracted from the war-weary Afghan population between 1992 and1994,

resulted in the political formulation of the Taliban, which was not only a reac-

tion to the criminal warlords, but also represented a reactionary Deobandi (a

revivalist movement within Sunni, primarily Hanafi) Islamist movement. Many

of the early Taliban leaders and soldiers had fought the Soviets in the Yunas

Khalis’ Hezb-e-Islami (“Party of Islam”) party (HIK) or Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-

Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement) led by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.

Due to their combination of fundamentalist Deobandi Islam and

Pashtunwali, although many of the Taliban’s domestic policies were often

based on local customs in the guise of religion, not all Taliban policies were

locally based. The Taliban’s hostility to orchestrated music and Sufism, for

example, was in stark contrast to rural Afghan cultural norms and practices.

The Taliban also strictly segregated the sexes (known as purdah). While this

is an established practice throughout much of rural (particularly Pashtun)

xxvii

PREFACE

Afghanistan, Afghan urbanites, especially Kabulis, were extremely concerned

when the Taliban attempted to push the practice onto the whole country.

According to Islamic scholars and legal experts, most of the Taliban, even

senior leaders and clerics, lacked even basic understanding of Arabic and

Shar’iah law; therefore, the Taliban’s legal code did not adhere to the Islamic

legal system that many other Islamic governments practiced. Still, in

Afghanistan religion had always been an important contributor to political

and social decisions, which is why many Afghans embraced the religiously

guided Taliban when they first surfaced to fight the corrupt and greedy war-

lords. I suspected that the eventual Taliban messages and IO would be heavily

focused on their religious beliefs and tenets, but I also realized that the US

would gain no credibility by trying to respond to their Islamist messaging. I

therefore argued with many involved in our Afghan information campaign

that we would have to cede such messaging and IO to our eventual Afghan

partners. Of course, the Afghan government never seriously did this during

the years to come.

By 2001, while the Taliban were relatively successful in pushing their stated

policies onto Afghans, they were never successful in creating jobs, creating or

maintaining infrastructure, or establishing meaningful ties with the interna-

tional community. This inability to bring prosperity and hope to the nation,

their draconian policies toward women, along with banning traditional

Pashtun pastimes (like music, movies, kite flying, the keeping of pigeons, etc.)

caused a significant erosion of Afghan support. In light of this, I attempted to

develop narratives that played on these facts.

For example, the first leaflet I developed was aimed at the rural Pashtun

community (Figure 1.1). It consisted of a picture I found on the Revolutionary

Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) website that depicted a

Taliban member of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the

Prevention of Vice, or “religious police,” who patrolled the urban and some

rural areas enforcing Taliban dress codes and other religious, cultural, and

moral “edicts,” beating a woman with a car antenna for wearing a burka that

revealed the woman’s ankles. In the forefront of the picture was a young child

viewing the beating with fright in his eyes. Under this disturbing picture I

wrote a caption that read: “Is this the future you want for your women and

children?” On the reverse side of the leaflet was a picture of al-Qaeda mem-

bers with the caption: “Drive out foreign terrorists.”2 Here I wanted to play on

the relatively xenophobic nature of many Afghans3 and to suggest that the US

war was aimed at foreign terrorists rather than the Afghan people.

xxviii

PREFACE

An Afghan man’s honor and pride ( nang) is intimately tied to how the

women of his family are viewed and treated. It is basically unimaginable for an

individual outside the immediate Pashtun family to touch a woman, much less

hit or beat her, especially in public. This would be in direct and enormous

violation of a Pashtun’s honor and esteem ( ghariat), the most important per-

sonal values of a Pashtun, and would demand an immediate act of revenge

( badal) to regain that honor. This was exactly the reaction I was attempting to

engender by this IO leaflet, as well as other IO messages I produced.

I developed this leaflet to be used explicitly in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan,

but I also believed that the message would resonate with other Afghan popula-

tions. A few weeks after the war commenced, the leaflet was reproduced on the

front page of the Washington Times, where it was presented as the first leaflet

dropped into Afghanistan by the US forces.4 To my frustration, in the caption

that I had carefully crafted to head the leaflet in both Pashto and Dari, the Dari

was presented above the Pashto text. While this might seem inconsequential,

my response was that to present the Dari translation over the Pashto on the

leaflet and then drop it into Pashtun areas was a significant faux pas.

“Pashtunwali presents an ethnic self-portrait of the Pashtuns according to

which the Pashtuns are distinct from other ethnic groups not only due to their

language, history and culture, but also due to their behaviour.”5 Pashtuns take

their Pashto language very seriously, and presenting it in a way that appeared to

make Pashto “subservient” to Dari was a major blunder. Indeed, presenting a

Dari translation on the leaflet, in and of itself, was a major mistake in my view.

The leaflet was explicitly developed to be used in rural, predominantly Pashtun

areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. While possibly relevant, I never felt

it would be a successful messaging instrument in non-Pashtun areas.

Many have questioned the utility of using leaflets at all in Afghanistan,

because of the high illiteracy rates. I was well aware that the literacy rates for

the rural Pashtun in the areas I expected the leaflet to be dropped—eastern

and southern Afghanistan—was low (5 to 10 per cent), but I expected those

literate members of a particular Pashtun village to read it to other community

members. This is very similar to how shabnamah or “night letters” as well as

other types of written information have been delivered to Pashtun communi-

ties in these areas for generations. Moreover, I wanted to produce leaflets that

could tell a “story” through their visual presentation alone. I believed this

leaflet accomplished that goal.

In Fall 2002, I met with a Special Forces ODA team sergeant who had been

deployed to southern Afghanistan and we talked about my experience work-

xxix

PREFACE

Figure 1.1: Leaflet designed by the author6

ing on IO products; he presented me with the actual leaflet that I had

designed and was dropped into the country. To my amazement, he claimed

that he had personally witnessed Taliban members scooping up the leaflet

soon after it was dropped from US aircraft and burning it. I viewed this as an

indirect metric that the message I was attempting to send via the leaflet and

its narrative was a success. If the Taliban were committed to destroying it, I

assumed that it was sending a message which they did not want heard in the

Pashtun villages.7

My experiences working in OSD on Afghan messaging and narratives

heightened my interest in the role of messaging and propaganda generally in

Afghanistan. They were also the initial impetus for this book. Over the next

few years I gathered responses from numerous students at the Naval

Postgraduate School where I teach: when they returned from Afghan deploy-

ments they had interesting information and stories to tell, not only about US

messaging but also about the Taliban’s use of a variety of tools and instruments

to influence the thinking and emotions of the Afghan rural population.

Purely on the mechanical or process side of Information Operations, I was

told of the significant confusion between IO, Psychological Operations

(PSYOP), and Military Information Support Operations (MISO). In the US

military, the role of an Information Operations team is to “integrate, synchro-

nize, employ, and assess a wide variety of information-related capabilities.”8

Thus, IO’s function is coordinating and facilitating, not doing; unfortunately,

throughout the US government, this is a confused topic (there are numerous

examples of secretaries of defense, general officers, commanders, and other key

xxx

PREFACE

personnel routinely using the terms IO, PSYOP, MISO interchangeably). This

confusion and misunderstanding of roles impacts on mission effectiveness,

particularly that of PSYOP/MISO.9

The basic and significant issue becomes unity of messaging and effort. The

Taliban do not separate messaging functions: their influence operations/

propaganda/strategic messengers, as will be seen below, are often the same

people, but this is not necessarily the norm. The US military (and more fre-

quently the Taliban) separate those functions into specialties, and the IO

officer’s job is to coordinate and synchronize those efforts along with the other

capabilities under IO. This sounds good in theory, but it is extremely compli-

cated in practice. Every US Brigade Combat Team (BCT), and the echelon

above, have information efforts: they are independently planned and run by

each individual unit’s IO officer/team; therefore by default the efforts are not

synchronized. This is not the case with most Taliban messaging, which is

highly coordinated in relative terms. For example, Taliban mul ahs regularly

coordinate their khutba (Friday sermons) in Loya Kandahar.10 Further confus-

ing the issue is that capabilities under IO, specifically MISO, require very high

levels of mission/messaging approval. MISO/PSYOP personnel are trained

in this approval process, and US military personnel are also trained to conduct

MISO missions. IO officers are not trained to do either, because they are not

supposed to be involved; but that does not stop commanders from attempting

to task IO officers with messaging, and it does not stop some IO officers from

attempting to message. These IO officers might know the target audience’s

culture and behavioral patterns very well and might create a product that

effectively influences behavior; but there is no way for DOD to know that,

because the IO officer is not trained to do any of this.

The culmination of this confusion is in DOD officers’ training and under-

standing of influence activities. The vast majority of DOD personnel, even the

highest ranking, receive little to no training on the different roles and respon-

sibilities of IO and PSYOP/MISO. Many times, commanders just hear an IO

officer say, “Yes, sir/ma’am, we can message this now,” and the PSYOP officer

says “Well, sir/ma’am, we need to get authority; ensure that this message does

not conflict with other messaging in the area, and is approved.” Commanders

do not necessarily understand the process; they just understand that their

mission is not occurring as they want it to. The Department of the Army is

now including some additional IO/PSYOP training at the CGSC in Fort

Leavenworth, but this is just one component—and the other components

receive even less training.11

xxxi

PREFACE

How are military commanders supposed to use weapons/tools correctly if

they are not trained in them, if they do not understand the artifacts’ roles, and

they are routinely mislabeled? As suggested above, and will be elaborated in the

further chapters of this book, the Taliban, as well as other Afghan insurgents,

for the most part do not face these process or organizational problems. As we

shall see, while some Taliban information operations or propaganda are highly

centralized and controlled by explicit Taliban organizations, much of this

information is decentralized to local commanders and is highly dispersed.

I have also interacted with Naval Postgraduate School students holding

explicit and valuable information concerning the Taliban’s information cam-

paign. In 2005 one of my students while deployed in Afghanistan had com-

piled a sizeable collection of Taliban night letters or shabnamah. For decades

the Taliban and the anti-Soviet Mujahidin before them had used this messag-

ing instrument to instruct and threaten Afghan villagers. I immediately

started to collect Taliban night letters through field research and other means

and to analyze their explicit messages and narratives. Chapter 5 presents a

discussion of the importance of Taliban night letters and an examination of

some of the narratives and stories portrayed. Appendix B (available online at

www.hurstpublishers.com/book/taliban-narratives) presents a summary of hundreds of night letters across a variety of variables (producer, target audience, message, etc.) to help engender further research concerning this long-

tested and frequently-used Afghan messaging technique.

In addition to Afghan field research, I also collected a variety of Taliban

messages and narratives while I served in 2009 as a Senior Political and

Counterinsurgency Advisor to General Jonathan Vance, Commander of

Canadian Forces in Afghanistan (now Canadian Army Chief of Staff ).

During this time I collected Taliban taranas (poetic chants), poetry, DVDs,

periodicals, and text messages. I later gathered data on Taliban messaging

through Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Much of this data will be discussed

in the chapters that follow.

My introduction to taranas was especially interesting. In Fall 2008, I was

interviewing Taliban and Kandahari tribal elders in a hotel in downtown

Kandahar. During a break in one of my sessions, I visited the small hotel lobby

and witnessed people “blue-toothing” information between cell phones. On

further enquiry, I was informed that people were sending Taliban

chants/“music” to each other’s cell phones. I later found out that this was a

regular exercise in southern Afghanistan (Loya Kandahar), but to my surprise

I found no NATO/ISAF or US military personnel who had any idea or

xxxii

PREFACE

knowledge of this practice! In fact, I found that the US and its allies were

totally ignorant of this Taliban messaging technique. I asked numerous US

and Al ied PSYOP and IO officers and found that no one had even heard of

Taliban taranas. Chapter 7 offers an analysis of selected Taliban examples.

The majority of the research presented in this book was conducted over the

years 2004–11. During most of these years I conducted considerable field

research in eastern and southern Afghanistan, focusing on Taliban messaging.

While some might argue that the data and analyses presented in this book are

dated, I would vigorously argue that Taliban messaging has not changed sig-

nificantly over the intervening years and that the findings presented here are

still valid and have important implications for US and Kabul policies.

Many of the findings from these research field trips mentioned above will

be elaborated in the chapters below, but a number of these findings need to be

described in more detail to help present a context for what is to follow.12

A central thesis of this book is that information operations and their related

stories and narratives should ultimately drive both an insurgent’s and counter-

insurgent’s operations and policies. While data gathered and interviews con-

ducted during my research trips clearly suggested that this was the case for the

Taliban, we found that this was not true for the United States, the Afghan

government (GIRoA, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan)

or their NATO/ISAF al ies. We found that US IO and PSYOP messages were

generally too broad and not focused on Afghan cultural nuances, such as

Pashtunwali. In contrast, the Taliban’s messages are precise, focused and local-

ized, recognizing political and social cleavages in Afghanistan. There is no

question that Afghan local politics and the local disposition of the people in

the area are very important and that the Taliban play on these dynamics in

their messaging.

The Taliban claim patience among their attributes, and impatience among

the NATO vanities. They speak of fighting for generations as an honor and a

reward from Al ah. In fact, this is a common trope of Taliban stories. This is

an especially troubling dynamic for Kabul and the international forces.

Religious rhetoric is a seemingly important tactical option in the IO campaign

that the US and its allies should not have completely relinquished to the

insurgents (such rhetoric probably represents 90 per cent of the Taliban’s IO

battle space).

Another important IO dynamic that was identified by many Afghans we

interviewed was that the Taliban are effective at influencing civilians simply

due to their daily interaction with people. Mul ahs preach about people’s daily

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PREFACE

problems face-to-face and provide an emotional context that resonates with

the rural Afghans. Radio programs and billboards—regular US and Afghan

government IO instruments—can never have the same effect as such a truly

effective whisper campaign. Direct engagement with the population is an

extremely significant factor which obviously plays upon the strong Afghan

tradition of oral history. Additionally, many Taliban fighters are locals, which

of course makes it easier for them to empathize with people because they

know the language and culture, as opposed to the international forces’ dis-

tanced approach. Furthermore, the ability of the Taliban to establish shadow

governments and a semi-permanent presence in some areas also helps promote

their message. The Taliban have been successful at enforcing justice and

Shar’iah law, while highlighting the government’s inability to impose law and

order. The result is that the local populations are increasingly turning to

Taliban courts because they are viewed as more effective and fair when com-

pared to the corrupt official system.13

Taliban and insurgent forces have exploited the presence of communication

technologies, such as cell phones and text, photo and video imaging capabili-

ties, to expedite the speed of their message transmission. Insurgent websites,

such as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban website) (http://www.

alemarah1.org/english1/) and the joint Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis)–Tora Bora Military Front (http://toorabora.com/Pokhto/Filmona/konar.34.htm) were important operating websites during our field research. Each site posted news,

battle reports, interviews, commentaries, and the Tora Bora website had five

video clips posted, including one that showed a rocket strike against an

American CH-47 helicopter in Kunar province. The Tora Bora website also

had a significant portion of warrior poetry posted, which is further evidence

that the Taliban and other militants were utilizing and exploiting cultural

norms to enhance their IO–PSYOP capabilities. This is discussed in detail in

the chapters that follow.

The Taliban websites, which are available in several languages at any given

time,14 have taken on an increased sophistication (visually). This was most

noticeable in the English version of the sites, which now feature colorful ban-

ners and relevant photographs attached to “featured” news reports. The web-

sites are updated several times a day and change URLs frequently to avoid

long-term disruption from Western cyber attacks.

In conclusion, let me suggest that a central assumption and a major finding

of the research reported here is that the Taliban has won the information war

against the US Coalition and the Afghan government. The Taliban’s messag-

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PREFACE

ing, as will be demonstrated below, is concise, to the point, and uses an effec-

tive information discipline that is in tune with the target audiences they wish

to influence. Much of their messaging is also supported and funded by the

Pakistani military, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate.

The US as well as their Kabul al ies, on the other hand, have blundered greatly

in their messaging by basically failing to present narratives and stories that

resonate or can be understood by their targeted audiences.

In other words, the United States and its allies have lost the “battle of the

story” in Afghanistan. Despite its conventional and technological superior-

ity, the US military lost the battle for the most valuable terrain of all, the

trust and confidence of the Afghans themselves; much less their “hearts and

minds,” that we never had a chance of winning in the first place. Moreover,

and intimately connected to the Taliban information campaign, the US and

Afghan government have failed to meet the rural Afghan population’s basic

expectations of improving their lives through good governance and effective

security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction efforts. And this has

proved fatal in a war that turned out to be primarily a Taliban rural insur-

gency wrapped in the narrative of jihad. The Taliban quickly learned how to

wage a sophisticated and effective information campaign against the “cru-

sader” invaders and the Afghan “puppet” regime. This was in stark contrast

with the initial view of the Taliban in 2001 as a bumbling, technologically

backward enemy with few connections with the Afghan people. The Taliban

have proved to have an adept understanding of guerrilla warfare strategy and

tactics in which “the guerrilla fighter is primarily a propagandist, an agitator,

a disseminator of the revolutionary idea, who uses the struggle itself as an

instrument of agitation.”15

While primarily assessing the messaging, delivery means, and central nar-

ratives and stories of Afghan insurgents, especially the Taliban and Hezb-e-

Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG), this book also assesses US PSYOP and

IO operations and compares them to the Taliban’s campaign. In my briefs to

senior officials responsible for US information and PSYOP operations over

the last fifteen years, I have suggested that we include in our messaging al u-

sions to Afghan poetry, folktales, legends, and oral traditions—essentially the

kind of sources that the Taliban use in their information operations—but I

was basically or at least implicitly told that this was “too hard.” Such a response

and position, I believe, is one of the central reasons why our efforts were

unsuccessful in Afghanistan. We ultimately proved too “lazy” to develop

Afghan-resonating stories and narratives that could have complemented our

operations and policies in the country.

xxxv

PREFACE

Finally, let me suggest that many of the analyses presented in this book are

extremely relevant to information operations that could be conducted against

the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), who have adopted a sophisticated

information campaign. There is no doubt that the Islamic State militants pro-

duce an abundance of highly professional, crafted propaganda in the form of

narratives that advertise not only the unforgiving brutality of their operations

but also the promise of an “idyllic, pure Muslim life” in areas under its control.

They have become masters at producing and disseminating videos, photos,

music, messages on social media, electronic magazines, and newspapers to a

civilian population living in every Islamic State-held territory. The importance

of their messaging is clearly evidenced when the Washington Post reports that

“senior media operatives [of ISIS] are treated as ‘emirs’ of equal rank to their

military counterparts. They are directly involved in decisions on strategy and

territory. They preside over hundreds of videographers, producers and editors

who form a privileged, professional class with status, salaries and living

arrangements that are the envy of ordinary fighters.”16 The development of

counter-narratives is critical to defeating ISIS, and this book suggests some of

the ways in which this could be achieved.

In the Acknowledgments section, I name scores of people who have made

this book possible; I alone, however, am responsible for any errors in fact or

judgment.

xxxvi

1

INTRODUCTION

“Wars today cannot be won without media. Media aims at the heart rather than the

body, [and] if the heart is defeated, the battle is won.”

Alemarah or the Voice of Jihad (Taliban official website),

editor Abdul Satar Maiwandi1

“The Muslim community is a subtle world we don’t fully—and don’t always attempt

to—understand. Only through a shared appreciation of the people’s culture, needs,

and hopes for the future can we hope ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative. We

cannot capture hearts and minds. We must engage them; we must listen to them, one

heart and one mind at a time—over time.”

US Navy Admiral, Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20092

“When I took a decision or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every rele-

vant—and many an irrelevant—factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social

customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew

almost like my own side.”

T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)3

“The medium is the message.”

Marshal McLuhan4

Throughout the history of warfare, armed groups have organized, recruited,

and extended the duration of conflict by tapping into a myriad of socio-eco-

nomic grievances, ethno-cultural values, customs, and tropes to help unify

their ranks and cultivate powerful doctrines able to withstand opposing

1

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

efforts to break warrior morale and spirit. The conscious and sometimes sub-

conscious effort by armed groups to create and maintain this arsenal of cul-

tural ammunition, referred to here as “narratives,” plays an essential part in

combat, directly influencing the level of morale, esprit de corps, and honor

among warriors. The trend of implementing narratives to tap into reservoirs

of culture and manpower, especially among contemporary rural-based insur-

gencies as seen in Iraq, Syria, Burma, and Afghanistan, has largely been mis-

understood and under-analyzed.

The primary purpose of this book is to assess the information operations

and associated narratives and stories of Afghan insurgents: especially the

Taliban and to a lesser extent Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG),

two distinct Afghan insurgent/jihadist organizations.5 A secondary, but more

implicit research goal is to suggest why the Taliban have been so much more

efficient and effective in presenting messages that resonate with the Afghan

population than have the United States, the Afghan government, and their

al ies. Chapter 10 explicitly assesses the information and PSYOP campaigns

of the United States and compares them to those conducted by the Taliban.

Franz Boas, an early-twentieth-century German cultural anthropologist,

suggested that culture, which is intimately related to a society’s narratives, is

“the system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviours, and artifacts that the

members of society use to cope with their world and with one another, and

that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.”6 This

definition highlights several important concepts that will be central to the

assessment of the stories and narratives of the Taliban:7 first, culture is the

shared belief of a self-identified group of people, such as the Taliban; second,

culture has a psychological component as well as material manifestations

(such as produced artifacts); and third, culture is essentially adaptive and is

transmitted through certain processes to others. This operationalization of

culture suggests the importance of artifacts as instruments used to transmit

Taliban worldviews, or to borrow David Edwards’ terminology: the underly-

ing structure of the Taliban’s8 “moral systems” as portrayed by narratives.9

A narrative often represents a kind, or series, of “story(ies)” and reflects

foundational beliefs that articulate a group’s views toward the world. As

Turner notes, a “[s]tory is a basic principle of mind. Most of our experience,

our knowledge, and our thinking are organized as stories.”10 This is true for

peaceful citizens as well as violent insurgents and jihadists. There is ample

evidence that such artifacts have an effect on our capacity to recall events, to

motivate our action, to modulate our emotional reactions to events, to cue

certain heuristics and biases, to structure our problem-solving capabilities, and

2

INTRODUCTION

ultimately to influence our very identity: the underlying structure of the

Taliban’s “moral systems” referred to above, as portrayed by narratives.11

Stories are the “frames” of the narrative or moral systems of a culture or

group of people. As well as Turner’s insights,12 there is further abundant litera-

ture on this concept.13 The framing of stories associated with narratives has a

critical importance as to how Taliban messages resonate to greater or lesser

degrees with target audiences.14

To help us understand the gravity of enemy narratives, messages, strategies,

and their methods of implementation, this book will present research and

analysis on the narratives developed and utilized by Afghan insurgent groups.

Throughout the analyses presented, we will attempt to reveal the explicit

“story” of the Afghan insurgent information operation artifacts. To do so, I

spent many years gathering a plethora of insurgent propaganda material,

including statements, shabnamah (night letters), websites, publications,

DVDs and video segments, insurgent “symbols,” and audio files such as insur-

gent-inspired music and poetry of the Taliban and, to a lesser degree, HIG. In

areas where appropriate, examples of other conflict narratives and stories will

be used to help provide insight into the powerful use of genres like mythology,

lure, music, legends, and poetry in a conflict environment. Efforts have been

made to research, analyze, and recommend particular cultural legends and

myths within an Afghan-centric framework.15

It is important to understand how insurgents in Afghanistan identify them-

selves, putting aside the obvious limitations of studying their self-produced

information materials; it is useful to observe how insurgents attempt to bol-

ster their legitimacy and promote recruitment efforts and community influ-

ence. Uncovering how groups such as the Taliban, a decentralized, primarily

but not exclusively Pashtun, organization whose roots originate in the south-

ern province of Kandahar, recruit and promote themselves becomes critical,

especially as insurgent groups begin to expand and operate in non-traditional

battlefields across Afghanistan.16 Equally important is how such groups can

garner support for activities such as IED-emplacement and explosive acquisi-

tion through similar messaging campaigns.17

An important goal of this book18 is the assessment of narratives, stories,

and associated strategies that the Afghan Taliban have employed to garner

support from the Afghan people. To uncover how Afghan insurgent groups

tap this wellspring of influence, the research presented here will assess how

the Taliban have framed (or “reframed”) their ideology post-2001 and what

this means for their movement, its organizational structure, and its strategic

3

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

imperatives. This has allowed for further investigation into the Taliban’s mes-

sage campaign and discovering the power of the stories repeated by them.

This research basically seeks to understand what makes Taliban narratives, as

well as their stories, resonate with their target audience: the Afghan, espe-

cially rural Pashtun, population.

The research presented here also has direct policy relevance to ongoing

conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and other conflict regions, by providing a fresh lens for

analyzing and ultimately countering insurgent/jihadist narratives. By shedding

light on Taliban rhetorical techniques, the research implicitly provides a “style

guide” of sorts for constructing counter-narratives that should “connect” with

target audiences. In assessing Taliban narratives, this research will attempt to

answer several broad questions, including:

1. Do Taliban narratives and stories provide an insight into the conceptual

metaphors and other rhetorical techniques that are common in

Afghanistan?

2. Does an analysis of Taliban narratives reveal some of the major contours of

the Afghan/Taliban (Pashtun) worldview?

Narratives and stories: some theoretical considerations

It is apt to begin this book on Afghan narratives by addressing the basic ques-

tion of what makes a good narrative. Due to the importance of stories to a

group’s narrative, it is important to understand what makes a good story. Who

better to answer this question than accomplished practitioners of the art of

storytelling? Fortunately, many successful writers have recorded their

thoughts on this matter. Anthony Trollope, the nineteenth-century British

novelist whose autobiography was published posthumously in 1883, argues

that “stories charm us, not simply because they are tragic, but because we feel

that men and women with flesh and blood, creatures with whom we can sym-

pathize, are struggling amidst their woes.”19 Stephen King strikes a similar

chord in his book On Writing:

Book-buyers … want a good story to take with them on the airplane, something that

will first fascinate them, then pull them in and keep them turning the pages. This

happens, I think, when readers recognize the people in a book, their behaviors,

their surroundings, and their talk. When the reader hears strong echoes of his or

her own life and beliefs, he or she is apt to become more invested in the story.20

Catherine Ann Jones, a successful playwright and screenwriter,21 offers the

following observation: “Stories written by formulas rarely move us, and con-

4

INTRODUCTION

sequently fail. They are too generic, not about specific people. This is why true

stories are so popular. Knowing the story is true, that it really happened to

someone, means it could happen to you.”22

Annette Simmons, who specializes in group dynamics in the workplace, has

written a number of books that focus on the goals and proficiencies of inter-

personal communications. In her book The Story Factor 23 she persuasively

argues how stories demonstrate authenticity, build emotional connections,

inspire perseverance, and stimulate the imagination. Nestled in the middle of

this book is an absolute gem of a chapter called “The Psychology of Story’s

Influence.” In this chapter Simmons articulates what she calls “the physics of

story.” She argues that stories are particularly powerful tools of persuasion

because they allow you to “tap into your listener’s momentum.” It is a strategy

of pul ing instead of pushing; a push strategy “creates another push back.” (In

other words, it creates resistance.) The goal is to get your audience pul ing with

you, to create a win–win situation: “Most methods of influence introduce a

power struggle where one—influencer or influence—‘wins’ and the other

‘loses.’ Story has a quality of graciousness that bypasses power struggles.”

A common thread that emerges from the writings of these accomplished

storytellers is this: stories will connect if they are about seemingly real people,

convincing characters with whom the reader can identify. The Taliban, how-

ever, are not writing novels or screenplays; it would be more apt to say that

they are producing propaganda and influence documents. According to Garth

Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, “Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic

attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to

achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”24 In

their book Propaganda and Persuasion, Jowett and O’Donnell propose a “ten-

step plan of propaganda analysis [that] includes”:25

1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign.

2. The context in which the propaganda occurs.

3. Identification of the propagandist.

4. The structure of the propaganda organization.

5. The target audience.

6. Media utilization techniques.

7. Special techniques used to maximize effect.

8. Audience reaction to various techniques.

9. Counterpropaganda (if present).

10. Effects and evaluation.

5

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Many of these variables will be used in our analysis of Taliban narratives

and stories.

Some Taliban messaging artifacts, especially night letters, contain historical

narratives designed to be read aloud to Afghans who cannot read themselves.26

Therefore, it makes sense to view them, in part, as speeches. In the introduc-

tion to his anthology Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History, former

White House speechwriter William Safire offers “ten steps to a great speech”:

welcome, structure, pulse, occasion/forum, focus, purpose, phrase, quotation,

theme, and delivery. The third step, pulse, is worth further mention.

According to Safire, “A good speech has a beat, a changing rhythm, a sense of

movement that gets the audience tapping its mind’s foot… If there is one tech-

nique that orators down the ages have agreed to use, it’s anaphora, the

repeated beginning.”27 This raises the possibility of analyzing the Taliban

propaganda—night letters, statements, poems, music—with an eye to catalog-

ing the various rhetorical devices employed. In this vein, this book will exam-

ine Taliban poems, songs/chants, and other types of media.

One common rhetorical device is the use of metaphor. Colorful meta-

phors are often used to embellish the written and spoken word. George

Lakoff and Mark Turner have written extensively about the role of meta-

phor in human cognitive processes. In their classic study entitled Metaphors

We Live By, they assert: “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of

which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.”28

Lakoff and Johnson introduce the useful concept of the “conceptual meta-

phor,” one example being “argument is war.” In other words, the language

we typically use when discussing argumentation is the language we use

when discussing war. Other cultures might have a different conceptual

metaphor for argument:

Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen

as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing

way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them

differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently… Perhaps the

most neutral way of describing this difference between their culture and ours would

be to say that we have a discourse from structured in terms of battle and they have

one structured in terms of dance.29

Understanding the conceptual metaphors used by the Taliban and other

insurgent and jihadist groups can provide a window into their worldview and

can also facilitate replication of their common patterns of thought and dis-

course in a counter-narrative strategy.

6

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle’s

Rhetoric is a logical place to turn for further information about

rhetorical techniques. William Casebeer (citing an unpublished research

paper by Thomas Coakley) makes use of concepts from this classic text:

Ethos: these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience to establish credibility.

Essentially, ethos is what a speaker uses—implicitly or explicitly—to ensure that the

audience can trust him or her. An example in advertising is an athlete endorsing an

athletic product. In war, examples include a history of adherence to law of armed

conflict (LOAC) and an assertiveness of willpower.

Pathos: these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience’s emotions. An example

of this would be an advertisement for tires that emphasizes safety by portraying an

infant cradled within the circle of the tire. In war, pathos might be displayed by

showing the “average” guy on the adversary’s side that the US position is better.

Logos: these are appeals to facts. More doctors recommend toothpaste X than any

other brand. In war, there is no greater logic than firepower, but as insurgencies

demonstrated throughout the 20th Century, firepower (logos) alone will not win

wars, and will win very few arguments.30

Casebeer posits seven “narrative strategic principles” as a starting point for

narrative analysis. Aristotle is at the heart of the third principle:

Considerations of ethos, logos and pathos are simplistic. But they are better than

not bothering to evaluate the storyline at all. Relative to a target population, an

“E/L/P analysis” can provide a baseline for predicting and controlling narrative

flow over the course of a conflict.31

Patrick Hogan’s book on The Mind and its Stories presents four

hypotheses:

1. “Emotive terms are prototype-based in both eliciting conditions and

expressive/actional consequences.”32

2. “Prototypical narratives—including literary narratives—are generated

largely from prototypes, prominently including the prototype eliciting

conditions for emotions.”33

3. “Romantic union and social or political power (including material prosper-

ity) are the two predominant prototypes for eliciting conditions of

happiness.”34

4. “Cross-culturally, there are two prominent structures of literary narrative,

romantic and heroic tragi-comedy, derived respectively from the personal

and social prototypes for happiness.”35

In the seventh chapter of The Mind and its Stories, “The Structure of Stories:

Some General Principles of Plot,” Hogan argues that plots are typically “telic”

7

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

in nature. That is, they “involve a person and a goal.”36 They also have a “causal

sequence connecting the agent’s various actions with the achievement or non-

achievement of the goal.”37

Donald Polkinghorne provides a complementary perspective. In Narrative

Knowing and the Human Sciences, Polkinghorne’s central argument is “that

narrative is a scheme by means of which human beings give meaning to their

experience of temporality and personal actions.”38 Polkinghorne suggests:

Narrative meaning functions to give form to the understanding of a purpose to life

and to join everyday actions and events into episodic units. It provides a framework

for understanding the past events of one’s life and for planning future actions. It is the

primary scheme by means of which human existence is rendered meaningful.39

Narrative and audiences

Ruston defines a “narrative” as:

a system of stories that hang together and provide a coherent view of the world.

People use narratives to understand how their world works. Narratives contain

patterns that fit the data of everyday life (events, people, actions, sequences of

actions, messages, and so on), explaining how events unfold over time and how one

thing causes another.40

It is important to distinguish the terms “narrative” and “messaging.” Simply

put, “narratives” are a system of cognitive standards within which “messages”

are interpreted. For example, American IO Afghan messages make perfect

sense to Americans because they are framed within an American narrative that

reflects American values. In order to message an Afghan audience effectively,

however, messages must be crafted in a way that resonates with Afghans’ own

narratives and stories. This requires an intimate knowledge of the target cul-

ture and norms. The Taliban had and have an inherent advantage over the US

and its allies, because they craft messages on their “home turf ” and with

Afghan narratives.

Corman et al. identify two messaging models that were relevant to the

information campaign in Afghanistan. From the time of the Cold War, the

United States has utilized what is known as the “message influence” model. In

this model, one “mind” attempts to influence another “mind” using a series of

messages. The goal of the “transmitting mind” is to make the “receiving mind”

understand the information in the same way as the originator. Failure of the

“receiver” to interpret the message correctly is attributed to noise sources that

cause distortion in the message transmission.41

8

INTRODUCTION

An important implication of the message influence approach to communi-

cating is that noise can generally be overcome by either minimizing noise or

by repetition of the message until it is perceived “correctly.” A major problem

with this model is that “meaning cannot simply be transferred, like a letter

mailed from point A to point B.”42

This notion about message repetition is especially apt for the Taliban infor-

mation campaign. Throughout the chapters that follow, the reader will find

many narratives and stories presented time and time again. The reason for this

repetition bordering at times on monotony is because the Taliban are consist-

ently playing on tropes that most Afghans, but not all Afghans, readily accept;

moreover, they represent mechanisms that correlate with Polkinghorne’s

central argument that stories and narratives represent an attempt to give

meaning and relevance to an Afghan’s life and actions. Stories are always inter-

preted within a persistent structure of norms and beliefs (narratives) that will

affect the ways that stories and messages are interpreted.

There is an abundance of research that suggests that messages and stories

are much more effective when repeated:

Psychological studies have suggested that repetition can have a positive effect on

someone’s reception of and agreement with a persuasive argument. J. T. Cachiappo

and Richard Petty43 were two pioneers in this field in the late 1970s and 1980s.

They concluded that low to moderate levels of repetition within a message tend to

create greater agreement with the message, along with greater recal .44

Corman et al.’s second model is known as the “pragmatic complexity

model.” Rather than focusing on messaging and repetition, this model seeks

to alter the fundamental structure of interpretation (the “narrative”) among

the receivers. In this model, fewer messages are preferred, and actions that

undermine the existing narrative are more important. Rather than repetition,

messages should vary on a central strategic theme and exploit the nuances and

cultural opportunities in the target audience.

Information Operations (IO) and PSYOP

This book focuses on the Information Operations (IO) and PSYOP of both

sides in the conflict: both the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents, as well

as the US. Hence, it is useful to introduce a few salient points about IO

and PSYOP.

The critical challenge for IO and PSYOP programs is to persuade a target

audience to engage in a particular behavior that may or may not be culturally

9

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

normative. IO and PSYOP often use persuasion during situations where

“behavior has been modified by symbolic transactions (messages) that are

sometimes, but not always linked with coercive force (indirectly coercive) and

that appeal to the reason and emotions of the person(s) being persuaded.”45

Persuasion attempts to win the “hearts and mind,” or as we prefer the “trust

and confidence,” of the target audience. These programs frequently rely on the

power of verbal and non-verbal symbols and depend heavily on the credibility

of threats and promises made by the communicator.46 When individuals are

induced to abandon one set of behaviors and to adopt another, it can be said

they were successfully (or unsuccessfully) persuaded.47 This is the definitive

goal of IO and PSYOP.

H.

C. Kelman wrote an important article on persuasion which describes

the concept of means control as a situation where the persuader is successful

because of his or her ability to dispense rewards or punishments.48 Persuasion

pivots on the relative impact of messages. It relies on symbolic transactions

between message sender and receiver.

Within the non-verbal realm, there is often room for disagreement as to

whether a persuasive act was symbolic.49 This fact can be exacerbated within

an IO or PSYOP campaign that is conducted among a population with

extremely low literacy rates and whose non-verbal behavior may differ from

that of the communicator; and this is the predominant situation in

Afghanistan. Language is a critical part of a persuasive transaction, with non-

verbal behavior serving to reinforce or give credence to the verbal messages.50

There are subtle nuances buried within the linguistics of every culture that can

work to a persuader’s advantage if he can master the inflective architecture of

a foreign tongue. As we shall see in Chapter 10, this was a significant challenge

for US efforts in Afghanistan.

Coercive persuasion was a term coined by Edgar Schein after his study of

Chinese POW indoctrination. He defined coercive persuasion as “producing

ideological and behavioral changes in a fully conscious, mentally intact indi-

vidual.”51 Another definition of coercive persuasion is offered by Martyn

Carruthers: “Coercive persuasion attempts to force people to change beliefs,

ideas, attitudes or behaviors using psychological pressure, undue influence,

threats, anxiety, intimidation and/or under stress. It is often called mind con-

trol and brainwashing.”52 Although most instances of persuasion in IO and

PSYOP are not intended to be coercive, nevertheless incorrect or irresponsi-

ble messaging techniques can result in coercive communication and intimi-

date or create fear in the receiver.

10

INTRODUCTION

IO and PSYOP persuasion efforts often revolve around response-shaping

and changing processes. The concept of attitude becomes an intervening vari-

able in the persuasion equation and is often confused with behavior. Attitude

is just one factor of the behavior equation. There are two other fundamental

variables that are often overlooked or marginalized: the concepts of values and

belief. The trifecta of attitude, values, and belief are inseparable, and a change

to one element will affect another and have some impact on behavioral out-

comes.53 Attitudes are often unstable and fluid; they can change simply during

the process of thinking.54 Attitudes affect persuasion in four major ways: the

orienting of attention to a message; how extensively a message is processed;

whether the message is processed in a biased manner; and the resulting behav-

ior (which can be either deliberative or spontaneous).55 For example, people

are more likely to give their attention to something to which they already have

an accessible attitude, and so ultimately influence behavior around that

object.56

Another important concept in IO and PSYOP is “perception manage-

ment,” which includes all actions used to influence attitudes and objective

reasoning in foreign audiences. Perception management is also a significant

aspect of public diplomacy, PSYOP, Public Information, Deception and

Covert Action.57

There are four overarching PSYOP objectives of the US in Afghanistan: to

isolate the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents from domestic and interna-

tional support; to reduce the effectiveness of the Taliban and others’ forces; to

deter escalation by Taliban leadership; and to minimize col ateral damage and

interference with US operations.58 In order to obtain these goals, PSYOP

must influence behavior. Messages can be aimed at neutral or friendly parties

or adversaries, but in all instances IO and PSYOP should project strategic

influence.59 Hence IO and PSYOP attempt to leverage influence to reinforce,

reinterpret, or shape foreign perceptions of the US’s character and actions.60

This intent to influence and shape perceptions is very difficult, and for the

most part has been only modestly effective for the US, as we shall see below.61

The Taliban, on the other hand, have been very effective.

Propaganda obviously plays a large role in IO and PSYOP. Propaganda is

a specific type of message aimed directly at influencing opinions of people

rather than impartially providing information. The word “propaganda” is

translated from Latin to mean “things which must be disseminated.” The

concept of propaganda has acquired a negative connotation referring to false

or misleading information. It does not necessarily need to be the case, but

11

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

incomplete, poorly reasoned or unbalanced perspectives can have negative

impacts on the message purveyor. The volume of information also contrib-

utes to the reputation of propaganda that usually contains a political mes-

sage; a propagandist wants the message heard in as many places as possible

and as often as possible in order to drown out alternative ideas or reinforce

an idea through repetition.

Communications and media literature

To be effective, media like IO and PSYOP must present cohesive messages. In

order to be “effective,” the media must use proper language that resonates with

its target audience. As suggested above with IO and PSYOP, to be effectual

media must frame narratives with “stories.”62 Readers who perceive a media

story to have a positive slant will usually assume a positive disposition toward

that issue. The same applies to stories with a negative slant: readers will adopt

a negative disposition and assume that the rest of the public has a negative

disposition toward that topic).63

Petty, Priester, and Brinol present an instructive “Elaboration Likelihood

Model of Persuasion,” which argues how media can ignite attitude change.64

Their main premise is that “it is not the amount or direction of the informa-

tion per se that produces persuasion, but rather, people’s idiosyncratic reac-

tions to this information.”65 As we shall see below, this corresponds closely to

the Taliban IO strategy, when they exploited premises of Afghan narratives

such as Pashtunwali, and the typical Afghan’s view of a proud history of repel-

ling invaders as an integrated tactic to help define many Afghans’ perceptions

of their environs. Hence, an effective message needs to alter people’s “psycho-

logical barriers”66 to the information, rather than merely increasing the

amount of exposure to the content. Through cognitive dissonance, people are

naturally inclined to warp new, incoming information in a way that suits their

previous disposition. Thus, there is a need to prevent cognitive dissonance

from occurring, so that people will not be inclined to warp the message which

the source is sending. The media or any message purveyor, such as the Taliban,

needs to “reinforce a people’s already existing attitudes rather than producing

new ones.”67

Petty, Priester, and Brinol suggest that there are five independent variables

(or “inputs to the persuasion process”) that the media can control:

•  Source

•  Message (can appeal to logos or pathos)

12

INTRODUCTION

•  Recipient (can be of any level of intellectual prowess, regardless of their cul-

tural or ideological background)

•  Channel

•  Context (where the message is presented).68

Many of these same variables will be used to assess the effectiveness of

Taliban as well as US IO and PSYOP.

A central argument of the media persuasion literature is that after there has

been an attitude change, for a behavioral change to occur the subject must pull

this newly consolidated information from memory and act on it. But for this

behavior to stick (i.e. for it to be repeated), there cannot be any negative reac-

tions or negative environmental factors presented post-behavioral action;

there must be positive reinforcement for the new attitude and behavioral

change to persist into future situations. These points seem very relevant to the

Taliban messaging campaign, in part because rural Afghanistan is a “memory-

based” society.

Conclusion

The research presented in this book conceives of an insurgency and counter-

insurgency as primarily an information war supported by military kinetics or

actions. It will be argued that the warring side with the best resonating story

or narrative has a tremendous “leg up” on its opponent and will probably win

or at least stalemate the conflict. A stalemate for an insurgent, according to

Mao, is basically a victory.69 The purpose of this chapter was to present a series

of theoretical considerations especially relevant to what makes a “good” story

and narrative. These theoretical considerations will be used both implicitly

and explicitly to assess the inherent values of Taliban information messaging

and operations. In so doing, this book will examine a wide variety of Taliban

information strategies and actual artifacts. Most of these artifacts, the focus of

the following chapters, effectively use historical narratives, symbology, and

iconic portraits. They are often engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, des-

peration, hope, and complaints to mobilize and convince the Afghan popula-

tion of the Taliban’s worldview. These narratives and stories represent

culturally relevant and simple messages that are communicated in a narrative

and often poetic form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people.

This style is virtually impossible for the US and NATO to counter, because of

Western sensitivities concerning religious themes that dominate the Taliban

narrative space, not to mention the lack of Western linguistic capabilities,

13

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

including understanding and mastering the poetic nature of local dialects.

Nevertheless, there are some general lessons that should have been considered

by the West. The US and ISAF should have carefully studied Taliban propa-

ganda and attempted to learn from the Taliban’s information operation strate-

gies. Quite simply, the Taliban clearly know what resonates with the Afghan

population, and the narratives and stories presented below will clearly reflect

this. They understand relevant cultural referents and themes, and of course

local traditions. We quite simply do not.

14

2

AN OVERVIEW OF TALIBAN AND OTHER

AFGHAN INSURGENT STORIES AND AN

ASSESSMENT OF THEIR MASTER NARRATIVES

Introduction

David Kilcullen’s book The Accidental Guerrilla argues that “the insurgents in

Afghanistan treated propaganda as their main effort in 2005–2006.”1 He char-

acterizes the Taliban’s propaganda as a classic armed propaganda, which basi-

cally utilizes intimidation as a behavioral control mechanism. The coalition

failed to recognize that this armed propaganda was in fact an Information

Operation (IO), and not merely “a supporting activity.”2 A major flaw in

Western assessments of the Taliban’s communications ability is to draw the

conclusion that the group’s IO campaign is poor or ineffective: Foxley, for exam-

ple, argues that although the Taliban have “developed to embrace modern tech-

nology [its] methods remain crude home-grown”3 and therefore ineffective.

However, one could, and we believe should, argue the contrary. The

Taliban’s IO is effective because it is indigenous and relies on traditional tools

like shabnamah (night letters), taranas (chants), poems, and a variety of other

culturally effective artifacts. After al , an insurgency is the product of its own

culture, with the Taliban being very much part of the Afghan, and especially

Pashtun, culture. Kilcullen writes that shabnamah are a good example of the

Taliban’s armed propaganda: they use them to threaten people who do not

comply with its rules and it makes “examples of people who do not cooperate:

dozens of provincial level officials were killed between 2005 and 2006 as an

15

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

armed propaganda tool”4 after receiving such letters. With shabnamah, the

Taliban were thus able to send the message that it could reach anybody at any

time. This book will argue that the Taliban’s IO campaign is even more effec-

tive, in part because it uses tools that are deeply rooted in the Pashtun culture;

thereby it ensures that people will understand the extent of the Taliban’s mes-

sage and take it seriously.

Afghan insurgent groups enhanced and modified their propaganda cam-

paign after 2005 by using a variety of delivery mechanisms. These modes of

delivering their messages to target Afghan audiences now extended signifi-

cantly beyond the rather simplistic, traditional Afghan systems such as shab-

namah. Groups like the Afghan Taliban regularly exploit digital technologies

such as the internet and telecommunications to convey their messages; but

more importantly, the Taliban have consolidated and streamlined their stra-

tegic communication effort by focusing on Islamic, cultural, and nationalistic

themes to solidify the movement’s master narrative.

The Afghan Taliban utilize a wide range of message dissemination tech-

niques and platforms, including printed materials, pirate radio broadcasts,

official spokesmen, text messaging, their official website, independent but

associated websites in Pashto and Dari languages, social networking sites such

as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter; as well as conventional means such as

shabnamah, graffiti, propaganda videos, using preachers ( da’is) to infiltrate

areas and call for jihad, khutba (Friday sermons), poetry, taranas (poetic

chants), and presence patrols and pattak (ad hoc security checkpoints). The

Taliban even briefly entertained creating an app in April 2016, “Pashto

Afghan News— Alemarah AMK,” a portal into the group’s Pashto webpage,

but it was removed and banned from the Google Play app store within 48

hours of its appearance.5

The Taliban’s messaging campaign and its related stories remain relatively

simple in the sense that they reinforce easy-to-understand grievances, promote

anti-Western sentiments, delegitimize the Afghan government, and attempt

to sow fear among the local neutral/undecided population, as well as govern-

ment supporters, by threats of violence and intimidation. The Taliban mirror

a variety of messages that are typical of contemporary Afghan and/or Islamic

narratives, but also use a toolkit of messages unique to the Taliban movement,

separating their voice from the litany of insurgent and criminal syndicates

operating in Afghanistan.

The Taliban identify themselves as the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

(IEA),” and view themselves as both protectors of Islam, righteous and uncor-

16

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

rupt, the suitable alternative to the current Afghan regime, and the only legiti-

mate authority able to implement social justice through the implementation

of Shar’iah law. Islam, and a Muslim’s duty to protect it, is one of the central

themes the Taliban use to influence people and gain recruits; it is a powerful

motivator among rural Afghans. The Taliban have been able to use Islamic

rhetoric effectively to help legitimize their actions, and to help fuel Afghan

anger against the foreign forces. Domestically disseminated Taliban messaging

varies in the sense that it is often tailored to address local grievances (village/

district level) and needs.

Background

Afghan insurgent groups have quickly broadened their ability to disseminate

propaganda to the Afghan population and foreign audiences by using the

internet effectively and by exploiting the increasing availability of digital tel-

ecommunications networks.6 However, the Taliban continue to use tried and

trusted means as well: including low-cost and low-tech delivery systems such

as Taliban mul ah preachers ( da’is) to infiltrate local areas and call for jihad,

khutba (Friday sermons), and official spokesmen able to be reached 24/7 by

local and international media outlets. Slickly produced DVDs showing inter-

views with Taliban commanders, battle footage, and misdeeds carried out by

foreign forces and the Afghan government are widely available for sale in

Afghanistan’s urban cities and bazaars.

While recognizing that the means by which the Taliban distribute their

messages is important and a focus of this chapter, the central objective is to

make a specific assessment of the Afghan Taliban master narratives and what

themes and stories the Taliban have used to support these narratives. As sug-

gested above, narratives serve as a means for societal or group members to

interpret and understand their contextual environment. Narratives employ

“frames” or stories that represent sub-stories within the larger narrative con-

text. Frames in the form of stories then set the stage for the larger narrative

message. In other words, frames act primarily as a mechanism for consistent

expression and integration of other stories.

It is important to understand how the Taliban in Afghanistan uniquely

identify themselves, putting aside the obvious limitations of studying their

self-produced information materials; it is equally useful to observe how insur-

gents attempt to bolster their legitimacy and promote recruitment efforts.

It is critical to understand how groups such as the Taliban recruit and pro-

mote themselves, especially as insurgent groups begin to expand and operate

17

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

in non-traditional battlefields across Afghanistan.7 The Taliban are primarily

a decentralized militant and political organization, whose roots originate in

the southern provinces of Loy Kandahar; the contemporary Taliban move-

ment is an umbrella organization of various militant networks, marginalized

tribes and clans, criminal gangs, some of whom pledge allegiance to the core

element of the former Taliban government, originally to the late Mullah

Mohammad Omar and the so-called Quetta Shura. The years 2015–16 saw

an explicit fragmentation of the Taliban after Mul ah Akhtar Mansour pub-

lished in late August 2015 that Omar had died in April 2013.8 The death of

Mul ah Omar opened up new tribal and leadership rivalries within the leader-

ship ranks of the Taliban. The killing of Mul ah Mansour on 21 May 2016 by

a US drone strike in Baluchistan, Pakistan and the selection of Mullah

Haibatul ah Akhundzada as the new supreme leader, or emir, of the Afghan

Taliban will probably heighten Taliban rivalries. Moreover, the role of the ISI

within the Taliban ranks, and how many Taliban view this, will be significant

to the future maneuverings of the Afghan Taliban. The ISI played a central

role in the selection of Mansour9 and also surely played a critical role in the

selection of Haibatul ah. How this will impact on Taliban rivalries and fac-

tionalism is yet to be determined.

It is interesting that the Taliban named their 2016 summer offensive

operations in Afghanistan after their founder and first supreme leader of the

group, Mullah Omar; and the Taliban’s announcement clearly serves as an

information operation statement. As we shall see, the Taliban will use nearly

any occasion to spread their narrative and story. Below is the actual

announcement of their 2016 Spring/Summer military operations. Note in

the Taliban declaration assertions of the “obligation” to fight jihad, the “valor

and bravado” of the Taliban, apostate Kabul leaders (“internal servants”), past

Afghan military victories against foreign invaders, as well as instructions to

Afghan villagers. These are topics and themes often found in Taliban narra-

tives, as we shall see in the following sections and chapters of this book:

[Translation]

“O Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them.

And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination.” 66:9

The Islamic Emirate’s armed jihad against the American invasion has completed

fourteen years and is now in its fifteenth year. Jihad against the aggressive and

usurping infidel army is a holy obligation upon our necks and our only recourse for

re-establishing an Islamic system and regaining our independence.

18

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

With the advent of spring it is again time for us to renew our jihadi determination

and operations. Hence the Islamic Emirate’s leadership eagerly announces this

year’s Jihadi Operation in honor of the movement’s founder and first leader, the late

Amir ul Mu’mineen Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid ( May Allah have mercy

upon him).

Under the leadership of the late Amir ul Mu’mineen Mullah Muhammad Omar

Mujahid ( May Allah have mercy upon him), Mujahidin pacified 95 per cent of our

nation’s territory from wickedness, corruption and oppression, and vanquished the

maligned and wicked. Then following the invasion, through holy jihad, they

defeated the vast multinational coalition arrayed against them, forcing their retreat

and inter alia filling the annals of Islamic history with deeds of valor and bravado.

So we pray to Al ah Almighty that through the deceased’s blessed name, Operation

Omari, He Almighty will consecrate this Operation with strategic victories and

cleanse our beloved country from the presence of the remaining foreign invaders

and their malignant and corrupt rebel servants.

Operation Omari began across Afghanistan at 5 am today (local time) on the 5th of

Rajab ul Murajab 1437 (Lunar Hijri) which corresponds to 24th of Haml 1395

(Solar Hijri) and 12 April 2016 (Gregorian). The fact that the 5th of Rajab ul

Murajab year 15 (Hijri Lunar) was the day on which—under the leadership of

Khalif Omar al Farooq—the Muslim armies fought and annihilated the vast infidel

Byzantine army in the Battle of Yarmouk, so we pray to Al ah Almighty that He

bless our Operation Omari in a similar fashion and ordain it with great Islamic

victories on the battlefield and the unconditional defeat and withdrawal of the

foreign invaders and their internal servants.

Operation Omari—which was initiated and planned by the Islamic Emirate’s lead-

ership, the leaders of the Military Commission as well as the Emirate’s military

planners—focuses, with hope of divine assistance, on clearing the remaining areas

from enemy control and presence. Similarly the Operation will employ large-scale

attacks on enemy positions across the country, martyrdom-seeking and tactical

attacks against enemy strongholds, and assassination of enemy commanders in

urban centers. The present Operation will also employ all means at our disposal to

bog the enemy down in a war of attrition that lowers the morale of the foreign

invaders and their internal armed militias.

By employing such a multifaceted strategy it is hoped that the foreign enemy will

be demoralized and forced to retreat from our nation. In areas under the control of

Mujahidin, mechanisms for good governance will be established so that our people

can live a life of security and normalcy.

Simultaneously with the present Operation the scholars, elders, and leaders of the

Islamic Emirate will open a dialogue with our countrymen in the enemy ranks to

give up their opposition to the establishment of an Islamic government and join the

ranks of the Mujahidin so as to safeguard them from the shame and failure of this

World and the Hereafter. During the planning of this Operation, the Mujahidin

have been unequivocally instructed to implement their operations in such a manner

that takes pains to protect civilians and civil infrastructure.

19

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

During the span of Operation Omari, in areas including villages and cities where the

Islamic Emirate has established its rule, the lives and property of the dwellers will be

safeguarded, as is its duty. Therefore we call upon the dwellers of these areas, be they

the professional classes or businessmen, not to fall prey to enemy propaganda and not

to feel threatened by the Mujahidin. As it is our duty to protect and assist the wronged

and helpless, so we will pay particular attention to the freedom of prisoners.

The Islamic Emirate calls upon all the people of Afghanistan and the Mujahidin,

that in similar vein to last year’s successful Operation Azm, they should fully and

in high spirits participate in this year’s operations as well so that with the help and

mercy of Al ah Almighty this present Jihadi Operation serves as the killing blow to

the invading foreign forces and their al ies and thus our nation is freed from the

present invasion.

And nothing is hard for the Almighty Al ah.

Leadership Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

5th Rajab ul Murajab 1437 Lunar Hijri

24th Haml 1395 Solar Hijri

12 April 2016 Gregorian10

The story portrayed in this announcement is:11

The Taliban are about to commence a great, new operation named

Operation Omari after their late and great supreme leader and Amir ul

Mu’mineen, Mul ah Mohammed Omar. The only way that Afghans can

keep the invading infidels, most of whom they have already defeated,

and apostate Afghan Government from destroying Islam and the

Afghans’ way of life is to join the jihad. Joining the jihad is an obligation

of all Afghans. This year will see the Mujahidin fight with divine assis-

tance like the most powerful, pious, and influential Muslim caliphs in

history. The Taliban will not only defeat their enemies, they will also

bring honest and uncorrupted government to Afghanistan, reinstitute

Shar’iah law as well as avoiding the harming of civilians or the destruc-

tion of Afghan infrastructure. The Taliban plan to attack infidel and

apostate leaders in urban areas by assassination and other means and

bog down the enemy troops in the rural areas of the country. Over the

course of the struggle, sanctified by Al ah, Afghans presently fighting

with the infidels and apostates and their leaders will join rank with the

Mujahidin. The Taliban’s supreme goal is to protect and defend the

Afghan people and repel the invaders from Afghanistan.

20

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

For years, the difficulty in managing an umbrella front consisting of many

sub-groups has challenged senior Taliban leadership—many of whom reside

in nearby external sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas—and it is most evident

in the reissuing of Taliban created field manuals, or Layeha. While the Taliban

are said to consist of a litany of various committees, commissions, and shuras,

the Taliban in effect consist of a few overall governing committees broken

down along political, military, and religious responsibilities; while provincial

and district level organizations are broken down loosely along military, politi-

cal, and legal lines of operation.

Equally important is how such groups can garner support for activities such

as IED-emplacement and explosive acquisition through similar messaging

campaigns.12 The Taliban tailor their messages to a variety of important actors,

segments of society, and even the international community. An overview of

these audiences and the Taliban’s adjustment in communicating with each

supplements the overall analysis presented which defines what the Taliban are

saying, how well they are saying it, to whom, and through which means they

are communicating.

Key elements of the master narrative: What the Taliban are really saying

The Afghan Taliban movement continues to view itself as a viable alternative

to the current Afghan government structure, and refer to themselves as the

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA): a strategic interpretation that we sus-

pect is meant to invoke a level of authority and legitimacy among its followers.

Although it is clear that the IEA’s strategic objectives are to evict foreign

troops by force from Afghanistan, overthrow the US-supported Kabul gov-

ernment, restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and implement Shar’iah

law, the Taliban thereby utilize a strategic communication toolkit designed to

delegitimize the current government and garner local support for the short-

comings and perceived failures of US and NATO policies in Afghanistan.

These overarching themes include:

•  Taliban victory in cosmic conflict is inevitable;

•  Islam cannot be defeated;

•  Taliban are “national heroes” and willing to sacrifice all for Al ah and country;

•  Afghans have a long and honorable history of defeating invading foreign

infidels;

•  Foreign invaders as well as their Afghan puppets are attempting to destroy

Afghan religion and traditions;

21

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  All Afghans have an obligation to join the jihad against the foreigners and

apostates.

In the broadest sense, the Taliban target three distinct social identities

which most Afghans share: religious (Islamic), cultural, and political. These

three social identifiers are defined further through various dispositions (see

Figure 2.1) and each identity is targeted by a variety yet finite number of

themes to inform/educate, convince, persuade, and/or coerce the Afghan

population into supporting the Taliban movement by disengaging from the

Afghan government structure and services and those services provided by US

and NATO forces.

The Taliban messaging strategy navigates these three identities and taps a

series of recurring themes such as Pashtunwali (“Way of the Pashtun” social

code),13 elements of pride and honor (which also extend to non-Pashtun

Afghans), the call for justice, exploiting themes of victimization, independ-

ence, and resistance (to “foreign invaders”). The Taliban message campaign

articulates these social values through a host of means depending on which

audience is being targeted. In general, the Taliban messaging campaign seeks

to delegitimize and discredit the previous Kabul regime of President Hamid

Karzai and the present regime of President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and

NATO forces in Afghanistan. A powerful aspect of the Taliban strategy is the

movement’s intelligence collection effort at the local level. This effort helps

pinpoint specific grievances and accusations pertinent throughout the local

community, and the Taliban incorporate these anecdotes into their messages

to help increase their influence.14 This is an area where the US and its NATO

al ies have had particular problems in generating an information strategy that

truly resonates with the local population.

Religious concepts

Religious narratives have been a foundation of the conservative Afghan

Taliban movement since its earliest inception and formation during the tem-

pestuous civil war period that engulfed Afghanistan between 1991 and 1996.

The Taliban continue to use Islamic piety, based loosely on the strict dog-

matic Deobandi interpretation of Islam, to construct a jihadist image that

evokes righteousness and greater justification to their violent anti-govern-

ment military campaign. Deobandi Islam, a conservative Islamic orthodoxy,

22

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

Figure 2.1: Taliban narrative targets

Islamic

Cultural

Political

Legalists (moderates)

Ethnicity

Islamism

Ulema

Nationalism

(conservatives)

Salafists (extremists)

Overlapping tenants

Pashtunwali

Pride and Honor

Justice

Victimization

Foreign Oppression/Occupation/Need for Independence

Islamic appeal: Broad

Cultural appeal:

Political appeal: Broad

domestic, regional and

Narrow, tailored to

domestic appeal

international appeal

local audiences

(transnational jihadists/

Islamists)

follows a Salafist egalitarian model that seeks to emulate the life and times of

the Prophet Mohammed. Within the religious narrative, Islam is used as the

primary vehicle and utilizes specific language to target a wide variety of audi-

ences, including local, regional, the global Islamic community, and interna-

tional audiences.

Jihad: According to the Taliban, jihad is war and is obligatory for all

Muslims, particularly Afghans, and must be undertaken against all enemies of

Islam such as “infidels,” apostates, and those (civilians) who support them. The

Taliban produced a tarana, or chant, called “Da Kufar sara Jang dai” (Fight

with Infidels), which was published on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s

23

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

website, clearly articulating how the Taliban incorporate religious rhetoric

effectively into their messages. Here is an extract:

I and you will definitely win the war over infidels

I and you will definitely win the war over infidels

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

I and you will definitely win the war over infidels

I and you will definitely win the war over infidels

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

O Brothers, please keep your patience high and make your hearts’ passion fresh

O Brothers, please keep your patience high and make your hearts’ passion fresh

We will win starting from Iraq, Palestine to Arianna

We will win starting from Iraq, Palestine to Arianna

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

I and you will definitely win the war over infidels

I and you will definitely win the war over infidels

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow

The fight is tough but it is easy for God

The fight is tough but it is easy for God

As Moses did, we will also win from Pariah [international forces]15

The Taliban appear to be careful in how they pick the topics to be por-

trayed in their taranas and other message venues, to give an explicit reflection

of the values held dear by most Afghans, and by Pashtuns in particular. Simple,

culturally relevant information communicated in local dialects projects these

messages into the popular Afghan consciousness through topics that resonate

deeply with local Afghan communities. The themes portrayed by Taliban

chants are relatively unadorned and to the point. The themes are presented

through the use of symbols and iconic portraits engendered in emotions of

sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and complaints. Each of these themes and

topics is presented in a narrative, and often poetic, form that is familiar to and

resonates with the local people.

Islamism: The Taliban’s perspective that all Muslims have a duty to protect

it is one of the central themes that the Taliban use to influence people and

gain recruits. It is a powerful motivator among rural Afghans, who have long

believed in jihad when Islam is perceived to be threatened.16 The Taliban have

been able to use Islamic rhetoric effectively to help legitimize their actions and

to help fuel Afghan anger against the foreign forces. Most Afghans accept

24

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

Al ah’s divine will, and believe that Al ah will punish the oppressor (foreign

invader) because Al ah is fair and just.

In rural Afghanistan, and even in some urban areas, mul ahs hold a near

monopoly of power over religion, and they instruct people about what is right

or wrong. This association between mul ahs and Afghanistan’s rural popula-

tion has developed into a powerful patron–client relationship, and in rural

Afghanistan such relationships help define Afghans’ day-to-day life. This was

not always the case. Before the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan,

mul ahs served their communities according to the communities’ needs and

desires. The Taliban, however, have used the mul ahs to present a coordinated

narrative to the people. It is even reported that in southern Afghanistan, espe-

cially Kandahar, Taliban mul ahs coordinate their Friday sermons ( khutba) to

focus on a particular religious, social, or political issue.17 Undoubtedly, the

Taliban have been able to manipulate religion, and have used this manipula-

tion as a powerful weapon in their jihad against the Afghan government and

its international al ies.

Incidentally, aside from sectarian warfare after the Mazar uprising in 1997

between Pashtuns and Uzbek and Hazara militiamen, anti-Shi’a statements

and derogatory ethnic targeting have been a missing element of the Taliban’s

view of jihad since 2001.18 However, 2015 did witness some Taliban atrocities

against Hazaras.19 But nevertheless, recent Taliban statements have rarely

identified Shi’a as enemies of Afghanistan or “heretics,” as radical insurgents

in Iraq did during 2004–12, and as Pakistan-based insurgent and terrorist

groups have done. In fact, the Afghan Taliban have largely attempted to

bypass sectarian and religious divides by using Islam as the unifying factor,

particularly the role of jihad. Mul ah Omar has repeated this message since

being expelled from power in 2001.

•  “You should understand that the American plan is never limited to the

occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, but they want to change the whole

map of the world by having invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in the heart of

the Islamic World. But the Afghans, as defenders of the Islamic Ummah and

destroyers of colonialist plans, have a well-known history behind.” Mul ah

Omar’s Eid message, 8 September 2010

•  “I also call on the entire Muslim nation and the Jihadist movements in

the world to be aware of the plots of the enemies to cause disagreements

between them. They must completely unite their efforts for the liberation

and defense of this ruled nation, the victim of injustice.” Mul ah Omar’s Eid

message, 19 September 2009

25

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  “Our religion enjoins us to avoid indulging in any kind of activity involving

prejudices based on ethnicity. The only bond which binds us is the bond of

Islam. Every Muslim is a brother and a friend to one another. We consider

every Muslim as a revered soul. Islam views Muslim as a single community.

A saying of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) related in

Abu Dawood instructs as follows: ‘Whoever fights for the prejudices of

tribe and tribalism, is not one of us.’” Mul ah Mohammad Omar, Eid Adha

Eve statement, published 12 July 2008.

Shaheed or martyrdom: The Taliban have ascribed the term shaheed, or

martyr, to any of their fighters killed in combat against international or

Afghan government forces, not just those who commit suicide bombings. This

belief is based on the trust that those who become shaheed will be rewarded in

heaven for their action. This is a particularly useful mobilization tool for

recruiting suicide bombers from the madrasa networks in Pakistan, including

many in North and South Waziristan.

By 2007, over 80 per cent of all suicide bombers in Afghanistan were said

to traverse through North and/or South Waziristan before conducting their

attack.20 In nearly all Taliban and Afghan insurgent literature, obituaries of

Taliban shaheed can be found. Taliban music and poetry has also venerated

shaheed, especially suicide bombers or the deaths of “famous” Taliban com-

manders killed in battle. The usage of shaheed is not limited to the Taliban,

nor is it a new phenomenon. During the Soviet–Afghan war, many Mujahidin

fighters were eulogized as shaheed following their deaths in combat.21

In 2011, a Taliban-produced book entitled Convoy of Martyrs was trans-

lated after US forces discovered a copy in the Orgun-e area of Paktika prov-

ince. The book includes advice regarding jihad in accordance with the Qur’an,

eulogizes fifteen Taliban fighters killed in combat, and concludes with some

warrior poetry. This type of propaganda is prevalent among Taliban periodi-

cals, the website, newsletters, interviews with Taliban spokesmen, and even

the official Taliban website.

Shar’iah: Restoring Shar’iah remains a key objective of the Taliban-led

insurgency, and is equally represented in the Taliban strategic communication

campaign. Simply put, Afghan villagers typically will not ask the Kabul gov-

ernment to help them resolve their disputes because the government is viewed

as ineffective, complex, inefficient, and corrupt. This feeling is especially

prevalent relative to Kabul’s justice system. Some communities view the

Taliban as able and willing to resolve disputes quickly and without any persua-

sion, such as bribery. Taliban leaders conveyed their intentions regarding

26

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

Shar’iah during an interview taken at an overrun district (Waigal) in north-

eastern Afghanistan’s province of Nuristan province in late June 2011:22

•  “Thanks be to God, the Mujahidin are now in charge of this area, and the

people’s problems are solved under Shar’iah law. The tribe(s) welcomed us,

and now they bring us their problems and we deal with them. They under-

stand that implementing Shar’iah is one of their duties.”23

•  “Smoking is forbidden here; our religious department will punish those

who shave and those who intoxicate themselves. Schools and hospitals are

open, under Shar’iah law.”

•  “We will respect the Islamic rights of all people of the country including

women; we will implement Shar’iah rules in the light of the injunctions of

the sacred religion of Islam in order to efficiently maintain internal secu-

rity and eradicate immortality, injustice, indecency and other vices; we will

strictly observe the law of punishment and reward and auditing in order

to bring about administrative transparency in all government departments,

The violators will be dealt with according to the Shar’iah rules.” Mul ah

Omar Eid message, 8 September 2010.

Islam: To conclude our survey of religious concepts, Islam is a common

influence in that almost everyone in the country (99.5 per cent) is a Muslim,

but it would be wrong to infer that this brings unanimity of opinion. While

Islam is not a monolithic entity, and in Afghanistan encompasses a wide range

of opinions, from reformists, foreign-educated progressives, radicals, Sufis,

Salafists, Deobandis, Talibs, to conservative judicial scholars, it is important

to note the connection between Islam and jihad, especially in southern

Afghanistan. As suggested above, using the call of “Islam under threat” is a

prominent theme of Taliban messaging; and the Taliban recognizes that this

kind of messaging encourages public and communal action.

“Our religious and historical enemy has cunningly launched a propaganda drive,

spending huge amounts of money in order to gradually strip our young generation

of their Afghan and Islamic identity.” Mullah Omar Eid message, 16 November

2010

Cultural concepts

Pashtunwali:24 This term has been variously described as a system of law and

of conflict resolution, a body of custom, and a mindset that dictates the way

in which Pashtuns operate in their society. It helps define how Pashtuns

behave toward each other and how Pashtuns deal with outsiders in order to

27

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

maintain their identity as Pashtun. The Taliban regularly play on notions of

Pashtunwali in their messaging, in an effort to invoke certain tribal mores

such as those mentioned below.

Pride and honor: Among Afghans, nang, or pride and honor, and ghariat

(esteem and pride derived from courage) are the highest personal value. Any

infringement on or loss of one’s nang—any disgrace or embarrassment—

prompts a call for an immediate act of revenge. Afghans view the improper

trespassing into a village or household, the killing of one’s family members,

the touching of women outside one’s own family, and the hooding and shack-

ling of Afghan males in front of their family members and neighbors as

enormous violations to one’s honor. Revenge-seeking individuals will usually

combine anti-government actions with local Taliban mahaz (fronts) to “right

their wrong.”

This boosts the insurgency’s reservoir of manpower with supporters who

may not necessarily be ideological/religious fanatics, but rather ordinary

Afghans. Afghans refer to these Taliban as majburi (forced) Taliban, an indi-

cation that these fighters were “forced” into the ranks of the insurgency to

defend their honor or to “right” the wrongs of the corrupt local government

who habitually abuse and harass local rivals and adversaries (see Appendix A

for different “types” of Taliban). The Taliban are apt to exploit these griev-

ances and knowingly tap into this wellspring of supporters for violent activity.

References to “errant” air strikes, night raids, compound searches and images

depicting the inappropriate touching of women by Coalition forces are the

Taliban’s most overt messaging to potential supporters, a rallying cry for

Afghans seeking revenge, or badal (“payback” or restitution): another highly

important tenet of Afghan culture.25 They also refer to their enemies in a simi-

lar light. The members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan

National Police (ANP) are dismissed as munafiq (hypocrite), and others in

the Kabul administration are called ghulam (slave/servant), ajir (agent) and

gawdagai (puppet).

The Taliban regularly evoke anger as the vehicle needed to avenge dishonor

and redress insults to one’s pride. Figure 2.2 is an excellent example of how the

Taliban try to evoke anger and exploit Pashtunwali and Pashtun concepts of

honor, in addition to their trope of the “victimization of Afghans by foreign

invaders.”26 This Taliban leaflet shows a female African–American soldier

“patting down” or frisking an Afghan woman, but it is very hard to tell from a

distance if the American soldier is a woman or a man. The Taliban are obvi-

ously suggesting that this is an American man touching an Afghan woman,

28

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

which would be inconceivable and the ultimate violation of an Afghan’s honor

( namus), pride, and esteem ( ghariat).27 Such an action to an Afghan, especially

rural Pashtun, would demand immediate revenge.

The translated leaflet caption says it al : “The US evil soldiers are defiling our

Muslim sisters, as you can see in the picture.” This leaflet portrays not only a

culturally powerful message in the frame of the narrative of Pashtunwali, but is

also a superb Taliban recruiting tool. This leaflet, in many respects, could be said

to be sending the same message but in a more powerful and effective fashion,

and of course to a different target audience, as the author’s first leaflet developed

for OSD that was described in this book’s Preface. Also note the leaflet’s tropes

concerning past historical Afghan victories against foreign invaders, which we

have already seen are a common theme of Taliban narratives.

Cultural values and traditions are used by the Taliban to shift public loyal-

ties away from the government. The Taliban narratives attempt to make an

emotional connection with Afghans through the explicit use of examples from

Figure 2.2: “The US Evil soldiers are defiling our Muslim sisters, as you can see in the

picuture. Despite this our Mukahid Nation keeps quiet. Afghan Muslim Mujahid

Nation! Your grandfathers beat the British forces; your father beat the super power

Russians! How long will you keep quiet against US? Join the Jihad today against the

defilers”

29

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Afghan history, and through appeals to Afghan nationalism and Afghan col-

lective memories. The Afghan public is generally proud of their history and

their ancestors’ performance in defending Afghanistan against foreign invad-

ers over the centuries. This analysis clearly suggests that the Taliban attempts

to use and manipulate Afghan culture and traditions. For example, the use of

gila (complaints), a traditional tool that is tied to Pashtun lifestyle, is often

used in their messaging to appeal to subtle Afghan emotions.

Leaflet story: The evil, infidel Americans—a supposed superpower—

regularly defile and dishonor our Afghan women. There is an obligation

for all Afghans to end their silence at this horrible act and join the

Mujahidin and the jihad to regain the honor of our nation, just as our

fathers did against the infidel Russians, another superpower.

Resistance and independence: The Taliban repeatedly target local audi-

ences, and to a smaller degree regional Pashtun communities, with themes of

resistance and independence. Both themes are not only prevalent among the

informal Pashtunwali social code, but also represent an effective communica-

tion tool to help create a collective Afghan identity based on shared historical

values of repulsing foreign invasions and evoking personal feelings of prestige

and honor in the military efforts to resist these incursions. Aside from Islamic/

religious rhetoric, the themes of resistance and independence are noticeable

in nearly every form of Taliban propaganda and unquestionably represent a

cornerstone of the Taliban’s overall strategic communication strategy.

“America never ever imagined its defeat, due to its technological advancement, but

now everyday it welcomes the coffins of its soldiers and is facing great life and

monetary losses. A few years back no one would have conceived that US and its

al ies would face such resistance in Afghanistan, which would compel their presi-

dent to beg other countries to provide economic assistance, military equipment and

soldiers to combat the resistance; furthermore no one is prepared to bring to light

this unique development.” Mul ah Omar Eid message, 30 September 2008

Justice: The greatest challenge facing successive national governments in

Kabul over the past century has been the ability to impose an effective central-

ized legal code/judicial institutions upon local communities. Historically,

local Afghan communities have had their own non-state institutions for regu-

lating behavior and resolving problems. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the legal

30

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

system consists of three competing parts: the state legal codes, Islamic reli-

gious law (Shar’iah), and local customary law. Customary, religious, and state

sectors define their own exclusive shares of authority, but also ally with other

actors—a complex relationship that is hindered by insecurity, corruption, and

competing interests. The Taliban exploit the central government’s inept and

inefficient system by offering their own roving form of justice, typically in the

sense of a mobile court system, which brings Taliban affiliated qaziyan

(judges) who are usually bolstered by a Taliban-aligned Islamic scholar

( ulama). The Taliban utilize this theme especially among domestic audiences,

and consistently seek to delegitimize the authority of the central government

with this theme.28

“Use your judgment, is it democracy or is it Bomb-cracy, Qatal-cracy, or Kharab-

cracy? Filling jails with people is what they call their presidency. It is a shame that

even though some sold-out Afghans witness everything, they call invading forces

as friends.” Taliban video by Alemarah studio, “Destruction and Reconstruction”

Victimization: Taliban narratives regularly play on the notion that the

Afghan people are being systematically victimized by foreign occupiers, who

not only want to corrupt and destroy Islam and the Afghan way of life, but

also the Afghan people. The Taliban spend considerable time and effort on

their attempts to expose US and NATO’s collateral damage. The death of

innocent civilians resonates enormously for Afghans, who still have vivid

memories of terrible and destructive Soviet bombing campaigns. Their official

website, Alemarah, has an entire section devoted to issues involving the death

of Afghan civilians by US and NATO forces. Such issues are also a prominent

focal point of Taliban videos and DVDs that are widely available in

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“Today, this nation is entangled in a complicated trial and an imposed war on the

charges of their professing (Islamic) ideology. Every day, men and women of this

nation fall prey to the bombardment of the invaders and their children become

orphans; miserable people are displaced internally due to the operations and fear

of bombardment of the enemy.” Mul ah Omar Eid Message November 16, 2010.

Political concepts

Nationalism: A key element among insurgent communications is the widen-

ing scope of their target audience to include all Afghans (including sympathiz-

ers, supporters, and undecided/neutral), avoiding any notions of a purely

Pashtun-centric messaging strategy.29 The communiqués offered by the

31

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Taliban’s former Supreme Leader, Mul ah Mohammad Omar, depict the evo-

lution of widening the jihad against the government and foreign forces by

appealing to all Afghans; later they go as far as asking support from neighbor-

ing countries and from Muslims around the world. This trend began soon after

the Taliban government was toppled by Coalition forces in 2001, and has

remained consistent ever since:

•  “Being a leader of Muslims, I accept that jihad against US troops is our duty

and everyone who assists Americans in executing their mission is liable to

death.” March 200330

•  Mul ah Omar issued a statement saying, “the Americans have tightened

their grip on the northern al iance, and the cities of Mazar-e Sharif, Herat,

and other northern areas.” He also called on “the people and the command-

ers in the north to free themselves of America’s oppression and help the

Taliban.” 23 October 2004

•  “The people of Afghanistan and the Taliban should unite against US

and al ied forces and intensify their jihad against the foreign occupiers.”31

6 November 2005

•  “Finally I appeal to all Muslims to help their Mujahidin brothers in fighting

against the forces of evil, by putting aside their personal interests and desires

for power. Now you know your religion and Afghanistan are in danger, so

pursue the path of bravery, righteousness, nobility, dignity and generosity

by following the footsteps of pious religious leaders and leaving cowardli-

ness, haughtiness, stinginess and the ways of dishonesty by joining Jihad.”

Mul ah Omar Eid messages, 17 December 2007

•  “The current Jihad and resistance in Afghanistan against the foreign invad-

ers and their puppets, is a legitimate Jihad, being waged for the defense of

the sovereignty of the Islamic country and Islam.” Mul ah Omar Eid mes-

sages, 8 September 2010

•  “Some internal and external enemies are now speaking of disintegration

of the beloved country. They should know that the patriotic countrymen

and the Islamic Emirate will never allow anyone to put into practice their

wicked plan.” Mul ah Omar Eid messages, 16 November 2010

Collective memory: Similar to nationalistic appeals, the Taliban and other

insurgent groups consistently tap into past conflicts in Afghanistan and urge

the recollection of these historic memories in comparison to the current con-

flict. Coalition forces are usually compared to the Soviet or British army and

even German Nazis. Afghans are typically reminded of the hardships faced

32

OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

during the Anglo-Afghan wars, the Soviet invasion, and the success in resist-

ing Genghiz Khan and Alexander’s army. The Afghan government is typically

compared to unfavorable Afghan rulers and regimes, as the passage below by

the late Mul ah Omar implies:

•  “[There is] no difference between Shah Shuja, Babrak Karmal and the rul-

ers of the present Kabul Administration. All are equal when [it] comes to

national and Islamic [betrayal] and treason… Now when the enemy is on

the verge of defeat, I would like to remind you that (throughout history)

enemies have deprived the Afghans of sustaining the pride of victory fol-

lowing the military defeat of the enemy because the enemies do not leave

them to build up a strong foundation and a sole leadership. This exactly hap-

pened after the defeat of the Russians. The flames of difference and atrocities

engulfed every house of the Afghans. The prolongation of the sufferings of

our people and their perdition originate from this factor of not having a sole

and strong leadership after the defeat of the Russians. Of course, concoction

of col usions and conspiracies added to our failure.” Mul ah Mohammad

Omar, Eid Adha Eve statement, published 12 July 2008.

33

3

TARGET AUDIENCES OF AFGHAN NARRATIVES

AND STORIES

As suggested above, unlike the US-led international Coalition in Afghanistan,

the Taliban continually focus and act at the rural, Afghan village level ( kalay).

The Taliban seem to be well aware that the center of gravity of their insur-

gency, wrapped in the narrative of mandatory jihad, is in the rural hinterland

of Afghanistan, and they target their informational messages and propaganda

accordingly. Below, we present and assess the target audiences for Taliban

narratives and messages.

Local (Dari/Pashto): Taliban and insurgent messaging targeting local con-

stituents is most often published in Pashto, targeting local Afghan Pashtun

communities, the traditional wellspring of support for the movement early on

and during its rebound between 2002 and 2005. These messages attempt to

drum up support and sympathy for the movement by highlighting grievances

and animosities against the central government and Coalition presence in

Afghanistan. Messages include religious themes (i.e. jihad, martyrdom), cul-

tural, and political themes (i.e. references to anti-colonialism, exploiting local

anger over Coalition operations). Considerable Taliban informational efforts

are devoted to addressing local issues and concerns.

However, three distinct audiences have been targeted for Taliban messag-

ing: the local population that is undecided/neutral toward the Taliban’s cause;

the local population that supports or is sympathetic to the Taliban’s cause; and

those who are opposed to the Taliban’s cause and support the current regime.

35

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

The Taliban adapts its messaging themes to approach each distinct audience

differently, as far as its strategies are concerned.

Local undecided/neutral: Messages are aimed at instructing, persuading, or

ultimately intimidating and coercing local constituents into supporting or

siding with the Taliban, threatening extreme acts of violence against those

“collaborating” with the government, Coalition forces, or foreign NGOs.

Some threats force neutral actors simply to vacate the community, village, or

area, which helps the Taliban penetrate deeper to establish support and intel-

ligence networks in areas deemed critical to their strategic survival. Often the

Taliban will soften the local community by penetrating with a small number

of operatives, usually preachers, to gauge the community’s attitudes and dis-

positions, to collect intelligence regarding local grievances, and possibly to

offer financial assistance in exchange for cooperation early on. Pro-

government supporters or government workers are routinely threatened at

this stage, and will be targeted or killed following a warning grace period.

Table 3.1: Local population that is neutral/undecided toward the Taliban’s cause

Taliban strategy

Informational/educational, persuasion, coercion

Taliban objectives

To succeed in eliciting a local community’s compliance with

Taliban demands to end its relationship with the current

government structure and to disengage from the influence

and outreach of foreign forces.

Narratives used

Islamic, cultural, and political

Major themes used

• Coalition/ISAF forces are exactly the same as the Soviet

army that invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s.

• Coalition/ISAF forces employ the same tactics as the

Soviet Army: bombing villages, “killing everyone,” target-

ing civilians because they cannot distinguish between

civilians and Mujahidin.

• Coalition/ISAF speaks of peace and reconstruction but

these are lies.

• Coalition/ISAF simply targets all Afghans, spilling the

blood of men, women, and children alike.

• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the United States

is, money and superior weaponry cannot defeat the will of

the Afghan people.

• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and attempt to

spread Christianity and proselytize for it.

• The Coalition is facing a military defeat.

• Morale and resources among the Mujahidin are at an al -

time high.

36

TARGET AUDIENCES OF AFGHAN NARRATIVES AND STORIES

• Afghans have defeated Alexander’s armies, the British, the

Soviets, and now the US and NATO.

• The Taliban are planning for the future of this country

after the occupation “under the shade of social justice of

Islam, with economic and social development programs.”

Message effectiveness

• Exploiting the failures or deficiencies of the current

Afghan government structure, issues of abuse and corrup-

tion, and the perceived predatory nature of the Afghan

security services.

• Exploiting collateral damage, especially from errant air-

strikes or night-raids conducted by foreign forces.

• Portraying US and NATO forces as occupiers and com-

paring them to colonial occupiers or the Soviet forces,

which resonates among most communities.

• Expanding and strategically shaping linguistic delivery

capabilities. (For instance, the Taliban disseminated vid-

eos of religious sermons spoken in Dari and Pashto, com-

pared to previous offerings only available in Arabic.)

• Afghan media/journalists are being manipulated and lev-

eraged effectively by the Taliban’s media commission.

Message ineffectiveness

• Local opposition to terrorism, especially suicide terrorism.

• Redundant and negative messaging campaign induces

audience fatigue.

• Contradictory statements between senior and mid-level

command (in public addresses, claims of responsibility,

on negotiations, relations with al-Qaeda, etc.)

• Taliban attacks against civilians or attacks that maim and

kill civilians are extremely unpalatable and unjustified,

according to Afghan popular public opinion.

Delivery systems

Preachers, graffiti, shabnamah, khutba (Friday sermons),

poetry, taranas (poetic chants), DVDs, and face-to-face

interactions.

Local supporters/sympathizers: These messages seek to portray the success of

violent battlefield victories and aim to improve recruitment among local com-

munities. By repeating and exploiting local conditions, such as disrespecting

Afghan culture, unemployment, corruption, government and international

forces’ abuse and detention of innocent individuals or col ateral damage from

Coalition operations, these messages tend to solidify a foundation of support and

sympathy among their followers. Greatly exaggerating the battlefield accomplish-

ments of Taliban fronts, messages of this type are usually in the same vein as the

messages and statements appearing on the Taliban’s website. The Taliban con-

tinue to focus on maintaining a high level of morale among their rank-and-file.

37

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Table 3.2: Local population that supports or is sympathetic to the Taliban’s cause

Taliban strategy

Informational/educational

Narratives used

Islamic, cultural, and political

Major themes used

• Coalition/ISAF simply targets all Afghans, spilling the

blood of men, women, and children alike.

• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the US is, money

and superior weaponry cannot defeat the will of the

Afghan people.

• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and attempt to

spread Christianity and proselytize for it.

• The Coalition is facing a military defeat.

• Morale and resources among the Mujahidin are at an al -

time high.

• Afghans have defeated Alexander’s armies, the British, the

Soviets, and now the US and NATO.

• Taliban victory is inevitable and certain.

Message effectiveness

• Messages are delivered with a level of linguistic mastery

and resonance.

• Convincing usage of contemporary folklore, collective

memory of past Afghan victories (Soviet–Afghan jihad,

anti-colonial jihad).

• Utilize and exploit shared Islamic identity among Afghans;

effectively use cultural tenets of pride, shame, and right-

eousness to convey messages.

• Islamic rhetoric aims to convince participants that their

actions in jihad will be rewarded dually in the afterlife if

individuals are killed in combat ( shaheed).

• Messages are designed to uphold and increase morale

among insurgent rank-and-file and leadership.

Message ineffectiveness • Confusion from inconsistent messaging from leadership,

erroneous or competing statements from official spokes-

men, or from rival insurgent factions (HIG).

Delivery systems

• Layeha (“rules and regulations for Mujahidin” field book),

graffiti, DVDs, periodicals, khutba (Friday sermons),

poetry, taranas (poetic chants), face-to-face interactions,

internet websites/forums, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,

text messages.

38

TARGET AUDIENCES OF AFGHAN NARRATIVES AND STORIES

Table 3.3: Local population that is opposed to the Taliban’s cause

Taliban strategy

Threats and intimidation, coercion, persuasion

Narratives used

Islamic, cultural, political

Major themes used

• Those who work with the current Afghan regime or inter-

national forces are munafiq (hypocrites), zalem (cruel/

tyrannical), zulum (tyranny), ghulam (slaves/servants),

be-ghairat (dishonorable, cowardly), be-ābrū (dishonor,

disgrace, indignity) and/or gaudagai (puppets).

• If you are not supporting the Taliban, then you are sup-

porting the oppressors.

• You, as a Muslim, must join with the Taliban to evict the

invading army so that Shar’iah law can be re-established

under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban

government).

• Coalition/ISAF simply targets all Afghans, spilling the

blood of men, women, and children alike.

• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the US is, money

and superior weaponry cannot defeat the will of the

Afghan people.

• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and attempt to

spread Christianity and proselytize for it. The Coalition

is facing certain military defeat.

Message effectiveness

• The use of threats followed by violent actions (kidnap-

ping, assassination, murder) can be effective in eroding

local support for government structures and services and

helps portray the local government as ineffective and

powerless.

• Persuasive messages include referring to local strongmen

as Mujahidin to help reach out to those who fought in

previous eras in an effort to have them rejoin a “righteous”

cause.

Message ineffectiveness

• Message consumption is usually limited, since those

opposed to the Taliban do not seek them out and avoid

any distributed by the overall Taliban structure.

• Confusion from inconsistent messaging from Taliban

leadership, erroneous or competing statements from offi-

cial spokesmen, or from rival insurgent factions (HIG).

• Difficulty in discerning the authenticity of communica-

tions from Taliban representatives.

Delivery systems

Shabnamah (night letters), graffiti, khutba (Friday ser-

mons), face-to-face interactions, and text messages.

39

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Table 3.4: Neighboring population

Taliban strategy

Threats and intimidation, coercion, persuasion

Narratives used

Islamic, cultural, political

Major themes used

• You, as a Muslim, must join with the Taliban to evict the

invading army so that Shar’iah law can be re-established

under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban

government).

• Those who work with the current Afghan regime or inter-

national forces are munafiq (hypocrites), zalem (cruel/

tyrannical), zulum (tyranny), ghulam (slaves/servants),

be-ghairat (dishonorable, cowardly), be-ābrū (dishonor,

disgrace, indignity) and/or gaudagai (puppets).

• If you are not supporting the Taliban, then you are sup-

porting the oppressors.

• The US attacks Muslims worldwide, spilling the blood of

men, women, and children alike.

• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the US is, money

and superior weaponry cannot defeat the will of the

Mujahidin.

• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and attempt to

spread Christianity and proselytize for it.

• The Coalition is facing certain military defeat.

Message effectiveness

• Themes highlighting US oppression, aggression toward

Muslims, and “the righteous cause of jihad” resonate

widely among the regional population.

• Persuasive messages include referring to local strongmen as

Mujahidin to help reach out to those who fought in previ-

ous eras in an effort to have them rejoin a “righteous”

cause.

Message ineffectiveness

• Confusion from inconsistent messaging from Taliban

leadership, especially regarding pro- or anti-Pakistani gov-

ernment sentiments, erroneous or competing statements

from official spokesmen, or from rival insurgent factions.

• Difficulty in discerning the authenticity of communica-

tions from Taliban representatives.

Delivery systems

• DVDs, periodicals, khutba (Friday sermons), face-to-face

interactions, poetry, taranas (poetic chants), internet web-

sites/forums, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, text messages,

spokesmen, and media influence operations.

40

TARGET AUDIENCES OF AFGHAN NARRATIVES AND STORIES

Local opposition to the Taliban’s cause (i.e. government supporters): Acting gov-

ernment officials, political parties, and their supporters comprise the center of

gravity for the current Afghan regime and remain a critical target audience of

the insurgency. The Taliban have primarily deployed threats and coercive mes-

sages to the strata of government supporters and officials, although persuasion

is increasingly used against government supporters and even Afghan National

Security Force personnel. Threats of death, beheading, and abduction are

being replaced by calls for amnesty if security personnel surrender and disarm

to local insurgent fronts, for instance. Non-threatening themes include high-

lighting or exaggerating the perceived deficiencies and failures of the current

Afghan regime and the international military coalition in Afghanistan.

Specific language is used to highlight these thoughts, such as referring to the

Afghan government as zalem (cruel/tyrannical) and those who work for the

government as ajir (agent), gaudagai (puppet), and munafiq (hypocrite).

Neighboring countries (Urdu/Arabic): The dissemination of messages and com-

muniqués in Arabic helps to expand the insurgency’s support to wealthy areas

in the Middle East (i.e. Persian Gulf ), where resources and personnel (trans-

national networks) are sought. Additionally, Arabic spoken sermons and

religious texts help to strengthen claims of righteousness and piety among

more radical or ideological fighters in Afghanistan. One militant periodical,

Al Somood, which is also published and linked to the Taliban’s official website,

is the only Afghan Taliban periodical that is entirely in Arabic.

Urdu published material helps spread inflammatory anti-Western and anti-

domination sentiment among the Pakistani Pashtuns and other ethnic groups

living in Pakistan. It also provides “battlefield updates” and informs the

Pakistani constituency of the unfolding events in neighboring Afghanistan.

International (English, European languages): Generally opposed to the Taliban

movement and its motives: Messages in English and European languages are

quite dissimilar from those published in local and regional languages. English/

European written messages attempt to pervert the international perception

regarding the conflict in Afghanistan and try to influence local political deci-

sions away from supporting NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Messages

attempt to portray the Afghan Taliban movement as a legitimate political

organization, and frame its existence around claims of victimization (foreign

occupation, suppression, victims of an anti-Islamic “crusade”) while reiterating

that the group’s military and political objectives remain domestic in scope, not

international. However, this last point is often refuted by local Taliban fronts

who often threaten participating NATO countries and their constituents;

41

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Table 3.5: International population

Taliban strategy

Education, persuasion, threats and

intimidation

Narratives used

Islamic, cultural, political

Delivery systems

Internet websites/forums, Facebook,

Twitter, YouTube, periodicals, influence

operations that target Western and

international media outlets

Differences between International Media Statements vs. Regional/Local Articles

International (English)

Regional/Local?

Primarily focus on US foreign policy

Primarily focus on domestic Afghan

developments (in Afghanistan); offer

events, news, actors, and policies. Offer

few statements directly against the

some broader articles focusing on the

European Union.

international Islamic community.

Democracy

Exercise of power/military achievement

Decry “human rights abuses” caused

Increased use of nationalistic terms such

by foreign military operations and

as the Afghan Nation, “invaders,” and

collateral damage.

“puppet government” while referring to

themselves (the Taliban) as Mujahidin.

Describe the West as being the

Almost no use of the term kafir, “infidel,”

aggressor, and the Afghan population

whereas this term is frequently used in

the victim of this aggression.

Taliban night letters at the village and

district level.

Indicate that the Taliban movement

Offer articles concerning the hijab/

poses no threat to the international or

women’s rights-related articles (criticize

regional community.

the prohibition of the hijab in the West).

also, these claims are not officially sanctioned or broadcast from the recog-

nized Taliban leadership councils or spokesmen.

Conclusion

Having examined and evaluated the targets, the delivery systems and their

associated narratives, themes, and effectiveness of Taliban and other Afghan

insurgent messaging, the next chapters will discuss in depth each of the key

techniques and delivery systems that they use to portray their messages, sto-

ries, and narratives.

42

4

TALIBAN AND AFGHAN INSURGENT

MAGAZINES, CIRCULARS, AND NEWSLETTERS

Through a simple but effective communications and public relations cam-

paign, the Taliban have successfully penetrated the “hearts and minds” or trust

and confidence of many ordinary citizens throughout Afghanistan. As sug-

gested above, a central target of the Taliban’s media campaign is the Pashtun-

dominated provinces of southern and eastern Afghanistan where the Taliban

have traditionally enjoyed their greatest support, although we have also wit-

nessed this recently in northern Afghan provinces as well.

Afghan insurgent periodicals and newsletters

This section provides a bibliography of Taliban and other insurgent circulars

and magazines by identifying their inception, content, length, language, and

publication. Many of the magazines are derived directly from the Taliban

insurgency, including the Tora Bora Military Front and Haqqani Network; a

few others are affiliated with Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG).

The Taliban magazines and circulars contain myriad amounts of material,

and the contents range from interviews and statements of prominent jihadist

leaders, to martyrdom obituaries, to commentary on cultural and religious

issues, including the rights of women in Islam. In addition, contents often

depict battlefield reports, anti-coalition forces rhetoric and propaganda, as

well as chronicles depicting the suffering of the civilian population. As a

43

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

means of appealing to a broader audience, some of the magazines also incor-

porate poetry, sports, news, and art. Publications range from weekly, monthly,

bi-monthly to quarterly. One of earliest and most prominent magazines, Al

Somood, was allegedly established in 2002; most, however, were generally

published after 2004. Furthermore, magazines such as Al Somood and In Fight

are directly affiliated with video studio productions such as Alemarah and

often recycle images, eulogies, and battle operations produced by the studio.

These types of Taliban magazines and circulars continue to proliferate, as

many of them have become accessible online and are translated not only into

Pashto and Dari, but also into English, Arabic, and Urdu.

The publications released in Peshawar reveal that although the Islamic

Emirate of Afghanistan does not directly publish the newspapers, much of the

content is extremely sympathetic to the insurgency and serves as Taliban

propaganda, focusing heavily on Pashtun nationalism.

The contents within the Taliban magazines and circulars are attempts made

by jihadists to reveal their continued presence, as well as an exercise of power.

The magazines and circulars typically cover original interviews with current

high-ranking Taliban field commanders and Shura leaders, giving eulogies,

sermons, or tirades against the US and NATO Afghan policies. There are

ample articles and commentary on history, religion, and Islamic issues as well

as the coverage of recent political events. As a means of appealing to a broader

audience, several of the magazines cater to youth through social media, pri-

marily through Facebook. While most of the magazines and circulars cater

specifically to the particular insurgent group’s issues, several of the magazines,

such as In Fight, focus on the Western audience. The objective for In Fight, for

instance, is to influence international perceptions negatively through the usage

of photo essays and by chronicling graphic insurgent raids and suicide bomb-

ings on Afghan and Coalition forces. Images typically contain deceased

NATO and US personnel’s flag-draped coffins.

Taliban origin

Al Somood (Resistance)

In September 2002, the Taliban-era Minister of Information and Culture,

Qudratul ah Jamal (alias Hamed Agha), created the Arabic-language jihadist

magazine Al Somood. In May 2004, Ustad Mohammad Yasir, a top Taliban

ideologue and former military chief for Abdul al-Rasul Sayyaf ’s Ittihad-i

44

MAGAZINES, CIRCULARS, AND NEWSLETTERS

Islami tanzim, took the reins of Al Somood. Yasir speaks fluent Arabic and

commanded Al Somood’s production until his arrest in August 2005. In March

2007, Yasir along with four other Taliban figures were released from prison in

exchange for a captured Italian journalist in Helmand province. Yasir resumed

his functions in the Taliban but took command of the Invitation Council

(Recruitment committee for the Taliban’s Quetta Shura) until he was re-

arrested in Pakistan on 1 January 2009.1 Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, one

of the founding members of the Taliban, now runs Al Somood and is in charge

of the Quetta Shura’s Cultural Council (Propaganda wing).2 Al Somood pro-

duces original interviews with current Taliban field commanders and shura

leaders, including the likes of the late Jalauddin Haqqani, Mullah Berader

Akhund, Ustad Yasir, Mul ah Abdul Salaam Baryali (a former Kunduz shadow

governor), and many others. Al Somood’s chairman is published as Sheikh

Nasiruddin “Herawi,” a nom de guerre.

•  Content: Interviews and statements of Taliban figures, commanders, and

fighters; martyrdom obituaries, poems, and photographs of commanders

and martyrs.

•  Length: Approximately 50 pages. Color. Includes photographs.

•  Language: Arabic. (Analysts note “the simple standard of the Arabic

[used] would suggest it is written by those to whom it is a second language,

although the cover pages are of a noticeably higher standard.”)3

•  Publication: Every two months.

•  Existence: Allegedly established in September 2002; however, consistent

since 2008.

Srak (Beam of Light)

A monthly pamphlet published mainly in Pashto but includes some Dari

material. Its letterhead includes the label “Afghanistan Islamic Literary

Association,” whose editor is identified as Lutfullah Momand. Srak, some-

times misidentified and translated as Sark, publishes various commentaries

and statements from high-ranking Taliban leaders, most noticeably a lengthy

interview with Mullah Berader Akhund during the spring of 2009. Srak

remains one of the Taliban propaganda magazines with the most content and

material, surpassing even Al Somood and Murchal. Srak’s publication address

is listed as Khair Khanna Mina, Area 2, Kabul, an unlikely reality since the

address is located in a Tajik-dominated neighborhood.

45

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  Content: Interviews and statements by Taliban figures, commanders, and

fighters. Srak also provides poetry, editorials praising the Taliban, and com-

mentary on religious issues and the history of Islam.

•  Length: Approximately 75 pages or more.

•  Language: Mainly Pashto, some Dari.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Existence: Since 2004.

•  Cover Price: 20 Pakistani rupees.

Tora Bora Magazine

A quarterly jihadist periodical that claims to be published in Nangarhar prov-

ince (the site of the Tora Bora cave complex), Tora Bora Magazine delivers

statements and interviews with mid- to high-level insurgent commanders such

as Qari Baryal (Kapisa, a commander independent of the Taliban), Sheikh

Abu Yaha al-Libi (al-Qaeda), and Mawlawi Saiful ah Jalali, an alleged militant

commander operating in Kabul. The magazine supports the current insur-

gency, but is directly associated with the Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz, an off-

shoot of the Taliban and led by Anwur ul-Haq Mujahid, the son of the late

Hezb-e-Islami leader Mawlawi Younus Khalis. Tora Bora Magazine’s founder

is said to be Ghazi Ajmal and it is edited by Malawi Hatem Tayi.4

•  Content: Interviews and statements by insurgents, commanders, and fight-

ers. The magazine also offers commentary on religious and cultural issues.

•  Length: approximately 70 pages or more.

•  Language: Pashto.

•  Publication: Quarterly.

•  Existence: Since 2007. But its frequency of publication has waned in recent

years.

Shahamat (Courage/Bravery)

A periodical that appears every two months, Shahamat is predominantly

published in Pashto, with many of the articles appearing on the Alemarah

website.5 Like several other jihadist publications, Shahamat lists its publica-

tion address in Kabul; it is published by the Taliban front organization the

“Islamic Cultural Society of Afghanistan.”

•  Content: Shahamat publishes articles and commentary on history, religion,

and Islamic issues and supports the Taliban cause of fighting NATO forces

in Afghanistan.

46

MAGAZINES, CIRCULARS, AND NEWSLETTERS

•  Length: N/A.

•  Language: Pashto/Dari.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Existence: N/A.

In Fight

A photo essay of Taliban-related attacks (taken from reports on the Alemarah

website), this monthly publication is available in a slick PDF format, complete

with color photos taken from a variety of sources, including local press, inter-

national media, and military photography departments. This is a monthly

publication that began sometime in late 2008. Interestingly, the publication is

in English. A typical issue consists of a photo essay chronicling insurgent

attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces with heavy attention being paid

to imagery of fallen NATO (mostly British) and US personnel in flag-draped

coffins. Some photographs seem to be recycled between issues. The magazine

does not venerate fallen insurgents like other magazines (i.e. Al Somood), and

given that it is written in English, this suggests that the magazine is intended

solely for Western audiences, in the hope of influencing international percep-

tions that the war in Afghanistan is going badly and cannot be won (or is not

worth the sacrifice).

•  Content: Little to no commentary, and when present it is taken from

Alemarah website reports. Each issue relies heavily on graphic color photo-

graphs: primarily a photo essay format that depicts the conflict as the insur-

gents view it.

•  Length: 50–130 pages.

•  Language: English.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Existence: Since 2008.

Elham (Inspiration/Revelation)

This publication is allegedly published weekly; its chief editor is Salim Sohail.

Their publisher is labeled as “Afghanistan’s Islamic Cultural Society,” the same

front behind the Shahamat publication.6 The content includes recycled mate-

rial from the Taliban’s Alemarah website. Elham is directly linked to the

Taliban movement.

47

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  Content: Editorials and battlefield reports previously published on

Alemarah.

•  Length: At least 14 pages.

•  Language: Mostly in Pashto but offers some material in Dari.

•  Publication: Weekly.

•  Existence: Since 2005.

Murchal (Trench)

A quarterly periodical published by “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,”

Murchal is one of the longest-running Taliban magazines in Afghanistan. The

editor is identified as Mul ah Kabir Ahmad Mujahed, and it lists its publica-

tion address simply as Kabul.

•  Content: Tends to focus primarily on military events happening in

Afghanistan.

•  Length: Varies.

•  Language: Pashto.

•  Publication: Quarterly.

•  Existence: Since 2006.

Hezb-e-Islami (HIG) origin

Shahadat (Martyrdom)

This is the official newspaper of Hezb-e-Islami and is mainly circulated

throughout Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The

magazine does not report Taliban attacks and claims, but rather offers mes-

sages and statements from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and attacks attributed to

his commanders. Shahadat ran its own website, www.shahadatnews.com,

which was active until October 2008. Access to the website was broken as of

1 November 2009; it then reappeared on the internet under the name Daily

Shahadat, accessible at http://dailyshahadat.com/index.php

Tanweer (Enlightenment)

Tanweer is a Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) circular that is published in Peshawar

and offers the views of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and updates from his militant

originations activities inside Afghanistan. The late Mohammad Asif Mukhbat,

48

MAGAZINES, CIRCULARS, AND NEWSLETTERS

a senior member of HIG, initially ran this magazine. He died of abdominal

problems in late May 2011. Mukhbat was also responsible for publishing

Hekmatyar’s statements and publications.7 Tanweer magazine also carries

information regarding the current political situation and offers commentary

on Islamic topics.

•  Content: Statements by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, anti-Coalition editorials,

interviews with Hezb-e-Islami field commanders.

•  Length: 60 or more pages.

•  Language: Pashto and Dari.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Existence: N/A.

Mesaq-i-Esaar (Covenant of Sacrifice)

A weekly newspaper published in black and white by the Cultural Section of

HIG Central Zone Kabul. The newspaper materials are mostly reprints from

HIG daily publications of newspapers and website. It is not clear where it is

published but it covers HIG propaganda in 8 pages on a weekly basis.

Counting the serial number of the newspaper volumes, it appears that the

newspaper was founded in early 2007.

•  Content: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar statements, HIG military gains, pro HIG

political literature and editorials, anti-Coalition and ISAF forces articles,

transcripts of interviews with Hezb-e-Islami senior members, religious and

cultural pieces.

•  Length: around 8 pages.

•  Language: Pashto and Dari.

•  Publication: Weekly.

•  Existence: N/A.

Ihsas (Feelings)

A monthly color magazine covering political and social issues published by

Zawan Islami Tanzim, a youth wing of HIG.

•  Content: The magazine focus is not limited to Afghanistan, but covers the

broader Islamic community around the world. It also covers topics such as

religious issues, anti-Coalition forces rhetoric and propaganda, and wom-

en’s rights in Islam and the West. The front cover of its first publication

49

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

appeared on HIG youth wing’s Facebook page. Considering HIG youth

wing activities, it seems that the magazine distribution center is in their

stronghold Shamshato camp, a prominent Afghan HIG immigrant camp

near Peshawar, Pakistan.

•  Length: N/A.

•  Language: Pashto.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Existence: Since November 2010.

Resalat (Duty)

The masthead says that Resalat magazine is “a bimonthly independent, jihadi,

political and scientific publication. Proprietor of the magazine is the Martyr

Asadol ah Jihadwal Cultural Centre.”8

•  Content: Resalat publishes the views of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-

Islami as well as commentaries on jihad, Islam, politics; it offers scathing

editorials against the Afghan government and the presence of international

forces.

•  Length: Over 22 pages.

•  Language: Pashto and Dari.

•  Publication: Every other month.

•  Existence: N/A.

Zamir (Conscience)

An alleged weekly published by the Association for the Protection of the

Islamic Culture in Afghanistan. Little is known about this publication.

Published in Peshawar

Hittin

An Urdu magazine allegedly associated with al-Qaeda and produced by

Al-Fajr Media Center. It publishes articles discussing Qur’anic verses and

hadiths, justifying martyrdom not only against the United States, but also the

Pakistani army.

•  Content: Often commentaries on jihad, Islam, politics; it offers scathing

editorials against the Pakistani army.

50

MAGAZINES, CIRCULARS, AND NEWSLETTERS

•  Length: Over 60 pages.

•  Language: Urdu.

•  Publication: Once a month.

Wahdat

A daily publication covering politics and security in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

•  Content: Covers the political and security situation in Afghanistan and

Pakistan; offers editorials and Pashto poetry as well.

•  Length: 6 pages.

•  Publication: Daily.

•  Language: Pashto.

Nawa-i Afghan Jihad (Voice or melody of the Afghan jihad)

Affiliated with the Haqqani Network, this publication appears only in Urdu

and contains a litany of anti-government and anti-Coalition commentaries,

reports, and interviews with top insurgent commanders. The late Jalaluddin

Haqqani was interviewed on the use of suicide bombers in a November

2009 issue.

•  Content: Publishes insurgent commentary and editorials as well as inter-

views with known insurgent commanders.

•  Length: Approximately 30–50 pages.

•  Language: Urdu.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Existence: N/A.

Likwal

Pashto-language magazine offering commentary and editorials that defend the

rights of Pashtuns. It specifically covers developments in Pakistan and their

impact on the Pashtun people.

•  Content: Pashtun issues.

•  Length: Approximately 20 pages or more.

•  Publication: Monthly.

•  Language: Pashto.

51

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Hewad

Periodic newspaper.

•  Content: Offers commentaries critical of Pakistani government policies,

US foreign policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and chronicles the suffering

of Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line.

•  Length: 4 pages.

•  Language: Pashto.

•  Publication: Daily.

Khabroona

Periodic newspaper.

•  Content: Offers editorials regarding US foreign policy in Afghanistan and

Pakistan and India’s destabilizing role in the region. Also covers sports and

arts.

•  Length: 6 pages.

•  Language: Pashto.

•  Publication: Daily.

52

5

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH

(NIGHT LETTERS)1

Shabnamah (or night letters) are an effective means of communication, espe-

cially in rural Afghan areas. Night letters are part of the Afghan folklore,

which has many functions, especially in a rural illiterate society as found in

most parts of rural Afghanistan. According to Louis Dupree, folklore in

Afghanistan “explain[s] and justif[ies] the group[’s] existence […] define[s]

the ideal personality type, [and] describe[s] interpersonal, in-group and extra-

group relations.”2 Night letters are “framing instruments” that present “stories”

and serve a number of functions, with social control being one of them.

Opponents to the Afghan regime have often used night letters to mobilize

people against the government. The Mujahidin used them during the Soviet

invasion to rally support around their insurgency, and now the Taliban send

them to villages, at times covertly, to threaten people, call for jihad, and

announce a code of conduct for the population to follow. The Taliban benefit

from the lack of communication infrastructure and the high levels of illiteracy,

because it is hard for people to verify the accuracy of information in the letters

or more simply to be exposed to a different discourse or narrative.

One can also argue that the use of shabnamah is more than utilitarian for

the Taliban: symbolism is also important. Night letters are part of the Afghan

tradition and one can assume that people are more receptive to them than to

any other/new means of communication that would be foreign to their cul-

ture. The use of shabnamah is also testament to the Taliban’s ability to

53

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

immerse itself physically in the population, and also psychologically through

its ability to use terms and meanings that are culturally close to their audience

so as to mobilize or control it.

The Taliban’s primary target audience when disseminating shabnamah

remains the local population. The methods and techniques used at the rural,

district, and village level remain low-tech and cost-effective but are also

extremely potent. Large swathes of these areas, especially in the rural environs,

are generally devoid of technological media such as radio, television, internet,

landline telephones or printing presses, although this is changing slowly since

the US invasion of Afghanistan, especially with the relative abundance of cell

phones that are now appearing in the country’s rural areas. Nevertheless, in

these rural, hinterland areas, the populace is still largely isolated, illiterate, and

self-sustaining. Such communities remain vulnerable to Taliban infiltration

through low-tech means. The communication methods employed by the

Taliban in these areas consist of direct contact (oral communications), radio

transmissions, and the distribution of shabnamah—crudely written state-

ments posted on walls or doors inside villages, often at dead of night.3

Night letters were an effective tool during the Soviet–Afghan jihad, as sug-

gested above, and were quickly reinstated following the Taliban’s ousting in

November 2001. Interpreting the messages, themes, stories, and intended

audiences of these night letters is critical to understanding how the Taliban

intimidate and influence community decisions and actions.4

Night letters5 generally address an entire village or district and often

threaten violence or death if the demands of the letter are not met. Night

letters sometimes “advise” the intended audience, a whole district, village, or

influential community leaders, on issues of conduct or warn of an impending

attack. Night letter tropes can be summarized as:

•  an appeal to past Afghan struggles against “foreign invaders”: the Taliban

regularly play on how foreign powers have been historically defeated by the

peoples of Afghanistan

•  the battle between the Taliban and the Karzai or Ghani “puppet” regime

and its foreign coalition represents a “cosmic conflict” between the righ-

teous and the infidel. Afghans have a collective religious responsibility to

fight the apostates and invaders.

•  the Taliban’s enemies represent “crusaders” that are promoting Christianity

and attempting to destroy Islam

•  the power of “martyrdom”: brave Afghans will sacrifice themselves to save

Afghanistan

54

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

•  the fight against their enemies involves saving honor

•  supporting the enemy is prohibited. The penalty for ignoring the warnings

is usually death.

Table 5.1: Thematic lines of operation for night letters

Counter-collaboration: Threats are made against Afghan citizens, entire villages or

districts, tribal elders and or other influential personalities, for working with either

Coalition forces or the Afghan government. This also includes Afghan security per-

sonnel, translators, and “spies.”

Counter-education: Threats are made against schoolchildren, their parents, school

teachers, principals, administrators, and school facilities.

Counter-reconstruction: Threats are made against construction companies (both

domestic and international), laborers, the villages, and districts benefiting from such

projects, and the sites of the projects.

Counter-mobility: Threats are made against specific avenues, roadways, bazaars, or

other geographic areas. These threats are generally in the form of a warning for citizens

not to travel or go near areas during specific time frames due to an impending attack.

Counter-stability: Threats are made against tribal elders, civilians, women, religious

personalities, government officials, non-governmental organizations, and political/

factional parties.

Table 5.1 presents the general, thematic lines of night letters. As suggested,

these Taliban IO artifacts often focus on themes such as counter-col abora-

tion, counter-education, counter-reconstruction, counter-mobility, counter-

stability, and explicit tactical military directives.6

Given the simplicity, the cost-effectiveness, and the time-tested tradition of

night letters in Afghan society, the Taliban are not alone in using them as an

underground means of communication and intimidation. Several insurgent

groups operating independently, but who support the Taliban’s activities to

one degree or another, also distribute night letters, sometimes even co-author-

ing letters. Additionally, there is evidence that criminal elements also try to

exploit the fear these messages evoke by forging night letters in the name of

the Taliban.

As will be demonstrated below, night letters have played a critical role in

the information campaign employed by the Taliban in an effort to establish a

popular base for their insurgency, wrapped in the narrative of jihad against the

Kabul regime.

55

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Taliban night letter stories and narrative analysis

Night letters, as suggested above, have been a traditional and common instru-

ment of Afghan religious figures, jihadists, and rebels to encourage people,

especially (but not exclusively) in rural populations, to oppose both state

authority and regulations. Dupree’s seminal work on Afghanistan suggests

that such “framing” instruments, often in the form of folklore, performed a

variety of significant functions to include “social control,” where individuals

are told by illustration what they should or should not do and what rewards

or penalties they will incur for not following these norms.7 Taliban shabnamah

are often the modern manifestation of such folklore instruments and serve the

same purpose.

Traditionally, storytelling and narratives, especially oral history and shab-

namah, have been extremely important to the people of Afghanistan as well

as to the tribes in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border area. Unique and perva-

sive themes are found throughout Afghan poetry and literature that resonate

with Afghans. In many respects Afghanistan’s literature, arts, and music have

been critical dynamics for Afghan perseverance and adaptation. Narratives

also served an important role in Afghan social mobilization, be it peaceful or

violent. This has been especially true when tribal collective actions have inter-

sected with political opportunities.8 During the British colonialist period, for

example, anti-colonial literature encouraged rebellion against the British and

their patrons.

As suggested above, night letters and oral stories, as well as narratives, were

important instruments used by the Mujahidin against their Soviet occupiers.9

Resistance literature called for total opposition against the Soviets and their

“puppet” Afghan leaders and support for jihad to establish an Islamic order.

While a variety of means were used to deliver such messages to the Afghan

public, the particularly powerful media, especially in the rural areas, were

poems and music.10

Below is an example of a widely circulated Pashtun folk poem that was used

to transmit a narrative characterizing Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal as a

traitor:

O Babrak! Son of Lenin

You do not care for the religion and the faith

You may face your doom and

May you receive a calamity, O son of a traitor.

O son of Lenin.11

56

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Narratives were also used by the anti-Soviet Mujahidin against King Zahir

Shah and the royal family, as illustrated by a popular Mujahidin folk song

presented below. This narrative contrasts the sacrifices made by the anti-Soviet

Mujahidin with the exiled life of the Afghan king and how he had forsaken

his legacy and ultimate rewards:

You have none of your family fighting in Afghanistan,

Only the brave are here, you are

Enjoying life in Italy.

Wind of the morning, go tell Zahir Shah

There is no halwa [sweetmeat] for you in Afghanistan

The graves of your ancestors are here,

But there will be no grave for you in Afghanistan.12

Night letters were a particularly useful Mujahidin influence and intimida-

tion technique. In Nelofer Pazira’s biographical story, called A Bed of Red

Flowers, she describes night letters used to coordinate shop closings or other

activities designed to create solidarity among the anti-Soviet Afghan popula-

tion. One activity coordinated by the nocturnal campaign was a concert of

“Allah Akbar” s (God is Great) shouted from the rooftops of village houses.

This created a levée en masse effect toward the Soviet invaders, and reminded

the secular communists of the unifying power of Islam.

The next day we are tired but, as if concealing our night’s secret from the light of

day, we don’t talk about Allahu Akbar s, until Uncle Wahid arrives with the news.

In a silent rejection, all Kabul shopkeepers decided to keep their stores closed yes-

terday, February 22, 1980; they designated the night as the time to voice that day’s

protest. An anonymous nightly letter had been spread all over Kabul, asking people

to cry Allahu Akbar after dark, says Uncle Wahid. For the following two days,

Kabul shops remain shut, and for the third night in a row we are standing on the

roof, joining in this religious symphony. Until dawn we chant, “God is great.” We

are all so caught up in this rotation of rhythm and order that no one complains

about the lack of sleep … this is our welcome, Afghan-style, to the Soviet Invasion.13

The Taliban have adopted shabnamah as a well-tested, cost-effective

method of instruction and intimidation. The Taliban regularly post such let-

ters or leaflets during the night, warning of the “wrath” that villages will face

if they cooperate with US forces (the “Christian invaders”) or the Karzai

regime (“a US puppet”).14 The Taliban rely on the educated populace to trans-

mit the shabnamah to illiterate villagers. Often these “letters” are pasted to the

walls of mosques and government buildings and promise death to anyone who

defies their threats or instructions. They are typically aimed at symbols of

57

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

authority and supporters of the Kabul government, and often read as follows:

“Once this government falls, we will be in power. We will have your docu-

ments, your résumés, your names and your addresses. We will come and pun-

ish you.”

The Taliban have thus far been true to their word in sowing doubt and fear

among Afghans.15 As reported by Time Magazine:

Night letters left across southern Afghanistan, the Taliban’s stronghold, have

slowed government services and brought reconstruction projects to a halt. In

Kandahar province, many police officers have quit, and after letters appeared threat-

ening employees, two medical clinics were shut down. In the past two months,

insurgents have burned down 11 schools in the region. Night letters warning par-

ents to keep their children home presaged some of the attacks.16

The Taliban night letters represent a strategic and effective instrument,

crafting poetic diatribes which appeal to the moral reasoning of Afghan vil-

lagers. While many of the night letters represent overt intimidation, they also

present important insights into who and what the Taliban represent. The

quality and use of these letters have impressed professional US Information

and Psychological Operation (PYSOP) officers who consider them “eloquent

and impressive” and subsequently more effective than the vast majority of US

Information Operation artifacts.17

Figure 5.1 reproduces a Taliban night letter18 distributed in Kandahar in

2003 entitled “Message to the ‘Mujahid’ Afghan nation!” It is a good example

of the Taliban’s literary eloquence and poetic approach to persuasion, originat-

ing in historical intercultural communications found throughout Afghanistan

and Iran.19 This shabnamah references Afghanistan’s grand history and the

threat that Americans and their “cronies” pose to a historically great Islamic

Afghan government. The proclamation is addressed to the “Mujahid people”

of Afghanistan, intimating the notion that the country itself is engaged in a

jihad or lawful war against infidels and an apostate government. The label

“Mujahid,” as used in this narrative, does not apply solely to the Taliban but

rather to the Afghan population as a whole. The message suggests that all

Afghans have a role in this campaign against a common enemy of Islam, and

Afghans have an obligation to join the fight against the infidels.

The posting is a well-prepared story that helps frame the narrative reflecting

on the “illustrious” history of rule of three particular Afghan leaders who

harnessed the power of Islam. The first “ancestor and hero” mentioned is

Ahmad Shah Durrani (Abdali), founder of the Sadozai dynasty of the Abdali

who would establish the Durrani Afghan Empire in Kandahar in 1747. He is

58

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Figure 5.1: Taliban night letter, Kandahar, 2003

59

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 5.1

60

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Translation of Taliban Night Letter, Kandahar, 200320

Message to the “Mujahid” (freedom fighter) Afghan Nation!

You have served Islam a great deal throughout history and have defeated

the non-Muslims of the world. Your ancestors such as Ahmad Shah

Abdali, Mahmood Ghaznawi, Shahaabuddin Ghori and other heroes

have recorded a great history in fight against non-Muslims, but it is a pity

that today some America-trained servants, supposedly bright-minded,

have destroyed the honored history of Afghanistan. Today once again

your sons, clerics and Taliban and the faithful people in these circum-

stances are fighting against non-Muslims and are serving Islam. If you

don’t do anything else, at least support your Mujahid sons and do not be

impressed by the false propaganda of non-Muslim enemies. God knows,

one and half million martyrs of the jihad against the Russians and one

hundred thousand martyrs of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (mar-

tyred Taliban) will ask you for the cost of their martyrdom, so we hope

that you meet those expectations. They are stopping Islamic education

and instead are teaching Christianity to your children. The Taliban never

want to kill common civilians, but unfortunately some so-called Afghans

have become the supporters of our enemies. Non-Muslims want to kill

and pit Afghan against Afghan; in the name of (attacking the) Taliban

they are attacking everybody, they are killing Afghans and destroying your

houses, and they are destroying Islamic madrasas in Afghanistan. They

burn Afghan arms and ammunitions. They want to make Afghanistan as

helpless as Palestine. You have seen that in all madrasas (Islamic schools)

nowadays they teach Christianity to your children. Once again, we

request you not to support non-Muslims, otherwise you will have the

whole responsibility here and hereafter.

Be happy

Poem

I was so sad you laughed

I was caring for Islam and you betrayed us

How can you call yourself an Afghan

Instead of me, you supported a non-Muslim

61

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Document 5.1: Shabnamah story “Message to the ‘Mujahid’

Afghan nation!”

Afghans throughout history have defeated infidel invaders while pre-

serving their Islamic way of life. Numerous Afghan leaders throughout

history, including the father of our nation, Ahmad Shah Durrani

(Abdali), have demonstrated this. The infidel Americans along with

their apostate Afghan puppets are attempting to destroy our nation, our

way of life, and our religion. Your families and clerics and the Taliban,

as well as all faithful Afghans, are fighting these evil people in the name

of Islam. You must support your faithful sons as well the memory of

half a million anti-Soviet Afghan jihadists who were martyred during

our destruction of the Soviet infidel invaders. Beware of the false teach-

ings of the infidels who want to destroy Islam and bring Christianity to

Afghanistan. We see the Americans destroying our schools and killing

faithful civilians as well as our religious “seekers.” Afghanistan. They

want to make us as helpless as the Palestinians. If you don’t support the

Taliban’s efforts, you are not an Afghan but rather a betrayer who will

face punishment forever.

considered by many as the “father” of modern Afghanistan. While Ghilzai

members of the Taliban have long disdained the Durranis, Ahmad Shah is

revered by all Afghans. Sykes’s History of Afghanistan calls Ahmad Shah “a

monarch whose high descent and warlike qualities made him peculiarly

acceptable to his aristocratic and virile Chiefs, as well as to his warlike subjects

in general. In short, he possessed all the qualities that enabled him successfully

to found the Kingdom of Afghanistan.”21

The second “ancestor and hero” referenced is Sultan Mahmud Ghaznawi, a

young Turkic (non-Afghan) king who ascended the throne around the year

1000 and embarked on Ghaznavid empire-building that represented “one of

the great renaissances of the Early Islamic period.”22 Mahmud was considered

a great general who conducted at least seventeen successful campaigns against

India. According to Dupree: “He added northwest India and the Punjab to

his empire, and enriched his treasury by looting wealthy Hindu temples.

Probably more important, Mahmud’s mullahs converted many Hindus to

Islam.”23 Historians, such as Caroe, trace the origin of the Ghilzai nation to

the Turkish tribes of the Ghaznavid empire.24 Hence, the reference to

62

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Mahmud could be al uding to the glorious genealogy of the Ghilzai, a very

important Taliban dynamic during this period.

The early political Taliban of 1994 primarily consisted of rural Pashtuns

from the Ghilzai nation25 with some support from the Kakar tribe of the

Ghurghusht nation.26 The composition of the Taliban has since changed, in

many respects, to reflect the local demographics and tribes of the specific areas

where they are operating. The Ghilzai are descendants of the great nomad

clans ( powindah) of Sulaiman Khel, and the Aka Khel are the largest Afghan

tribal confederation, including the tribes of Sulaiman Khel, Ali Khel, Aka

Khel, Taraki, Nasirs, Tokhis, Hotaks, and Khototi.27

Much of the original Taliban leadership, including the late Mullah

Mohammed Omar, came from the Hotak Ghilzai tribe that held power in

Afghanistan in the eighteenth century and for a time even possessed the

throne of Isfahan (Persia). The Hotaki Ghilzais under Mir Wais Ghilzai

achieved historical fame as the liberators of Kandahar from Safavid control in

1709. In 1722 the Hotaki served as the leading tribe in the invasion of Persia

and destruction of the Persian Empire.28 The importance, remembrance, and

implications of such a proud history in tribal Afghanistan stupefy many

Western analysts.

Nadir Shah ended the Ghilzai regime in 1737. After the assassination of

Nadir Shah in 1747, the Afghans established the first “modern” Afghan gov-

ernment in Kandahar after they elected Ahmed Shah Durrani as their ruler.

The Ghilzai have traditionally held a strong animosity toward the Durrani

Pashtuns, who took power from the Ghilzai and have held it almost continu-

ously for the last 300 years.29 The Durranis have provided all of Afghanistan’s

modern kings, a fact not lost on the Ghilzai. Only four times have the Ghilzai

seized national power: in 1721, when Mir Wais took the throne; in 1978, after

a coup against Mohammed Daoud by Marxist military officers, who immedi-

ately handed over power to the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of

Afghanistan leader Nur Mohammed Taraki;30 again in 1996, when Mullah

Omar came to power and with the election of President Mohammad Ashraf

Ghani in September 2014. Since the demise of Mir Wais Ghilzai and his

empire, the Ghilzai have hated the Durranis, their arch-rivals and the tribe of

former President Hamid Karzai.

The divisions between Durrani and Ghilzai Afghans have been at the root

of centuries of conflict and intrigue in Afghanistan. Such issues were inti-

mately involved in the demographics of Peshawar politics during the anti-

Soviet jihad.31 In fact, a case can be made for the politics of the Afghan war

63

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

being a virtual Ghilzai affair. Khalq’s Ghilzai leaders, Hafizullah Amin and

Muhammad Taraki, began the process with the 1978 coup. Khalqi officers,

many of who were Ghilzai, dominated the Afghan military forces. Babrak

Karmal (with Durrani connections) was replaced by Najibul ah, one of the

few Parchamis with Ghilzai roots. Except for Babrak Karmal, the great

Durrani Pashtun confederation had little representation on either side of the

conflict. Khalqi members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) were committed to breaking the established tradition of Durrani

rule.32 Some spoke of the Marxist usurpation and the war as Ghilzai revenge

against Durrani dominance. On the resistance side, as suggested above, nearly

all the key Mujahidin parties were led by or had strong ties to the Ghilzai.

Ethnic rivalry, perhaps more than Islamic ideology, was even responsible for

the refusal of the Peshawar parties to accept former King Zahir Shah into

Mujahidin politics.33

The final “ancestor and hero” reference in the night letter of Document 5.1

is to Shahab al-Din Ghuri of the Ghurid dynasty, who ruled from 1173 to

1206 and controlled the entire eastern caliphate encompassing much of

Afghanistan, eastern Iran, and modern Pakistan.34 His numerous invasions of

India and his powerful rule helped construct a widespread and long-lasting

historical memory framed by heroism and sacrifice through Afghan genera-

tions. Although Ghaznawi and Ghuri were not Afghan by birth, history

granted them an Afghan pedigree and the two kings are still honored as

heroes. Hence, the Taliban night letter uses the collective historical memory

of Afghans handed down through generations to frame their intellectual argu-

ment against popular support of the Karzai regime and American forces. The

shabnamah’s narrative glorifies those who have fought and converted infidels

to the righteous path: the goal of the Taliban.

This

shabnamah also represented a clear challenge to the Karzai regime, its

expatriate members, and proffers that “it is a pity that today some American-

trained servants … have destroyed the honored history of Afghanistan.” The

letter also follows the time-honored Afghan practice of attacking foreign

influence: a xenophobic message that has historically resonated with many of

the Afghan people, because this is what the Karzai government and the

Americans represented in the eyes of the Taliban.

A clear distinction is made between “Muslims” and “non-Muslims” as the

Taliban appeal to the “true Islamic believers” and decry the “false propaganda

of non-Muslim enemies.” The letter appeals to the population’s gratitude and

appreciation for the “martyrs” of the Soviet occupation and the Taliban’s bat-

64

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

tles during Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), even citing

casualty statistics. The letter states that the Taliban are against killing common

citizens, but at times it cannot be avoided. On the other hand, the shabnamah

argues that supporters of the Karzai regime and the Americans are not

“Afghans” and are open targets.

It is interesting to note that this night letter made its appearance during

the height of the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reorganization (DDR)

campaign, aimed at ridding the country of weapons and convincing reluctant

and recalcitrant regional and warlord militia members to support the Karzai

regime. The letter states that “Non-Muslims want to kill Afghans by Afghans

while they burn their arms and ammunitions.” The author of the letter obvi-

ously believes that disarmament is ludicrous while Afghanistan’s enemies are

“killing” Afghans. During the 1990s there were more personal weapons in

Afghanistan than in India and Pakistan combined. “By some estimates more

such weapons had been shipped into Afghanistan during the previous decade

than to any other country in the world.”35 Afghans and especially the

Pashtuns revel in a “gun culture.” One of the first sounds that a rural Afghan

male infant hears after he is born, immediately after praise to Allah, is the

firing of guns celebrating his birth. An appeal against DDR is not only a clear

indication that the Taliban tracked aspects of the Bonn Process, especially

those that have the potential to impact on their insurgent actions; it is also,

more importantly, a recognition that the Taliban understand that taking

away a Pashtun’s gun is equivalent to taking away his manhood. While the

Taliban undoubtedly do not want Afghans, especially their supporters, to

give up their weapons and become “helpless,” the narrative is appealing to a

deeper characteristic that resonates with nearly every Pashtun. Indeed guns

are intimately related to the Pashtun tribal code of Pashtunwali and “as a

result … most [Pashtun] males become acquainted with weapons in their

early childhood and develop a keen sense of marksmanship.”36 The Pashtun’s

affinity for weapons has traditionally plagued every state’s attempt to enforce

its own rule of law in deference to Pashtunwali.

The document does not communicate any direct threat against the US

military, but it does insinuate that Americans destroyed mosques and madra-

sas in order to re-educate Afghan children about Christianity. Such a narrative

is presented to create mistrust and apprehension among the Afghan popula-

tion. Afghanistan is 99.5 per cent Muslim, and religion is and always has been

a central characteristic of the Afghan people.

The letter warns that the enemies “want to make Afghanistan as helpless

as Palestine.” An emphasis on the plight of the Palestinians has been a cen-

65

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

tral focal and rallying point for Islamists for decades. In the past, Islamic

struggles outside Afghanistan have not been an explicit mantra of the

Afghan resistance. The Mujahidin, for example, had a more immediate and

limited goal of liberating Afghanistan from the Soviets and fighting the

puppet government they installed in Kabul. “They had no intention or

desire to turn their country into a theater or camp from which to wage

global jihad against either other Muslim governments or Western states.”37

It is interesting that the Taliban, who in the past have never represented a

transnational jihadist organization, would focus on more global struggles,

even indirectly in their shabnamah.

The letter concludes with a poem that is aimed at invoking respect and

striking a chord in the receivers’ historical memory. As suggested in Chapter

1, message repetition provides a way to remember facts or messages and

enhances the delivery method with emotion anchored in cultural traditions.

It is likely that this proclamation was read aloud by an educated village elder

to illiterate members of the local populace with an emphasis on the poem at

the end of the letter, possibly even reading it twice to allow the audience to

experience the power of the poem.

Figure 5.2 presents a shabnamah that is an example of a warning letter tar-

geted at the populace of the Kandahar province towns of Ma’ruf and

Arghistan.38 Unlike the night letter examined above, this letter appears

quickly constructed and warns the Afghan population against supporting

the Americans.

The letter was written in Pashto and warns the residents of Ma’ruf and

Arghistan against cooperating with the Americans. It explicitly suggests that

the Taliban will kill all those that cooperate with the Americans once the

Americans leave. The point is emphasized by asserting that “the Americans

will not always be there” to protect those who chose to cooperate. Moreover,

the letter states that the Taliban “know” the names and location of col abora-

tors and compare these present-day col aborators with those who were “loyal”

to the Russians during the anti-Soviet jihad.

Such a message is typical of messages delivered by Taliban mul ahs speaking

to rural village elders. They are fond of saying, “the Americans have the wrist-

watches, but we have the time.” The simple message they deliver in person or

by night letter such as the one presented in Document 5.2 is one of intimida-

tion: “The Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventu-

ally they will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this village and

kill every family that has col aborated with the Americans or the Karzai gov-

66

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Figure 5.2: Warning letter to the people of Ma’ruf and Arghistan, Kandahar

province

Translation of Figure 5.239

We inform those people of Ma’ruf district who serve Americans day and

night and reveal the places of Mujahidin to them, or those who dis-

honor sincere Muslims of the country, that American guards will not

always be there and we can catch you any time.

We know the name and place of every person. Learn a lesson from those

who were loyal to the Russians. (If God wills) soon you will come under

the knife or bullet of Mujahidin.

Document 5.2: Shabnamah story

We warn all those apostate people living in the Ma’ruf district who tell

the American enemies the Taliban plans or their whereabouts that they

not only greatly dishonor faithful Muslim Afghans, but will also meet

a dreadful fate by a knife or a bullet. The Americans cannot save you—

God wills it—just as the infidel Russians could not save those traitor

Afghans who supported and were loyal to their efforts. The Taliban

know the Afghans who dishonor themselves and all sincere Afghans by

helping the enemies of Afghanistan.

67

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

ernment.” Such a message is devastatingly effective in these areas where

transgenerational feuds and revenge are a fabric of the society. It is also an

effective message to keep NGOs and reconstruction activities out of areas

which the Taliban control.

If one assumes that the center of gravity for both the insurgency and coun-

ter-insurgency is popular support and for the Kabul government to succeed,

it must deliver reconstruction, infrastructure, and services to the hinterlands

(areas which have thus far received virtually nothing), then the Taliban’s strat-

egy has proven very effective. To reiterate, the three fundamental problems in

Afghanistan that have allowed the Taliban’s re-emergence are:

•  the inability of the national government to establish a politically significant

presence throughout the country;

•  the failure of Kabul as well as the international community to create a secure

rural environment, especially in the south, advantageous to even minimal

development and reconstruction;

•  the unfulfilled expectations of the people in the southern half of the coun-

try who have had no meaningful improvement in the lives, despite the fact

that they live in an environment where, at the time, one child in five dies

before the age of five and 90 per cent of the population lives in conditions

little changed since Alexander the Great.40

The hinterlands of the east and south remain impoverished wastelands with

few schools and roads and little prospect of a better life for the vast majority

of the population. A poll conducted in 2005, when this night letter was sent,

showed that six out of ten Afghans had no electricity and only 3 per cent had

it consistently.41 Significant change has not happened since this poll was taken,

especially in the south, despite the fact that the US has spent considerable

money “developing” Afghanistan: in total $113.1 billion, or $10 billion more,

adjusted for inflation, than the amount the United States committed in

civilian assistance (the Marshall Plan) to help rebuild Western Europe after

World War II.42

The Taliban are well aware of this and continue to put up obstacles to

inhibit Kabul or the international community from bettering the lives of the

average Afghan villager. Whole districts in provinces such Helmand,

Oruzgan, Zabol, Paktika, Ghazni, Wardak, and Logar (to name but a few)

are essentially war zones with virtually no chance of rehabilitating fractured

infrastructures: a prerequisite for the US long-standing tactics of counter-

insurgency in the country.

68

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Figure 5.3 presents a Taliban night story and its translation from the Wardak

province, authored by “the Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”

This shabnamah is significantly different from the other night letters examined

here. The message uses language which mimics that regularly used by transna-

tional jihadist organizations and intimates that the ultimate goal of the Afghan

insurgency has a global dimension. This message is in stark contrast with the

shabnamah presented in Document 5.2 written in 2004. The significant differ-

ences between these two letters suggest that the Afghan insurgency had the

ambition of morphing into a campaign with more transnational concerns,

something that we have not seen.

One theme of the letter is: do not associate with or help the Karzai regime

and Coalition forces, or you will be judged as one of them (“One who lends a

hand to infidels to transgress [against Muslims] is one of them”). This message

of intimidation, as we have seen earlier, is clearly a cornerstone of Taliban

night letter narratives.

This letter, like many other Taliban shabnamah, has considerably more

Islamic references than the narratives assessed above (or below). Juergensmeyer

suggests that religious tropes are more likely to play a narrative role if the

confrontation between two groups can be characterized as a “cosmic struggle

or battle.” This is most likely in the following circumstances:

1. If the struggle is perceived as a defense of basic identity and dignity.

2. If losing the struggle would be unthinkable.

3. If the struggle is “blocked” and cannot be won in real time or in real

terms.43

The first two circumstances are valid for the Taliban. The Taliban view their

insurgency/jihad, as evidenced in their shabnamah, as a struggle over basic

questions of identity and culture: it must be won, and losing is not an option.

The third circumstance was probably also valid until mid-2004. Since then,

however, the emboldened Taliban insurgency has shown real signs of success

since their reconstitution in early 2004.

The

shabnamah invokes the name of Allah via a standard greeting and

begins by rallying the population against the “crusaders” and “their domestic

servants.” The use of the term “crusaders” is significant. This terminology was

often used by Osama bin Laden when he referred to the conflict in

Afghanistan as a battle between “a crusader army” and Islam.44 The use of this

terminology suggests that the United States and its al ies are waging a crusade

against Islam, and this “aggression” is not an isolated conflict, but rather the

69

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 5.3: Night letter, Wardak45

70

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Translation of Figure 5.346

The Prophet of God Mohammed (peace be upon Him) says: One who

lends a hand to infidels to transgress [against Muslims] is one of them.

By the Islamic Devoted Mujahidin, In the name of Allah, the most

merciful and most compassionate

Statement

Pious Afghans, Brave and Courageous People! Accept our greetings.

Dear Muslim and devout brother! As you all know, some countries in

the Islamic world, and specifically our dear country Afghanistan, have

spent day and night under the grip of the crusaders over the last few

years. During this time the cruel crusaders’ army and their domestic

servants have committed grave atrocities, barbarity, and savagery against

our innocent brothers and sisters. Their cruelties have not ceased. You

have watched and heard of their ongoing savagery in Afghanistan and

Iraq, the two best examples that have been exposed by the international

media. Therefore, the Afghan Muslim Mujahidin have initiated their

sacred jihad to gain the independence of our beloved country from the

crusader powers. The jihad will continue until in the end we defeat of

the crusaders’ army, and establish a pure Islamic State (Inshal ah).

Therefore, the Afghan Muslim Mujahidin offer the following related

guidelines to help obtain our goals, and earnestly ask all Afghans to

respect them seriously:

1. All those who work for and are in the service of the crusader army,

cooperate militarily or logistically with them, and carry oil, food

and similar things for them: you are strongly warned to stop coop-

erating with them promptly; otherwise, you will face serious

consequences.

2. All those who do business with the crusaders are asked to avoid

doing business with them, so as not to suffer during the exalted strike

of the Mujahidin on the crusaders.

3. We seriously ask all persons not to expose the holy names of the

Mujahidin to the crusaders’ army and to their Afghan slaves during

the exalted strike of Mujahidin on them, and likewise we ask those

Afghans who spy for the Americans and for their Afghan slaves to

71

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

stop doing this evil act, otherwise they will be punished at the hands

of the holy Mujahidin according to Shar’iah.

4. We ask all Muslims to cooperate wholeheartedly with their

Mujahidin brothers and to join their ranks and to support jihad, so

as to perform their religious duty properly.

5. We ask all those who spread false allegations against Mujahidin to

stop their evil acts. The Mujahid power is not based on any foreign

support, it is founded on Al ah’s blessing and the will of the Afghan

Muslim people.

(God grand success to the Mujahid everywhere and always.)

The Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Religious

Scholars say: Cooperation with infidels, under any circumstance and

for any reason and excuse, in any form, is an open blasphemy that needs

no deliberation.

Afghanistan’s Devoted Mujahidin.

Document 5.3: Shabnamah story

Brave and courageous Afghan Muslim brother, for many years the

attacking crusaders have ravaged Afghanistan and other Islamic coun-

tries such as Iraq. The crusaders as well as their Afghan apostate slaves

have committed savage atrocities against innocent Afghans that have

been exposed by the world’s media. In response to such barbarity,

Afghan Muslim jihadists have fought courageously to free Afghanistan,

and the Mujahidin will continue to fight until the crusaders’ armies are

totally defeated and we can again establish a pure Islamic State. All

Afghans working for the crusaders must immediately stop cooperating

and doing business with them or they will suffer grave consequences

from the Mujahidin. Moreover, all Afghans must immediately stop

exposing the Mujahidin to the crusaders or their Afghan apostate slaves.

Failure to do this will result in grave punishment sanctioned by

Shar’iah. All Afghans have a holy obligation to join and support the

jihad. All that we ask is according to Al ah’s will and blessings.

72

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

latest episode in a long chain of conflicts that have been targeted at Muslims.

While there is no evidence suggesting that al-Qaeda or an Afghan–Arab

wrote this letter, the language used is very similar to the regular terminology

used by al-Qaeda. It proclaims a clash of civilizations.

The declaration accuses the “crusaders and their domestic servants” of

unceasing “atrocities, barbarity and savagery against our innocent brothers

and sisters” in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these conflicts represent, in

the eyes of the Taliban, defensive jihads against a Christian onslaught that will

continue until the “defeat of the crusaders’ army,” and “the establishment of a

pure Islamic State.” The jihad, according to this message, is a collective respon-

sibility of all Muslims and the shabnamah instructs Afghans to:

•  offer no assistance or cooperation to US or Afghan National Armed Forces

or “face serious consequences”

•  not divulge the identity (“holy names”) of the insurgents

•  end the “evil act” of spying for the enemy or “be punished at the hands of

the holy Mujahidin according to Shar’iah”

•  cooperate and join the Taliban “so as to perform … religious duty properly”

The letter concludes by suggesting that those who ignore the advice and

instructions of the shabnamah will be dealt with swiftly without deliberation.

Such a response, claims the night letter, has been sanctified by “religious

scholars”—a powerful message to Afghans.

Many of the Islamic underpinnings reflected in this shabnamah have been

a component of the past Afghan resistance movements. For example, Hazarat

Shaib or Mul ah Shor Bazar (a member of the Mujadidi family) was an impor-

tant Afghan religious figure whose Ghilzai tribal army or lashkar 47 inflicted

heavy losses on the British during the Third Anglo-Afghan war of 1919.

Hazarat Shaib would later defeat the Afghan reform-minded King Amanul ah

Khan and assisted Nadir Kahn to overthrow Bacha Saqqao in 1929.48 Other

religious leaders such as Mirwais Khan Hotaki and Mul ah Mushki Alam also

organized lashkars that fought against the British occupation of Afghanistan.

And of course during the anti-Soviet jihad, talibs (or religious students) regu-

larly fought alongside the Mujahidin, mainly under the leadership of

Mohammad Nabi and his Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Islami

(Khalis). But none of these movements had explicit global goals aimed at the

Islamic Ummah.

The role of the Taliban in the larger global Islamist jihad has been a ques-

tion that has baffled researchers. Most would agree with Fawaz Gerges when

73

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

he suggests that Afghan resistance has never been focused outside the Afghan

border.49 The message portrayed in the shabnamah of Document 5.3, however,

indicates that this position could change if the Taliban garner strength and

other international events turn against the West (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Libya). There

is ample evidence to suggest that the late Mul ah Omar appealed to the global

Ummah,50 but he as well as the Taliban have traditionally not pursued actions

directly and explicitly aimed at this audience.

Figures 5.4 and 5.5 present night letters that represent messages of intimi-

dation against schools and teachers involved in girls’ education. The

Taliban’s strict views against girls’ education are related primarily to its views

concerning the “protection” of a woman’s honor, emanating from the code

of Pashtunwali in which women are forbidden to participate in most public

events and processes outside their kin group. The authority of the kin is a

male prerogative. Gulick describes such kin relations as an expression of the

“peril and refuge mentality.” He observes that the kin who provide a person

with social, emotional, and, if necessary, armed support are also competitors

for the same resources. In the case of women, the same brothers and fathers

with whom they are so close and who are their protectors are also their

executioners, should the males doubt the daughter’s or sister’s chastity.

These are also the relatives who know the person best and to whom he or she

is consequently most vulnerable.51

The Taliban have consistently pursued a campaign against girls’ education

by burning schools and attacking teachers. The Afghan Ministry of Education

has reported that hundreds of schools have been forced to stop classes: a third

of them in the south because of Taliban intimidation.52 The draconian writs

against female education during the reign of the Taliban are well documented

and are likely to continue into the future.

Figure 5.4 presents a letter from 2005 found in Kapisa posted to a tree three

days before a boys’ school in the area was set on fire. The letter was apparently

posted by the “Taliban Islamic Movement representative of Parwan and

Kapisa provinces” and represents a “warning” against female education.

According to Human Rights Watch, other shabnamah were also found in the

school. The shabnamah warns both ulema and teachers alike not to attempt

to educate girls. It suggests that the Taliban knows who violate this edict and

that they will be dealt with appropriately.

Taliban incidents like burning tents and school buildings, explosions near

schools, and threats to women teachers are well documented and were a focus

of international concern during the reign of the Taliban. Threats such as those

74

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Figure 5.4: Warning from Taliban Islamic movement, representative of Parwan and

Kapisa provinces53

Translation of Figure 5.4

This is a warning to all those dishonorable people, including ulema and

teachers, not to teach girls. Based on the information given to us, we

strongly ask those people whose names been particularly reported to us

not to commit this act of evil. Otherwise, it is they who bear all the

responsibilities. They have no right to claim that they have not been

informed.

This is to inform all those who have enrolled at boys’ schools to stop

going to schools. An explosion might occur inside the school com-

pounds. In case of getting hurt, it is they who bear all the responsibili-

ties. They have no right to claim that they have not been informed.

75

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Document 5.4: Shabnamah story

Ulema and teachers who are educating girls are dishonorable and acting

in an evil, un-Islamic fashion. We know who is doing this and we demand

that they immediately stop teaching girls. This is a grave warning to al

those dishonorable people not to teach girls. You have been warned and

should not be surprised if we seek reprisal. We also demand that boys stop

going to schools, because destruction of these schools could happen. You

have been warned, so don’t be surprised if something happens. If some-

thing does happen and someone is hurt, you will be responsible.

delivered in the narrative of this night letter cannot be taken lightly. In January

2006 Malim Abdul Habib, headmaster of Shaikh Mathi Baba high school,

which is attended by 1,300 boys and girls, was stabbed eight times before he

was decapitated in the courtyard of his home in Qalat, Zabul.54

The second part of the letter warns students not to go to boys’ schools: “an

explosion might occur inside the school compounds. If anyone gets hurt, it is

they who will bear all the responsibilities. They have no right to claim that

they have not been informed.” This threat levied at a boys’ school that was

constructed by a US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) represents an

additional indication of the Taliban’s strategy of negating most reconstruction

and infrastructure development in the Afghan hinterlands.

The

shabnamah presented in Figure 5.5 is my interpretation of an example

of Taliban intimidation directed at a specific individual: Fatima Moshtaq, the

then Ghazni province director of education. Threats were apparently directed

against Moshtaq because of her role in female education. She was warned that

both she and her family were in grave danger. The letter calls on her to resign

her position: in the eyes of the Taliban, a position that should never be held

by a woman. Similar threats have been directed at numerous government

officials by Taliban night letters.

Local education officials in Ghazni blamed the Taliban for scores of the

attacks on educational institutions. According to Human Rights Watch during

2004–5, 31 per cent of students officially enrolled in Ghazni schools were girls.

In two of the eighteen provincial districts that happen to lie in southern Ghazni

and are areas of significant Taliban activity, no girls had enrolled in school:55 yet

another indication that the Taliban intimidation campaign was succeeding.

76

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Figure 5.5: Taliban night letter from Ghazni56

77

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Translation of Figure 5.5

Greetings to the respected director [of education] of Ghazni province,

Fatima Moshtaq.

I have one request, that you step aside from your duties. Otherwise, if

you don’t resign your position and continue your work, something will

happen that will transform your family and you to grief. I am telling you

this as a brother, that I consider you a godless person. I am telling you

to leave your post and if you continue your work, I will do something

that doesn’t have a good ending. It should not be left unsaid that one

day in the Jan Malika school I heard Wali Sahib praise Ahmad Shah

Masood. I wanted to transform your life to death and with much regret

Wali Assadullah was present there and I didn’t do anything to cause

your death. But if you don’t resign your work, I will attack you to death.

With respects.

27 Meezan 1384 [At the bottom, last paragraph]

Look, dear Fatima, consider your poor employee who will suffer. He

was in front of the house, look at how many bodyguards you have, for

instance the one who was there, but if you have them, it doesn’t matter

to us. I was following you from 4 in the afternoon till 7 at night.

With respects.

Document 5.5: Shabnamah story

This message is meant for Fatima Moshtaq, the education director of

Ghazni province. Your actions have demonstrated that you are an infi-

del and godless person. If you do not resign from your position, harm

will come to both you and your family. We have heard that in the Jan

Malika School, Wali Sahib praised Ahmad Shah Masood; this is unac-

ceptable. If you do not resign you will be killed. We have already fol-

lowed you and your employee and will strike when your bodyguards are

not present.

78

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Finally, Figure 5.6 presents a 2003 Kandahar shabnamah with its transla-

tion. After the recitation of a Qur’anic verse (“Jihad is a right in Al ah’s Path:

Jihad yesterday, Jihad until the Day of Judgment”), this proclamation authored

by “Jamiat-e Jaish al Muslemin” presents a series of specific actions and instruc-

tions that Kandaharis who worked with the Karzai government (“American

puppets”) were to follow:

•  immediately quit your government or NGO job,

•  do not use government vehicles and do not go to areas where such vehicles

have been damaged or destroyed,

•  never go to a feast where government officials are to be present,

•  ulema as well as community leaders should not attend governmental shuras,

•  women and girls are forbidden any educational participation,

•  Muslim cars should not use the roads used by government officials,

•  do not transport American equipment,

•  avoid hotels frequented by Westerners.

These instructions represent an integrated program to obstruct government

operations in Kandahar.

The letter of 2003 appears to foreshadow the use of improvised explosive

devises (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devises (VBIEDs) as

well as suicide bombings, presently a grave concern and a tactic previously

unknown in Afghanistan. Despite a quarter-century of war before 2004, sui-

cide attacks in Afghanistan had been relatively rare. “Suicide is not a charac-

teristic tactic of the Afghan people … they have a cultural aversion to it.”57

Only five suicide attacks, none of which targeted civilians, were reported

during the first three and a half years after the Taliban were driven from power

in November 2001. This dynamic changed drastically in 2004.58

The use of IEDs has demonstrated an unusual level of internal coordination

and a growing technological sophistication in the Afghan insurgency. Since the

summer of 2004, a variety of guerrilla tactics, including assassinations and kid-

nappings, have occurred in Afghanistan59 suggesting that insurgents were bor-

rowing tactics from Iraq.60 The late Mul ah Dadul ah, a primary spokesman for

the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan in 2005 and at the time one of the their

most combative commanders, claimed that the Taliban had registered 500

Afghans ready to be used as suicide bombers against “the intruders who have

occupied our Islamic country” and that Taliban from outlying districts had

entered cities to launch attacks. “Now we are going to change our tactics, using

a new weapon we did not have in the past, to target US and al ied forces … We

will create a big problem for them.”61 His prediction proved to be correct.62

79

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 5.6: Night letter from Kandahar63

80

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

Translation of Figure 5.664

(Arabic Qur’anic verse): Jihad is right in Al ah’s path: Jihad yesterday,

Jihad until the Day of Judgment

Jamiat-e Jaish al Muslemin

Announcement

Date: 24/Moharram/1424 [23 April 2003]

1. This letter aims to address those who are Muslim but work with the

current American puppet government, either for money or, assum-

ing they serve Islam, to abandon their jobs immediately.

2. Muslims, do not use government vehicles.

3. Whenever a governmental vehicle is exploded or damaged by any

means, Muslims do not go there in order to have a look at the site.

4. Where there is a feast, Muslims should not go there with govern-

ment officials, because danger may threaten them.

5. Respected Muslim do not go to [illegible] because whoever goes

there commits double sins: one, they commit [illegible]; and sec-

ond, they rescue government officials.

6. Ulema and influential leaders of the community should not go to

the governmental shura (council).

7. Those women who are teachers, and adult girls who are students,

should not go to school.

8. Muslim cars should not use the roads used by government officials’

cars.

9. All Muslims should desist from transporting American equipment

and oil in their cars.

10. Muslims should avoid going to places where foreigners stay, such as

hotels, etc.

11. Muslims should not work in organizations [NGOs], because

Americans use those NGOs for their own purposes.

12. Muslims’ sons who are working with the current infidel’s govern-

ment should get out of it immediately. Those, whoever, who act in

opposition to the above-mentioned rule bear the mortal and eter-

nal responsibilities.

Al-Salaam

81

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Document 5.6: Shabnamah story from Jamiat-e Jaish al Muslemin

Jihad is the most important path one can take in life. If you are working

for the puppet Afghan government, you must immediately quit your

job. No true Muslims should travel in government vehicles because they

will be destroyed. All Afghan Muslims must avoid any fests where

Afghan puppet officials are present, as well as roads traveled by puppet

government officials, because danger will strike them. Afghans should

also avoid hotels and other places where foreigners reside. Religious

elders and community leaders must also avoid going to government

councils. Afghan women must not teach in schools and Afghan girls

must not go to schools. Muslim cars should never be used to transport

American equipment. Nor should honorable Afghans work for NGOs

that are controlled by the Americans or the Afghan puppet and apostate

government. If these instructions are not followed, grave mortal and

eternal circumstances will occur.

The great majority of the early suicide attacks carried out during 2004–6

appeared to be “outsourced” to non-Afghans, most often to Punjabis from the

south of Pakistan and young foreign Islamists recruited from radical groups in

the Middle East. Such attacks targeted government officials such as Hakim

Taniwal, governor of Afghanistan’s Paktia province; during his funeral another

suicide bomber detonated an explosive device, killing at least an additional six

people. Recent attacks have also targeted US and Coalition forces.

Conclusion

In summary, shabnamah are a traditional means of communicating in

Afghanistan. As we saw above, the Taliban use them as warnings or instruc-

tions to the local population to refrain from cooperating with the interna-

tional forces or the government. Many of the stories of these letters reference

Afghanistan’s history and the threat that the international forces pose to the

Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and are addressed to the “Mujahid

People.” The implication of this type of message and story is that all Afghans

have a role in the resistance to a common enemy of Islam and Afghanistan and

are obligated to fight. Other letters suggest that the Taliban will kill all those

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THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

who cooperate with the Americans or the Kabul “puppet” government. Some

letters, as we say above, even go so far as to target specific people or schools

and teachers involved in the education of girls. Much of the effectiveness of

these letters is based on the mere presence of the letters themselves. Not only

do these letters confirm the presence of Taliban in the area but they are usually

accompanied by some direct action as well.

Analysts and observers have argued that “the Taliban are now drawing

increasing support from the Afghan population.”65 While it is impossible to

evaluate specifically how the Taliban’s night letter campaign has contributed

to this “support,” Taliban narratives have clearly resonated; where their mes-

sages have not resonated with the population, the Taliban have compensated

by waging an effective intimidation campaign.

The Taliban’s shabnamah story themes66 can be summarized as:

•  an appeal to past Afghan struggles against “foreign invaders”: the Taliban

regularly play on how foreign powers have been historically defeated by the

peoples of Afghanistan.

•  the battle between the Taliban and the Kabul’s “puppet” regime and its for-

eign coalition represents a “cosmic conflict” between the righteous and the

infidel. Afghans have a collective religious responsibility to fight the apos-

tates and invaders. Afghans “must not” offer any assistance or cooperation

to US or Afghan National Armed Forces or they will “face serious conse-

quences” (threatened death).

•  the Taliban’s enemies represent “crusaders” that are promoting Christianity

and attempting to destroy Islam.

•  Afghans must cooperate and join the Taliban “so as to perform … religious

duty properly.”

•  the power of “martyrdom”: brave Afghans must sacrifice themselves to save

Afghanistan. The fight against their enemies involves saving honor.

The narratives of the night letters partly represent the preservation of tra-

ditional Pashtun values and society, often at the expense of modernity. Night

letters used in urban areas by the Taliban, not assessed by the analysis pre-

sented here, directly confront some of the ills of modernity, such as alcohol,

pornography, and prostitution that are now very visible in urban areas such as

Kabul and that the average Pashtun abhors. Recent night letters have targeted

urban areas and a more sophisticated campaign against modernity as the

Taliban insurgency pushes north—a phenomenon that we have started to

witness over the last few years.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

The Taliban have deep interests in preserving traditional social structures and

organizations and preventing social change. Maintaining the social status quo is

an explicit goal of a segmentary society.67 These root goals and worldviews are

clearly evidenced in Taliban shabnamah and they severely hamper Kabul’s ability

to offer social or economic progress as an incentive to accept state authority.

Moreover, through their intimidation campaign the Taliban have been able to

scare off those few NGOs and humanitarian organizations that could deliver on

Kabul’s wishes. This has proved to be a brilliant strategy to defy Kabul and the

US/NATO counter-insurgency. It has clearly presented a dilemma for the

Afghan government as well as US and Coalition counter-insurgency strategies.

Pashtuns value highly their independence and have grown accustomed to

it; they have preserved their way of life for centuries, despite the efforts of

some very powerful forces to alter it. Although there have been times when

parts of this tribal society have experienced short durations of subjugation by

alien forces, they were permitted to conduct their lives in accordance with

Pashtunwali. Even today, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of

Pakistan, predominantly inhabited by the Pashtun, are basically exempt from

Pakistani law. Independence is the historical norm for the Pashtun, and the

Taliban night letters dwell on this fact. The desire for continued independence

is one theme of the shabnamah assessed here. The risk of losing tribal inde-

pendence to “infidels and puppets of the West” outweighs the possibility of

improving tribal social welfare or increasing economic opportunities that

would probably be gained by accepting state authority. Any concession in

tribal independence should exceed any compensation offered in return for

submission to state authority. Kabul as well as the US and their Coalition

partners have failed miserably to understand this dynamic.

84

6

THE TALIBAN’S USE OF THE INTERNET,

SOCIAL MEDIA VIDEO,

RADIO STATIONS, AND GRAFFITI

The internet

The Taliban’s official website, Alemarah, first appeared on the World Wide

Web in mid-2005 and serves as the Taliban’s main source of information

operation for both domestic and international audiences. It is a simple website

but loaded with religious, cultural, historical, and political articulated themes.

Alemarah publishes detailed and up-to-date situation reports on the Taliban’s

activities across Afghanistan. It is divided into sections that include Islam,

news, commentary, statements, poetry, taranas [chants], articles, books, maga-

zines, and a link for the online Taliban Radio, Shar’iaht Voice. Furthermore,

Alemarah is colored blue and white with labels for the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan and the Voice of Jihad, together with their logo and a white flag

on the front page. Providing Afghan war information in five different lan-

guages (Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Arabic, and English languages), it serves as the

virtual public relations center to the Taliban and its viewers. Most of the lit-

erature on the website is written in simple syntax.

Pashto and Dari sections: The Pashto and Dari sections of the website target

domestic Afghan constituents and the Pashto- and Farsi-speaking residents in

neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan. Although many

residents in Afghanistan, especially rural, are mostly illiterate and have limited

85

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

access to the internet, the Pashto and Dari webpages of Alemarah are used to

facilitate communication with local journalists, the educated community, and

to a lesser extent the urban community. The educated population in turn share

Taliban messages with people through verbal conversations and other media

sources, such as radio, newspapers, television, and other websites. Conversely,

the audience living in neighboring countries, namely Iran and Pakistan, has a

comparatively wider access to the internet, which provides the Taliban with

the opportunity to attract them with inflammatory anti-Western and anti-

Afghan government themes in their public relations campaign.

Although only found on the Taliban website, political cartoons are becom-

ing a platform to disseminate general anti-Western sentiments to the Afghan

constituency. The cartoon in Figure 6.1 (the first one published on the

Alemarah website (June 2011) depicts a saw-bladed sword shoved into the

throat of an American icon (“Uncle Sam”) with text in Pashto that reads:

(arrow up) American exit; (arrow down) America stays in Afghanistan.

Urdu, Arabic, and English sections: The Taliban have strategically chosen

foreign languages in addition to Dari and Pashto to reach out to some vitally

important audiences beyond the Afghan borders. The Urdu language is widely

Figure 6.1: Alemarah cartoon, June 2011

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INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

spoken across Pakistan and other South Asian countries, and is also an official

language of Pakistan. The presence of this language in the website demon-

strates the Taliban’s conscious effort to reach out to their supporters within

the Urdu-speaking population. In other words, the Taliban’s heavy reliance on

their Pakistani constituents highlights the need for an Urdu section on the

website. The Taliban receive sanctuary, private donations, and—as increas-

ingly exposed by the international media and US military sources—receive

state aid and advice especially from the Pakistani intelligence service.1 Just like

the patron–client relationship, those who are actively supporting the Taliban

with sanctuary, finance, and ammunition may expect the Taliban to update

them on military progress made on the battlefield. In this case, a website is an

effective and accessible source for sharing information and establishing com-

munication. Meanwhile, Alemarah’s overly exaggerated news and other pub-

lications illustrate the Taliban’s continuous struggle to placate and impress

their foreign audience and supporters with their achievements over Afghan

and international forces on the ground. A similar reasoning can be used for

the Arabic language presented on the website too.

The Arabic webpage is one of the most updated parts of the website and

shows the Taliban’s effort at making it attractive with a range of information,

including a monthly Arabic magazine called Al Somood. It contains interviews

with senior Taliban officials, reports on the military operation, Taliban bios,

a martyrs’ list, and the monthly provincial military operation list.2 The Taliban

understand that the support of Muslim constituents in the Islamic community

will assure their legitimacy and success. The Taliban’s legitimacy may be

acquired by the public’s endorsement of the insurgency, and their success will

be achieved by the access to generous financial resources in the Arab world;

however, the target audience of the English webpage may vary substantially

from the Urdu and Arabic pages on the website.

The English language serves as a universal communication tool and so

serves as a corridor to convey Taliban messages to the Western world. Most

publications are designed to demonstrate the Taliban’s power while also con-

veying the defeat of international forces in the Afghan war. They are used to

communicating with the West and maximize local political pressure on ruling

governments to end their military presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban hope

that excessive expressions of power, fear, and a functioning shadow govern-

ment will manipulate the West’s public perception of the war. A glaring exam-

ple is the collapse of the Dutch government in February 2010: the first

European and NATO administration to fall because of the war in

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Afghanistan.3 Likewise, publishing reports in English help the Taliban to

demonstrate the failures of international forces that are continuously making

efforts to break the momentum of the insurgency.

Although the number of websites disseminating Taliban statements in

English are not as prolific, the Taliban do take the time to create English state-

ments and “war updates” on their official website (www.alemarah.info) and Twitter, as well as some jihadist magazines, such as In Fight, a digital photo essay

magazine that contains high resolution photos of combat from Afghanistan

overlaid with English statements stripped from the Alemarah website.

In summary, the Taliban have embraced the use of the internet through

their website Alemarah. The website has existed under a number of different

addresses and has been blocked on multiple occasions, but now moves

between service providers. It consists of five language sections: Dari, Pashto,

Urdu, Arabic, and English. Its reports list numerous attacks against the US,

the Afghan government, and their al ies as well as highlighting col ateral dam-

age from international air strikes. There are also links to official magazines and

sections dedicated to official articles and statements, for example, the Arabic-

language magazine Al Somood. The magazine is available in PDF format or in

hard copy. It covers in-depth articles, military statistics, and interviews with

field commanders and leadership figures. In addition, video clips of recent

activities are also available. However, unlike some other Islamist websites,

Alemarah has no discussion forums, although some pro-Taliban forums do

operate on an unofficial basis. Another difference from other jihadist websites

is its lack of instruction manuals, and it does not link with other groups in

other theaters. But like the discussion forums, alternative sites also exist, such

as those that report Taliban statements.4

Social networking: FaceBook, Twitter, and YouTube

In December 2010, the Alemarah website published an interview with the

site’s editor, Abdul Satar Maiwandi, in which he explicitly stated: “Wars today

cannot be won without media. Media aims at the heart rather than the body,

[and] if the heart is defeated, the battle is won.” This interview was especially

interesting because for the first time the Taliban media chief explicitly revealed

the venues and objectives of the Taliban’s information operations to involve

email, texting, tweets, blogs, YouTube, and Facebook. Maiwandi emphasized

the importance of both the official Taliban website and expanded use of social

media, specifically Facebook and Twitter, to project Taliban messages. While

88

INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

the Afghan government in Kabul is conspicuously absent from social net-

working sites, the Taliban have become Afghan pioneers in establishing

Facebook and Twitter accounts and using them to disseminate their propa-

ganda narratives, especially those narratives and messages targeting Afghan

youth and young adults. A few years ago, the Taliban exclusively used a variety

of jihadi forums and blogs to discuss their positions and propagate their nar-

ratives and self-perceived achievements online. These forums have lost some

of their value as social networking sites have come to dominate the market,

due in part to their simplicity and the multi-tasking capabilities of the social

networking media. The Taliban have taken notice and responded accordingly,

and have also shown themselves to be aware of the impact of the media and

their role during the Arab Spring.

Before the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there were only 2,000

internet users in the whole of the country; by 2010 Afghanistan had a multi-

tude of internet providers and 1 million users (1,000 per cent growth in the

past ten years).5 According to Mr Amirzai Sangin, then Afghan Minister of

Communications and Information Technology, there should be over 2 million

Afghan internet users shortly.6 According to some sources, there are over

155,000 Facebook users in Afghanistan. This number is expected to increase

due to vast investment in information technology in Afghanistan.7

The Taliban have increasingly used Facebook, where they maintain a rela-

tively large “network of friends” to spread their message to target audiences.

Currently over 2,000 members “like” the Islamic State of Afghanistan page,

which seems to be the Taliban’s official Facebook page; while other Taliban

individuals and supporters each have hundreds of friends to share pro Taliban

narratives. (As this book was being finalized, Facebook authorities had appar-

ently banned or taken down the most prominent Taliban page. However, it

seems that the Taliban continue their publishing and networking under indi-

viduals’ names.) They appear very flexible and extremely interested in expand-

ing their social media network.

Similar to the Taliban official website, Alemarah, Taliban Facebook profiles

are loaded with hundreds of Taliban videos, photos, and narratives. Their site

provides timely news updates, videos, chants, photos, and conversations on

specific topics. Presently the size of the Taliban audience is limited to approxi-

mately several thousand people. However, it will most likely increase with the

expansion of internet access in Afghanistan.

Even though there are specific pages that regularly disseminate Taliban

propaganda, many Taliban supporters separately spread Taliban messages

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

through their individual profiles, to reach out to as many people as possible.

Their profiles often carry various al-Qaeda and Taliban-related materials.

Aside from their official Facebook page, there are many individual Facebook

pages under various names that share Taliban-related news coverage and propa-

ganda. These sites also assist the Taliban to enlarge their reach and connectivity

to their target audience. Likewise, the Taliban have an official Twitter account

with over 5,600 (and growing) “followers.”8 Here the Taliban regularly Tweet

news updates concerning their exaggerated and propagandized “military

achievements,” such as: “9 US invaders killed and wounded, two tanks destroyed

in Logar battle,” “4 puppets killed in clash with Mujahidin,” or “Mujahidin kills

12 US–Afghan cowardly troops in martyr attack.”

The Taliban have also utilized a network of Twitter accounts to rehash

entries made on the Alemarah website, and the official Taliban Twitter

accounts include the following table.

Table 6.1: Primary Taliban Twitter accounts (as of summer 2011)

User account

Number of

Number of Tweets

Status

followers

@Alemarahweb

Over 5,500

Over 1,626 as of

Active

followers as of

August 2011

August 2011

@Alemarahwebsite Only 58 followers

Over 384 as of

Active

as of August 2011

August 2011

@Alemarahmedia

Only 23 followers

Only 36 as of

Inactive since

as of August 2011

August 2011

March 2011

Secondary Taliban Twitter accounts (as of summer 2011)

User account

Number of

Number of Tweets

Status

followers

@Ahmadkhan111

Over 171

Over 180 as of

Active

followers as of

August 2011

August 2011

@ABalkhi

Over 141

Over 367 as of

Active

followers as of

August 2011

August 2011

@GhazniwalTariq

Only 36 followers

Only 4 as of

Inactive since May

as of August 2011

August 2011

2011

90

INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

Figure 6.2: Screen dumps of the most followed and active Twitter accounts attributed

to the Taliban: @Alemarahweb and @adamkhan11. Both accounts were still active

on 17 August 2011.

There are several Taliban account managers for the Alemarah website:

“Dr Tariq” (otherwise known as Azam Tariq), Mostafa Ahmedi, Zabihul ah

Muhajid, and Qari Yousaf Ahmadi; the pseudonyms or personas of Dr Tariq,

Abdul Qahar Balkhi, and Mostafa Ahmedi maintain the network of Taliban

Twitter accounts as well.

The Taliban Twitter account, @Alemarahmedia, previously disseminated

Taliban propaganda videos via YouTube before the video account was termi-

nated by YouTube in the summer of 2011. The @Alemarahmedia account has

been inactive since 10 March 2011, although a few of the YouTube video links

posted to this account remain active. The YouTube account (FreedomIsOur1),

which has several videos linked to the @Alemarahmedia account, appears to

support the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, posting a variety of anti-Western

and jihad-themed video clips.

Despite early misunderstandings of some technology, such as cell phones

and the internet, the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups have warmly

adopted modern communication and technology to their advantage. The

Taliban are aided in the spread of their messages through the lack of meaning-

ful Kabul government (or US/NATO) counter-attacks. The Taliban have

capitalized by producing a multi-media strategy that enables them to be a

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

dominant player in the “hearts and minds” battle space, an ironic reality given

the ideological foundation of the old-guard Taliban.

DVDs and videos

The Taliban were quick to utilize methods and techniques of message dissemi-

nation from other insurgent groups, including using the internet and distrib-

uting DVDs with clips showing insurgent attacks, executions, and sermons.

The proliferation of Taliban-produced videos was clear by 2006, when a vari-

ety of Taliban “media studios” emerged. Most of the early iterations of

Taliban-produced videos were conducted by the media arm of al-Qaeda,

As-Sahab Media, which in 2006 released speeches attributed to al-Qaeda

ideologue Dr Ayman al Zawahiri. Taliban operatives distributed the DVDs

for free at first, allegedly scattering them around village areas much like they

would leaflets and shabnamah.9

DVDs are sold in kiosks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and are given

out to journalists (both Western/international and local). The objectives of

most of these videos are: recruitment, boosting morale, religious indoctrina-

tion, and delegitimizing the current Afghan regime and the international

community supporting it. Typical video content includes scenes of militant

training and preparation (i.e. showcasing weapons platforms), launching an

attack, venerating “martyrs” killed in these operations, interviews with Taliban

commanders and/or Taliban religious clerics, and commentary on the

Taliban’s “state of affairs.” Recently, videos of Taliban fighters entering aban-

doned/decommissioned US and NATO outposts have become prevalent.

Taliban and other insurgent video studio productions

A number of Taliban-affiliated “media studios” have also emerged, and no

longer are Taliban propaganda videos solely reliant upon the As Sahab media

wing. Studios such as Mana-ul Jihad, al Hijrat, and El Emarah produce and

disseminate Taliban videos officially sanctioned by the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan.

This section provides a glossary of video production units featuring Taliban

and other Afghan insurgent groups. It is important to be aware that many of the

video producers are in constant col aboration with one another, both regionally

and internationally (often overlapping each other with regard to thematic mes-

sages), and convey a universal message of jihad against the West, particularly the

US. Aside from a few specific studios that focus solely on their particular group

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Al Emarah Jihadi studio

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

An Afghan Taliban media unit dedicated to the elimination of all for-

eign troops from Afghanistan and in other Muslim countries. This

organization is led by Qari Muhammad Yousuf Ahmadi and Zabihul ah

Mujahid, who have effectively used social media to unite other Mujahid

factions. The video productions are extremely well developed and pro-

vide a justification for the jihadi movement. One particular production,

American Reconstruction, shifted the studio’s strategy of propaganda by

focusing on the impact of the Afghan–NATO military campaign on

the civilian population in Kandahar. Interviews with Afghan locals

aimed to depict the carnage by the hands of American soldiers and

therefore appeal to locals to join the jihadist movement. English subti-

tles were provided and languages spoken by the insurgent groups were

Dari, Pashto, and English. The studio is also extremely active on

Facebook and, similar to As-Shahab, posts eulogies, military operations,

and recruitment for prospective jihadists.

Sample video

1) http://theunjustmedia.com/clips/afgha/Jan11/Al-Emara%

20Jihadi%20Studio%20Presents%20“American%20

Reconstruction”%20In%20English.htm

2) http://theunjustmedia.com/clips/afgha/sep11/Maidan%20

Wardak%20Door%20Of%20Kabul.htm

Direct source

1)  http://shahamat-english.com/index.php?option=com_content&

view=article&id=11211:us-terrorists-horrendous-brutality-

and-heart-rending-crimes-in-logar&catid=1:news&Itemid=2

Bot-Shikan

An affiliate of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Content is often

produced in Farsi/Dari.

Secondary source

1) http://botshikan1.blogfa.com/post-8.aspx

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Manba-ul Jihad (The Source of Jihad)

A media unit of the Haqqani Network within the Afghan Taliban. The

footage often shows raids on US military bases, several bombings tar-

geting vehicles of Afghan, American, and NATO-led International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) vehicles in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika

provinces, and suicide bombings in Kabul and Wardak provinces.

Other clips show the military training of Afghan Taliban fighters and

their recorded wills. The videos further depict scenes from suicide raids.

The Haqqani Network utilizes the Manba-ul Jihad media label, and

several notorious videos directly attributed to them include: the

3 March 2008 Sabri district HQ suicide bombing in Khost province;

and the insurgency videos showing captured POW US army PFC

Berghdal seized by the Haqqani Network shadow governor of Paktia,

Mauluvi Sangin.

Sample video

1) http://jihad-e-informacion.blogspot.com/search/label/Manba%20

Al-Jihad%20%28Emirato%20Isl%C3%A1mico%20de%20

Afganist%C3%A1n%29

2) http://www.zshare.net/video/53250736869dccb4/

3) http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=769_1224010418

Direct source

1) http://www.jhuf.net/showthread.php?10634-Manba-ul-Jihad-

Studio-Presents-quot-Da-Jihad-Sungur-quot-%26%231583%3B-

%26%231580%3B%26%231607%3B%26%231575%3B%26%23

1583%3B%26%231587%3B%26%231606%3B%26%231711%3B

%26%231585%3B

Secondary source

1) http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghan-

istan/158_taliban_propaganda___winning_the_war_of_words.

ashx

2) http://www.zimbio.com/Bowe+Bergdahl/articles/yy4BBkRXbyq/

Manba+al+Jihad+Video+Shows+American+Spc+Bowe

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Hezb-e-Islami

Affiliated with As-Shahab Media, which publishes Hezb-e-Islami video

productions, taranas, magazines and books. It has also tapped into

social media through Facebook by constantly updating its page and

inundating it with HIG propaganda, as well as addressing current

events and military operations.

Direct source

1) http://www.facebook.com/pages/ShahabStudio/1076118 

42603062#!/profile.php?id=100002186722868&sk=info

As-Sadeqin

A studio belonging to Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, focusing

on recruiting Dari-speaking jihadists.

Sample video

1) http://tanweer.blogfa.com/post-2007.aspx

Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz (Tora Bora Military Front)

A breakaway from Hezb-e-Islami Khalis (HIK), this is a militant group

formed by the son of Younis Khalis (deceased Mujahidin commander

and leader of a separate Hezb-e-Islami faction), Anwur-ul Haq

Mujahid, and currently operating in Nanghahar, Afghanistan. The

group publishes its own propaganda magazine, Tora Bora, and has its

own website, Alemarah, independent of the Taliban’s primary propa-

ganda source. The Tora Bora Front continues to remain active by peri-

odically updating its website, publishing its quarterly Tora Bora

magazine, and launching occasional attacks in Nangarhar province. Its

potent support base is in Khalis’ native district of Khogyani and other

dangerous areas such as Pachir Agam and Shinwar.

Sample video

1) http://theunjustmedia.com/clips/afgha/may10/Tora%20Bora%20

Studio%20entitled%20History%20Page%2010.htm

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Secondary source

1) http://almanac.afpc.org/taliban

Al Hijrat

An Afghan Taliban media outlet linked with Alemarah and Manba-ul

Jihad, which often releases footage of Taliban training, martyrdom

obituaries, as well as suicide attacks. Typically recycles contents from

other production studios.

Taifetul Mansura (Victorious Sect)

A transnational Turkish military group that has joined the jihadi move-

ment in Afghanistan. The Taifetul Mansura spokesman is Suraka Turki.

The primary languages used are Turkish and English. Ebu Zer AKA

Serdal Erbashi, the former leader of Taifetul Mansura in Afghanistan

and a fighter in Chechnya, was reportedly executed by the Taliban after

it was discovered that he ordered the death of two foreign fighters on

21 June 2011. The group maintains that its area of activity is in

Afghanistan, and that it is not operating at all in Turkey

Secondary source

1) http://occident2.blogspot.com/search?q=mansura

Elif Media (Turkish)

A Turkish jihadi media outlet associated with the German Taliban

Mujahidin, and currently supporting the jihadist movement in

Afghanistan.

Sample video

1) http://theunjustmedia.com/clips/other/April10/Deutsche%20

Taliban%20Mujahidin.htm

Direct source

1) http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=12286

2) http://www.elifmedya.de/

Secondary source

1) http://www.archive.org/details/yardim2-alflojaweb.com

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activities, others share videos from other groups and are not focused on one

region. This is particularly true for al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban.

Many Taliban video productions that are regional often align themselves

with internationally-based video production studios to gain superior quality

and capability in disseminating propaganda operations and recruiting jihadists

worldwide. The numerous languages delivered by these video production

studios seek to reach diverse demographics and recruit new jihadists from the

Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, and Turkey, to join the movement in

Afghanistan. Sympathizers can easily radicalize themselves and ideologues can

offer compelling arguments of their struggle, achievements, and devotion to

join the movement. Whereas the Taliban video producers can offer the video

footage, advanced video producers can create the narrative and emotional

appeal to demonize the US and boost jihadist morale.

Taliban spokesmen

The Taliban have learned how to promote themselves expertly through the

media. The Taliban have used established contacts with radio, television, and

newspaper journalists and they regularly use these contacts to implement their

information campaign. In this pursuit, the Taliban have appointed spokesmen

as points of contact for the international media and regional press. For

instance, two prominent spokesmen are Zabihul ah Mujahid and Qari Yousuf

Ahmadi. These spokesmen maintain regular contact with the media through

email, SMS, telephone calls, and they provide online reports on incidents.

Journalists remark that the Taliban spokesmen are available around the clock,

as opposed to the government and international representatives. However, at

times in the past the international community has received conflicting reports

from the spokesmen or ones not associated with the Taliban.10

The full-time Taliban spokesmen, Mujahid and Ahmadi, act as mouth-

pieces for the Quetta Shura and will also take credit for attacks attributed to

the Haqqani Network. It is unclear whether the identities of these spokesmen

refer to actual people or a network of spokesmen who make statements under

one of the two names.11 Some semi-autonomous mahaz (groups) are repre-

sented by their own spokesmen, and some high-level insurgent commanders

use spokesmen from a local region representing their group, such as Mauluvi

Sangeen’s spokesmen identified as Abdul ah Jalali and Muhibul ah Mahajir,

the spokesmen for former Taliban commander Shah Mansoor Dadul ah.12 The

local, regional, and Western press can easily contact Taliban spokesmen

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 6.3: Photo purportedly showing Taliban spokesman, “Zabihul ah Mujahid”

through their email addresses or cell phone numbers, both of which are

prominently displayed at the bottom of the Alemarah website.13 “Official”

Taliban statements are now found in nearly every major news article written

about the Taliban, and newsletters attributed to the IEA are also disseminated

from official Taliban spokesmen to international and local journalists working

in Afghanistan, all of which are usually translated into English, Arabic,

Pashto, Dari, and Urdu.

Shar’iah Zhagh (Voice of Shar’iah Radio)

Although the Taliban’s main means of message delivery remain relatively sim-

ple, such as distributing night letters, word of mouth, and their website, they

have repeatedly tried to increase their presence on the radio airwaves in

Afghanistan. With a rural population generally illiterate, radio programs in

Afghanistan remain a viable method for delivering messages and communicat-

ing. However, unlicensed or “pirate” radio broadcasts are essentially an exten-

sion of the Taliban’s reliance on low-tech means of message transmission.

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INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

Most FM radio transmitters are built or purchased in neighboring countries,

such as Pakistan, which is also grappling with a wave of unlicensed Taliban

radio programs, consisting of basic equipment that can be manufactured or

acquired for just a few hundred dol ars. In the case of Pakistan, several mobile

transmission devices belonging to the Pakistani Taliban have been discovered,

confiscated, and destroyed. The low cost and abundance of readily available

equipment that can be quickly modified and sent back into the field has made

disrupting the pirate broadcasts a challenge in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Taliban movement first revitalized its radio program (through pirate

broadcasts) in sporadic bursts since announcing the relaunch of Shar’iah

Zhagh (Voice of Shar’iah) from Kandahar, their former stronghold in the

south, beginning in 2005. The spotty signal broadcast for over an hour each

night was believed to have been transmitted from mobile transmitters

mounted on the back of pick-up trucks. In April 2005, then Taliban spokes-

man Mufti Latiful ah Hakimi told the Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press

news agency that Radio Shar’iah Zhagh was back on air after a six-month

break, although evidence of prior Taliban broadcasts was non-existent follow-

ing the termination of the Taliban regime in October 2001. The 2005 broad-

cast consisted of an hour’s program between 06.00 and 07.00 local time and

was broadcast in both Dari and Pashto.

By 2007, similar media reports indicated that Taliban radio programs could

be heard in parts of four south-eastern provinces, Paktika, Paktia, Khost, and

Ghazni, but local officials said that reception for the programs remained weak.

Similarly, during the ten-month Taliban occupation of Helmand’s northern

district of Musa Qala between February and December of 2007, the Taliban’s

Voice of Shar’iah could be heard throughout the district. Broadcasts included

translations of the Qur’an, calls for jihad, and religious programs. According

to a local Taliban spokesman, the radio station had five employees and broad-

cast on an FM frequency with the traditional Afghan pattern of morning and

evening transmissions.

By 2009, media reporting concerning the Taliban’s radio broadcasts had

increased, suggesting that the Taliban had attempted to increase their broad-

cast capabilities, expanding their coverage area. However, there is little evi-

dence to suggest that the Taliban have successfully launched any pirate radio

programs since 2009. An additional tool used by the Taliban for broadcasting

is the internet. In June 2009, an online version of Voice of Shar’iah was

launched via the Taliban Pashto-language website Shahamat (Valour) (previ-

ously at www.shahamat.org). The internet-based radio service streams news, 99

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

commentaries, and jihadist songs, and the morning and evening broadcasts are

updated daily.

When asked by the Afghan Islamic Press how they set up these radio

stations, Hakimi replied: “We imported the equipment from abroad and

Afghan engineers here set up the stations.” Hakimi added: “The Taliban

own three radio stations. One is now reopened and the others will start

functioning soon.”14

During the last decade, media reporting concerning the Taliban’s radio

broadcasts has increased, suggesting that the Taliban have successfully

increased their broadcast capabilities, expanded their coverage area, or the

media is just responding to or creating the perception of a trend. Similarly,

reports of the Taliban broadcasting two-hour programs in Ghazni province

surfaced in August 2009, suggesting that the Taliban have improved their

transmission capabilities and are offering more content.15 In 2005 the Taliban

launched the radio station Duond Jokanyanam, and also launched a clandes-

tine radio station that broadcast anti-Afghan government (GIRoA) programs

as well as Islamic hymns. It is reported that this radio station, Voice of

Shar’iah, broadcasts from Loya Kandahar twice a day: 6–7 a.m. and 6–7 p.m.16

Highlights from the Taliban’s various broadcast capabilities as of October 2009

follow below.17 That year was the height of Taliban radio stations; most were

jammed soon after, when the US started to halt Taliban radio broadcasts.18

Taliban radio in Lower Helmand province

In July 2009, Reuters were reporting on the activities of a British-funded PRT

(Provincial Reconstruction Team) radio station at a base in Garmsir, in the

south of Helmand province, and said: “Lately, the Taliban have set up their

own radio station in the valley, broadcasting from a secret location further

south. But it doesn’t play music, and the DJs of [PRT’s] Radio Garmsir just

don’t see it as competition.”

Radio Shar’iah, Ghazni province

According to Pajhwok, Radio Shar’iah in Ghazni province is a “typical

Taliban mouthpiece.”19 In August 2009, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah

Mujahid told Pajhwok that the radio station was the most effective commu-

nication tool for “the fighters,” claiming that the Taliban controlled enough

territory in Ghazni to operate the FM radio station “freely.” Radio Shar’iah

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INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

broadcasts in Pashto on 88 MHz FM to the Qarabagh, Giro, and Andar dis-

tricts. Programs included commentaries, religious programs, poetry praising

the Prophet Muhammad, pro-Taliban songs, and exhortations to Afghans “to

stay away from the election process.”

In August 2009, the Pakistani daily newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt reported that

Radio Shar’iah’s program content was “anti-government.” According to

Mujahid, Radio Shar’iah could be heard over a 50-kilometer radius from the

provincial capital and broadcast from a vehicle parked in a mountainous area.

He added that the Taliban had set up similar radio stations in Paktia, Paktika,

Konar, and Nuristan provinces.

Taliban radio stations in Khost, Paktia provinces

In August 2009, the Pashto-language website benawa.com reported that a

Taliban radio station had begun broadcasting in Khost province. According

to locals, it broadcast Taliban announcements and asked people to boycott the

upcoming elections. Some residents of Khost province said that the Taliban

broadcast had created fear among the population. They also said that they did

not know how and from where the broadcast took place. According to the

same benawa.com report, Taliban radio stations were active in Ghazni prov-

ince and in Zormat (a district in Paktia province).

Taliban radio station in Nuristan province

In September 2009, US-based CBS TV news reported from the operating

base of a US-funded PRT radio station in the remote Nuristan province that

“a battle of the airwaves” had developed locally because, in addition to lis-

tening to the PRT radio station, “another villager was listening to a Taliban

radio station. They have sprung up around the country as well, broadcasting

threats to kill those who cooperate with international forces.” CBS reported

that US forces admitted that locals could use their new radios (supplied by

US forces) to tune into the Taliban, but that, given the choice, Afghans

wanted positive information.

Summary of broadcasting

•  The Taliban’s Radio Shar’iah resurfaced in the spring of 2005 and has

increasingly produced “organized” programs, lasting initially an hour and

now up to three hours long.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  The programs are broadcast in both Dari and Pashto.

•  By 2009, Radio Shar’iah was reportedly being broadcast in Paktia, Paktika,

Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Konar, and Nuristan. In 2007, the program was

being broadcast in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand.

•  The radio transmission systems are said to be “mobile” and mounted on the

back of pick-up trucks. “Engineers” inside Afghanistan are said to aid in the

technical aspects of working the equipment.

•  Broadcasts include translations of the Qur’an, calls for jihad, and religious

programs. Threats against civilians participating in the elections (August

2009) or supporting the government/Coalition are also common.

•  No DJs and no music are featured on the Taliban radio programs in south-

ern Helmand. Sometimes poetry, pro-Taliban music or music with no lyrics

is played on programs aired in the east (Ghazni).

•  The Taliban have further exploited their webpage and now include a Radio

Shar’iah webcast that can be heard around the clock. The program is said to

be updated daily.20

•  Local residents seem to be pleased with radio broadcasts in general but

gravitate toward stations that play music, and a diverse array of music is

even better. Music played during the Taliban era consisted of musical instru-

ments while passages of the Qur’an were spoken.

Ziaullah, a resident of Ghazni’s Giro district, told Pajhwok news that he

listens to the Taliban broadcasts every night because “he enjoyed listening to

songs on the radio.” Similar sentiments were also found in Farah province

where resident Amir Ahmed said, “The only thing I don’t like is the Taliban-

style music. I’d prefer to hear some jazz. Something to get us a bit excited.”21

Graffiti

Graffiti marking the walls of urban and rural compounds and buildings,

including threatening messages and pledges of allegiance to Taliban com-

manders, can be found in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. “Graffiti culture,”

however, is more prevalent on the Pakistan side of the border, with messages

supporting various political parties dotting nearly every available inch of wall

space in certain neighborhoods. The Afghan Taliban has used this delivery

system inconsistently, particularly in southern Afghanistan and the urban

centers of Lashkar Gah, Spin Boldak (Wesh), and Kandahar City. Similar to

waving the Taliban’s trademark white flag, Taliban graffiti primarily aims to

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INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

Figure 6.4: A pro-Taliban supporter standing in front of a display reading “Long live

holy fighter Mul ah Muhammad Omar” in Killi Nalai, a village near the Pakistan and

Afghanistan border, September 2010. Source: AFP.

Figure 6.5: Local residents stand outside a shop (“Maddrassah Petroleum Service”)

with graffiti reading “Leader of the Faithful Mul ah Moammad Omar Mujahed/JAI/

Opinions,” on Sunday 8 May 2011, in Pashin, 100 km south of Quetta, Pakistan.

Source: Arshad Butt/AP

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

mark territory friendly or sympathetic to the Taliban’s cause and objectives,

while offensive graffiti (threatening messages) aims at intimidating or “mark-

ing” undecided or pro-government communities.

Conclusion

Many of the areas of Taliban operations and control are ungoverned spaces (at

least from a Western perspective) where tribal independence from the state is

highly cherished. These areas are primarily inhabited by segmentary societies,

such as the Pashtuns. Lindholm’s characterization of segmentary societies22

supports the notion that tribal organizational and normative factors, of the

Taliban being quite familiar, impede the establishment of state authority.

Segmentary societies differ from other forms of society in that they only tend

to unite when they feel that they are losing influence over their own way of

life. The Taliban were brilliant at exploiting such sentiments during their ini-

tial rise to power in 1994–6, when Afghans were extremely war-weary and

seeking to extend control over their lives that had been lost over two decades

of war, as well as during the archaic and ineffectual Mujahidin rule after the

fall of Najibullah. The Taliban leadership offered stability and the Afghan

people welcomed it with open arms (at least until they recognized what the

Taliban ultimately represented).

The Taliban use the media presented in this chapter for simplistic objectives

such as “forcing the invaders to withdraw” and re-establishing Shar’iah

throughout Afghanistan in their strategic communication efforts. It is these

two simple objectives that many Afghan insurgent groups subscribe to, chal-

lenging Western perceptions that the Taliban employ overly complex or

sophisticated messaging campaigns. In fact, it is with their simplistic and easy

to follow approach that Afghan insurgents avoid convoluted messaging cam-

paigns that risk alienating their target audience, typically rural, uneducated,

and conflict-fatigued Afghans. The simplicity of their strategic aims is similar

to their successes soon after their creation in 1994, when they vowed to

accomplish (and largely achieved) two highly desired objectives: establishing

security and instilling law and order through swift Islamic-based justice.23

The Taliban’s messaging spectrum and narrative universe are finite, but their

information tools are numerous. The number of objectives, messages, and

narratives can be identified and framed within a given outline. Henceforth,

the Taliban are able to draw upon this information-message/story-narrative-

treasure chest and “plug” it into the litany of delivery systems available to

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INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA, VIDEO, RADIO, GRAFFITI

them, as we saw in this and other chapters. Despite early misunderstandings

of some technology, such as cell phones and the internet, the Taliban and

other Afghan insurgent groups have successfully adopted modern communi-

cation and technology to their advantage. Video productions, DVDs and

CDs, internet web pages, text messaging, Twitter, Bluetooth dissemination of

audio and video files are some of the modern delivery systems the Taliban now

use to spread their views and statements.

However, despite an aggressive effort from Afghan insurgent groups to

exert control over territory, groups like the Taliban still lack the manpower

and material needed to impose a large-scale occupation of territory inside

Afghanistan. In 2008, the International Crisis Group suggested that the

Taliban “still puts out contradictory messages that indicate internal rifts and

the diffuse nature of the insurgency.”24 We have seen these rifts definitely mate-

rialize in 2015 and 2016.

The Taliban are assisted in spreading their messages by the lack of meaning-

ful government counter-attacks and the proliferation of jihadist messages

through local and international media outlets. The Taliban have capitalized

on this situation by producing multilingual websites as well as several militant

publications and many other media, discussed in this and other chapters, that

enable the Afghan insurgents to operate as a competitor in the hearts and

minds battle space.

In summary, the use of the internet, social networking, radios, videos, and

other storage media as a means to promote the Taliban has allowed the

Taliban to speak directly to the population without the need of an intermedi-

ary who could edit or censor their message. In addition, this medium speaks

louder than published works because of the predominance of illiteracy, espe-

cially in Afghan rural society. Much of this media output is not only sold but

distributed to journalists as well. The bulk of the content contains archive

footage from the fight against the Soviets, videos of insurgent training, attacks

on government and international forces, and the destruction or capture of

enemy equipment. Finally, the prevalence of mobile phones is one of the most

popular ways to pass these images and videos to their Afghan targets.25

105

7

THE AFGHANS’ AND TALIBAN’S USE OF POETRY

AND TARANAS 1

وتسن ب

ل اک وپً راخت

ا

وپ ًذنس ًذنى وپ

وتسن لتاام ول ۍړن ید وپ یرمز می هز

وتسن لتا

ام ول و تسن لباز وپ لب

)ناٌليپ نايج(ړًرک ریما

I am the lion, in this world there is no one braver than me

In India, in Sindh, in Takkhar, in Kabul, nor in Zabul.

There is no one braver than me!

Amir Kror (The world’s best wrestler) 2

“A nation of poets” is how Louis Dupree described the Afghans.3 Poetry is the

central pillar of Afghan literature, with important social and political implica-

tions, and the Taliban are well aware of this fact. Afghans use poetry as a tool to

communicate feelings and thoughts on a daily and customary basis. Since tradi-

tionally there has been minimal presence of print media and a publishing indus-

try, literature in general and folk literature in particular are often shared in oral

form, especially in rural Afghanistan. The illiteracy of the great majority of the

population certainly reinforces this oral tradition. Thus, written literature has

been confined within the boundaries of a few literary circles, primarily in urban

cultural centers and educational organizations (i.e. Kabul and other Afghan

universities, or the Writers Society of Afghanistan). Realizing that poetry is

critical to the process of communication among Afghans, the Taliban have also

attempted to use poetry, as will be seen below, as an important component in

their information campaigns and storytelling.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Within the past three decades of war and political turmoil, poetry has been

greatly politicized in Afghanistan. Numerous collections of poetry concerning

political issues have been published either in Afghanistan, or abroad (Iran,

Pakistan, Europe, the US and Canada). Subsequently, it has played a promi-

nent role in the expression of political views among Afghans. This chapter

examines the intertwined relationship between Afghan politics and poetry,

especially from a Taliban perspective.

Poetry is important because it is essentially a spoken, not written art, so it is

accessible to those who have not needed to learn to read. Two particular aspects

of poetry contribute to its widespread use in Afghan society. One is the rhythm

and rhyme embedded in this genre that aids memorization. The other pertains

to the unique quality of poetry, which allows deep thoughts, sometimes diffi-

cult to comprehend, to be entrenched within a few short lyrics.

The political events of the past four decades have also contributed tremen-

dously to the prevalence of poetry among all other literary genres. War,

destruction, and the loss of millions of lives have left deep psychological

wounds in the hearts of almost all Afghans. This has given way to the use of

poetry as an effective medium to express feelings of sorrow, anger, pride, hope,

desperation, and patriotism. Conflict and political turmoil have tremendously

contributed to the politicization of poetry in particular, and literature as a

whole. Poetry is a window through which one is able to understand the

Afghan mind. Afghans memorize specific resonating lyrics reflective of their

values, beliefs, and the socio-economic realities of their environment, which

can then be used during daily conversations. To make a point, to offer an

example, and even to prove a claim, Afghans often refer to and weave a tak-

baiti, a one-liner, or a do-baiti, a two-liner, within their speech. In fact, the use

of poetry in daily conversation is so prevalent that many lines are synonymous

with proverbs and axioms. Unfortunately, these are the critical pieces of com-

munication that are often “lost in translation” during shuras, jirgas, and key-

leader engagements between US and Coalition forces and Afghan citizens.

Poetry has also played a large role in Taliban information operations. Rural

Pashtuns, as we have seen, are a critical component of the Afghan Taliban

movement as well as a target of Taliban narratives, relying heavily on oral

tradition at the expense of written materials. While some of this reliance is

directly related to the lack of literacy, especially in rural Afghanistan, Afghan

poetry has traditionally been extremely important to Afghans, in part because

poetry relies on spoken language and is figurative in nature. In addition, it is

an ideal art to be used when there are few other materials to draw from. Much

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like shabnamah, poetry is used to disseminate news down to the village and

individual level, and the Taliban are well aware of this fact.4

As previously stated, the late Mul ah Omar called on the service of Afghan

poets to help support the Taliban’s military and political objectives in an Eid

statement released around 25 November 2009: “I also urge the committed

and sensible poets to preserve the jihadi epics and acts of heroism of

Mujahidin in their poetry and literary pieces and generate emotions for inde-

pendence, honor, national unity, and Islamic resurgence.”

•  Talib poets portray their anti-government efforts as an extension of the

anti-Marxist regime that began in the early 1980s. Comparatively, contem-

porary and/or moderate Afghan poets tend to focus on peace as a theme,

reminding the reader of its value and necessity for political unity and the

hard work needed in order to achieve and maintain it.

•  Their main concern is changing the current state of affairs in the country,

which predominantly revolves around the issue of foreign invasion.

•  They make use of religious terminology and themes far more frequently

than other poets, i.e. jihad, “crusaders” or “people of the cross,” martyrs/

shaheed, and paradise. In fact, they use religious doctrine to support their

arguments in favor of political dissent and military action against the gov-

ernment and coalition forces.

•  Cooperation with state is be-nangi, a great shame. This is because the

regime, in their view, is a puppet of the foreign powers—the infidel invad-

ers. Cooperation with and support of such government means indirect sup-

port of the invaders and infidels. This qualifies the Afghan supporter of the

state as a mulhed, or hypocrite. Some argue that being a hypocrite is a more

grievous sin then becoming a kafir, or infidel.

•  Guilt and shame are two of the emotions that the Taliban authors use to

influence their readers’ thoughts. The reader must feel shameful because not

only is he not taking any action against foreign invaders, but he is also coop-

erating with the enemy. The reader must begin to act immediately, and par-

ticipate in the jihad against the infidel—similar to his ancestors who fought

against and defeated the Greeks, the Mongols, the Persians, the British, and

the Soviets.

•  They instigate war and disorder to purify the country of immorality and

the religious heresy of the imposed Western political and economic orders.

Below we present Pashto poems written by the Taliban and some of the

“stories” they portray, as well as moderate and progressive contemporary

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poets, all of which are translated and analyzed. This will hopefully help one to

gain a better understanding of the way in which Afghans perceive current

socio-political realities. A comparative study enables us to understand the

manner in which each group differs from (or is similar to) others in reaction

to issues and events. The main purpose of this examination is to shed some

light on the way in which poetry shapes and mirrors Afghans’ world outlook;

it should familiarize the reader with the manner and extent to which feelings

and thoughts are expressed in poetry among Afghans.

Poetry in Afghan politics

يو نادو ناهج اد ېچ ىڅ

يو نامسآ هکمځ اد ېچ ىڅ

يو ناغفا ىی ېتاپ ېچ ىڅ

يو ناهج ېد هپ دنوژ ېچ ىڅ

يو ناتسناغفا اد هب لت

Until there is this earth and sky

Until there is this universe

Until there is life on earth

Until there remains one Afghan

There will always be an Afghanistan

Afghan history is replete with warrior poets; in fact, many Afghans argue

that any would-be leader, or person wishing to make an impression, needs to

write and recite poetry in order to be taken seriously.5 This last fact may seem

utterly foreign to the average Western reader, who would rarely look to their

leaders to prove their worth by reciting a few lines of poetic verse in order to

prove a point. This fact illustrates just how foreign the Taliban and the people

of Afghanistan are to many in the West, and it is for precisely this reason that

Westerners should pay attention to the poetry of the Taliban, so that we may

extract some understanding of them as well as their target audience.

Put simply, a political poem is one in which political opinion and or patri-

otic sentiments are expressed. Throughout Afghan history, political activists,

politicians, army officers, and journalists have used poetry to convey their

opinions and theories on social, political, and economic issues. Statesmen,

tribal leaders, and army generals such as Ahmad Shah Durrani and Khoshal

Khan Khatak, and journalists and philosophers such as Mahmud Tarzi and

Khalilullah Khalili, used poetry to express political opinion and patriotic

sentiments. They are often referred to as warrior poets. Being a poet con-

firmed their intellectual legitimacy, which in turn reinforced their authority

as capable leaders. In other words, in Afghanistan politics and poetry are

closely intertwined.

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This politicization of poetry is a result of many social and political transfor-

mations in the past forty years. As politics became intertwined with armed

conflict, persecution, and violence, those writers who expressed their political

opinions in a direct and emphatic manner became susceptible to imprison-

ment, torture, and even death. The indirect nature of expression in poetry

provided the writer with a relatively less dangerous venue to express discon-

tent with the establishment.

Moreover, poetry has served as a suitable instrument with which to appeal

to the readers’ religious and patriotic sentiments. Proponents of various social

and political movements have attempted to arouse the public’s emotions

through poetry, and sought to persuade their readers to take action in support

of their cause.

Pashto poems by Taliban poets and poets sympathetic to the Taliban

The Taliban, especially in their early political incarnation, were composed

almost entirely of Pashtuns.6 They clearly understand the cultural impact that

poetry carried in Afghan society, and they use it deftly in many ways to com-

municate their messages to existing members, would-be members, the uncom-

mitted bystander, Afghans collaborating with the central government or

coalition, the Islamic world, and even to the West.7

The Taliban, as suggested above, use poetry to communicate legitimacy and

to sanctify the insurgency against the GIRoA and the Coalition.8 They do so

by using three main themes: defense of the homeland against foreign invaders;

defense of Islam against crusaders; and for those not so patriotic or pious, by

appealing to personal gain in the form of honor and esteem gained through

valor and worthy action in the name of the previous two themes. Taliban

poetry may also be instructional and is used not only to pass on Islamist/

jihadist ideology, but also tactical instruction.

Throughout the Taliban poems examined below, it is clear that several key

elements are continuously used as a means of influencing the target audience.

Continuous references are made to personal honor and manhood, seeking

revenge, defense of the homeland and of Islam, references to invaders/crusad-

ers, foreigners, traitors, the greatness of Afghanistan in world history, and the

worldwide fame of the Afghan Mujahid. These ideas are meant to incite the

reader/listener in various ways to take action on the side of the Taliban, who

portray themselves as the true Afghans and Mujahidin. They play on cultural,

historical, and religious elements, which are held very dear to the Afghan in

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the establishment and maintenance of his personal honor, or nang, an element

of Pashtunwali.

The main intent of the poetry examined here is for the Taliban not only to

justify their war and the manner in which they wage it; but also, and perhaps

more importantly, to sanctify it not only to the Afghan public, but also to the

greater Islamic community. In terms of justifying the war, the Taliban seek to

portray the ongoing struggle as a war of honor. They make continuous refer-

ences to the foreign invader, and historical references to past heroes who have

stood up and fought against other foreign invaders, thus putting themselves

in the same category as past heroes, and justifying their conflict as one against

an aggressive foreign would-be conqueror. It is important to note that this

theme resonates to many Afghans due to the long history of invasions by

foreign powers such as the Greeks, Mongolians, Persians, English, Russians,

and Americans.

The Taliban also make liberal use of Islamic ideology in their poems, play-

ing on the paranoia of jihadists that there exists an ongoing and deliberate

attempt by the infidel West to destroy Islam.9 This is a critical aspect of their

information campaign and associated stories, as it casts the Coalition not only

as invaders, but as crusaders as well. Furthermore, this theme has a dramatic

impact on the nature of the conflict and the actions/tactics used by the

Taliban. By wrapping their character as an organization, inclusive of the indi-

vidual, in terms such as Mujahid, the Taliban affiliates themselves with the

greater struggle that the jihadis believe is going on between good and evil

throughout the world.10 Jihadis believe in a global and perhaps universal fight

between the forces of Allah (Islam) and the forces of Satan (US and her

al ies).11 By using the terms of Islam such as Mujahid and jihad, the individual

and the organization become fighters for Al ah’s cause, and therefore justify

their actions.

The Taliban also seek to rationalize their struggle by making it an honorable

act. They use terms such as revenge and honor that resonate with their largely

original Pashtun audience. These factors, as suggested previously, comprise

certain important elements of the Pashto ethic of Pashtunwali, a key aspect of

being Pashtun. This factor cannot be lightly overlooked. What is important

to understand is how closely related Pashtunwali and the notion of honor are

to the identity of the Pashtun. As suggested above, Pashtunwali is so integral

to the Pashtun that there exists no distinction between practising Pashtunwali

and being a Pashtun.12

Furthermore, the Taliban use poetry as a means of instruction similar to

how they often use shabnamah. Examples of this will be shown to illustrate

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not only the manner in which the Taliban provide religious instruction, but

perhaps more significantly to, illustrate how they use poetry to communicate

tactical instruction to their members.

In communicating their main themes with the purpose of justifying and

sanctifying their ongoing violence, the Taliban present numerous poetic ele-

ments to their audience. As previously stated, the main poetic themes used by

the Taliban are defense of the homeland, defense of Islam, and honor of the

individual Afghan. The methods used to strike a chord in the hearts and

minds of the audience include the use of history and calling the audience’s

attention to the great past of Afghanistan, including great battles like

Maiwand, where, during the second Anglo-Afghan war, Afghan forces

inflicted heavy losses on the superpower of the day.13 The use of this genre is

meant to bolster the idea of the Afghan warrior tradition, and several poems

refer to the defeat of England, Russia, and America at the hands of the Afghan

hero, stating that the Afghan Mujahid is known throughout the world as the

one who defeats superpowers. The subtle use of poetry by the Taliban to com-

municate their ideas to their audience will be further examined below.

The following Taliban poems are expressed within the conventions of

Ghazal, which is arguably the most popular classical form of poetry, especially

in the Pashto and Dari languages. Judging by the types of messages, these

poems are no doubt written by poets sharing a belief in the Taliban’s cause.14

The nuances of language aside, the body of poetry examined reveals several

factors of interest. The main purpose of the entire body of poetry seems to be

to justify and promote the Taliban’s fight against the GIRoA and Coalition

forces. It does this by leaning heavily on the following three themes: defense

of homeland; defense of Islam; and the gaining and maintaining of personal

honor. Here are examples to illustrate how each of these themes is employed

to manipulate the target audience.

Taliban poems

Mujahid’s wish to his mother

Mother, pray for me, I am going to Ghezaa [the battle] tomorrow

I am going for Al ah’s satisfaction, I am not delaying

Battle has many rewards,

Al ah will give me paradise

If I am martyred, I’ll go to my leader with white face

I am getting to my trench

For combating the invader

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I like enthusiasm, and will go to the afterlife with enthusiasm

If I don’t come back home

This is my will to my father and mother

Don’t be impatient; I am going to doomsday with the red shroud

Till the homeland becomes free

All the betrayers will be suppressed

I’ll go to the tough area of war with great courage

You became Al ah’s mercy for us

Now, we all accept you, Abul Fazl

I’ll ascend to the sky with great honor

Poem’s story: Following the wishes of Al ah, I have decided to go to fight the

infidel invader. I do this enthusiastically and I am not afraid to die fighting for

our noble cause of freedom. Pray for me, Mother, for I do this for our honor

and Al ah’s mercy.

The poet asks his mother to pray for him. He is proclaiming himself a serv-

ant of Al ah in the Manichean battle taking place between the forces of good

and evil. He is fulfilling his duties as a good Muslim, thereby bringing honor

to himself, his family, and country. He is fighting the invader of his homeland,

making him a good Afghan. This declaration indicates that he believes that his

fight is a defensive one, and therefore the jihad that is being waged is defensive

in nature, making his actions justifiable and praiseworthy. He refers to himself

as a Mujahid, a holy warrior, further justifying his actions and bringing credit

to himself and his cause by couching them in Islam. He expresses the desire for

all betrayers to be suppressed. The idea of a betrayer indicates that other apos-

tate Afghans and therefore Muslims are helping the invaders. In terms of the

language of Islam, apostate Muslims are considered murtadd;15 in terms of

Pashtunwali, such Afghans are considered benanga (shameless, undignified),

possibly the worst insult that can be delivered to a Pashtun.16 Thus, the poet

seeks to use the language of Islam and the cultural values of the Pashtun peo-

ple to disgrace the Kabul government and anyone assisting them. He pro-

claims that he is worthy of honor and is assured a place in heaven.

White House!

May you be burnt in red flames, White House

May you be set on fire, burned to ashes, White House

There are black calamities in your stomach, you look white apparently

May you be changed to ruins, White House

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Murderers of oppressed tribes live inside you

May you become red with their blood, White House

You are the station of cruelty and barbarism from long ago

May you col apse from the foundations now, White House

You took the faith away from the West lovers

May you become the target of Islam lovers, White House

May Al ah fell you down like Bush

May you be plagued with Obama’s grief, White House

Poem’s story: Foreign invader, America, you will be destroyed because of your

brutal cruelty and savagery. Obama will fail just as Bush did, and Afghans will

triumph because their cause is just and righteous.

Here the Taliban poet is railing against the US in the language of jihad. He

is illustrating to the audience that the White House is the epicenter of evil

America. His use of color is interesting throughout, and of course has

intended negative connotations. Black calamities in one’s stomach may refer

to an illness such as cancer, or possibly refer to the Obama family’s ethnicity.

In Afghan folk symbolism, a black man usually signifies a foreign influence,

and “embodies the threat of exogamy in a society where people rarely marry

outside of their clan.”17 Furthermore, the poet wishes to imply that the US has

murdered and oppressed countless tribes and that those Muslims who ally

themselves with the US are murtadd.

Screams of forty-one countries reach to the sky

Screams of forty-one countries reach to the sky

As their coffins go out from our land to everywhere

I wonder what might be written as memory on their tombs?

Which nation led them to this end!

This is their policy and democracy’s result

Their work in Kabul and Baghdad reaches to trembling

They played with humanity’s integrity such that

The brutality and barbarism of history reach to crying

The blow of Afghan sandals with Afghan method

Montazir Zaidi’s message reaches to every Afghan

Al ah, these are all considered with your mercy and examination

An epic with empty hand reaches to a complete work

We haven’t stepped into anyone’s house

Inside the house, my message reaches to the big slave

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Stop puppetry and lowliness of life

It’s impossible that your current position would reach to permanency

As you present a medal to the titled dog

Your insult in dog’s shape reaches to the hero Amanul ah

Be prepared for Afghan and Al ah’s accountability

Your name will for sure reach to the garbage can

Poem’s story: The world’s Islamic countries are in a global struggle against

America, the West and their false democracy. Afghanistan and the Taliban will

fight with the help of Al ah to an epic and a righteous victory. For America, its

al ies and apostate col aborators will all suffer the fate they deserve and their

names will be eternally cursed.

This poet also decries America’s influence in the world and suggests the evils

of democracy. The forty-one countries are assumed to be the total number of

nations in the world that are Islamic. This not only illustrates to the audience

that this is a global battle of Islam against the West, but also that Afghans are

being victimized by a foreign invader, and thus the Mujahidin are defending

Afghanistan for a righteous cause. Once again, anyone working with the US

is considered the lowest of the low, on a par with a dog. Such a person will be

held accountable for their actions and in the end their name, and consequently

their family name, is eternally disparaged. This is a fear tactic employed by the

poet to let the “fence sitter” or col aborator know that once the Taliban has

won, the betrayer and all of his family will have a day of reckoning; they will

be dealt with by Afghans as well as by Al ah, illustrative of the idea that Al ah

is on the side of the Taliban, and by default those working with America and

her al ies are kuffar.

Good news

They are days of the insolent White House col apsing

They are days of the infidels’ Coalition col apsing

Signs of disunity are appearing in these forces

They are days of Islamic countries’ unity

Bad Abraha has come to ruin our Kaaba

They are days of coming of the green birds

Today as they are burning Ibrahimi nations with fire

They are days of burning Nimrod’s forces

The pharaoh of the time has come, killing our children

They are days of drowning the satanic armies

Bush came impudently and wouldn’t listen to anyone

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His economy is ruined, they are days of happiness

He didn’t learn from the example of Gorbachev’s defeat

He is disgraced in the world, they are days of shame

Those who would go to their houses in the darkness of night

They are days of escape of the wild forces

They intentionally bombard and then give excuses

They are days of crusader terrorists’ disappearance

Invaders, muftis with white turbans

They are embarrassed, they are days of crying

Toward freedom, with the help of the Al ah

We are taking firm steps, they are days of hope

Martyrs of the sweet homeland tell us in our dreams

Take revenge, they are days of uprising

The world will be left, don’t sell your faith in it, brothers

Hours are waiting for you, they are days of coming

Abidzai wants martyrdom from Al ah

Life in this world is enough, they are days of disaster

Poem’s story: The audacity of the infidel American and their disarrayed

Coalition forces will be totally defeated by a united Islamic foe. The Americans

have destroyed their economy, just as the Russians did during their evil and

ill-fated attempt to conquer Afghanistan. Like the Russians, the Americans kill

innocent children; but the Taliban with the help of al -powerful Al ah will seek

revenge and defeat the infidels and their false Islamic apostate puppets.

This poem is heralding the eventual col apse of Coalition efforts in

Afghanistan. The poet draws the audience’s attention to the disunity amongst the

Coalition and the unity of the Islamic struggle against the armies of Satan.

References are made to the deaths of innocents as if they were intentional acts,

further driving the wedge between the Coalition forces and the Afghan popu-

lace. The poem illustrates how Afghans defeated Russia and with Al ah’s assis-

tance will do the same to America and its al ies. There is a general call to hold the

course, and that the false Islamic scholars who aid the Western invaders will be

shamed. The poet calls for revenge, a theme of Pashtunwali; lastly, this poem is a

call to arms, stating that martyrdom for this cause is a great and honorable thing.

Pol-e-Charkhi prison

May Al ah col apse your wal , Pol-e-Charkhi prison

Fear comes up from your yard again

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May your stones and structure be set on fire from hell

You put foreigners’ weapons on your shoulders for my death

Once again, the cruel leaders made their daggers red with our blood

Once again, the disgraced brought the Western Satan’s tanks

The gown’s magician is wandering like a beggar

So that he might be able to find some more forces for my killing

The green parrots of the United Nations got mute (dumb)

The human rights claimers sealed their mouths

We are connected with the principle of enthusiasm, look at our firm determination

We don’t have any fear from the deaths and no pain from the wounds

We are going to dedicate our heads to Islam

May death come a hundred or a thousand times on this path

Ahamdi says, o Al ah take our revenge from them

Or make us stronger than them so that we’ll cut off their heads

Poem’s story: Pol-e-Charkhi prison is yet another example of the torture and

disgrace that the Americans and their apostate puppets have imposed on the

Muslim Afghan people. But the United Nations and other “human rights”

organizations refuse to face or address the evil of the Americans and their

Afghan puppets. The Taliban and faithful Afghan people, however, will stand

strong and with the support of Al ah will take revenge and end this evil and will

drive the evil ones from Afghanistan.

Pol-e-Charkhi prison is an Afghan prison that was originally used by US

and Coalition forces to hold captured Taliban and other insurgents (it has

since been turned over to the Afghans). This prison is held in the same disdain

by the Taliban as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. The implication here is

that within Afghanistan there exists yet another American institution for

torture and murder of the faithful. The poet states that the US can act with

impunity, because the world is either too weak, or too afraid to stand up to the

US or UN. Moreover, human rights groups have lost their nerve and have

turned a blind eye to foreigners’ atrocities in Afghanistan. The poet then

relates how it is up to the faithful—the good Muslims and good Afghans—to

seek revenge for these atrocities in Al ah’s name, regardless of the number who

will die seeking this revenge.

The following poem is extremely interesting. It subtly relates that the poet

is no longer a real person. This poem looks directly into the heart of the

Pashtun audience and declares that it cannot be a real human being in accord-

ance with Pashtunwali, so long as invaders are within his homeland.

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Who am I, what’s my duty

How did I come here

There is no house or love for me

I am homeless, without homeland

I don’t have any place in this world

They don’t leave me to rest

There are shootings and gunpowder here

Rain of bullets

Which direction I should go then

There is no place for me in this world

A small house

I had from my father and grandfather

In which I was very happy

I and my beloved would live

They were great beautiful times

We would sacrifice ourselves for each other

But suddenly a guest came

I let him stay for two days

After these two days passed

The guest became the host

He told me, you came today

Be careful not to come the next day

Poem’s story: The Afghan people let foreigners come into their country only to

find that they came to destroy the Afghan people and their beloved homeland.

Now the foreigners have claimed the country as their own. The foreigners have

taken our homes, our lives and now want our entire country, which was once

beautiful and was home to people who were always ready to help their

neighbors.

This is a poignant lament that the poet is now homeless in a land of warfare.

He had all the things in life that a man could need, but he unwisely allowed a

guest to stay in his home too long. The guest is a metaphor for foreigners and

foreign concepts such as the GIRoA and Jeffersonian democracy. His ances-

tral home has been taken from him by this guest who now tells the poet—the

original host—that he should not visit too long because he is no longer wel-

come in his own home. The interest here is that it speaks to the Afghan con-

nection to ancestry and homeland. It also reminds the reader/listener that

without certain things, a man is not a person, and has no place in the world.

Interestingly, the poet raises the question of “what is my duty?” This is particu-

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larly interesting as the poet says he has lost his identity. Having lost his ances-

tral home, he is now no one. He does not know who he is. This is a metaphor

for the entire country, and the poet is warning the audience—the Afghan

public—that so long as the foreign usurper is within Afghanistan, no Afghan

can truly be free, or truly realize his own identity because independence and

egalitarianism are such a big part of what makes an Afghan an Afghan. In fact

the Afghan has become a servant to the foreign occupier.

In memory of the lost martyr

Your father is looking for you in the mountains

Your mother is looking for you by the sea

They left their sleep to recover the memory

Of which desert or valley you might be lying in

Your father and mother keep your memory alive forever

Your family graves are known in the graveyards

There will always be many flags blowing there

Those who sacrifice their lives for the homeland

The black soul will become gold with their blood

Flowers take color from the martyrs’ blood

Ohud and Khandaq’s [Prophet Mohammad’s battles] mountains are still red

Many years have passed there

Who calls the martyr of the homeland’s honor dead?

History writes his name in gold

Tulips are colored with your blood

The atmosphere takes color from it as well

Come and see what happened and what it is

Blood is streaming innocently and changes to rivers

Guesthouses of the Afghans are deserted

O Al ah, bring back the previous times

Make trouble for the foreigner and the cruel

So that they won’t throw heavy bombs on us

O Al ah, accept this prayer from me

Remove this pain and trouble from us ever more

He is sitting in the expectation of your mercy

Khalilzai raised his hand toward you

Poem’s story: The fallen martyrs who have defended our beloved homeland are

Afghanistan’s true heroes that will never be forgotten by their families or coun-

try. The martyrs have fought like Mohammad and history will never forget

them. We pray for the martyrs and ask Al ah to seek revenge against the evil

foreigners who have invaded our country and caused the people of Afghanistan

so much pain.

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This is a prayer to Al ah for those who have fallen and remain unfound by

their parents. It implies that many fall and remain unclaimed on the battle-

field, and even though they are not returned to their family graveyards, they

are honored there with many flags. Furthermore, any stain that they had on

their souls is now erased because in this struggle against the foreign invader/

crusader they gave their lives for Islam and in service to Allah. The fallen

martyr is therefore a good Muslim and a good Afghan, worthy of praise, and

will be remembered as a hero. Perhaps the intent of this poem is to bolster the

courage of the would-be Mujahid who may fear being killed in battle and not

being found, claimed, and returned to his ancestral homeland to be properly

honored and buried.

Heroes of Islam

Anyone who has an Afghan sword in his hand

He won’t resist and escape from the battlefield

The bravery of his sword is obvious to the entire world

The fact that they made the red infidels (Russians) run away from their homeland

It’s Islam’s soil and has well-trained heroes

That’s why they beat the enemy to the ground

This homeland has grown up and trained heroes of the religion

Each of them raised from the cradle by the dedication of their mothers

The entire Muslim world is proud of the Mujahid

Because they have embarrassed the communists in this world

You have banished Lenin’s communist system from the world

They have been scattered and the whole universe has laughed at them

Look at our history, what the Afghan has in his background

The English are the great example who have been pushed out of the country

Afghans gave sacrifice for their honor

They have made a revolution, every traitor is shaken by them

Nations are amazed by the Afghans

Since they have beaten a power like Bush

Afghan sons don’t have a parallel; hey, o Ahmad Yar

Stop complimenting them, they have won every field.

Poem’s story: The Afghan Mujahidin’s bravery is the envy of the entire Islamic

world. Their bravery drove the Russian invaders from their beloved homeland

and eventually destroyed Soviet communism. The Mujahidin also defeated and

drove the English from Afghanistan, and are now destroying the invading

Americans. The Afghans are the world’s great fighters who have defeated all

superpowers and are recognized by all for their bravery and heroism.

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This is a proclamation that Afghans are the heroes of the Islamic world.

Afghan mothers instil this heroism in their babies from the cradle, and it is

this zeal and bravery that the Mujahid used to defeat the Russians, the English,

and the Americans (Bush). The poet proclaims that Afghans are revered and

honored by the ulema, and awed by the rest of the world as honorable fighters.

The main theme of this poem is one of national pride, and this poem could

serve as a recruiting tool for the Taliban.

This next poem is the lament of a grandfather or a father. He, like all par-

ents, believes his son possesses great potential, and he is crushed when his

child falls short, seemingly selling out and shaming not only himself, but the

poet and his family as well.

Empty Case

I thought it was an eagle but it turned out a craw

Man wasn’t made out of him, and turned out neutral

I trained him with the love of my heart

I wanted to make a heart from him, but he turned out lungs

I thought he had weight in the community

But he finally turned out a light pack of straw

He played with the jihadi purpose

It seems he turned out like the Russians

He danced to US dol ars

We said his fortune turned out sinister

Khalis does not complain about anyone else

His own pocket bullet turned out to be an empty case

Poem’s story: I thought my son would be a brave and honorable man; this was

they way he was brought up. But he gave into the temptation of the blood

money of the evil American invaders and he tragically abandoned and betrayed

the Afghan people.

The poet suggests that his offspring “sold out” to the Americans. This is a

metaphor to shame the target audience. It directly targets those Afghans seen

collaborating with the foreign invader. It implies further that some of the

offspring (the children, or people) of Afghanistan are less than what they

could have been, that they are a disappointment to their fathers. The empty

shell case is a metaphor for the weak seed of the father in fathering such a

child, and implies shame to the betrayer’s family as well. The betrayer is viewed

as a man trained in the proud warrior tradition of Afghanistan to fight the

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invaders, but in the end only playing at jihad, becoming instead a boy dancing

for the money of the foreign invader.

The next poem sings the praises of the Afghan warrior. It plays on feelings

of national and tribal pride.

I am Afghan mujahid

Gun in my hand and dagger under my arm, I am going into battle

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

I may be victimized for my homeland a hundred times

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

I have religion; I have the Qur’an and am under the law of the holy Qur’an

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

Anyone who looks badly at me will see himself lost for ever

Look, I am a known champion of history

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

We have good Shar’iah, and believe in it at all times

Shar’iah is my light and my heart is lit by its light

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

We want a free life, we want universal stability

Because I love truth and hate unjustice for ever

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

We hate the war, but we wage war against war

If war is imposed on us, then I am a man of the field

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

Hey, cruel colonizer, take it from my Qatin

I am taking revenge for my people, I am committed to my promise

I am Afghan mujahid, I am Afghan mujahid

Poem’s story: I am a brave and proud Afghan Mujahid who eagerly goes to battle

to fight the evil American invaders. I might be martyred but I have the strength

of Islam on my side and history will remember me. I will eternally fight for

Shar’iah, truth, freedom, and justice. War was imposed on us, but we will fight

and promise to revenge the cruel and evil acts of the infidel invaders.

The poet sings the praises of the Afghan Mujahid. He uses terms that will

resonate with the audience, referencing the victimization of Afghanistan at

the hands of foreign invaders, the defense of the homeland, and uses Islamic

terminology as well. The poet makes the bold statement that he, a Mujahid,

follows the laws of the Qur’an. This once again sanctifies not only the indi-

vidual fighter, but also the cause itself. The poet proclaims that the Afghan

freedom fighter is known throughout the world and his name echoes through

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history as that of a champion. This idea instills pride in the would-be

Mujahid. Other ideas put forth by the poet are the correctness of Shar’iah

law and the desire for freedom and stability, which can only be attained

through making war. Very importantly, the poet states that the Afghan

Mujahid does not want war, but since war has been imposed on the home-

land (making his struggle purely defensive), he must fight to expel the colo-

nizer. The good Afghan therefore seeks revenge for this wrongdoing and

must be committed to undoing it.

Autumn came to you instead of spring, my homeland

Hot wind and rain of fire came on you

Your blossoms of wishes faded in this world

Storm of cruelty and power came on you from all sides

You were tired and exhausted in poverty

The red open-mouthed predatory animal came on you

You had seen cruelties from natives and foreigners

Wars, tensions, murders, and killings came on you

This world has changed to a hell for you, you are burning in it

You were not dead, yet other bullets came on you

You have made many of your son’s messengers to paradise

The Satan that has ambushed came from afar on you

They fried you on a fire like a kebab once again

Puppet of Satan came on you with an Afghan name

They brought the army once again, they are not satisfied yet

The big caravan of the time’s Nimrods came on you

Abraham’s army with arrogance from the West

The line of their tanks and elephants came on you

Your true sons will not give you the built paradise of this world

Leader or Mujahid, a sympathetic Afghan came on you

Poem’s story: The Satanic Americans and their apostate Afghan puppets have

brought cruelty and murder to Afghanistan but the heroic Afghan Mujahidin

will eventually protect our beloved homeland and defeat the arrogant and evil

Americans and apostate al ies.

In this poem the poet wishes to convey the ruin of the Afghan homeland.

He begins with the analogy of autumn, a time of decline having come or been

brought to his homeland. Afghanistan has been exhausted and kept in poverty

by a predatory animal in the form of foreigners and greedy natives. The far

enemy, the great Satan, the US has brought war, death, murder, killings, hell,

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and bullets on the homeland, setting it afire. Afghan puppets are seen by the

poet to be just as guilty of this ruin as the invader. It is these betrayers, false

sons of Afghanistan, who brought the multilingual armies of the West, al ud-

ing to biblical references of Nimrod’s Caravan.18 The poet concludes that the

true son of Afghanistan, the Mujahid, is there to continue to protect it.

Throughout, the poet refers to Afghanistan as if a person.

The next poem is another lament at the current state of Afghanistan. Note

that the poet lays the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of the Afghan

people.

Built prison

Tears dripped on my col ar

The history of the Afghan has been defamed

As our turban was high in the world

Today it has descended, my God

Nightingales are crying and remembering their meadow

Foreigners brought autumn to it

They are buying its honor and esteem with dol ars

All the competitors unified against it, my God

This mad man is targeting me with stones

They changed my wishes to soil

It’s a pity that we are wandering like vagrants

We ourselves did all this to us

Rain of tears pours down my face

When I remember Afghanistan, my God

Poor Afghans are suffering everywhere

There is no one to ask about them, my God

Where can we go, who can we cry to, my God

Say, ruin the cruel ones, my God

Poem’s story: While Afghanistan was once a strong and proud country, many

apostate, traitor Afghans have sold out to American dol ars and corruption and

dishonored Afghanistan and their people.

The poet tells us that historically Afghans once held their turbans high, but

now they have descended. The metaphorical nightingale of the Afghan people

laments the loss of its green meadow at the hands of foreign invaders who have

brought a metaphorical autumn (end of prosperity) to the land, whose honor

is being diminished by dol ars. The poet then puts the blame on the Afghan

people for allowing this to hppen, and therefore there is no one to cry to or

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even blame for this. In this Taliban poem, there are themes of homeland, ruin,

foreign corruption, traitors, loss of honor, and a call for action.

The next three poems are all instructive in nature. The first two give guid-

ance to the audience, first in acceptable behavior, and second in what should

be the true desires of the good Muslim. The third poem provides instruction

to the audience on the validity of using IEDs, and their tactical application.

O, Eid of the trench

You came with peace, o Eid

Joyful and blissful Eid

I welcome your coming

Come all the time, Eid of Tor Ghar [name of a mountain in Afghanistan]

We spent the fasting month in the trench

We would always walk in hunger

Today that you are our guest, my dear

We will surely celebrate you, Eid of Spin Ghar

But don’t get upset, dear Eid

Evening is near, Eid

We are moving now to ambush

The Western army is on its way, Eid

If we didn’t esteem you

Don’t get upset, o Eid

O Eid, they are revolutionary days now

Danger is happening in all directions

Don’t complain to the Mujahidin

They are faced with difficulties, o Eid

Faizani is on his way

Launchers are on his shoulder, o Eid

Poem’s story: The Mujahidin are fighting honorably to save Afghanistan from

the infidel invaders. The Mujahidin fought during Ramadan while fasting. The

Mujahidin have to be honorable in fighting the enemy during Eid, and cannot

celebrate as they would desire. Fighting evil and danger that is attacking

Afghanistan from all directions requires the total attention of the Mujahidin.

This poem is instructive in how it treats the celebration of Eid. The poet

says that it is justifiable for the Mujahid to put off his Eid celebrations if he is

engaged in battle with the Western army. The poet sanctifies the actions of the

insurgent by using the term Mujahid, thereby linking the fighter to Islam, and

thus making the fighter’s action good, even if he puts aside a mandatory cele-

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bration because he is acting for the greater good of Islam and fulfilling God’s

will. The poet is excusing the Mujahid from strict adherence to Islamic rites.

Inner clothes

Nothing tastes good to the sick

But when they get healthy, they taste everything

Decorate your inner clothes

Trim your outer clothes

Reputation and braveness do not come from clothes

Look to the heroes of Pani Pat [Afghans’ battle with the Indians] or Maiwand

Hardships will return to the person who

Did not take his example from history

Virtue is gained through effort

It does not come from simply sitting at home

He will be capable of greatness and leadership

Who has devoted his life to serving

Privilege and manliness come from merit

Not because you are Ghalji or Momand [names of two Pashtun tribes]

Arrogance decreases with honor and esteem

Patience and modesty grow from them many times over

O dust, who is living in a wealthy palace

Where you had placed yourself in expectation

Poem’s story: The true character of a person comes from his internal fortitude

and bravery. All Afghans should try to emulate the heroes of the great Afghan

victories at Pani Pat and Maiwand. A man’s true character is a reflection of his

actions and services to fellow Afghans. Don’t let arrogance destroy your honor,

but always be patient and modest.

Here the poet stresses that it is not the outward appearance that makes a

person great. A good Muslim should dedicate himself not to enhancing his

outward appearance, but instead focus his efforts on the development of his

inner self. He can acquire greatness through service to a greater cause, to suf-

fering hardships for this cause, and by going to battle (a historical reference)

for this cause. It is service and hardship that will gain him merit. The poet also

says that greatness is not due to tribal affiliation, encouraging potential insur-

gents to put aside tribal feuds in service of a greater cause. A man can grow his

personal honor and esteem from modesty, rather than pride. The poet draws

the analogy that the person who seeks to enhance his outer clothes is sick, and

once he gets better and “healthy,” all things in life will get sweeter.

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This next poem deserves close attention, and is a prime example for how

poetry is used by the Taliban for instruction.

While crusaders pass

I’ll go back to my sweet homeland

When peace comes to my beloved country

We will not go in any other direction

Once Shar’iah is restored there

I go there from time to time

When it is time to farm our lands

When I go there, my friends tell me

They were waiting for the bus when they saw a convoy

Foreigners were at the back, traitors coming ahead of them

The crusaders passed by with arrogance

Like a superior person walking over the poor

The poor all stood aside from them

As if an eagle would come on the birds

One who has little zeal would look at them with anger

He can’t do anything to them except sweat down his forehead

But they can’t survive a Mujahid at a distance

Spying on them through binoculars

These green-eyed devils would not survive

Going through an ambush

O Janbaz, take revenge for your countrymen on them

He is waiting for when the traitors will come

Poem’s story: I am looking forward to returning to my sweet home in

Afghanistan once Shar’iah is restored. I am told about the arrogant crusader

invaders and their apostate puppet traitors who drive on our roads and make

Afghan cars move to the side of the road. But the honorable Afghan Mujahidin

will eventually take revenge and ambush the crusaders through the remote use

of roadside bombs.

The poet tells of how he will go home when the invaders have been expelled

and Shar’iah law has been established. He then relates how the invaders walk

with arrogance through the homeland and that the weak tolerate this, but the

Mujahid fights back. The poet refers to using IEDs to defeat the enemy and

that no foreigner can survive this. Of interest here is the poet’s observation of

the travel patterns of Coalition convoys, stating that the traitors (Afghans who

serve in any capacity with the Coalition, whether it be ANA, ANP, or some

other form of col aboration) come first, followed by foreigners: “Foreigners

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were at the back, traitors coming ahead of them,” thus demonstrating a clear

knowledge of how Coalition forces move about the battle space. This observa-

tion/ instruction is then followed by reference to the use of IEDs when the

poet states: “But they can’t survive a Mujahid at a distance/Spying on them

through binoculars.” This statement is interesting in that it not only gives fur-

ther tactical guidance to the would-be ambusher by instructing him to main-

tain a distance from the ambush site—enough of a distance to warrant the use

of binoculars—but further provides justification for the action by referring to

the ambusher as a Mujahid. This reference thereby makes the action of using a

remotely detonated IED justified and sanctified, as it is the action of a holy

warrior in the defense of Islam and in service to Al ah.

The next poem is another example of the theme of defense of Islam.

Every night, somebody hits my door with stones

They hit my knowledge and art with stones

My friends, they hit the sun with stones

I am not hitting them even with flowers, I am surprised

Most of those people hit me with stones

I must be looking so elevated to them

That’s why they are aiming so much at my head

Every night, somebody hits my door with stones

The Danish see, and are proud of their wisdom

See the ignorant one; he is hitting the mountain with stones

Poem’s story: The ignorant and infidel West is trying to discredit and destroy

Islam. Their jealousy of Islam and our purity has even seen the West pursue

sacrilegious actions to denigrate the Prophet Muhammad through cartoons

and other profane acts.

The poet tells the audience that the thrower of stones is the ignorant West,

casting stones at the door of Islam. The poet portrays the West as ignorant,

arrogant, and jealous, seeking to denigrate all the best things of Islam, from

art, to knowledge, to religion. This is the language of the jihadist. The poet

points out that the proud Danish (cartoonists of the Prophet Muhammad)

are throwing stones at the mountain of Islam, an act of futility.

Give me your turban

Give me your turban and take my veil

Give me the sword so that the issue can be settled

You sit inside the house; I am going to the battlefield

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I may either free my dear land, or Karbala will be made again

Don’t hide behind nominal masculinity, how long are you going to lie asleep

You sit among the girls, calamity be on your masculinity

Stop these endless stories and don’t become so emotional

Your cunning, boasting, and lies make me laugh

That land which has been set on fire still burns

How would you know about widows and orphans

That day will be my Eid and happiness

When the enemy of my religion and land enters the trap of my influence

Someone will rebuild my ruined land and establish the rule of truth

Will such a person rise up? Will such a person appear?

I, Nasrat, am living in sorrow a joyless life

I will know the joy of life once my prayer is answered

Poem’s story: If cowardly men will not fight the infidel invaders of our country,

I—a woman—will take up the sword. If I am not successful, a large and historic

battle like Karbala will eventually free Afghanistan. Cowardly men are natural

liars and ignore the enemy’s making Afghan women widows and Afghan chil-

dren orphans. I pray that the defenders of Islam will rebuild our ruined land

and re-establish both truth and freedom.

This poem is a prime example of how the Taliban wish to shame men who

will not fight. This poet is a young woman who basically is telling any man

who will not fight for Afghanistan to put on her veil while she puts on his

turban and does the man’s work for him. She denigrates this type of man,

making him an object of ridicule.

Oblivious Muslim

By Zaheb

Do you have love and affection in your heart or not? ؟هــــــــن هک ېرــــل تبمح هـــنيم يـــک هړز

Do you have any hope for forgiveness19 or not?

؟هـــن هـــــــک ېرــــل ترـــــفغمددــــيما هڅ

O! Muslim, you are asleep in oblivion.

هـــنمالسم ې�ي هديو بوخ هپ تــــلفغد!

Do you have the desire for martyrdom or not?

؟هــــــــــــن هک ېرـــــــــل تداـــــهشداـــــنتم

When you call Mohammad as your beloved,

ېـــلوبدــــمحمدــــمحم يچ ننااج لپخ

Do you have the characteristics of Belal?20

؟هـــــــن هک ېرــــل تفص يدـــــنوغ للابد

You are proud of the Usman’s21 generosity.

ېړکزناوخ يدنبا تواسخ هپ نثماعد

Do you have a generous hand yourself?

؟هــــــن هک ېرـــــل تواــــسخد سلا هم هت

Like Omar22 who got rightfully angry,

ېش هــسوغ يچ هقح هپ يدــــنوغرعمد

Do you have that kind of bravery in you or not?

؟هــــــــن هک ېرل تعاشج سياد کي ناځ

The victims look forward to his coming

يروـګ هـــت ېرلاولتارد يد ناــــمولظم

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Do you have the habit of Khaled23 or not?

؟هـــــــن هک ېرــــل تداع يدــــنوغلداخد

You spent your life with lying and deception.

ړـکرېت نودنوژ يد هکود هپوا غورد هپ

Do you have any interest in truth or not?

هن هــــک ېرــــل تــــقيقحد باــــب هترېچ

Death does not care about anyone O! Zaheb.24

هــــــــــــبهاذ يوک هناورپاــــچيهد ګرم!

Are you prepared for the day of judgment or not?

هـــــــــــــــن هک ېرـــــــــل تــــمايقد یرايت

Poem’s story: If you are a true Muslim, you will fight the infidel crusaders and

their apostate al ies. Are you true to the wishes and life of Mohammad? Are

you a committed warrior willing to defend Islam, like Usman, Omar, and Belal?

Are you a brave follower or a liar and deceiver? If you are a coward, you will

never reach paradise and will be denied on the Day of Judgment.

This poem asks the reader whether he is a good Muslim. It also warns him

that there will eventually be a day of judgment, and that he needs to be pre-

pared for it. Each line asks a fundamental question: Do you believe in … or do

you not? It reminds us of the manner in which an attorney would pose this

question to a defendant: Did you … or did you not? Such questions are

designed to appeal to the reader’s emotions and give a positive answer.

Furthermore, what the poet indirectly asks the reader to do, without actually

mentioning it, is to take action. He dares the reader, saying that if he sub-

scribes to the same values that Usman, Omar, and Belal did, and if he is a true

Muslim, then he must prove it in practice. He must act in order 1) to prove

that he is a believer, and 2) to be saved on the Day of Judgment.

The poet also mentions the names of historic figures that Muslims, espe-

cially Sunni Muslims, revere. His purpose is to inspire the reader to achieve

the level of nobility that these men did, and to offer role models to relate to

and emulate.

Liberty

يد يـــلدــيل ګنروـــنيوداــــتس مي يـک ولګ هپ

By Mawlawi Mohammad Ghafoor Peroz

يد ليديل ګنسسونيو هپاتسساد مي يچ ينګنر

I have seen the color of your blood in the flowers. هــــتيرحد هـــمغن لهړک هـــمزمز يـــچومـــلز

I have seen the rock become colorful with your يد ليديل ګنز مي کيوناملاغدوړز هپ

blood.

هنوسر لوش يچ نبارق يدنبا ۍدازاد هرعن

When the young men began to murmur the

يد يـلديل ګـــنلاپ کيونوصرق يــموغهد

melody of freedom

هنوتلم يو يدنوژ يدنبا ۍدازاد حور هپ

I have seen the bells ringing in the hearts of the

slaves.

يد ليديل ګــنلم تلمره مي هحور ېد ې�ب

Those heads that were sacrificed for freedom.

يو هن يښکپ يچ ېزانج هنوواړک هنوـخمز

؟ يد ليديل ګنځروغتاوبرخوڅ هپ ېلوخد

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I have seen beds made with them in the palaces. هد هــــــڼېګ هويوــــــنوـــــسلواد يدازا ! هزورــــېپ

Nations are alive with the spirit of liberty.

يد ليديل ګنشر ګنشر هپوروتد مي نسحاد

I have seen every nation in destitution25 without

this spirit.

If there are no wounds, hardships, and funerals in it.

Have you seen a movement of only a few [empty] talks?

O! Peroz, liberty is an adornment for the nations.

I have seen this beauty in the clank of the swords.

Peroz attempts to draw attention to the value of freedom. He also justifies

paying the ultimate price: sacrificing one’s life for attaining it, or its protec-

tion. He equates a nation’s liberty to the human soul. Similar to a soul that

keeps a body alive, a nation lives as long as it is free. Without liberty the nation

dies. He warns that it is not an easy task to fight for and protect one’s freedom;

it entails suffering and even death. To achieve or protect one’s independence,

one has to make sacrifices. One may even have to die for this noble cause. This

poem is nationalistic in nature; it appeals to the patriotic sentiments of the

reader rather than to his religious beliefs.

In Peroz’s opinion, freedom is absolutely worth sacrificing one’s life for. This

is because independence keeps a nation alive, just as a soul keeps a body alive.

Therefore, sacrificing one’s life is obviously worth protecting and is related to

rescuing the life of a nation.

Complaint

By Zaker

My beloved, why did you sell out your love هړـــــــک هـــڅرخ هرــــس هراــــي له يد هـــنيم يــلو !هريا

with your beloved one.

هړـــــــــک هـــــڅرخ هسر هرارــــقا له يد هدـــعو ېړـــکتا

You sold out your promise along with your هو ېلټګ يدنبا تيمق هــــپوــــنيوورــــسد يــــچاــــچ

confessions.

هړــــــــک هـــــڅرخ هرـــــس هراـــــت هـــــل يد هرــــلغلم هغه

The person whom you have won [his

heart] with your red blood.

لـــــــــتکو هترو يـــــچتا هـــــکل هو هـــــن هکپسس هرمود

You have sold out that pearl in return for هړــــک هــــڅرخ هرـــــس هرازوګ هـــــل يداـــــــبباد هروــــت

the thread.

ېړاــــغردوګد هت بـــيقر ېدوـــښو هــــترو يد هــــښ

It wasn’t as light as you assumed.

هړــــــک هـــــڅرخ هرــــــس هراــــيد له يد هڅوک هرهږومز

You have sold out the sword of your father ېړک يدنلاوښپرت يد ۍنبارق ېترس ېترس هرموڅ

along with the strike.

هړـــــک هــــڅرخ هرــــــــــــس هرازـــــم هــــل يدديهشد هــــنيو

Good, you showed the way to the spring روک هپ تيرغدوا ګنند ېو ېـګج يچ مي ېګترس

[water] to your competitor.

هړک هــــڅرخ هرــــس هراــــقو هــــل يد يخرتاد هــــــــــنوخ

You sold out our every street along the اــــنشااـــــفو ېــــــب هو هــــــــــليګدردد ”رکاذ ”د هــــــغد!

land.

هړک هڅرخ هرـــس هراـــــهرپ له يد هــــنيسس يخمزږومز

You have stamped on all the big sacrifices.

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You sold out the blood of the Martyred along with his grave.

The house in which I could hold my head up with pride.

You sold out the house of history along with your honor.

O! My disloyal friend, this was the pain and the complaint of Zaker.

You have sold our wounded chest along with the injury.

This poem is primarily addressing those who cooperate with the govern-

ment and the ISAF, especially those who used to be members of the Taliban

insurgency. To provoke him, Zaker is accusing the reader of being a coward.

Breaking one’s promise is a sign of spinelessness among the Afghans. He also

wants to convince the reader that his desertion of the Taliban has been a great

mistake. This is because in return for cooperation with the government, he has

lost his moral values. He is selling out the achievements that his ancestors

made shedding their blood throughout history. The main objective of Zaker

in this piece is to make the reader feel guilty—ashamed of cooperating with

the Afghan government.

Traveler Martyred

By Mafton

I am on my way to war, look after me.

Or else you will regret [if you don’t look] not

watching me leave.

هروــــګ يـــسپار ناور يم هــــت ګنج لهه!

Raise your hands to pray, and ask for my

هروګ سيپار نامرا ېړک هتسسورو هبايب!

martyrdom.

هړاوغ ميديهش تـــچوا سلا هړکاعد هپ

With tear-filled eyes, look after me.

هروګ يـــــسپار ناــــمشچ کډ هـــناړژ له!

I am the Majnon26 of the love of religion and

يم نوـــــنمج کي قشع نطودوا نيدد هز

country.

هروګ يـــــسپار ناـــبايبوا هنورغ ېتسښد!

O, deserts, O, mountains, look after me.

يم یـــــلمز هاش یرـــېتسر هز مــــي هــــن لهغېپ

I am not a girl, but a brave prince

هروــــګ سيپار نادـــيم ګنجدداـــجهد!

Of the battleground of jihad, look after me.

هـــــيرګلم ېړاوغ نديد مي هــــک امخاخ!

If you want to see me, but of course.

هروــــګ يـــــسپار نادــــنزاـــيوارګنسسيا!

Look after me, either on the war front or in prison.

يد ېــــپش ېځرووــنوګنجد ید بلاقنا

هروګ سيپار ناــــتسناغفا يـګنج لپخ!

There is a revolution; these are the days and nights

of war.

وــــــناديهشورـــفاــــــسمداـــــــيب هـــــــتله

Look after your warrior Afghanistan.

هروــــګ سيپار ناـــــتسبرقړـــــپړخ هــغه!

ونيو هپ نـيګنر یکټپ یروس یروـــسوي

Look after the traveler martyrs

هروـــــګ يــــــسپار ناـــــښنادرــــــبقرهرپ!

In the dilapidated graveyard.

A riddled shawl [with bullets] colored with blood.

On every tomb look for this sign.

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The poet, Mafton, is a journeyman, but not an ordinary one. He has made

a decision to travel to the battleground. From there on, he is certain that he

will either be a martyr or become a prisoner. He will eventually travel to

heaven. The poet is sure that he will not return from the war. He does not

characterize victory in jihad in a conventional sense, as the defeat of the enemy.

His goal is to become a martyr while defending his religion and country.

It is time for jihad

By Mawlawi Mohammad Yonos Khales Nabi

Khel27

The autumn’s wind has arrived in the territory

of red flowers.

Vouchers have taken the place of nightingales.

This is the territory of Islam and of Islam’s

followers.

ولګوسرد ېيمسس هپ ىغاردبا نازخدايب

There is no place here for the coming of ولــبلبد ليوــين ياځوناغراـکون هکـــځ

strangers.

هدوناويرپد ملاساد هيمسس ملاــساداد

Now that the looters have placed their looting وللتاردورايغاد هتسشن ىاځ هڅ ېک ېد

claws on it.

يد ېښيا ېجنپ بصغد ېرپونابصاغ ېچ سوا

O! Muslim, it is time to shed some red blood.

وـــلوــيوـــت وـــنيو وسرد ، هناــملــــسم ىد تــــخو

Today if we be frightened by the real هخڅ تداهش نيتيسښير ،ورلو هرېو هک نن

martyrdom.

ولوګنم لهويدرپد،وش هن هب صلاخوږيادخ

For God’s sake, we will not be free from the ئړک همخ هت نيدوااش هت ىود ئش ړلاوار ئله

claws of the foreigners.

وللــــت هتاـــشد مدق وي هــــت لمـــــــسم ې�ياښ هن

Come on! Rise and turn your backs on them, ئګنادو هت نادېمداجهدوارپسوا هروت ئلخاو

and turn your faces toward religion.

Placing even one step behind is not appropriate ولهو ګرم هپ ىودد ،هرون هفرــــــــص ېوک هم

for the Muslim.

هد ېلغار عقوم ناحتماد نمالسم هپ نن

Pick up a sword and a shield, and jump to the ولوډنځ د هزاجا هــــت نمالسم هتــــــــشن

battleground of jihad

Don’t be hesitant any more to bring death upon

them.

Today, the time of the test [of courage] for the

Muslim has arrived. The Muslim does not have

permission to procrastinate.

The poet’s purpose here is comparing the foreigner to a vulture and thus

demonizing the enemy. This vulture has taken hold of the Muslims’ territory

with his claws. This line of argument connects the Muslim with a specific

space, offering a tangible reality to the existence of his reader who belongs to

a Muslim nation. He also refers to the foreigners as robbers. For this reason,

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he deems the killing of foreigners not only legitimate, but also necessary and

urgent. Therefore, all Muslims must take up arms immediately and free them-

selves from the claws of the foreigners. This poem appeals to the religious

beliefs of the reader as much as it does to his nationalistic sentiments.

Closing One’s Eyes

By Amanzoi

You pointed to the past, you forgot the present.

There is chaos all over the country; you have closed your eyes on the north.

You gave the criminal many titles.

You closed your eyes on justice being trampled.

Next to and with the Cross you raised a drink.

You didn’t think about it, you closed your eyes on its sin.

The Shaikh and Morshed 28 sat on the rank of the invader.

You closed your eyes to fourteen years of trouble.

The country’s young girls are colorful with new colors.

You have closed your eyes on their pants,29 and jacket and shawl.

From the beginning it wasn’t like this, music was all haram.30

Today a new fatwa31 has been imposed; forever you closed your eyes.

Not only blind and deaf, but also the Mul ah became a democrat.

He closed his eyes on his old promises.

Watch out, Amanzoi, so your pen does not go astray.

Your enemy is a sorcerer; he will close his eyes on your writing.

Amanzoi pretends to be speaking to a person such as a government official.

He explains a dire social and political situation. But in fact he is having a

monologue not with a government representative, but with the ordinary

Afghan. Amanzoi attempts to convince his reader that the state is a weak and

unjust entity incapable of governance. He makes this claim based on two main

factors: first, the government does not have the capacity to serve the public;

and secondly, its actions are contrary to Islam.

Pashto poems by moderate and progressive contemporary poets

لیديل بوخ هږاوخ

I have had a sweet dream

يږيړوج نایما وا مزع ګنیټ هپ وخ یږيړوج نطو

The country will be built, but with strong resolve

يړيړوج ناځ د وا وټګ صيشخ د نيبارق هپ

and faith;

ېک ايند هرايت يځار هن اڼر ېروتسس هوي هپ

It will be built by sacrificing one’s self-interest.

يږيړوج نماسآ� ڼور شي یاځوي ېچ ېروتسسريډاد

With one star there won’t be light in the dark

world;

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

رکا موک یږیک هنوا يیژخ هن کټ هن سلا وي شتد

When many stars get together, then the sky will

يږيړوج ناجه ايب ئش وي هسر ئړکرو هنوسلا

be brightened.

نوصلاخ د رلا وي یديوش اديپ هت کلشم وي ره

From only one hand no sound will arise, and

يږيړوج نابیبط د ې�ياود هپ ریماب وي ره

nothing can be done;

Put your hands together, unite, then the world

لیديل بوخ هږاوخ ريډ هاګيب ام هريا يرهاط

will be built.

يږيړوج ناتسسناغفا نارګ ږنومز وا يځار لهوس

For every problem there is a way to a solution;

یرهاط اللهرکش

Every sick person will be cured with doctors’

medicines.

Taheri, my friend, last night I saw a sweet dream:

Peace is coming, and our dear Afghanistan will

be built.

Shokrul ah Taheri

This poem is a hopeful and optimistic message. The poet encourages the

reader to focus on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. But he also reminds the

reader that this is no easy task. Rebuilding the country requires strong resolve,

faith, and sacrifice. In addition, using relevant examples, Taheri tries to con-

vince the reader that without unity it will be impossible to reconstruct

Afghanistan. Even though the reconstruction is a difficult task, there is no

problem that does not have a solution. This assertion coincides with the

English saying that “where there’s a will, there’s a way.”

O! my country, in your love

O! my country, in your love I sacrifice my

life.

ېک هنيم هپ اتسس هنطو یا

I am the kind of young man who wants your هیم هناځ لپخ رت يرت هز ېک قشع هپ اتسس هنطو یا

progress.

هیم ناوځ سيغه هز يړاوغ قيرت ېچ اتسس

O! my country, you are the graveyard of our ږنومز رلاپ وا روم د هريده ې�ي هت هنطو یا

mother and father.

هیم ناتسسا د اتسس روامج هز ترياز هکل هت

I am the servant of a shrine like you.

مړکن رو ناجه تسرد هپ اتسس يرواخ د هرذ هوي

I will not give one speck of your soil in هیم نبارق لام وا سر هپ اتسس يرواخ له یټوم وي

return for the whole world.

هن ېښرک وي د اتسس هن نکيل سر له شم هب يرت

I sacrifice my life and belongings for one fist- هیم ناغفا هپ یوش روهشم ېک ايند ېچ هکځ

ful of your soil.

ديلو لپخ ناج ګنلم ام ېچ هکل تبخ سياد هتسشن

I will sacrifice my head, but not a piece of you. لاشوخ تورپ ېک ږیغ هپ اتسس اد يځرو ې�پسش

That is why I am famous by the name of

Afghan in the world.

هیم نادنخ

There is no other good fortune like the one

that I, Malang Jaan, have seen myself.

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POETRY AND TARANAS

I am happy and laughing in your embrace, day and night.

Malang Jaan

This is a poem about patriotism. In this piece there is no mention of jihad

or martyrdom, the inclusion of which, as seen above, is typical of Taliban

poetry. This poem also demonstrates the poet’s desire for progress and recon-

struction of the country. Malang Jaan seems to be optimistic about the future.

However, he emphasizes the importance of making sacrifices to achieve suc-

cess. The nationalistic element of pride is also salient in this piece. Malang Jaan

likens the country to a shrine, or sacred place. The public in general perceives

the shrine with reverence, and it bears a special symbolic significance among

the Sufi Islamic school of thought.

Who do we want?

We want the kind of person who would unite us in one room.

We want the kind of person who would heal our wounds.

The kind of person who would rescue a homeless and lonely Pashtun

From the taunting remarks of others.

The kind of person who would make one climb down the mountain, from the

war front, And from the tank, and gather us all in one basket.

The kind of person who would destroy the imposed wall which stands between us,

And make me a brother with my brother.

The kind of person who could transform a gun and a sword into a pen

And discourage us from war.

The kind of person who would mend our torn col ars,

And make us all the children of one mother (motherland).

To rescue the victimized heart of Attak from the foreigners,

And turn the power of the bully into water,

That is the kind of person we want.

Ajmal Attak Yosofzai

This piece is not just about the criteria that the author sees necessary for

selection of a leader, but also about what Pashtuns need in order to restore the

lost glory of the past. Yosofzai portrays the Pashtuns as the ethnic group that

has been victimized throughout the years of war. In this poem, he is in search

of a leader who could change the undignified social and political status of

Pashtuns from its current state. Indirectly, he is asking the Pashtuns to refrain

from fighting against each other, and unite. Additionally, there is emphasis on

the need to replace the gun and sword with a pen: in other words the poet

highlights the importance of knowledge and learning for restoring this lost

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

identity. He maintains that Pashtuns are the sons of one mother (Afghanistan)

and therefore they are brothers. The conclusion he draws is that they should

not fight each other but become united. Yosofzai’s poem entails a list of the

essential values that play an important role in engendering peace and progress

among Pashtuns. Note that this poem focuses on the importance of national

unity among Pashtuns as an ethnic group, not all Afghans. This is a clear

example of how ethnic sentiments continue to remain pronounced among

some, or perhaps many Afghans.

هراهدنک رت ناشخدب From Badakhshan to Kandahar

هراهرګنن رت تاره له From Heart to Nangarhar

هرازم رت هن ايتکپ From Paktia to Mazar

هرماسارت ناجزوج له From Jawzjan to Asmar

یدروک امز هړاو ههم All together is my house

یدروروامز ېئ نمالسم Any Muslim is my brother

هنتايرح رت نلاوب له From Bolan to Hairatan

هناخيرش رت هن کټا له From Attak to Sherkhan

لهاترچ رت هن ۍډنوغروت From Torghondi to Chatral

هناغفاد ید روک ههم It is all the house of the Afghan

یدروتوګترسد ووي رهامز Each one is the light of my eyes

یدرورو امز ېئ نمالسم Any Muslim is my brother

ید يروس هکوا يرافص If it is Safari or Sori

ید يدول هکوا يرهاط If it is Taheri or Lodi

يد ليادبا هک،کيتوه If it is Hotaki or Abdali

ید روز وټم د ناغفاد They are the power of the fist of Afghan

ید رورو امز ېئ نمالسم If he is Muslim he is my brother

يرمون دمحمادف Feda Muhammad Nowmir

While Ajmal Yusofzai addresses only Pashtuns as an ethnic group, this

piece by Feda Nowmir focuses on the nationalistic notion of “Afghanness.” He

recognizes people from other parts of the country as his brothers. He argues

that the fact that all Afghans are Muslims is reason enough for all Afghans to

be considered a nation. Nowmir sees Afghanistan as the home of one nation,

regardless of people’s ethnicity or geographical location.

The following is another example of a Pashto poem that advocates nation-

hood among all Afghans. This piece by Abdul-Bari Jahani gives precedence to

nationality, rather than ethnicity as the main pillar of one’s political identity.

Born in Kandahar, Jahani is arguably the most famous contemporary (living)

Pashto poet among Pashtuns (south and east) in particular, and among

Afghans in general.

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POETRY AND TARANAS

ﺉد امز نطو ﺉد نماغل هک ﺉد راهدنک If it is Kandahar or Laghman, it is my homeland.

ﺉد امز نطو ﺉد ناخاو هک ﺉد يرشجنپ هک If it is Panjsher, if it is Wakhan, it is my homeland.

ﺉد ناغفا وي ﺉد کبزوا هک ﺉد کجتا هک Tajiks and Uzbeks are all Afghans

ﺉد امز نکمرت هرازه یرواخ ېد د This soil’s Hazara and Turkmen are all of my own.

نیاجه یرابلادبع Abdul Bari Jahani

Comparative analysis

A comparative analysis of poems written by the Taliban and those published

by moderate and progressive poets32 reveals obvious differences in their per-

ceptions of the political affairs in the country. However, authors from both

groups share a common ground within the boundaries of which the authors

share their thoughts and feelings with the reader, hoping to entice the reader/

listener to subscribe to his views of the Afghan social and political realities.

Each struggles to appeal to the reader for certain commonly accepted morals

(i.e. religious beliefs, patriotic sentiments, desire for justice, etc.). The follow-

ing are the main disparities between Taliban and moderates’ views expressed

in the poems assessed here:

Taliban

Moderates

1) Taliban poets portray their anti-gov-

1) Tend to focus on peace as a theme,

ernment efforts as an extension of the

reminding the reader of its value and

anti-Marxist regime that began in the

necessity for political unity and hard

early 1980s.

work in order to achieve and maintain it.

Their main concern is changing the

2) They emphasize the importance of

current state of affairs in the country,

working towards a future that is

which predominantly revolves around

prosperous and peaceful.

the issue of foreign invasion.

2) They make use of religious terminol-

3) Their poems possess a nationalist

ogy and themes far more frequently than flavor. They often incorporate vocabulary

the moderates, i.e. jihad, people of the

such as “nation,” “Afghan,” and “unity.” In

cross, martyrs, paradise. In fact, they use general, they look beyond the boundaries

religious doctrine to support their

of religion and ethnicity. However, this is

arguments in favor of political dissent

not to say that they ignore religion or

and military action against the govern-

ethnicity altogether.

ment and Coalition forces.

3) Cooperation with the state is

4) Although they do not explicitly

be-nangi, a great shame. This is because

encourage people to cooperate with or

the regime, in their view, is a puppet of

support foreigners’ presence in the

the foreign powers: the infidel invaders.

country, they do not condemn their

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Cooperation with and support of such

existence in Afghanistan either. Many do

government means indirect support of

complain about the country’s “depend-

the invaders and infidels. This qualifies

ence” (political, economic) on foreigners.

the Afghan supporter of the state as a

However, they do not aim to instigate

munafiq, or hypocrite. Some argue that resistance against the “foreign

being a hypocrite is a graver sin then

occupation.”

becoming a kafir, or infidel.

4) Guilt and shame are two of the

5) These poets in general convey a sense

emotions that the Taliban authors use to of hopefulness regarding the future. They

influence the reader’s thoughts. The

seem to believe that with hard work, and

reader must feel shameful because not

a united nation, it is possible to achieve

only he is not taking any action against

peace and prosperity.

foreign invaders, but he is also cooperat-

ing with the enemy. The reader must

begin to act immediately, and participate

in the jihad against the infidel: just as his

ancestors fought against and defeated the

Greeks, the Mongols, the Persians, the

British, and the Soviets.

5) They instigate war and disorder to

6) They see disorder and war as eminent

purify the country of immorality and

dangers to Afghanistan’s future.

irreligiosities imposed by Western

political and economic orders.

Conclusion

Two particular aspects of poetry contribute to its widespread use in Afghan

society. One is the rhythm and rhyme embedded in the genre, which aids

memorization. The other pertains to the unique quality of poetry that allows

deep thoughts, sometimes difficult to comprehend, to be entrenched within

a few short lines.

Poetry has an exceptional place within Afghan culture and society, and the

Taliban play on this fact. Condensing deep thoughts and emotions within just

a few words, and expressing them with elegance and flow, has meant that a

Taliban poem’s can be used as a communication device. In the West, on the

other hand, it is the longer essays and novels that have played a pivotal role in

shaping literary discourse around philosophical issues. It is important to

understand and appreciate why poetry occupies such a significant space in the

psyche of the Afghans.

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POETRY AND TARANAS

Poetry in Afghanistan plays a huge role in communicating thoughts and

ideas from person to person. Understanding this fact, the Taliban uses poetry

to communicate the legitimacy of their actions, and to sanctify the ongoing

insurgency. As illustrated in the numerous examples and their associated

stories, the Taliban has three major themes that it employs to accomplish its

goal: defense of the homeland against foreign invaders; defense of Islam

against crusaders; and appeal to personal gain in the form of honor and

esteem. Furthermore, they make excellent use of other aspects of Afghan

culture by playing on feelings of national pride, the code of ethics of

Pashtunwali, and even shame. Poetry resonates so greatly with the Afghan

and Pashto people that the Taliban also employ it as a means of indoctrina-

tion and tactical training.

Through poetry, the Taliban can continue to deliver messages to the people

that the Coalition is nothing more than the latest in a long line of invaders of

the homeland. Furthermore, they seek to portray the Coalition as crusaders

bent on the destruction of Islam. It is against these two beliefs that the West

will have the greatest struggle. As the Taliban has demonstrated, they fully

understand how powerful poetry is in communicating messages to the people

of Afghanistan.

Taranas (chants) 33

Similar to poetry, taranas or poetic chants play an important role in Taliban

communication with local populations. The chants are communicated in the

local language and traditional style and often represent a manipulation of

Afghan traditions, narratives, collective memory of events, and culture to

serve Taliban interests. These chants, like poetry, are melodic with memorable

tunes, often with repeating passages that have a tendency to stay in people’s

consciousness. The chants are easily memorized, due to their rhyme, rhythm,

lyrics—much like the advertising jingles that permeate other countries’ radio

and television.

In many areas of Afghanistan, especially those with a significant Taliban

presence like Loy Kandahar, Taliban chanting has flourished.34 For example,

many Kandahari music shops that used to sell various types of music audiocas-

settes and musical instruments have begun since the 1990s to supply Taliban

chants to the market. Undoubtedly such dynamics are partly pragmatic in

light of the fact that Kandaharis (and other Afghan urbanites) have been

tortured and imprisoned for listening to or participating in other forms of

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

music. In some cases, a number of local singers/musicians have decided to sing

Taliban chants, while others have migrated to other countries because of their

well-founded fear of Taliban prosecution.35 Essentially, the Taliban have been

largely responsible for the spread of such chants, which have not only become

a source of entertainment for many but also a key component of the Taliban

information and propaganda war. These chants have also become a powerful

Taliban tool for “instructing” and intimidating the Afghan population.

In June 2009, as the author sat in a hotel lobby in downtown Kandahar City,

he witnessed individuals “blue-toothing” what appeared to be music from one

cell phone to another. Upon further enquiry, he discovered that the “music”

being transferred between cell phones was actually Taliban chants. While aware

of the importance of folklore and music to Afghan culture and traditions, the

author was unaware of how pervasive Taliban jihadi chants had become in

southern Afghanistan. On further reflection, he suspected that these chants

were just another piece of a very sophisticated (and often misunderstood) infor-

mation campaign that the Taliban had pursued for years at the expense of the

United States and NATO. Taliban information operations and narratives have

long used cultural identifiers, historical memory, familiar icons, and schemata;

it made perfect sense that the Taliban would also use a type of musical refrain in

the form of chants to present their message to target audiences.

This section offers a descriptive analysis of Taliban music and messaging in

the form of chants and the stories they reveal that were circulating in the

Kandahar region in the summer of 2009. Through a review and analysis of

actual Taliban chants, this assessment argues that Taliban chants are another

link in a long chain of sophisticated information operations used to reveal

the stories, rationale, and “road map” of the political and social goals the

Taliban wish to achieve. These chants follow a rational, discursive, and iconic

form designed to mobilize and convince the Afghan population of the

Taliban’s worldview.

Afghan music

Historically, music has always been an integral part of Afghan culture and

traditions.36 It is especially important to recognize that Afghan songs in the

form of chants are of course closely related to poetry, an intimate aspect of

Afghans’ daily life. “Generally, [Afghan] music implies the use of instruments

and song refers to poetry. Early music was basically in the form of hymns and

sacred chants, the focus was on the underlying text, and so it was often classi-

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fied as literature, not music.”37 Traditional songs and chants are part of the

fabric of Afghan society, with people often singing and chanting as a central

part of ceremonies associated with weddings and other celebrations.38 Many

of these chants and songs are often drawn from Sufi texts and poetry. Indeed,

despite negative reactions from some parts of Afghan society to music and

especially musicians, mystical Sufi orders have always held music as critical to

many of their religious rituals.39

All types of Afghan music were drastically affected when the Taliban came

to power in 1996.40 The Taliban not only viewed music as a distraction from

serious and important life matters, they also viewed most music as haram

based on their particular interpretation of Islam. This view of music has also

been upheld and enforced throughout the Pashtun areas of western Pakistan,

particularly in Swat and the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa (NWFP) Province since

the Taliban became prominent in the area.41 Many mul ahs, who are conserva-

tive religious figures, also disapprove of music despite the fact that Pashtun

culture has its own traditional music and musical instruments such as rabab,

dohol, shawm, and double-headed frame drum.

The Taliban viewed musical instruments as tools of Shaytan (Satan). They

did, however, apparently allow the use of the frame drum—the duff—because

they believed that other Islamic traditions allowed the use of this instrument

during certain religious and personal celebrations and ceremonies. Hence, as

distinguished British ethnomusicologist John Baily suggests, “the Taliban

were not against all forms of music, and they certainly permitted religious

singing without musical instruments.”42 The musical expressions of Taliban

chants and taranas were allowed. According to Baily, the Taliban taranas are

constructed in “the melodic modes of Pashtun regional music, nicely in tune,

strongly rhythmic, and many items have the two-part song structure that is

typical of the region. There is also heavy use of reverberation.”43

Analysis of Taliban taranas (chants)

As suggested above, chants play an important role in Taliban communication

with local populations. The chants are communicated in the local language and

traditional style and often represent a manipulation of Afghan traditions, nar-

ratives, collective memory of events, and culture to serve Taliban interests.

The chants are very similar to certain types of Afghan poetry that are regu-

larly memorized and recited by Afghans. Afghan poems, much like the chants

assessed here, are wrapped in deep emotions and thought; the language of

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poetry in Afghanistan is the language of wazn (balance or rhythm), and qafia

(rhyme). Abiding by the many other rules of poetry, badee (rules of creating a

poem) and arooz (the art creating balance and flow in poem), each verse of a

poem must maintain a specific wazn, and continuity in qafia. The combina-

tion of the two adds a melodic effect to the lyrics.44 This obviously has impor-

tant implications for their resonating narratives as well as their basic

propaganda value.

As will be demonstrated below, theses chants often portray the ongoing

events of Afghan life. Pashto and often Dari languages are mostly used in a

simple and traditional form that resonates with Afghan locals. We find it

particularly interesting that the chants are gaining the attention of an increas-

ing number of Pashtun youth, especially in (rural and urban) areas where the

Taliban have substantial presence.45 Nonetheless, the Afghan government and

security forces do not seem to take the chants seriously, perhaps because the

chants are not viewed as a direct threat to the country’s stability. Instead, they

probably consider chants as part of the local entertainment.46 It should also be

pointed out that none of the US military or government personnel that the

author spoke to after his field research had ever heard of Taliban chants.47 This

might explain why there is little, if any, news on the seizure of audiocassettes

or CDs, or of any effort to curb business related to the supply of recordings of

chants. Within this permissive environment, the Taliban eagerly and regularly

distribute chants to the population. The Taliban chants are widely available in

books and Taliban magazines,48 or on audiocassettes, CDs, cell phone ring

tones, various internet web pages,49 and even on YouTube.50

In an effort to assess the meaning and impact of Taliban chants, we sought

and obtained a series of chants that were circulating around Kandahar in the

summer of 2009,51 all of them vocalized in Pashto, and then translated them

into English.52 Below, we present the actual narrative of each chant, followed

by a brief analysis of its meaning and its potential impact on the Afghan

population.

As mentioned above, all of the chants assessed here were found in Loy

Kandahar, and it is assumed that the primary target audience was the local

Pashtun population. In assessing the meaning and impact of Taliban chants

on Afghan target audiences, we have been forced to make certain generaliza-

tions concerning this population’s own narratives, and their view of local

political, religious, and social environments. We recognize that Afghan iden-

tity and belief systems are multifaceted and dynamic, and are layered by lan-

guage, residence, tribe, clan, family, and qawm (among others), with each

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playing an important role in an individual Afghan’s worldview.53 Qawm (soli-

darity or affinity group)54 membership is particularly important to chants and

narratives because qawms are based, in part, on patron–client relationships

that in turn are central to the nature of resonating subjects or narratives for a

typical Afghan:

No single concept is more important to Afghanistan’s internal conflicts than that

of patron–client relationships and the patronage networks these create… The

importance of patronage relations extends to the battle of ideas in Afghanistan.

Afghans are exposed to many different and often competing sources of news, but

there is a tendency to follow the views of the provider of patronage or other

Afghans that they desire to emulate.55

While we are not suggesting an “ideal” or reductionist Afghan view of the

world, we have been forced to generalize across the target population in assess-

ing the meanings and impact of the chants on the Pashtun.56 The Taliban, in

their construction of these chants, have clearly calculated the intended infor-

mational impact based on their own assumptions about what resonates with

their target audience, and we have attempted to do the same here, albeit ten-

tatively, for this analysis.

Afghan Mulk Angrizan (Afghan region foreigners)

Chant 1

O Afghan, the British (foreigners) are present in your country.

They are your yesterdays’ (past) enemies whom your ancestors defeated,

and then they ran away. Today, they are the rulers who dominate your

soil (country). [repeated chorus]

Today, they have come under the slogan of friendship and rehabilitation

of your country. [repeated]

The spies are present in your country. Your yesterdays’ (past) enemies

are present in your country.

They have invaded your country again. They intend to kill you.

[repeated]

The murderers of your ancestors are present in your country.

They hit you with huge bombs, cruise missiles, and napalm bombs.

[repeated]

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Those people are present who pretend themselves to be your friends,

but they are your previous enemies.

Be careful, O Afghan, do not be deceived and do not be segregated

from your goal. [repeated]

Otherwise, Christians will be present [in your country].

The world’s biggest thieves have come to our country, and look! They

are all Westerners. [repeated]

Your history’s purchasers have come to your country.

The prospects and desires of Siddiqi (poet) will be accomplished. They

will be accomplished at the right time and date when once again the

Afghan conquerors are in power.

O Afghan, the British (foreigners) are present in your country.

They are your yesterdays’ (past) enemies whom your ancestors defeated,

and then they ran away. Today, they are the rulers who dominate your

soil.

Tarana’s story: Our brave ancestors defeated the British after they invaded

our beloved land, yet they and other foreigners have come again to spy on

us and are attempting to destroy the Afghan way of life. They were cow-

ardly murderers when they originally invaded our country and they have

come again as “friends,” but their real intention is to murder innocent

Afghans and try to take over our beloved country. Don’t be deceived by

them, they want to destroy Islam and replace it with Christianity. But just

like our brave ancestors, we will defeat the British and other foreigners

who will eventually run from our country in defeat. It is the obligation of

all Afghans to fight and destroy the invaders.

Analysis: This chant clearly targets the segments of the general Afghan civilian

population who make up the Taliban’s main recruiting pool. This chant

touches on a variety of serious issues that are dear to Afghan history, culture,

and lifestyle:

•  Foreign invasion (All foreigners in some parts of Afghanistan are referred

to as “British”);

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•  Foreigners want to bring Christianity to Afghanistan;

•  The cowardly nature of foreign invaders (“They were defeated and then they

ran away”);

•  Defeat of British Empire by Afghan fighters (“ancestors defeated”);

•  Fight against invaders (“Do not be deceived and do not be segregated from

your goal”).

This chant also focuses on the mistakes and contemptible behavior of for-

eign forces in Afghanistan (“they pretend to be your friends; they intend to

kill you”), behavior that is in direct contrast with the Afghan value of being a

straightforward “friend” or “enemy.” Foreign invasion has historically been a

very sensitive topic among Afghans, and the above chant repeatedly plays on

this foreign invasion message in an effort to draw the attention and support

of the public. The chant’s reference to past Afghan struggles against foreign

invaders is a theme that we have regularly seen in other Taliban narratives.

The vast majority of Afghans recognize personal freedom and national

independence as core values, and the Taliban understand the significance of

this. But the chant does not merely play on these Afghan sensitivities; it also

explicitly invites Afghans to join the Taliban’s war against the current influx

of foreign “invaders” by encouraging nationalism and playing on nationalis-

tic sentiments.

There is little argument that most Afghans are very proud of their nation’s

history. And some of this pride relates to the fact that Afghans in years past

have defeated some of the world’s dominant powers, including the Soviet

Union and Great Britain. In fact, this narrative of defeating “superpowers” is

arguably one of the most effective motivational tools used to provoke Afghans

against foreign forces, and is regularly used by the Taliban today.57 We suspect

that the Taliban often mention British forces because the British were long

viewed as interlopers; moreover they are part of the present NATO “occupy-

ing” force, so the British can be used to represent both past colonial powers’

attempts to exploit (“purchase”) Afghanistan and the present “invading/

occupying” ISAF foreign forces. This Taliban chant presents the foreign forces

as the “murderers” of Afghans’ ancestors in an apparent attempt to revive a

sense of revenge ( badal) amongst their target audience against the foreign

forces. Meanwhile, the Taliban chant reminds the Afghan public about their

ancestors taking revenge and defeating the British.

In this tarana, the Taliban also emphasize a very common and consistent

message found in other pieces of Taliban propaganda: Islam is at risk with the

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presence of international security forces in Afghanistan. The call to arms

against a “threat to Islam” has been an extremely powerful incentive for

Afghan communal action, and has historically been used to motivate

Afghans—including even non-Pashtun elements of society who can be mobi-

lized under the banner of Islam—to take action against foreign invaders. The

Taliban portray invaders as representing a “cosmic” threat58 to the survival of

Afghan’s religion and way of life. They want to project the argument that an

Afghan is not a true follower of Islam if he does not rebel against foreign

invaders. Taliban messages describe foreign forces as cruel and inhumane

invaders who do not respect Afghan culture and religion, and who do not

deserve the respect of Afghans. This chant plays up allegations of foreign

forces’ brutality by referring to foreigners’ use of aerial bombs, cruise missiles,

and napalm bombs to kill and maim Afghans. These examples are offered as

evidence to prove that US and ISAF forces are neither friends nor protectors;

that the foreign forces came to slay Afghans and to dominate the country59—

not unlike the Soviet occupation forces, whose widely acknowledged atroci-

ties against Afghans are still fresh in popular memory. These messages

powerfully exploit Afghan emotions by touching on painful historical and

more recent collective memories.

Ultimately the chant tells Afghans that the Taliban are strong enough to

defeat the enemy and to regain power. But the Taliban admit that they must

have the support of the Afghan people to succeed.

Aghyar Ashna (Stranger friend)

Chant 2

Should I complain about a stranger or should I complain about my

friend? I don’t understand, I don’t understand, should I complain about

the world or should I complain about myself? [repeated chorus]

The councils are held under my enemy’s command. Decisions are taken

by disqualified people in the council. They accept plenty of dol ars to

kill me.

Should I complain about his children or should I complain about their

father?

They conspire to murder me with the advice of strangers. Some cowards

in our country were celebrating my murder, as if it was Eid’s eve. [repeated]

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Should I trust their regrets or complain about his laughter?

My meat was being cut and you [pro-government Afghans] were pour-

ing salt on them. My meat was being cooked in the skewers of

brutality.

Should I complain about a butcher or should I complain about you?

I could hardly breathe because of my wounds and pain in this desert. I

was treated like a stranger guest that suffered from pain and no one

offered me treatment. [repeated]

Should I complain about a doctor or whom should I complain about?

I have become crazy about true love and have become like burned rue.

I am burnt on the beautiful candle of Islam. [repeated]

Should I complain about our own traitors or complain about the

world?

I am screaming for justice and recall past times. Where is the security

that I was happy with?

Tarana’s story: Foreign invaders have invaded our country and have been

joined by cowardly, apostate Afghans who accept the blood money of

the foreign invaders to murder us and destroy our country. But I have

faith in Islam and know that we will get our justice and security, just as

our forefathers did.

Analysis: This chant has two central objectives:

•  To recruit new fighters, and

•  To undermine the Afghan government.

It consists of a series of melodic refrains interestingly based on the

Pashtunwali concept of gila, which means to complain about something

important. In this chant the Taliban use Pashtun tribal mores not only to

“connect” with their target audience (Pashtuns) but also to argue against the

people supporting the Afghan puppet government (“councils are held under

my enemy’s command”) and international forces. In this very emotional chant,

the Taliban complain about the pro-government Afghans’ cruelty, while

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explaining how righteous and innocent the Taliban are. The chant suggests

that the current conflict has been imposed on the Taliban, and that they are

the victims of this war (“I am screaming for justice”).

It is instructive to note that the Taliban have established a series of

“shadow” justice systems throughout the country that are highly popular in

adjudicating land ( mezaka) and water disputes as well as criminal cases. Using

Shar’iah law, a Taliban judge can settle a case in a few hours without bribes—

unlike many of the formal Afghan government courts. While these Taliban

courts may not administer the kind of justice preferred by Kabul or the West,

it is swift and perceived as just by most that use them. This is especially the

case when property disputes are involved. In southern Afghanistan many vil-

lages as well as city dwellers go to the Taliban court to settle such land dis-

putes, that are often quite contentious and a serious source of local instability.60

The shadow courts actually give a certain degree of legitimacy to the Taliban.

The Taliban have also established an ombudsman system that local popula-

tions can use to report an abusive local Taliban commander or other com-

plaints that are then forwarded to an independent authority for resolution.

Most Afghans—particularly southern Afghans—will agree that the com-

plaints ( gila) voiced in this chant by the Taliban are legitimate.61 This chant

not only challenges people to oppose a corrupt, incompetent (“disqualified

people in the council”), and brutal government and the people that support it

(“traitors”); it also slams government corruption (“they accept plenty of dol-

lars to kill me”), the foreign dependency of the Kabul regime, and injustice.

The Taliban call their battle a pure Islamic movement (“the beautiful candle

of Islam”), and call the Afghan government a puppet regime that only serves

foreign countries that aim to dominate the entire country and kill Afghans.

This chant not only attempts to play upon Afghan’s Islamic affinities, but

also to discredit the Afghan government as being un-Islamic. The government

is introduced as evil, corrupt, and unable to provide justice. By doing so, it is

clear that the Taliban recognize that ownership and independent decision-

making are important parts of Afghan and community tradition. In addition,

the Taliban accuse the current Afghan government of killing Taliban fighters

in return for money from foreigners: actions that directly contradict Afghan

ownership and independence. In other words, to local Afghans this chant

suggests that Afghan government officials are killing their own citizenry to

serve foreigners. Likewise, the chant argues that Jirgas (councils) called

together by the government are held with the advice and support of foreigners

who are ruling the country by proxy.

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Lastly, the Taliban reminds the Afghan public about the past justice and

security which existed while they ruled over Afghanistan (“I am screaming for

justice and recall past times. Where is the security that I was happy with?”).

The phrase is an attempt to gain public support by drawing people’s attention

to the Taliban’s past performance while implicitly comparing the Taliban’s

past with the instability and insecurity under the current Afghan government,

which is itself under the authority of the US and its al ies.

Volleyball, football, and cricket

Chant 3

O youth, quit volleybal , football [soccer], and cricket. Take the Rocket-

Propelled Grenade launcher [RPG] on your shoulders. [repeated

chorus]

Play with human heads instead of playing with balls. [repeat]

Quit kids’ games; take the RPG on your shoulders. [repeat]

You look good with the weapon and Moswak [herbal tooth brush] but

not chewing gum and chocolate.

Purchase every worthless human for free (Kill the enemies.) [repeat]

You will soon defeat the enemies. You only need to put some more

efforts defeating them.

Behead by using the sword those people who open the country gate to

the strangers. [repeat]

Walk beside Ayubi [poet]. Don’t be late, not even for a minute! [repeat]

O youth, quit volleybal , football (soccer), and cricket. O youth, take

the RPG on your shoulders.

Tarana’s story: Afghan youth must accept their responsibilities and give

up their trivial pursuits, such as sports and candy, and join the righteous

jihad against the infidel invaders. The youth of Afghanistan will be suc-

cessful and defeat the foreign invaders, but this will take dedication and

immediate action.

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Analysis: This tarana is specifically written and sung to recruit Afghan youth

to join the fight against the foreign invaders. The chant implicitly encourages

Afghan youth to regain their nang (honor) by focusing their attention on

important matters (defeating and killing the foreign invaders) instead of wast-

ing time (“don’t be even late for a minute!”) on “kid’s games” and trivial pur-

suits such as “gum and chocolate.”

That the Taliban have chants that target a specific demographic says a lot

about the sophistication of their overall information campaign. Chants such

as this are aimed at influencing specific age groups of locals (under 25)—a

major recruiting pool for the Taliban—as well as the jobless and uneducated.

The Taliban understand that many Afghan youths spend their free time play-

ing different sports (“volleybal , football (soccer), and cricket”). In general, the

most popular Afghan sports are soccer, cricket, and volleybal . Due to a series

of recent successes by Afghan sports teams in the international arena,62 the

numbers of Afghans who participate in these sports and sports fans have

increased tremendously. This increased popularity has had a directly negative

impact on Taliban recruitment, and the Taliban recognize this. In an effort to

reach local youth and convince them to stay away from activities that do not

correspond to the needs of the Taliban, the Taliban have included this topic

in their chants.

As is apparent in this chant, the Taliban use various symbols and icons that

fit Afghanistan’s war-torn situation by talking about Rocket-Propelled

Grenades (RPGs), fighting on the battlefield, and killing the enemy.

Specifically, the RPG was one of the most well-known weapons used during

the war against the Soviet Union. The RPG was widely available during the

war, and Afghan Mujahidin became quite accomplished at using RPGs to

destroy Russian tanks, military vehicles, and pro-communist Afghan forces.

In past centuries, the sword was the most well-known weapon in Afghanistan,

but it has more recently been replaced by the AK 47 (Kalashnikov) and the

RPG. Therefore, the Taliban use these symbols of “modern” Afghan warriors

in an attempt to motivate Afghan youth to become “real” champions by join-

ing the Taliban in their fight against the foreign invaders.

Arman-Khodaya (Wish-Allah)

Analysis: This chant has two objectives:

•  To create sympathy for the Taliban among the Afghan public, and

•  To fuel people’s sentiments against foreign forces.

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Chant 4

O Al ah, it is very sad that our innocent youths are colored with blood

[martyred].

It is very sad that our village is (full of sorrow), covered with dust.

[repeat]

O Allah, it is very sad that this dust and ashes come from the (dead)

flower plant. [repeat]

O Al ah, it is very sad that the [innocent Taliban died] innocent lamps

of love fell down. [repeat]

It is very sad that despite the resistance of young flowers, they are fal ing

down [the Taliban dies].

O Al ah, it is very sad that the blood flow shakes our young plants.

O Al ah, it is very sad that our innocent youths are colored with blood.

It is very sad that our companions’ gatherings ( Majlas) are destroyed.

Life is full of tasty honey.

O Al ah, it is very sad that their red blood (loss of life) brought harsh

life to the community. [repeat]

It is very sad that the grey huts of love carry the coffin of desires.

O Al ah, it is very sad that our innocent youths are colored with blood.

It is very sad that my prospects and desires are unachievable, only Sakhi

Bacha (poet) is crying.

O Al ah, it is very sad that sorrow shakes our country. [repeat]

O Al ah, it is very sad that our innocent youths are colored with blood.

[repeat]

Tarana’s story: Foreign crusaders are martyring innocent Afghan youth

as well as our hero Taliban. The foreigners not only kill honorable and

brave Afghans, they are also here to destroy our villages and way of life.

But we will win if the people join the just Taliban cause.

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This chant focuses on the sadness of the dead youth (“innocent youth,”

“dead flower plant”) and commemorates young slain Taliban fighters (“despite

the resistance of young flowers, they are fal ing down”). The target audience

of this chant appears to be both the Taliban and the Afghan public. The chant

implicitly introduces the Taliban as “freedom fighters” and attempts to create

sympathy for the Taliban among the public. The chant also suggests how valu-

able the lives of the Taliban are for the country’s prosperity. This chant aims

to give emotional support to the Taliban in an attempt to explain the impor-

tance of each Taliban fighter’s life in the community and their struggle to free

the Afghan nation (“it is very sad that their red blood (loss of life) brought

harsh life to the community”). These chants are meant to create a high level of

local public support, particularly for the relatives and villagers of the fallen

Taliban fighters. Generally, the Afghan public tends to be very sympathetic to

a dead or “martyred” Afghan, even if he is viewed as an enemy.

This chant is also intended to prompt people to side with the Taliban

against the foreign forces. One traditional Afghan way to attract popular

support is to be humble in the invitation for assistance while at the same time

keeping open the door for a participatory struggle. The Taliban encourage all

Afghans to join their war against the enemy: “It is very sad that our compan-

ions’ gatherings ( Majlas) are destroyed.” Also, they convey a message,

through this chant, that this holy war is unwinnable without the participa-

tion and cooperation of the public: “It is very sad that my prospects and

desires are unachievable.”

Ay Ghrabi Shamara (O Western dragon)

Chant 5

O Western dragon! Where will you go when we shut all the ways?

[repeat]

O Western dragon! You have an opportunity to run away now.

Hurry and get out of Kabul so that you won’t regret when you are

captured. [repeat]

O Western dragon! Where will you go when we shut all the ways?

You will leave like a handicapped Russia and you will never gain

victory. [repeat]

O Western dragon! If you want to stay healthy, hurry up and apolo-

gize for your actions. [repeat]

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POETRY AND TARANAS

O Western dragon! Where will you go when we shut all the ways?

The Afghans cannot be deceived; they are intelligent.

O Western dragon! You will be ashamed and you won’t be able to

recover. [repeat]

O Western dragon! Where will you go when we shut all the ways?

This country is a flower in the turban of Asia. This nation is a great

champion.

This force will make you lose your direction.

O Western dragon! Where will you go when we shut all the ways?

This country belongs to Ghazi Abdul ah. [repeat]

O Western dragon! This is the residency of Ahmad Shah Baba.

O Western dragon! Learn from this poetry.

O Western dragon! Where will you go when we shut all the ways?

Tarana’s story: America and NATO, you have the opportunity to save

yourself, but you must leave Afghanistan immediately or you will suffer

the same fate as other foreign invaders such as the Russians. If you don’t

leave immediately you will have no escape; you have no chance of con-

quering us. History has demonstrated time and again that Afghanistan

cannot be defeated. We are the champions of Asia and we will not only

repel your invasion but totally destroy you.

Analysis: This tarana is an exercise of power by the Taliban and a warning to

US and NATO military forces (“Western dragon”) in Afghanistan to leave the

country while they are still able (“you have an opportunity to run away now.

Hurry and get out of Kabul so that you don’t regret when you are captured”).

The target audience is the Afghan public, although this chant is composed of

a series of ultimatums to international forces. In fact, via this chant, the

Taliban suggest Afghanistan’s degree of power and influence in the region

(“this country is a flower in the turban of Asia”). In addition, this chant claims

that the Taliban will soon regain power and defeat their enemies by invoking

past Afghan victories (“you will leave like a handicapped Russia, and you will

never gain victory”). Similar to other chants, the Taliban want to empower

their supporters’ morale by reminding them of Russia’s defeat in Afghanistan

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and the courage of Afghan national heroes (Ghazi Abdullah, Ahmad Shah

Baba) fighting various invading armies throughout history.

While the Taliban were in power, they rarely honored past national heroes

because this did not explicitly serve their interest and goals. During their rule,

they considered themselves the real and superior Afghan heroes, in part

because they were ready to sacrifice everything for religion and country.

However, more recently, they have increasingly used the names of past Afghan

heroes in their chants, especially those who fought foreign invaders in past

conflicts. Honoring national heroes’ achievements and their struggles to

defend the country against foreign invaders is a tactic the Taliban now uses to

connect to the general public. This tactic also reflects a nationalistic pride:

•  By suggesting that Afghanistan “is a flower in the turban of Asia” and a

“great champion.”

•  By invoking the legend of Ahmad Shah Durrani (“Ahmad Shah Baba,”

Ahmad Shah the “father”), the founder of the Durrani Empire, and the

founder of modern Afghanistan, as well as Abdul ah Shah Ghazi who tradi-

tion suggests was a famous commander and conqueror during the Afghan-

Anglo wars.

Afghans generally and fondly recall past historical “victories”, and the

Taliban continually play on this by recalling past victories in an effort to

engender pride and confidence in their target audience.

Ay Mujahid (O Mujahid)

Analysis: This chant focuses on praising and honoring the Mujahidin63 (aka,

Taliban fighters). Interestingly, the Taliban’s former ambassador to Pakistan,

Mul ah Salaam Zaeef, now under house arrest in Kabul, stated that the group

refers to its own forces not as Taliban but as Mujahidin, because only one in

ten fighters is a true Taliban, while the rest are “ordinary Afghans.”64

This type of tarana appears to have two central objectives:

•  To provide moral support and encouragement to the Taliban, and

•  To assist in the recruitment of new fighters.

To achieve these two objectives, this chant claims that there are four central

benefits of being a Mujahid:

•  You become a hero to the people (“you are champion and courageous. You

are our beloved man; you are our pride in the world”);

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POETRY AND TARANAS

Chant 6

O Mujahid fellow, you are a champion and courageous man.

You are our beloved; you are our pride in the world. [repeat chorus]

The enemies hear the fearful sound of your sword that won’t let them

get sleep and relax.

You are the thunder to every brutal enemy.

You devoted yourself and suffered difficulties for the sake of Al ah.

You have defended your bunker with the cost of your blood.

You are a recorded champion in history.

The country’s deserts exist because of your braveness.

The deserts are colored with your blood and look like red flowers.

You are the beauty of the country and protector of the whole book of

the Qur’an.

You are very famous for your bravery and everybody knows about you.

I am proud of your heroism; you are the solution to our problems.

O Mujahid fellow, you are a champion and courageous man.

You are our beloved man; you are our pride in the world.

Tarana’s story: Our beloved Mujahidin are the courageous heroes of the

world. All the unjust and the brutal enemies of Afghanistan fear you.

You fight and are willing to sacrifice everything for your people and

Al ah. Enemies run from you and your braveness and the whole world

loves you and knows that you are brave and heroes to all righteous and

just people.

•  You make history and become a historical figure (“You have defended your

bunker with the cost of your blood. You are a recorded champion in his-

tory…You are very famous for your bravery and everybody knows about

you”);

•  You become a servant and protector of Islam (“You devoted yourself and

suffered difficulties for the sake of Al ah… The deserts are colored with your

blood and look like red flowers. You are the beauty of the country and pro-

tector of the whole book of the Qur’an);

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•  You provide protection to the community (“You have defended your bun-

ker with the cost of your blood … you are champion and courageous”).

All of the aforementioned qualities have immense value in the Afghan cul-

ture and community. Moreover, all these qualities offer moral-related benefits.

The Taliban are attempting to suggest that new fighters are not being offered

material benefits such as salary, pension, and promotion; rather, in the eyes of

the Taliban, the benefits include the protection of their communities and

religion.65 The Taliban recognize that helping and defending the community

is very important to the Afghan public. They regularly play on the fact that the

Afghan government has been unable, in most instances, to provide for the

protection and defense of the Afghan people. The Taliban portray themselves

as ready to provide that security and protection to the Afghan people and to

Afghanistan without any foreign support and backing. Their objective is to

impress the public by stressing their hope for a secure Afghanistan following

decades of war. They know that a large percentage of the Afghan population

is extremely war-weary.

Interestingly, the chant suggests that a key advantage of joining the Taliban

is that it allows one to become a “recorded champion in history.” This claim

resonates with the Afghan population’s narrative of a proud history comple-

mented by ancestors and historical figures that were great warriors and con-

querors. Thus, this chant invites the Afghan people to follow and build upon

their ancestors’ struggle to protect the country from foreign invaders. Afghans

are generally emotional by nature, and pride themselves in being strong and

brave. Chants such as this serve as a reminder of their proud, collective history

and invoke memories of their elders and ancestors in defending their territory

from invaders. This chant also reinforces the Taliban claim that NATO secu-

rity forces are foreign occupiers of Afghanistan.

As we have seen in other chants, the Taliban use the appeal of Islam for

recruitment and to legitimize their actions. Taliban narratives, in conjunc-

tion with the Mullah status of many Taliban, allow the Taliban to leverage

their religious authority and teachings in support of their cause. Mullahs are

an important source for providing narratives, information, and guidance to

village populations. Therefore, the public, and especially the rural Afghan, is

increasingly under the Mullah’s sphere of influence. A large majority of local

Afghans are religious, but cannot read religious books and teachings; they

rely on the Mullah (who is often illiterate himself ) to teach and interpret for

them the Islamic narrative.66 The religious status and influence of Taliban

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Mullahs as a powerful authority to guide the local population should not be

under-estimated.

Badan Zakhmi (Wounded body)

Chant 7

My entire body is wounded. The wounds are colorful. O Al ah, please

assist the Taliban’s madrasas. [repeat chorus]

We are holding the martyr’s shawl and pray for him.

After his (Taliban) death, he left his family behind.

There is nobody to take care of him.

The Islamic nation does not take the lessons [responsibility to assist us.]

O Al ah, we only need your treatment.

All the cruel infidel nations oppose him.

O Al ah, the Taliban defends your religion.

O courageous Afghan, please be brave [join us.]

O Al ah, please be kind to us now.

My “Ayobi” prayer is for one whose body is wounded.

This is a shame for our descendants.

My entire body is wounded. The wounds are colorful. O Al ah, please

assist the Taliban’s madrasas.

Tarana’s story: Please, Al ah, protect and save our madrasas, students, and

the Taliban. We mourn our fallen Taliban. Foreign invaders who have

wounded Afghanistan threaten Islam. All Afghans need to join the

Taliban and the jihad and save Afghanistan from the infidel invaders.

Analysis: This chant mourns the death of a Taliban, and asks Al ah to help and

save their madrasas. Attracting support and creating sympathy for the Taliban

fighters appears to be the specific objective of this chant. Similar to other

chants, this tarana illustrates that the Taliban are the true followers of Islam

because they sacrifice themselves for the sake of Al ah and seek assistance only

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from Al ah. The chant further implies that although war has cost Taliban their

lives, they are still determined to seek assistance only from Al ah because they

are true believers of Al ah and Islam.

They also claim in the chant that they are the sole protectors of madrasas,

referencing the religious schools that provide Islamic religious instruction,

while also complaining about the Afghan people for their reluctance to join

the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban do not only state that the motivations

behind this war are divine, but also claim that Islam’s fate is reliant upon their

survival. The Taliban invite people to join and support their cause because

Islam is at risk, a common narrative that we have seen in other chants.

Bagh-Baghwan (Stranger-gardener)

Chant 8

It was a blooming garden of flowers but the stranger gardener took

over this garden.

Every flower’s leaves fell down because the autumn is a stranger.

[repeat chorus]

All the deserts, stones, and plants look forward to seeing their lovers

(Taliban).

We have not seen yet the red lips of those lovers. [repeat]

Tarana’s story: Foreign invaders are trying to destroy Afghanistan, but

as in the past, the Taliban will eventually destroy the foreigners and

reclaim our beloved homeland.

Analysis: This chant represents an iconic metaphor about how Afghanistan—

portrayed as a beautiful flower garden (“blooming garden of flowers”)—is

being destroyed by foreign forces, portrayed by a “stranger gardener.” Afghans

generally have an affinity for flowers and gardens and this chant plays on this

empathy.67 The chant’s story concentrates on how a foreign invasion is leading

to the destruction of the once prosperous and peaceful Afghanistan, while at

the same time they all wait for their “real lovers” (Taliban). The chant holds

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foreign forces responsible for all the misery in the country. It argues that

Afghanistan was at peace in the past, but the outsiders have devastated every-

thing. It also conveys a message to the people that they are the true caretakers

of the country, and that they will soon take control of Afghanistan.

Ghaleem pa Kaano (Enemy by stones)

Chant 9

O Lord, people stone me because of my love for you. The sons of

Nomudiaan stone Ezrayel [Angel.] [repeated]

Analysis: This chant targets the Afghan public and justifies Taliban actions as

“holy warriors.” This short but effective chant portrays the Taliban as pure

Muslims who suffer all kinds of problems for the love of Allah (“O Lord,

people stone me because of my love for you”). Meanwhile, it claims that all

those people who oppose the Taliban, including the Kabul government and

the international forces supporting the government in Kabul, are evil. The

Taliban often refer to the Karzai government and international forces as the

enemies of Allah because of their opposition to the Taliban, who claim to

fight in the name of Allah. The Taliban are ever vigilant of the notion that

most Afghans are highly religious, and this chant plays on those emotions by

highlighting Islam as core of the Taliban life-style.

Gulan Paasha (Toss flowers)

Chant 10

Please come, dear friend, and throw flowers on my grave. I lie on deserts

so please come always. [repeated]

Analysis: Although this chant is not fully copied from its original version, the

context of the song is obvious. The Taliban believe, as suggested by previous

chants, that they are national heroes who are often “martyred” as they attempt

to protect their country and people. This chant encourages people to visit

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shrines dedicated to dead or martyred Taliban: typically a Sufi tradition, and

outlawed under the previous Taliban regime because shrine visitations pre-

date Islam. This chant suggests an interesting turn of events, possibly meaning

that either the Taliban have become more politically adaptable in their percep-

tion of Islam and more flexible about their tolerance of traditional cultural

norms, or possibly because this tarana was created by a more localized, non-

ideologically aligned segment of the insurgency who reflect more traditional

Afghan values. In sum, this chant may represent the true face of local resist-

ance in Afghanistan comprising indigenous Afghans who are less influenced

by the radical interpretation of Islam subscribed to by neighboring Pakistani

Taliban fronts, than by ancient traditional customs and Sufi influences

observed in rural Afghanistan.

Afghans generally have a high level of respect for the shrines of national

heroes, influential figures, and religious leaders. Moreover, nearly every village,

town, and city in southern Afghanistan has a shrine visited by local Afghans

for a variety of reasons. They often go to pray beside the graves of deceased

ancestors. Many local Afghans believe that some shrines hold the key to solv-

ing problems faced by individuals and communities today. For example,

Afghans often go to shrines to ask for help for their sick children or relatives,

to pray for better family relationships, or to ask for increased economic oppor-

tunities and wealth. It is also common for Sufi and Shi’a Afghans to visit simi-

lar shrines in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. The observation of this tradition

on the Pakistan side of the border has drawn heavy criticism and resentment

from the Pakistani Taliban who habitually bomb and kill visitors to such

shrines, as witnessed during an early July 2010 attack against a Sufi shrine in

Lahore, Pakistan that killed 37 and wounded 180 others.68 In summary, this

chant plays on people’s affinity for shrines, and implicitly asks Afghans to

consider the Taliban as national heroes whose only purpose is to save the

Afghan people from outsiders and foreign invaders: a central justification for

their war against the Afghan government and international forces.

Jama ki da dosthai (In the clothes of friendship)

Chant 11

The enemies have come in the shape of friends.

They look like human beings but they are wild animals.

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The act of disuniting people stays in their blood.

Their messages look like flowers but they are full of poison.

They have come under the banner of friends but they are murderers.

I have always made the destiny of this country.

I have brought happiness and beauty to my country.

They have come under the name of sympathy but they are muggers.

They are Jewish but half of them believe in statues.

They are [pre-Christianity Zoroastrianism] believers who came from

East and West.

The enemies have come in the shape of friends.

They look like human beings but they are wild animals.

Tarana’s story: Beware of foreigners, who claim to be friends of

Afghanistan but are actually infidel, murderous crusaders who want to

divide our people and destroy our country.

Analysis: This chant, like the others we have analyzed above, challenges the

presence of international forces in Afghanistan by focusing on the notion of

false friends.

Generally, Afghans take the issue of friendship very seriously. They have a

tendency to respect those who call themselves friends of Afghanistan. In this

chant the Taliban claims that foreigners:

•  Appear as “friends’ but they are really “wild animals,” “murderers” and

“muggers”;

•  Present messages that “look like flowers” but are really “full of poison.”

This chant tells the people to beware the international forces because they

are insidious, false friends. The Taliban often use terms such as “disunity,”

“unreal or false friends,” and “deception and non-believers” in their propa-

ganda narratives. If we carefully assess these terms, we will be reminded of

Afghanistan’s former invading powers (the British Empire and Soviet Union).

Afghans recall that Soviet forces consistently referred to themselves as “friends

to the Afghan people” while they bombed and raped Afghans. Indeed, there

are many common local stories concerning this topic that nearly all Afghans

have heard numerous times. This chant reinforces these stories and may be

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aimed at creating suspicion of all foreigners who offer friendship but are per-

ceived as not having fulfilled promises since 2001.

Pashtun Mayaan (Pashtun lover)

Chant 12

Be brave and get your gun, those are not Pashtun who fight at the house

like a fox.

Get the sword of your ancestors because the infidels have come to our

innocent Afghanistan.

Please protect Haji Mul ah Dadul ah because the Taliban are proud of

him.

Get your swords and let’s be united. All the streets are full of non-

believers. My country is my belief.

Whoever further destroys our country, Allah may give them punish-

ment in hell.

I am with the Taliban because it is the army of Islam and I want to

impress Allah.

The mother of martyr cries while his coffin is carried by the angels of

the sky.

Allah says that our brothers are alive, the Taliban are colored with

blood.

Tarana’s story: Proud Pashtuns, get your weapons and guns and fight the

foreign infidel invaders, just as the honorable and martyred Mullah

Dadul ah and your forefathers did. The infidels are everywhere and are

here to destroy our country. The Taliban are the defenders of Islam and

will die, if need be, defending Afghanistan and Islam.

Analysis: We received this chant as part of a video that showed the chant being

sung by a local Afghan singer at a picnic. The video is significant in that it

indicates that the Taliban have been able to spread some of their chants using

local singers. Weekend picnics like the one displayed in the video are very

popular in Afghanistan, especially for urban Afghans who leave the city—

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Kandahar in this instance—to picnic in rural village areas. We find it very

interesting that local singers who are often hired to entertain at these picnics

would sing a Taliban chant that implicitly indicates the presence and influence

of the Taliban in the area.

Although this chant seems like a mix of various other chants, it still presents

very powerful messages about the Taliban and their jihad against international

security forces. For example, this chant encourages Pashtuns to use their cour-

age and honor (“Get the sword of your ancestors”), central components of

Pashtunwali, to protect Afghanistan from the non-believers’ invasion. The

chant also includes requests for Afghans to join the jihad and to protect

Mul ah Dadul ah (a slain Taliban commander known for his brutal and inhu-

mane battlefield behavior). Familiar refrains about the righteousness of the

Taliban, the proud history of the Afghans in expelling infidel foreign invaders,

and the power of Islam and the Taliban are also prominent in this chant.

Taliban Nasheed (Taliban ode)

Chant 13

I will defeat Khalilzad’s red brothers. I will defeat American and British

forces. I will be neither tricked nor deceived. [repeated chorus]

I have power in my arms to defeat these forces. [repeat]

I want to announce today that I will break the teeth of Westerners.

[repeat]

The outsiders live in Kabul and I publicly say that I will defeat American

and British forces. [repeat]

I will come down from the bunkers with power and dignity. [repeat]

I will destroy pharaoh’s residency in these valleys. [repeat]

I will break crusade and crusaders.

I will defeat American and British forces.

Tarana’s story: It is inevitable that the Afghans will defeat the Americans

and British and their apostate Afghan allies. The Taliban will not be

tricked or deceived; we will come from all regions of Afghanistan to

destroy the foreign crusaders.

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Analysis: This chant is recorded as background sound for a video of Mullah

Dadullah Mansour and his fighters.69 It is sung in a way that demonstrates

Taliban power, and to let the public know that they will defeat their ene-

mies. The video shows Mansour visiting a suicide bomber training camp and

giving a speech to very young trainees at the camp. It is an emotional and

motivating chant that focuses on giving moral support to fighters. The chant

primarily focuses on the idea that Taliban victory over American and British

forces is inevitable.

Interestingly, the chant also refers in the opening refrain to former

Presidential Special Envoy and US Ambassador to Afghanistan 2003–5,

Zalmay Khalilzad. The chant insinuates that Ambassador Khalilzad was al ied

with the “communists” in Afghanistan, invoking the Soviet experience in

Afghanistan (“I will defeat Khalilzad’s red brothers”). We suspect that this

chant might be referring to a specific group of Taliban that operates in regions

within the British and American forces’ areas of responsibility (e.g. in

Helmand province). Alternatively, the American and British forces may also

have been invoked in this chant, because they are well known today by most

Afghans across southern Afghanistan.

Taliban Reciting Nasheed (Ode)

Chant 14

Women fought on the battlefield because they wanted to scarify for the

sake of Islam.

The Muslim is reliant upon Al ah. The war is for Al ah (there is no other

God but him). [repeat]

In the war of Uhud, our beloved prophet got injured.

The war is for Al ah (there is no other God but him). [repeat]

Analysis: Although we only have a portion of this chant (we obtained it as part

of a video), the main theme of the chant is jihad. The video shows a group of

Taliban singing this chant with Arab fighters watching them. This is the only

chant we have heard that refers to women’s role in defending Islam. We sus-

pect the term “women” is used either to persuade males to join the jihad, or to

seek the involvement of women in Taliban military operations.

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POETRY AND TARANAS

The chant suggests that the fight against the Afghan government and inter-

national forces is a “war for Al ah.” Hence the message to the Afghan people

is that there is only one worthy motive behind this war, and that is to serve

Islam. This chant implicitly dismisses a notion held by many that the Taliban

fight for power and wealth, a charge often leveled against the Taliban.

Conclusion

This analysis of Taliban chants and their associated stories suggests that the

Taliban carefully pick the topics to be portrayed in their taranas. The chants

are seemingly developed explicitly to reflect values held dear by most Afghans,

and by Pashtuns in particular. It is also interesting to note that many of the

narratives and topics presented in the chants are also featured in other types

of Taliban propaganda, such as night letters. Unlike Western information

operations campaigns in Afghanistan, which seem to try to cover a multitude

of topics and issues, the Taliban have limited the topics that their chants and

other propaganda artifacts address.

Simple, culturally relevant messages communicated in local dialects project

these messages into the popular Afghan consciousness through messages that

resonate deeply with local Afghan communities. While the chants analyzed

have focused on a variety of key topics, including Afghan history, religion, and

tradition, the specific themes the Taliban taranas address are limited in scope.

The chants’ and stories’ overarching themes include:

•  Taliban victory in cosmic conflict is inevitable;

•  Islam cannot be defeated;

•  The Taliban are “national heroes” and willing to sacrifice all for Al ah and

country;

•  Afghans have a long and honorable history of defeating invading foreign

infidels;

•  Foreign invaders as well as their Afghan puppets are attempting to destroy

Afghan religion and traditions;

•  All Afghans have an obligation to join the jihad against the foreigners and

apostates.

The themes portrayed by Taliban chants are relatively unadorned and to the

point. The themes are presented through the use of symbology and iconic por-

traits engendered in emotions of sorrow, pride, desperation, hope, and com-

plaints. Each of these themes and topics is presented in a narrative and poetic

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

form that is familiar to and resonates with the local people. When one listens to

the chants, their rhythmic and melodic form is immediately apparent.

Islam, and a Muslim’s duty to protect it, is one of central themes the

Taliban use to influence people and gain recruits; it is a powerful motivator

among rural Afghans. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the Taliban have

been able to use Islamic rhetoric effectively in their chants to help legitimize

their actions, and to help fuel Afghan anger against the foreign forces. Most

Afghans accept Allah’s divine will, and believe that Allah will punish the

oppressor (foreign invader) because Allah is fair and just. In rural

Afghanistan, and even in some urban areas, mullahs hold a near monopoly

of power over religion, and they instruct people about what is right or wrong.

This association between mullahs and Afghanistan’s rural population has

developed into a powerful patron–client relationship. The Taliban have used

the mullahs to present a coordinated narrative to the people. Undoubtedly,

the Taliban have been able to manipulate religion, and have used this manip-

ulation as a powerful weapon in their jihad against the Afghan government

and its international allies.

The analysis of these chants and stories also suggests that cultural values and

traditions are used by the Taliban to shift public loyalties away from the gov-

ernment. The analysis clearly suggests that many of the Taliban chants attempt

to connect emotionally with Afghans through the chants’ explicit use of exam-

ples from Afghan history, and through appeals to Afghan nationalism. The

Afghan public is generally proud of their history and their ancestors’ perfor-

mance in defending Afghanistan against foreign invaders over the centuries.

Chants that focus on these sentiments remind Afghans of past foreign inva-

sions (by Great Britain and the Soviet Union), and suggest the ignoble moti-

vations of the foreign invaders: “they may appear as friends but they have more

sinister motives.”

The analysis clearly suggests that the Taliban attempt to use and manipulate

Afghan culture and traditions through their chants. For example, the use of

gila (complaints), a traditional tool that is tied to Pashtun lifestyle, was used

in a number of the chants. In addition, the Taliban have used chants to appeal

to subtle Afghan emotions.

Some of the chants posit that the Taliban are actually victims rather than

perpetrators of war. These chants portray the Taliban as an innocent and hum-

ble people, while simultaneously portraying US and ISAF forces as evil and

reckless invaders. The Taliban also use metaphors in their chants to send indi-

rect messages to the Afghan people, aligning themselves with Afghan tradi-

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POETRY AND TARANAS

tions. At the expense of over-generalization, Afghans frequently communicate

indirectly, using idioms and poetic expressions when they want to complain

about something without directly or explicitly stating their concerns. For

example, in the chant “Bagh-Baghwan,” we saw how the Taliban compared a

blooming garden of flowers with Afghanistan, and a strange gardener as the

foreign forces.

All of this begs the question, was there ever a realistic way to counter Taliban

chants and other Taliban narrative expressions? The simple answer, as we shal

see below, is that countering Taliban narratives is an extremely difficult and often

almost impossible task for the West, because of sensitivities concerning religious

themes that dominate the Taliban narrative space. This, in addition to the rela-

tive lack of Western linguistic capabilities, especially the understanding of local

dialects, makes the countering of taranas extremely difficult.

Songs and chants are important mechanisms for storing and sharing

Afghan memories, and a thorough understanding of these cultural artifacts as

well as Afghan history could play an important role in helping to win the trust

and confidence of the Afghan people. A more nuanced understanding of these

elements is essential to building influential communication bridges from the

West to the Afghan population. Taliban chants and other narratives evidently

work effectively because of their simplicity, cultural relevance, iconic symbol-

ogy, and rhythmic repetition.

169

8

THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE

OF CONDUCT1

Introduction

This chapter assesses the Taliban’s Layeha or “codes of conduct,” and in so

doing offers valuable insights into the Taliban’s objectives and key strategies,

and their attempt at consolidating the movement at the tactical and opera-

tional level. The codes of conduct also reveal overt and concealed clues into

the psyche of the Taliban leadership and their information campaigns.

Moreover, the codes highlight the Taliban’s weaknesses, fears, and vulnerabili-

ties. Finally, the Layeha also represent a sophisticated Taliban information

operation artifact.

The Taliban’s code of conduct manifesto, “Rules and Regulations for

Mujahidin,” offers critical clues into how the Taliban intended to operate as

well as how the movement was structured according to the Taliban, and repre-

sents a component of the Taliban strategic communication campaign. It also

suggests a catalog of weak points, vulnerabilities, and fears that are entrenched

within the Taliban organization and its top echelon of leadership. A thorough

examination of the document reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla

campaign implementing a rudimentary population-centric strategy, while cal -

ing upon elements of Pashtunwali and Shar’iah law into the doctrine as well.

While there is a rich scholarly literature on the Taliban,2 relatively little has

been written concerning the Taliban’s Layeha or “codes of conduct” that they

issue periodically for their cadre.3 We propose that although there are clearly

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limitations to the analytical use of Taliban Layeha— parts of these documents,

as posited above, relate to a kind of public relations or information operations

exercise4—these codes of conduct clearly suggest clues concerning the psyche

and perspective of Taliban leadership, as well as insights as to how the Taliban

see themselves and their organization.

What the Taliban presented in their latest manifestation of their Layeha

was unlike the usual media or political assessments of the Taliban’s strategic

positions and tactics. This document depicts a sense of urgency and offers

details as to how the Taliban, as an organization, planned to pursue their

short-term objectives and also make it serve as a propaganda narrative against

the Kabul regime.5 The Taliban continues to expand,6 but struggles in many

respects to maintain its command and control authority as well as its “ideals”

and “core principles.” Moreover, after the announcement of the death of

Mul ah Omar, the Taliban has fractured into at least two factions. The move-

ment, at least at the tactical and district level, seems to be suffering from a

variety of dynamics including greed, predatory behavior, and criminality. Self-

prescribed treatment for these dilemmas, if this Layeha is to be believed,

comes in the form of consolidation, loyalty, obedience, structure, professional-

ism, tolerance, lawfulness, and unity.

This chapter examines what the Layeha implies about Taliban objectives,

strategy, information operations, and organization.7 It is premised on the

assumption that deconstructing the Layeha provides important clues into the

Taliban’s organization following the capture of several of its political and mili-

tary elite in 2009 and 2010, as well as other recent changes in the organization.

For example, the rise to power of younger, more aggressive and militarily capa-

ble commanders, such as Mul ah Abdul Qauyum Zakir and his deputy Mul ah

Abdul Rauf Alizai,8 and their power struggle with old-guard Taliban leadership

was partially evidenced in the 2010 Layeha and will be assessed below.

29 May 2010 issue of Layeha

The Taliban first issued their code of conduct manifesto in Spring 2006. They

reissued the code in May 2009 and again in late May 2010. The Taliban’s most

recent code of conduct manifesto9 is significantly different from the 2009

edition. The May 2010 Layeha included major modifications as compared to

earlier versions, including an additional chapter and 18 new “articles” (rules).

The reissuing of the Layeha came at an important juncture in the Afghan

conflict, especially in light of the seizure and detention of several leading

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Taliban leaders since January 2010, including the “Deputy Imam,” Mullah

Abdul Ghani “Berader” (he was later released by the Pakistani ISI), who,

interestingly, was mentioned seven times in the 2009 Layeha.10 It is hypothe-

sized that the restructuring of the Taliban Quetta Shura following a series of

high-profile arrests and the targeted killings of “365 high-ranking and mid-

level insurgent commanders and mid-level Taliban leaders” between May and

August of 2010 prompted many of the changes observed in the 2010 Layeha.11

It is also interesting to note that the largely absent voice of Mul ah Omar had

become more apparent by Fall 2010, possibly signaling that some commanders

had lost (or were losing) faith in the Taliban’s then-supreme leadership.12

Some even claimed that Mullah Omar was basically under house arrest in

Pakistan, or at least tightly controlled by the Pakistani intelligence services.13

The ultimate role of Omar in the operational and strategic posture of the

Taliban at the time of the publication of the Layeha was critical to a whole

series of issues, including the feasibility of Taliban negotiation and/or recon-

ciliation with the Kabul regime, which had become a major focus for Kabul

as well as within certain sectors of the US Afghan policy community.

Although the publication of the Layeha was perceived among some

Western analysts as political theater, the document does provide important

clues as to how the Taliban intend to operate in the developing security envi-

ronment, as well as how the movement had been restructured—all according

to the Taliban’s leadership perspective. As will be seen below, the document

reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign in concert with a

rudimentary population-centric strategy; including the important creation of

a complaints commission: a shura that investigates suspected abuse of Afghan

civilians by Taliban leaders and their fighters. It appears that the Taliban have

become particularly sensitive to local perceptions and increasingly relied upon

traditional “population-centric” lines of operation to consolidate their battle

for “hearts and minds” of the Afghan populace and especially the southern,

rural Pashtun.14 All of these apparent Taliban positions also have powerful

information operation implications.

As in the past, the Taliban remain conscious, and vulnerable, to the damage

done to the movement’s political capital by the incorporation of criminals

( Taliban-e duzd) into the movement during the “open door” recruitment

policies enacted in 2003. Infighting among Taliban factions was another key

concern, something that has been recorded steadily over the past few years15

and has been explicitly witnessed in 2015. The Taliban are exerting tremen-

dous efforts to rectify issues concerning abuse and criminal activity by Taliban

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commanders and, as will be seen below, dedicated several new articles in the

Layeha to deal with these issues. Such efforts definitely have IO implications,

because many organizations and personnel associated with the Kabul regime

are widely viewed as massively corrupt, and even criminal, by a significant

majority of Afghans.

Tribal and communal conflicts were also of particular concern, and the

Taliban exerted considerable efforts to mitigate these issues by creating effec-

tive mediation council and dispute resolution mechanisms, usually termed

“shadow courts,” which were critical to achieving local support and sympa-

thies.16 The 2010 Layeha paid particular attention to the importance of these

judiciary councils and outlined the accepted way for Taliban fronts to create,

utilize, and manage these systems. The Taliban judicial system is also an

important subject of their information campaign.

Methodology

The analysis of the Layeha presented below is based on a qualitative content

analysis of the 2009 and 2010 documents. This analysis was primarily inter-

ested in categorizing and comparing the statements presented in each of the

two published Layeha. Particular research attention was devoted to analyzing

differences in content and themes. The Table of Contents of each document

was carefully compared and similar sections were systematically assessed in an

effort to identify changes in scope, intent, and focus between the two docu-

ments. This analysis was then complemented with previously obtained docu-

ments, including interviews with top Taliban leaders published in jihadist

leaflets, magazines, and websites, as well as the Layeha of 2006. The research

objective was to assess changes as well as similarities in the Taliban’s own state-

ments as presented in the two manifestos, concerning their strategy, tactics,

and goals.17

Before presenting the content analysis of the May 2010 Layeha and com-

parison with the 2009 “code of conduct” below, we first compare the structure

of the 2010 document with its predecessor. We will then present an analysis

of the 2010 Layeha and compare it to the 2009 document. Finally, we will

examine the Taliban’s organizational construct as presented in the 2010

Layeha. This organizational case study will demonstrate how the Taliban have

adopted portions of the Layeha in actual practice.

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THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

Structure of the 2010 Layeha as compared to the 2009 manifesto

Table 8.1 presents a comparison of the Tables of Contents of the 2010 and

2009 Layeha. The code of conduct manual offers a structured approach using

a chapter format with numbered “articles” listed below each chapter subhead-

ing. As evidenced in Table 8.1, the Tables of Contents of the two documents

were very similar. Ten of the fourteen 2010 section topics were the same as

2009. New topics suggested by the 2010 Table of Contents as compared to

the 2009 document were:

•  Decisions Pertaining to the Surrender of Opponents and Giving Invitations

to Them;

•  Health Related Issues;

•  National Issues;

•  Advice.

While many of the sections of the 2010 Layeha were similar to the 2009

document, the 2010 Layeha nevertheless represented a significant expansion

of instructions (although not necessarily a replacement) as compared to the

originally released 2006 Taliban Layeha.18 The 2009 Layeha was mentioned

in the foreword of the Taliban’s much longer 2010 version, which contains 14

chapters and 85 articles (or rules).19 In the 2010 Layeha, the Taliban leader-

ship asked its operators to abandon all previous modes of operational doc-

trine, including the 2009 Layeha, and abide by the new set established within

the code of conduct.

Table 8.2 presents an overview of the thematic changes evidenced in the

2010 Layeha as compared to the 2009 version. As suggested in the table, out

of the 85 articles in the 2010 Layeha, 47 were repeated from the 2009 Layeha,

14 were modified/altered, and 24 were new (18 of which are new additions,

6 are additional articles to replace the omissions from the 2009 Layeha). At

least 17 out of the original 30 Layeha were repeated in the 2009 manifesto.

The following analysis is focused on types of variations found in the Taliban’s

latest iteration of the Layeha, and provides insight into the Taliban’s overall

strategic shifts, alterations in Taliban command and control structures, and

the Taliban’s perceived adaptation to the ongoing and fluid security environ-

ment unfolding in Afghanistan. Similar to the US military force structure in

Afghanistan at the time, the Taliban have undergone serious leadership

changes between 2009 and 2010, and obviously since; these changes, many

caused by Coalition operations against senior leadership elements as well as

some arrests of senior Taliban leadership in Pakistan, had a seemingly signifi-

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

cant impact on the Taliban’s group cohesion and political objectives. An

examination of the 2010 Layeha strongly reflects these dynamics relative to

thematic changes in the document.

Table 8.1: Tables of Contents of 2010 and 2009 Layeha

2010 Layeha

2009 Layeha

1. Decisions Pertaining to the

1. Security;

Surrender of Opponents and Giving 2. Regarding Prisoners;

Invitations to Them;

3. Regarding Spies;

2. Regarding Prisoners;

4. Enemy’s Logistics and Construction

3. Regarding Spies;

Activities;

4. Enemy’s Logistics and Construction 5. Captured Enemy Equipment;

Activities;

6. Mujahidin Organization;

5. Captured Enemy Equipment (War

7. Mujahidin Personal Issues;

Booty);

8. Education and Training;

6. Regarding Commissions (i.e.

9. Regarding Mujahidin Organization;

Mujahidin Organization);

10. Local Personnel Topics;

7. Internal (Personal) Issues of

11. Prohibited Items;

Mujahidin;

12. Recommendations and Focus

8. Education and Training;

Regarding These Rules and

9. About Departments and Companies;

Regulations;

10. Health Related Issues;

13. The conclusion is summarized by a

11. National Issues;

poetic statement by Mul ah

12. Prohibited Items (Forbiddance);

Mohammad Omar, titled God Give

13. Advice;

Us Victory.

14. Recommendations about the Code

of Conduct.

15. The conclusion is marked by a small

speech of Mul ah Omar, called Dear

Grateful Mujahidin Brothers.

Analysis of 2010 Layeha

The 2010 edition, as previously suggested, was much longer and covers in

greater detail more strategic and tactical concerns than the earlier Layeha.

Significant additions were made to chapter 7 (“Internal Issues of the

Mujahidin”), with 10 new articles added, and a new chapter 10 entitled

“health-related issues” was included.20

There were suggestions that the Taliban were attempting to moderate their

behavior, after events in Sangin district in Helmand, where the Taliban

176

THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

Table 8.2: Overview of 2010 Layeha thematic changes

Repeated (47)

Alterations (14)

New Additions

Omissions (6)

(24)

• Guerrilla

• Properly dividing war • Rules for

• Condoning

fundamentals

booty

Provincial and

attacks against

• Prohibited behaviors • Construction and

District

NGOs

such as torture,

logistics activities

Commissions

• Narcotics

kidnapping for

• Decision-making

• Rules on health

ransom, home

on captured Afghan

services

invasions, and

logistics personnel

accepting bribes

• Recommendations

for suicide attacks

• Ordering fighters to

blend in with the

local population

shadow governor was replaced several times in 2012 because of brutality;21 but

this was clearly not universally recognized or followed by all Taliban and

Taliban groups. Code stipulations such as “protection offered to any govern-

ment official, worker or contractor captured by the Taliban” have been cited

to suggest a “softer, kinder” Taliban, but this was not a new doctrine.22 This

rule was previously outlined in the Taliban’s 2006 Layeha and is also a widely

accepted tenet of Pashtunwali.23 Obscene battlefield atrocities, such as behead-

ings, the murdering of women, and the mutilation of Afghans working for the

government and NATO forces were still occurring. The Taliban repeated their

prohibition of cutting “ears, nose, and lips” (chapter 12, article 70 of 2010

Layeha). However, in practice, the Taliban have continued the practice of

mutilating Afghan citizens, severing ears and noses, and often beheading

Afghan villagers (including women) and security forces.24 Hence, one needs

to ask if such pronouncements are mere IO propaganda or actual policy pro-

nouncements. The appeal by Taliban leadership to end this unpopular bat-

tlefield conduct remained a major bane to the Taliban’s political capital,

especially when they were linked to heinous acts like the carving out of a vil-

lager’s eyes in Kandahar province back in 2008 and the execution of a preg-

nant woman in Badghis province in August 2010.25

The content analysis of the main themes of the 2010 code of conduct sug-

gests that the main purpose of the reissuing of the Layeha in light of the

restructuring of the Taliban’s leadership infrastructure was:

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  A continued focus on network communication, consolidation and control;

•  A focus on the quality of jihadist operations;

•  A recognition of the importance of public support;

•  To ensure jihadist operations do not negatively impact the Taliban’s politi-

cal capital;

•  An attempt to convince the local population that the Taliban—not the

local Afghan government, local security force, local militia, or even a rival

insurgent faction (e.g. Hezb-e-Islami)—is the real power in that specific

region;

•  To convey the new construct of the Taliban provincial leadership, namely

the importance and structure of political commissions, the Taliban’s prover-

bial “silver bullet” in defeating the government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan by creating an effective and legitimate parallel government that

responds to the social, political, and security needs of the people;

•  To incentivize Afghan government personnel not only to defect to the

Taliban, but to be rewarded as newly “high-ranking Mujahidin” if they

kill a top government official or Coalition soldier or if their actions cre-

ate an environment where the Mujahidin can kill a high-ranking official or

Coalition forces;

•  To loosen the command-and-control parameters on executing captured

government officials, clerics, commanders, and elders.

It appears that the 2010 manual’s target audience was the provincial and

district leadership (many of the Layeha are directed at them), and stressed the

importance of obedience and the chain-of-command in conjunction with the

larger Taliban administrative bodies (provincial commissions). The 2009 ver-

sion seemed to target “group leaders,” tactical-level Taliban commanders in

charge of dilgai (local cadres) numbering 10–15 members. It also outlined the

organizational responsibilities of both the district and provincial-level com-

mand apparatuses. Interestingly, the 2010 Layeha only scantily refers to the

Taliban’s then supreme leadership, Mullah Muhammad Omar ( Amir ul-

Momineen)26 and his Deputy, who goes unnamed unlike the 2009 version

where Omar’s then most trusted deputy, Mul ah Abdul Ghani “Berader,” was

referred to frequently.27 Berader was arrested by Pakistani authorities in

Karachi sometime in January 2010 and later released to great fanfare. In the

2009 manifesto, Mullah Omar was referred to six times and his deputy six

times; in the 2010 version, Mullah Omar was referred to eleven times and

Berader seven times. In previous versions, Omar is referenced three times,

Berader not at al .

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THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

A significant addition to the 2010 edition of the Layeha was a directive

concerning Taliban access to medical facilities. The Taliban at the time report-

edly maintained several clandestine medical clinics throughout southern

Afghanistan, such as those in Helmand’s Garmsir district. Additionally,

wounded Taliban/insurgents had also been treated regularly at the Italian

NGO clinic [Emergency], then in Lashkar Gah, Helmand.28 This directive

was most likely aimed at curbing Taliban fighters from abusing their access to

such medical provision, because they sent their relatives and friends to seek

treatment from these facilities for non-combat-related injuries and ailments.

This stricture could also be advice from foreign sponsors, such as elements of

the Pakistani security establishment, who reportedly established medical

facilities close to the Afghan–Pakistan border to treat wounded Taliban.29

“Guerilla fundamentals,” an important addition to the 2009 Layeha, are

largely repeated in the new version. In the 2009 Layeha these fundamentals

included:

•  “The Mujahidin must have a good relationship with all the tribal commu-

nity and with the local people, so that they are always welcomed and are

able to get help from local people.”

•  “The Mujahidin should forget about tribal or language differences. The

Mujahidin should not fight among themselves. Prophet Hazrat Mohammad

says, ‘Those people that fight each other because of language or tribal differ-

ences, they are in the wrong path’ (chapter 319). If you are living under the

one flag and fighting under the same flag, then the language or tribal differ-

ences should not be important.”

•  “The Mujahidin should always have the same uniform (read ‘dress’) as the

locals because it will be difficult for the enemy to recognize them, and also

to make it easy for the Mujahidin to go from one location to another.”30

The dismissal of the importance of a particular tribe reflects the Taliban’s

preference (in recent years) to have members, especially “foot soldiers,” from

all tribes living in a particular locale. Downplaying the differences of tribes as

reflected in the above codes reflects the strategy that the Taliban had adopted

since around 2004–5.

The 2010 Layeha gave special attention to article 62 in chapter 11 [National

issues] which referred to two other articles [articles 46 and 76]. Article 62 was

presented as a cardinal rule regarding legal/judicial matters and states:

If the regional residents ever present a request to Mujahidin with the aim of judicial

resolution for rights or other conflicts, then not every group’s leader holds the

179

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

authority to intervene in public affairs. Although only the provincial commander,

the district head or his deputy can take the petitioner’s request application into

consideration and according to the procedures, initially in col aboration with the

mediators, the issue should be resolved with peace and organized Jirga in such a

way that it does not contradict the sacred Shar’iah. If reconciliation or Jirga con-

sultation is not possible, then in case of availability of courts, they should proceed

to the court and if a court doesn’t exist then in that situation the procedures in

agreement with the scholar’s points of view should be followed.

It is interesting to note that the Taliban in this Layeha, as demonstrated

above, referred to themselves as Mujahidin. Mullah Salaam Zaeef, the

Taliban’s former ambassador to Pakistan now under house arrest in Kabul,

stated that the group does not refer to its own forces as Taliban, but as

Mujahidin, because only one in ten fighters is a true Taliban, while the rest are

“ordinary Afghans.”31 While many of the Mujahidin of the anti-Soviet jihad

(1978–89) joined the Taliban in the early 1990s, it should not be forgotten

that many of the Mujahidin, especially those allied with Jamiat-e-Islami,

Shura-ye Nazar, and various Shi’a tanzim, formed an anti-Taliban bloc called

the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan; they were the prin-

cipal enemy of the Taliban after they came to power, and were their opponents

in the brutal Afghan civil war of 1994–2001.32

Significant differences: 2010 vs. 2009 doctrine

Although the Taliban had incorporated more than half of the prior Layeha

into their new manifesto, it is important to note which rules were modified or

removed altogether; additionally, which rules were added: namely just addi-

tional caveats and explicit details to particular rule sets (i.e. more detailed

rules for prisoners, the creation of provincial commissions, and dividing war

booty). Rules that were added to the 2010 doctrine are listed below, followed

by noteworthy deletions from the previous Layeha.

Actions prohibited by the Taliban (chapter 12) remain mostly unchanged

from the 2006, 2009, and 2010 Layeha except this important modification:

•  2010, article 69: “Youngsters (those without beards) are prohibited from

living in Mujahidin residencies or administrative centers.”

•  2009, article 50: “Youngsters (those without beards) are not allowed to be

taken on jihad.”

The importance in this modification was not so much the Taliban’s accept-

ance of child soldiers, but the prohibition of them from Taliban sleeping

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THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

quarters. Male-on-male sexual activity, especially that of man-on-child abuse

(known locally as bachabauzi, or “child’s play”), is a practice that allegedly rose

to prominence throughout the past forty years of conflict.33 Most Afghans

view bachabauzi as a grave social injustice, and even the Taliban movement

itself prides itself on the widely held narrative that the event that prompted

Mul ah Omar and his small band of talibs to take up arms against the warlords

was the tank duel that ensued between two commanders who were fighting

over the right to own a young dancing boy.34 The issue is so contentious that

Afghan laws also prohibit the young from dwelling in Afghan police and mili-

tary barracks.

Kidnapping and the criminalization of the Taliban remained a major vul-

nerability to the Taliban organization and how they were viewed among cer-

tain Afghan communities.35 Article 73 of the 2010 document expressly

prohibited kidnapping for money. The continuing focus on kidnapping and

other criminal activities in the Layeha would seem to suggest that the senior

Taliban leadership was fully aware of the negative reactions garnered by local

communities regarding the movement’s involvement in kidnappings, extor-

tion, mutilations, bribery, and attacking educational systems and students.

Nevertheless, 2010 saw a major increase in kidnappings in Kandahar City and

other locations.36 It is strikingly apparent that the Taliban organization(s) had

severe problems with banditry, extortion, bribery, and all-out criminality

within their ranks.37 Opportunistic predatory behavior was interfering with

Taliban tactics and strategy, and corrupting the organization from the district

level upward, likely infecting provincial-level leadership as well.38 Media

reports from summer 2012 speculated on a financial drain of the “central

treasury” that was partially caused by corrupt and greedy tactical and district-

level commanders who helped bleed resources for their own self-interests and

caused inner-Taliban rivalries based on economic domination of specific ter-

ritories, specifically within Zabul province;39 evidence of this phenomenon

also existed in nearly all areas where insurgent groups were operating.

The 2010 Taliban doctrine highlights a directive by Mul ah Omar written

on the back page of the manifesto. Table 8.3 presents this statement as well as

his statement in the 2009 document. As evidenced in the table, Omar’s 2010

statement was nearly identical to 2009’s, with one addition (highlighted in

Table 8.3): this included the emphasis on “consultation” before jihadi opera-

tions were carried out, a further indicator that the Taliban were striving to

consolidate command-and-control capabilities throughout the battle space,

highlighting the importance of the many new additions to the Layeha regard-

ing provincial commissions and quality of operations.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Table 8.3: Mul ah Omar statements in Layeha

Layeha 2010 statement

Layeha 2009 statement

by Mul ah Omar

by Mul ah Omar

Dear Mujahidin,

Dear Mujahidin,

1. Your intentions and all other

1. Everything you do should be according

activities must match the policies

to Islamic Law and only for God.

of almighty God and the Prophet

2. Stay like a rock to face the enemy and

Muhammad.

never go back.

2. Stand firm like steel in front of the

3. Keep good relationships with your

enemy, any incidents or propaganda

friends and the local people, and do

should not shake your resolution.

not let the enemy divide/separate you.

3. Love your Mujahidin brothers and

4. Always be careful during your

your own people. Keep the brother-

operations.

hood and firm honest relationship

5. Do not give anyone difficulties because

with people so that the enemy

of your personal issues.

cannot penetrate to divide you to

6. This is our mission: to keep people and

obtain its sinister aim.

their property safe. Do not let those

4. All of your jihad activities and

people who love money take away

operations must encompass consultation, people’s property and cause them

carefulness, contrivance and cleverness.

problems.

5. No one should use personal animosity,

Amir ul-Mominin

inferiority complex, or carelessness to

punish someone.

6. Safeguarding the wealthy and the

ordinary people is the basic responsi-

bility of the Mujahidin. All of you are

to fulfill these obligations responsibly

and do not allow those ambitious,

armed, and material-loving individuals

to abuse people and waste their wealth

for their own personal gains.

Amir ul-Mominin40

Financial matters as well as extortion appeared in several other rules

throughout the 2009 manifesto as well as the 2010 document, and have

important Taliban IO implications:

•  “Taking money in order to forgive someone is prohibited.”

•  “When we mention that we need a ‘guarantee’ from someone, we are saying

that a trusted person should provide a guarantee. We are not talking about

property or money.”

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THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

•  “When you capture drivers, contractors, or soldiers, releasing them for

money is prohibited.”

•  “If an Afghan National Army soldier is captured, the Imam or Imam’s

Assistant will make the decision whether to kill him, to use him for a pris-

oner exchange, or exchange him for money.”41

In Pashtunwali, money is often a means of settling disputes, or forgiving a

transgression between individuals or clans. It is a measure of conflict resolu-

tion that has been an established process in Afghanistan for thousands of

years.42 Afghanistan’s customary criminal norms are based on restorative jus-

tice rather than retributive.43 In Pashtun communities, this means that a cul-

prit is asked to pay poar, or compensation money, to the victim or the victim’s

family and to ask for forgiveness rather than spend time in a prison. This

underlying custom of seeking apology and eliminating enmity is known as

nanawati among Pashtuns and ‘ uzr among other communities. Even within

the doctrine of Shar’iah law, this type of “blood money” payment is also

prevalent and is known as diyat. In respect to the Taliban’s prohibition of

taking poar, the Taliban were preventing a traditional practice among

Pashtuns, Tajiks, and other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

Apparently in anticipation of having Afghan government employees and

others switch sides and join the Taliban (likely as a response to the increase in

US and Afghan government support for often unsuccessful reconciliation

programs for the Taliban and other insurgents), the 2010 code of conduct

included a series of new rules as to how to handle such events or government

desertions. These, like other rules presented above, have important Taliban IO

as well as “story” connotations:

•  “The people who surrender and regret their past deeds will have to return

the money or properties in case they have snatched the money or properties

while they were working with the infidels or their slavish government.”44

•  “Those who quit the puppet government and join the Mujahidin should

not give him a place in their lines until they develop satisfaction about the

person. In case of giving a place to such a person in their lines, the Mujahidin

will have to obtain the approval of the provincial commander.”45

•  “If a person quits the opposite camp and is unable to defend himself, it is

not justified to kill him until it is known if he plans to join the Mujahidin

or attack them.”46

Although there had not been reports of significant members of the former

Karzai regime or government workers “switching sides,” a 16-man Afghan

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

police unit did defect to the Taliban in Khogeyani, Ghazni, an explosive and

unstable area south-west of Kabul.47 The mere fact that a series of new rules

addressing such a contingency was added to the 2010 Layeha is interesting in

its own right. It was probably an indication of the confidence that the Taliban

had in early 2010 that their side would eventually be victorious. These rules

might also indicate the Taliban recognizing that Pashtuns historically have

been very willing to change sides, especially if they think the other side will

eventually be victorious.48

While the last few years have witnessed concentrated Taliban attacks on US

and NATO supply lines in both Pakistan and Afghanistan,49 2010–12 wit-

nessed considerable concern in Washington concerning the intensity of

Taliban attacks on coalition logistics and supply convoys.50 The 2010 code of

conduct explicitly addressed such dynamics and contractors and others

involved in US/NATO convoys and logistics:

•  “For those contractors who deliver and supply oil, resources, or other mate-

rial, and build governmental centers for the infidels or their slave adminis-

tration … and drivers supplying the enemy with goods who are captured, the

death penalty should be pronounced if the judge has solid proof in regard

to their involvement.51

The seriousness that the Taliban assigned to supply convoys was suggested

by the penalty that they ascribe to those proven guilty of being associated with

convoy work—death. Like the 2009 Layeha, the 2010-reissued version had a

special set of rules of conduct concerning construction and logistics activities.

The rules assigned specific responsibility to Taliban leaders (provincial author-

ity only) who attacked and seized contractors’ construction equipment or

vehicles and what was to be done with captured construction personnel.

Again, there were special instructions for Taliban fighters not to obtain and

loot convoys for their own self-interests.

•  “Burning a private vehicle which transports material to the infidels or pro-

vides other services to the infidels is lawful, but it is forbidden to spare them

in exchange for money or use them for any benefit.”52

•  The Taliban “have the right to kill” men who use “vehicles which transport

material to the infidels. The rules assign specific responsibility to Taliban

leaders (Taliban judge or in the absence of a judge, a Provincial Shadow

Governor).”53

The 2010 Layeha also published new rules concerning construction and

logistics activities:

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THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

•  “When it is confirmed that contractors … are transporting oil or other

equipment … the Mujahidin should burn their resources and they (contrac-

tors) should be killed.”54

•  “When it is confirmed [that] contractors are providing laborers and work-

ers to the enemy … [they] should also be killed.”55

These rules further suggested the importance that the Taliban apparently

placed on logistics, convoys, and especially oil transport by the types of penal-

ties proffered for those found supporting such activities. This is especially

interesting in light of the fact that a number of new more “moderate” rules in

the 2010 code of conduct pertain to penalties and prisoners. For example:

•  “Mujahidin are not allowed to torture any prisoner with hunger, thirst,

heat, cold even if these prisoners deserve death … nobody is allowed to

pronounce punishment decisions except the Imam, deputy Imam, and the

judge. The district judges are not allowed to pronounce death sentences

without the approval of the provincial judge. However, if a provincial judge

is not yet appointed, then pronouncing death sentences or other type of

punishments will be the authority of the governor.”56

•  “As there are so many Shar’iah obligations linked with execution, if

Mujahidin intend to execute a criminal person … Mujahidin … must …

inform his relatives about his date of execution.”57

As in earlier Layeha (2006, 2009), the 2010 document had a section and

a series of specific rules devoted to war spoils or “booty.” “Booty” was defined

as “property captured from infidels during war.”58 All money or other com-

modities captured by the Taliban during combat was to be split between

participants. One-fifth of such spoils were to be expended by the provincial

commander, and the remaining divided amongst “those Mujahidin who

fought.” Rule 28 states that before a battle begins, the relevant Taliban com-

mander should record the “names and particulars of the [participating]

Mujahidin” to aid in the “distribution of booty.”59 Money or property that

was obtained by means other than combat, according to the Layeha, was to

be distributed to the Baitul Maal, the “central treasury,” which is a Taliban

organization for distributing commodities and goods amongst the people as

well as the “Mujahidin.” Although hardly a serious attempt by the Taliban to

institute Hezbollah-type social welfare programs, the author has seen “com-

munity ledgers” written by the Taliban that documented names, ages, and

other descriptors of local individuals supportive of the Taliban and their

military activities. Programs that benefit the people, at least in the eyes of the

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Taliban, were also reflected in the new rules concerning war spoils of the

2010 Layeha:

•  “If Mujahidin carry out fighting against infidels in a village and if the villag-

ers also participate in the fighting, then they will have a share in the booty.”60

The benefits the Taliban offered villagers have been a major theme of their

efforts to win over sympathy and support from local communities. Having an

explicit rule that suggested that locals who participate with the Taliban in

fighting “infidels” would reap rewards (in the form of war spoils) was an

attempt to gain the trust and confidence of the local Afghan population.

While the Taliban explicitly stated that none should accept cash for transgres-

sions, they leave an opening for provincial authorities to accept money. This

aspect could be emphasized to show the hypocrisy and corruption of Taliban

leaders: hoarding money for themselves.

Both the 2009 and 2010 Layeha attempt to expand and reinforce the suc-

cess of the Taliban shadow court system, which represents a parallel legal

system that is acknowledged by local communities as being legitimate, fair,

free of bribery, and swift. The Taliban shadow justice system is easily one of

the most popular and respected elements of the Taliban insurgency by local

communities, especially in southern Afghanistan.61 The author witnessed this

first-hand in the Panjwayi district of Kandahar where there existed no formal,

operable justice system to adjudicate criminal cases or extremely important

civil disputes involving water and land rights. Disagreements over land

( mezaka) and water were (and are) presently a serious source of social instabil-

ity in the district. Such disputes were quite frequent because of a complicated

and convoluted system of landownership and inheritance that had been aggra-

vated by decades of violence and malfeasance by predatory local officials.

Attempts to resolve these disputes or claims through the channels of the

Afghan government’s formal justice system can take years and significant

monetary bribes. The Taliban have effectively exploited this situation through

their shadow justice system once housed in Zangabad (Horn of Panjwayi).62

Using Shar’iah law, a Taliban qazi (judge) can settle a case in a few hours

without bribes. While this court may not administer the kind of justice pre-

ferred by Kabul or the West, it is swift and perceived as just by most that use

it. This is especially the case when property disputes are involved. Many vil-

lages as well as city dwellers go to the Taliban court to settle such land dis-

putes. The shadow court system actually gives a certain degree of legitimacy to

the Taliban and strongly enhances their political capital.63 The elders’ account

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THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

of how the legal system is organized and how it functions matches the 2010

Taliban code of conduct rule on justice exactly. These codes concerning justice

also play an important role in Taliban IO stories.

Organizational analysis of the Taliban movement: internal issues

of the Mujahidin

Important information can be obtained regarding the organizational force

structure of the contemporary Taliban movement through the examination

of the new articles in the 2010 Layeha chapter concerning “Internal issues of

the Mujahidin.” The Layeha identified how the Taliban plans to increase its

efficiency and popularity in rural environs and zones of conflict by the crea-

tion of walayat-kommsyon, so-called “provincial commissions,” which are

investigative councils designed to ensure the interests of the local population

and maintain order within the Taliban’s provincial force structure. Chapter 6,

“About Commissions” (articles 34–39), and chapter 7, “Internal Issues of the

Mujahidin” (articles 40, 41, 42–50, 58), and chapter 11, “National Issues”

(article 62), indicate the Taliban’s methodology to be used to create provincial

commissions. The encouragement to create district-level commissions, which

are managed by a district governor and his deputy, is also critical in organizing

and directing the Taliban’s activities at the village and area level. The Layeha

advised its provincial governor to help create these councils and seek out well-

respected leaders and deputies who have civil service skills to help with politi-

cal and social causes, rather than having two military commanders in charge

of Taliban governing duties.

Since the issuing of the 2010 Layeha, US and Afghan forces carried out a

protracted series of operations aimed at dividing and conquering elements of

the Taliban’s senior leadership. The Pakistani arrest of [Deputy Imam] Mul ah

Abdul Ghani “Berader,” several ranking members of the political and ideology

committees, and the killing of scores of other senior leaders within the

Taliban’s military and political committees in 2011, led to a restructuring of

the Taliban leadership. An analysis of the Layeha chapters dedicated to the

creation and maintenance of the Taliban’s provincial-level force structure led

to the construct the Taliban organizational structure presented in Figure 8.1.

The Taliban’s vision of a provincial command and control structure is cen-

tered around five entities: the provincial governor, the provincial council, the

Shar’iah court, the district commission, and the district governor and his

deputy. The provincial command and control infrastructure remains loyal to

and under the management of the hierarchal leadership of the Taliban Quetta

187

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 8.1: Provincial military force structure of the Afghan Taliban

Supreme Leadership—Mullah Mohammad Omar

Military Commission (Quetta Shura Level)

Zonal Chief

Provincial Governor

Provincial Commission (Walyat-Kommission)

Shar’ia Court

No less than 5 Commanders At least

1 qazi (judge) and 2 ulema

3 members must present in AO

Deputy “Mayor”

Deputy District

Tasks of Provincial

“Mayor”

Governor

Provincial Govemor

District Commission

appoints members of the

Most of the district commission must be

commission and the

forward deployed in their respective area

Shar’ia court.

The Provincial Governor,

after consultation with a

district mayor, can make

changes to the district

commission.

The administrative chief,

after consulting the

Provincial Governor, can

make changes to the

provincial setup.

Imam (Mullah Omar)

Deputy Imam (Rahbari Shura)

Military Commission/Zonal Chief

Provincial Governor

District Governor

Dilgai (Commander)

Foot Soldier

188

THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

Table 8.4: Responsibilities of the Taliban chain of command64

Responsibilities of Taliban command and control apparatus

Zonal chief

Provincial

Provincial

District

governor

commission

governor

Has the authority Responsible to

Comprises at least Must appoint a

to make changes in form a provincial- five members, three deputy to serve as a

the provincial

and district-level

of which must be civil works/social

command structure commission and

present in their

outreach representa-

after consultation Shar’iah court

area at all times.

tive for the Taliban.

with the governor. system.

If any issues arise

In conjunction with

Coordinates

Has the authority between the

the district commis-

regional military

to make changes in Taliban and local sion, he ensures no

activities of the

the district

residents, the

spies, thieves, or

Taliban.

command structure commission will

criminals enter the

Oversees Taliban

after consulting

investigate the

ranks of the Taliban.

operations

with the district

matter and help

If the district

nationwide and

governor. If a

resolve the

governor or group

makes strategic

disagreement

situation. If the

commander suspects

decisions

ensues, the case is commission cannot any Taliban member

accordingly.

then passed to the resolve the issue, it

zonal chief.

must be investi-

of repeatedly

Must occasionally

gated by the zonal breaking the layeha

send delegates to

chief.

rules, they must refer

the provinces to

this case to the

assess the strength

Ensures no spies,

provincial council

of the provincial

thieves, or

who will investigate

command

criminals enter the the matter and

structure.

ranks of the

consult with the

Taliban.

Investigates cases of

provincial governor.

abuse committed

The provincial

by a district

commission

governor, his

conducts a

deputy, or a dilgai

monthly survey of

commander.

the Taliban

fighting in the

province to ensure

they are abiding by

the Layeha and are

being effective.

189

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Shura, whose regional military council and respective rais-e-thazema (“zonal

chief ”) relay strategic decisions and requests from Mul ah Omar to the pro-

vincial leadership (Figure 8.1); Table 8.4 details the explicit responsibilities of

the Taliban chain of command.

Noteworthy Code of Conduct deletions

A number of articles were omitted or significantly altered from 2009’s Layeha

as compared to the 2010 version. For instance, one of the major differences

was the reconfiguration of the decision-making process as applied to captured

Afghan logistics personnel. The previous strictures recommended “any con-

struction companies that repair infidel foundations or bring oil to the infi-

dels—after the Mujahidin warn them and they do not stop working for the

infidels—will be captured and taken to the provincial authority, who has the

right to decide their fate.”65 The new directive ordered Taliban fighters to kill

the logistics drivers on sight and burn their vehicles; if the drivers were cap-

tured alive, they must be tried by a Taliban judge for their alleged involvement

in supporting the Coalition and the Afghan government and subsequently

would be sentenced to death if found guilty. Additionally, the new rule 26

indicates that any contracting firms who were providing laborers to the

Coalition should also be targeted and their personnel shot on sight. These

measures offer the glaring evidence of an organization whose main aim is to

separate the state from the people and the people from the international com-

munity, by ordering the summary execution of such “col aborators.”

Previous

Layeha included scathing commentary against NGOs operating in

Afghanistan and justified the targeting and killing of unarmed NGO field

personnel. The 2009 and 2010 manifestos did not include any mention of

international NGOs nor did it promote the targeting and killing of their per-

sonnel; primarily because many residents find the services provided by such

organizations to be somewhat useful, especially healthcare services, food distri-

bution, and agricultural assistance. The removal of NGOs’ death warrants also

offered the Taliban a level of plausible deniability when they do commit such

atrocities; although several examples from 2010 onward indicate that the

Taliban are still deliberately targeting and killing NGO personnel. For instance,

the Taliban claimed responsibility for the execution of ten international NGO

personnel in a remote forest of Badakhshan on 7 August 2010: a grim reminder

of the Taliban’s intentions despite the barring of such rules in its code of con-

duct.66 According to the Afghan National Safety Office Third Quarterly

190

THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

Report, between January and September 2010, 25 NGO workers were killed

in Afghanistan compared to 17 who were killed over the same period in 2009;

and the deliberate targeting of de-mining personnel had also increased.67

Conclusion

The purpose of the 2010 Layeha was to establish an operational order and

retain discipline within the Taliban movement and promote their IO narratives

and stories. This was probably an attempt to solidify the movement in possible

preparation for the future withdrawal of international forces beginning in

2011, or in case acceptable political offers were presented by the central govern-

ment’s newly established “High Peace Council” tasked with reaching out to

Taliban networks for potential reconciliation measures. This analysis suggests

that the Taliban remain most concerned with: chain of command principles;

preventing the fragmentation of the various Taliban networks; obtaining and

maintaining political capital by winning “hearts and minds” of local residents;

ensuring enough fighters remain engaged in combat; and galvanizing the per-

ception that the Taliban represent a capable, desirable, and fair alternative to

the current political establishment.

The content of the Taliban’s 2010 Layeha exposed specific weaknesses

regarding the Taliban movement: their obsession with group cohesion and

consolidation, unifying the command and control structure, issues concerning

communications, and the difficulties the top leadership (the late Mul ah Omar

and his Rahbari Shura) had in coordinating with fighters at the district and

provincial level from their safe haven in Pakistan. Reissuing strictures that

prohibited group members from “taking money” to forgive someone, “guar-

anteeing” someone in exchange for money or property, and outlawing the

practice of kidnapping people for money indicated that the Taliban leadership

continued to worry about losing political capital from low-level members

engaged in criminal behavior.

“Additionally, it is widely known that the Taliban’s ‘central treasury’ had

been drained numerous times due to false claims from Taliban commanders

requesting payment for attacks they did not commit or to ‘replace’ war equip-

ment under false pretenses.”68 The punishment for criminality (rule 36) is

immediate banishment (Pashtunwali element of ostracizing) from the group

and future prohibition from joining any other Taliban factions unless the

individual pleads for forgiveness, which was a fairly light punishment. One

possibility was that the Taliban, although a resilient and redundant organiza-

191

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

tion able to regenerate its rank and file somewhat easily, were finding it chal-

lenging to regenerate as quickly as they did in the past, due to an increase in

Coalition, Afghan and Pakistani military offensives in the years 2010–12.

This brings up a second major implication: the 2010 Layeha laid out

numerous specific duties, most of which were directed at provincial military

force structure and its district-level chain of command, and the heavy reliance

upon the provincial- and district-level commissions, investigative bodies

tasked with ensuring “good behavior” and hearing the complaints of the local

population against local Taliban officials. This was the Taliban leadership’s

attempt at solidifying its political legitimacy and thwarting the proliferation

of criminality among its commanders and foot soldiers at the local level. It is

obvious with the inclusion of “guerilla fundamentals” as well as the late

Mul ah Omar’s statements at the conclusion of the Layeha that the Taliban

remained strategically concerned about the movement’s image among the

populace. In step with public perceptions, the Taliban prohibited the video-

taping of executions, outlawed all forms of torture, ordered those sentenced

to death to be shot (not beheaded) (rule 21), and strictly avoided the tactic of

cutting off noses, lips, and ears (rule 70).

The Taliban have suffered politically from engaging in barbaric, ultra-vio-

lent, and un-Islamic methods such as beheadings and mutilating civilians.

While this method may have short-term advantages in garnering support from

certain foreign donors or outbidding among competing insurgent groups, it

has had detrimental long-term strategic effects on Taliban efforts at gaining

public support among rural communities. This analysis suggests that media

reports framing the Taliban as criminals, a hostile entity vehemently against

education, rapists, bandits, or kidnappers has had an effect on the decision-

makers within the Taliban’s upper echelon. The fact that protecting civilians

and their property was a tenet from Mul ah Omar himself signifies the ire that

civilian casualties caused among local communities.

As the past has shown and 2015 explicitly experienced, Taliban factions are

susceptible to tribal rifts, rivalries, and conflicts, as much as any non-insurgent

Pashtun community may be. This can mean the difference between a safe

haven and a hostile environment regarding areas intended for penetration and

expansion. Nearly sixteen years have passed since the US-led attack against

Afghanistan ended the Taliban’s former regime, yet the Taliban has failed to

represent a plausible replacement to the current political establishment, pre-

senting itself as no model candidate for state-building experiments.69 However,

despite the Taliban’s effort to portray its organization in a certain light—as a

structured, orderly hierarchy with efficient information flow and doctrine—

192

THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

this does not represent the Taliban in a realistic sense. The 2010 Layeha clearly

dictated that the military chain of command, and political commissions

designed to hear the will of the people, ultimately refer back to a military

committee of the Quetta Shura for guidance. Clearly designed political and

social mechanisms—such as a hierarchal political and ideological committee

or public services committee operating at the Quetta Shura—were not men-

tioned in the Layeha. In the final analysis, the assessment here suggests that

the Taliban were simply repeating the same mistakes as in the past, overly

focusing on military objectives and intra-organizational functions, while fail-

ing to capture the true will of the Afghan people.

193

9

HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG)

PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Having assessed a large variety of Taliban information operation artifacts and

dissemination methods, we will now turn our attention to assessing the IO and

associated strategy of another central Afghan insurgency group: Hezb-e-Islami

Gulbuddin (HIG).1 HIG has long been one of Afghanistan’s leading insurgency

groups and radical Afghan political parties. Indeed, HIG is one of Afghanistan’s

three major insurgent groups and continues to produce propaganda materials

and issue statements against the Afghan government despite public statements

indicating that HIG is willing to participate in political negotiations with the

Afghan government. In comparison to the Taliban’s information campaign,

HIG has produced propaganda that is often better written and intellectually

more sophisticated than much of the Taliban’s information. HIG’s IO venues

have increased over the past years, particularly during the group’s high-level

delegation visit to Kabul in March 2010.2 In 2010, HIG launched a new website

called Oqab (Eagle) presenting information and propaganda in both Pashto and

Dari. This website served as HIG’s official communication hub and offered vari-

ous types of propaganda materials, including dozens of online books written by

its supporters as well as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The website is no longer avail-

able and has been currently replaced by a blog forum, which also contains a

plethora of HIG materials and content.

HIG continues to recruit fighters and maintain its influence over the activi-

ties at the Shamshato refugee camp located near Peshawar, Pakistan. HIG has

195

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

recruited many of its foot soldiers from this large refugee camp. What distin-

guishes the Shamshato refugee camp from other camps is that it is under the

direct control of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his followers and has been for

years. The 64,000 inhabitants of the camp have access to “schools, medical

facilities, mosques, madrasas and a crime-free security offered by HIG.”3 HIG

publishes two local newspapers ( Shahadat and Tanweer) for the refugee camp

that serve as important fora for propaganda dissemination.4

Historical analysis of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan inevitably served as the catalyst for the

jihad against foreign invaders and the birth of some and expansion of other

Mujahidin factions, including Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (a resurgent militia

of Hezb-e-Islami and the former Mujahidin Tanzim party). Originally one of

the leading fronts of dissent in Afghanistan during the 1970s, Hezb-e-Islami

emerged as the leading Mujahidin resistance organization throughout the

1980s Soviet–Afghan war and a favorite of Pakistan’s ISI. Although the party

itself split into several competing organizations before the Soviet–Afghan war

began, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, as the name suggests, was and is led by the

notorious Islamist warlord and former prime minister of the Afghan

Mujahidin government, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Even during the 1980s, HIG

excelled at media interaction, strategically communicated with the Afghan

refugee community in Pakistan (especially, the Shamshato refugee camp near

Peshawar and camps in Iran), and widely published and disseminated propa-

ganda materials throughout the region. The rigid and hierarchal structure of

Hezb-e-Islami allowed the group to maintain some coherence over the course

of the past forty years and is indicative of the group’s re-emergence following

the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan post-2001.

As suggested above, during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, HIG had

a prominent propaganda and IO machine that included the production and

dissemination of shabnamah, magazines, and other media products:

The pro-Hekmatyar Afghan News Agency (ANA) was headquartered in an Inter-

Services Intelligence (ISI)5 building in Islamabad. There, HIG and ISI propagan-

dists worked side by side to roll out pro-Hekmatyar tracts. The Pakistan ISI played

a major role in nearly all facets of early HIG information operations and worked

“side by side” with Gulbuddin’s propagandists until HIG lost ISI favor to the

Taliban in 1994.

ANA was the most voluminous Hekmatyar mouthpiece in his ISI/Saudi well-

lubricated media network, reporting, usually shrilly, near-daily condemnations of

196

HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

the US, his Afghan critics, especially the three moderate Peshawar parties in the

Afghan Interim Government (AIG, February 1989-April 1992), his bombard-

ments (ISI supplied and assisted inside Afghanistan) of the Mojaddidi and

Rabbani-Masood interim regimes in Kabul after Najib’s overthrow.6

During the Afghan Civil War, which began soon after the Soviets withdrew

from Afghanistan, there was brutal fighting between various Mujahidin forces

all vying for power in Kabul. While Hekmatyar was prime minister of the

Mujahidin government that had overthrown Mohammad Najibullah

Ahmadzai, the “Marxist” president and “Soviet puppet” 1987–92, in mid-

1992 he conducted fierce rocket attacks on Kabul, killing thousands of civil-

ians, and his ANA7 continued to push out HIG propaganda:

ISI trucks carrying rockets, ammunition and other armaments ferried supplies to

Hekmatyar’s base camps south and east of Kabul. Hekmatyar’s ISI-assisted ANA

news agency in Islamabad and his newspaper in Peshawar, Shahadat, published

articles glorifying his murderous rocket barrages against Kabul’s 2 million

inhabitants.8

HIG, which is currently one of the largest militant groups in Afghanistan,

continues to use the same rhetoric against the US and its al ies as it did against

the Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan Afghan regime (1973–8). Unlike other

Mujahidin parties, however, HIG’s primary focus has been based on propa-

ganda production and dissemination within its own ranks. Besides using other

media sources, HIG has focused on operating its own printed media, schools,

university, and large gatherings to expand its sphere of influence among the

Afghan population, particularly among Afghan refugees living in countries

neighboring Afghanistan since the early 1980s.9

Although both Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and the Taliban are currently

fighting a common enemy, their gestation and operational strategies differ

significantly. It is worth noting that high-ranking HIG members were and

continue to be much more educated than their quasi counterpart, the Taliban.

Much of the leadership of HIG emerged from the University of Kabul in the

early 1970s and radical, urban intellectuals complemented this leadership. In

1994, the Taliban emerged as the force against groups such as Hezb-e-Islami

and eventually seized control over 90 per cent of Afghan territory. HIG was

one of the major enemies of the early Taliban, and like many other former

Mujahidin groups, the Taliban defeated HIG, and its leader, Hekmatyar, took

refuge in Iran.10

The col apse of the Taliban in 2001 and the presence of international mili-

tary forces in Afghanistan ultimately resulted in a pseudo relationship and

197

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

col aboration between HIG and the Taliban along the lines of “an enemy of

an enemy is a friend”. However, HIG makes a conscious effort to distance itself

from the style of ongoing military operation that induces major civilian losses,

whereas the Taliban are notorious for such brazen attacks. Furthermore,

whereas the Taliban have been quite resolute in abstaining from serious peace

dialogues with the Afghan government, recent HIG visits and official mes-

sages indicate that HIG is more amenable to engaging in a peace negotiation

with the current Afghan government. In order to establish a better relation-

ship and gain legitimacy from the Afghan population, HIG makes a concerted

effort in addressing some of the ailments of the Afghan people, as evidenced

by its public statements, as will be seen below.

Information operations of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) utilizes a wide range of delivery systems to

maintain its political influence and to publicize its official position regarding

social and political events unfolding in Afghanistan. The group regularly uses

official spokesmen, shabnamah, as well as the internet and printed media (host

newspapers, newsletters, books, magazines) and videos to convey its state-

ments and policies to the Afghan populace and international community.

HIG’s strategic communications attempt to address political, cultural, and

religious themes in a more structured, organized, consistent, and clear format

compared to other insurgent movements active in Afghanistan. HIG messages

often portray sympathy toward civilians, government employees, and public

property, while its most offensive messaging is usually reserved for the inter-

national community, namely NATO and the United States.

A statement attributed to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during Eid 2011 high-

lights the important differences between HIG and Taliban communication

strategies:

I advise Mujahidin to concentrate on a real enemy. Do not get busy in other wars

[meaning internal fighting]. When you load your rifle, your intention should be

firing at your real enemy’s red chest. Don’t let people in your leeki (military fronts),

who harass people, don’t have Islamic manners, don’t respect Islamic rules, fuel

rivalries and dispute among Mujahidin, and disunite Mujahidin. Also, don’t let

them carry out explosions in mosques, Madrassas, schools, health clinics, bridges,

offices, public facilities and areas that harm people. They [those people] have other

plans than focusing on destroying military power of a real enemy. Avoid explosions

that hurt civilians. Don’t kill government civilian employees such as teachers,

judges, Mullahs, Engineers, doctors, reporters and other civilians. Do not force

198

HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

people to pay usher and zakaat. Only the Islamic government has the right to ask

for usher and zakaat in return of providing security for its people. Encourage peo-

ple to pay Mujahidin usher, zakaat, and charity voluntarily.11

These are powerful stories that HIG has repeatedly presented to the Afghan

populace.

Printed media 12

Two of the main sources of statements from HIG are online and printed

newspapers/newsletters: Daily Shahadat (Martyrdom) and Tanweer

(Enlightenment).

Daily Shahadat (Martyrdom): Unlike other media sources related to the

Afghan insurgency/jihad, the HIG newspaper and website, Daily Shahadat,

is designed to target audiences from a variety of backgrounds and age groups.

The website is divided into different sections which explicitly address adoles-

cents, children, editorials, poetry and literature, articles, books, magazines,

and useful links. Daily Shahadat conveys various HIG social and political

messages while publishing current news on domestic and international issues

with particular emphasis on topics related to the Global Muslim Community

( Ummah). A central focus is the military operations in Afghanistan, events

related to Palestinians, and conflicts in other Muslim countries. The official

party newspaper of HIG, it is designed to target audiences from all educa-

tional backgrounds and some certain age groups. The website is colored green,

portraying the HIG’s party flag color, while the newspaper hardcopy is printed

in black and white. Although the website often becomes unavailable online, it

can usually be found at http://dailyshahadat.com/index.php

Tanweer (Enlightenment): Tanweer is a HIG monthly, published in

Peshawar and offering the views of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his organization

on Afghanistan, as well as its activities inside the country. Based on analysis of

several volumes of magazines, it appears generally designed to include com-

mentary on current political events, religious and social articles, HIG monthly

military/battlefield achievements, and official statement and narratives. A

number of recent magazines also include a chapter from a book called Bible Da

Islam pa Rana Ki (Bible in the light of the Qur’an) authored by Hekmatyar.

•  Length: 60 or more pages.

•  Language: Pashto and Dari.

•  Publication: Monthly.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Interestingly, the magazine is published in both Dari and Pashto in an

attempt to reach a wider general Afghan audience. It is estimated that approxi-

mately 40 per cent of Tanweer’s content is published in Dari and 60 per cent

in Pashto.13 The typical table of contents for Tanweer suggests the importance

of the following issues and themes:

•  Editorial ( paigham tanweer) (politically themed);

•  Complaints and suggestions section (readers’ comments);

•  Religious teachings (multiple);

•  Interview, official statement, or book excerpt attributed to Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar;

•  Interviews with a Hezb-e-Islami military commander;

•  Pashtun culture (including literature/grammar lessons);

•  Regional coverage (e.g. Western world and Israel; Open Letter to Obama);

•  Martyr list of HIG personnel killed in Afghanistan and their biographies;

•  Khpalwak Afghanistan (Independent Afghanistan) publishes their politi-

cal statements (primarily anti-Western sentiment) within Tanweer.

HIG’s use of printed media in the last few years has resulted in a consider-

able increase in HIG’s propaganda activities. This surge in HIG’s dissemina-

tion of stories and narratives began during (and immediately after) their

“peace delegation” trip to Kabul in March 2010.14

Shabnamah and spokesmen

Like other insurgent groups active in Afghanistan, HIG use shabnamah to

communicate with local audiences, usually at district and village level, but

occasionally at the provincial level as well. Some speeches attributed to

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are also neatly reprinted and disseminated as shab-

namah, including bi-annual Eid statements.

HIG relies upon official spokesmen to relay messages to local and interna-

tional media sources, but also allows its lower-level commanders to speak to

the media. Engineer Haroon Zarghoon is widely regarded as the chief spokes-

man for HIG, while a number of lesser-known regional commanders occa-

sionally serve as spokesmen for district or provincial-related messages and

incidents. Zarghoon rarely, if ever, appears in public, and no actual image of

him is currently available online or in print. But other high-ranking HIG

officials, like Ustad Qareebur Rahman Saeed, who serves as the senior repre-

sentative to Europe; Mohammad Daud Abedi, the HIG representative to

200

HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Figure 9.1: HIG spokesmen and representatives

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(a) Eng. Qutbuddin Helal, Ariana TV interview, 2007 (broadcast from US) (b) Ustad

Qareebur Rahman Saeed, Shamshad TV interview, 2010 (broadcast from

Afghanistan) (c) Mohammad Daud Abedi, Noor TV interview, May 2011 (broadcast

from US) (d) Dr Ghairat Baheer, Canvas TV interview, September 2011 (broadcast

from Belgium) (e) Eng. Mohammad Amin Karim Tolo TV interview, May 2010

(broadcast from Afghanistan)

201

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

North America; Eng. Mohammad Amin Karim and Dr Ghairat Baheer, mem-

bers of the HIG delegation to Kabul to discuss HIG peace proposal with the

Afghan administration; and Eng. Qutbuddin Helal, the deputy political

director of HIG, occasionally offer official statements to local and interna-

tional media outlets.

Lesser-known or locally active HIG spokesmen include Sher Agha for

Nuristan province,15 Qari Mansoor for Nangarhar,16 and Zubair Siddiqui for

Kunar province;17 all have provided statements to Afghan press organizations

regarding military activities attributed to HIG.

Internet activities

In 2010, a new website called Oqab (Eagle) was launched by HIG, sharing

information in Pashto and Dari languages; by May 2011 it had been shut

down. Oqab served as HIG’s official hub of communication and dissemina-

tion for several books written by HIG commanders, including several alleg-

edly written by Gulbuddin himself.

Oqab published a variety of statements, commentaries, and directives that

represented the official HIG view, as well as news updates on war and political

activities. Up until 4 March 2011, the website was able to offer services in

English and Arabic languages, with tabs for both languages. At the top of the

website was a Dari poem and logo showing a cavalry on the map of

Afghanistan holding a green flag with a Kalema Shahada (There is no god but

Al ah, and Muhammad is His messenger), the first of the five pillars of Islam.

Most importantly, it shared with its audience many books authored by

Hekmatyar himself and HIG members. Loaded with poetry, audio and video

taranas, and video clips on HIG fighter operations across the country, the

website was still in the process of expanding when it was disrupted and taken

offline. It was formerly accessible online at http://www.oqab1.com/

Tanweer weblog is another web-based outlet that disseminates HIG propa-

ganda and literature. This blog, under the name Dostdaraan-e-Watan, pub-

lishes HIG official messages, statements attributed to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,

members’ articles, videos, pictures, Hekmatyar’s interview transcripts with the

media as well as the weekly newspaper Mesaq-e-Esar. It carries almost as much

information as their websites. Some of the literature present in the blog sug-

gests that several senior HIG members contributed to writing for this blog.

According to its archive dates, it seems that Tanweer weblog became available

online around 2006.

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Figures 9.2A: (above) and 9.2B (below): The above logo of Zawanano Islami Tanzim

appeared in one of the HIG Facebook accounts.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

HIG on Facebook

HIG appears to disseminate its propaganda on Facebook as well. Beside vari-

ous Facebook accounts under people’s names, Shahab Hezb is their official

Facebook page for sharing HIG propaganda on a daily basis. Content includes

military news, HIG statements, and photographs depicting atrocities blamed

on US and NATO forces as well as photos of HIG fighters, commanders, and

those HIG fighters killed in battle ( shaheed). After studying their activities on

Facebook, it seems that HIG propaganda on social networking sites is han-

dled by its youth wing, Zawanano Islami Tanzim. This group, probably based

in Shamshato camp in Peshawar, is active at connecting with Afghan youths

and HIG media products.

DVDs and videos

Like the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, HIG

also uses digital technologies other than the internet to convey political and

military messages. These formats include DVD and internet-based video dis-

semination methods, such as YouTube (users Huryat786, Tanweer7866,

Tanweer 786, Oqaab08, Ghazy66, and ZAZAI11). HIG also uses its own

media label ( Shahadah, or martyrdom). The videos are heavily reliant upon

imagery, including montage sequences of still photos showing American

forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and are usually accompanied by background

music ( taranas).

In a video uploaded to YouTube on 10 November 2010 entitled “Stay for

another little while, O you: the martyr who has no grave,” HIG presented

footage of one its fighters preparing for a suicide attack. The nine-minute

video is accompanied by a tarana urging Muslims to prepare to conduct sui-

cide attacks to achieve the status of a martyr. Although no date is presented in

the video indicating when it might have been made, the footage appears to be

cut from multiple sources and depicts various suicide bomb attacks in

Afghanistan. A date stamp of 6:27 indicates that the footage was probably

recorded on 27 June 2007 and possibly shows the individuals who launched a

car bomb attack against a security convoy in western Kabul on that same date.

The video is a rather crude attempt at replicating the preparations of a sui-

cide attack, and the only audio soundtrack is a tarana. Unlike Taliban-

produced videos, this video lacks personal statements from the bomber, and

no further information on where or when the attack occurred and what it

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Figure 9.3: Stills from HIG video “Stay for another little while, O you: the martyr who

has no grave”

(b)

(a)

(c)

(d)

a) Shahadah is the media label of HIG. The green flag is the iconic symbol of Hezb-e-

Islami. b) The video, which was unaccompanied by audio other than a music track,

features suicide bombers greeting other militants before launching their attack. c) The

video shows several car bomb attacks against alleged security targets, such as military

convoys, although they are never close enough to be photographed. d) The video also

recycles suicide-attack footage from other militant networks, including some Taliban

attacks previously produced under the Manba ul Jihad label.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 9.4: Stills from HIG video “How large is the caravan we have?”

(b)

(a)

(c)

(d)

a) Shahab (Arabic for a shooting star) is another media label attributed to HIG. b) The

iconic green flag of Hezb-e-Islami is prominently displayed throughout this video. The

militant group’s Imam leads his “caravan” of fighters over rough terrain while bearing

the flag. c) The producers of this video appear to be extremely mindful of operational

security, blurring out the faces of all individuals in the video except the group’s reli-

gious leader (shown top right). d) The masked militants wear green Kalima head-

scarves bearing the Islamic testification of faith while being led in prayer by their imam

(face uncovered). A voice-over sermon by Maluvi Shah Mohammad is presented in

both Dari and Pashto.

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

might have accomplished. Other HIG videos, such as “Shaheed Habibul ah

Shahab Hekmatyar,” a video eulogy to a slain relative of Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar uploaded in June 2011, and “How large is the caravan we have?”

are similar in that they lack any dynamic audio tracks or audio taken at the

scene.18 Instead, they are accompanied by a single track, a tarana, and the

images are usually long, somewhat roughly cut together shots or still images

presented in a montage sequence.

While HIG periodicals and websites are sophisticated, well-written, and

articulate, HIG-produced videos seriously lack both quality and creativity.

Major political themes of HIG propaganda

The themes of HIG’s IO activities and stories have concentrated on promot-

ing a number of consistently focused political tropes, such as:

•  Protecting civilians (exploiting col ateral damage by Coalition and Afghan

forces and even the Taliban);

•  Coalition forces are facing an imminent defeat in Afghanistan;

•  Political discussions about a permanent presence of foreign forces and mili-

tary bases in Afghanistan.

•  Implications of the parliamentary and presidential elections;

•  The HIG peace proposal.

Collateral damage: the failure to protect civilians

Civilian col ateral damage is a primary issue of HIG propaganda and an issue

that it attempts to condemn in very strong words.19 Civilian casualties have

become a very sensitive topic among the general Afghan public, and HIG

seems to attempt to distance itself from the kind of ongoing insurgent opera-

tions that result in major civilian loss: attacks which are usually carried out by

groups like the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan (IMU).

Unlike the Taliban, HIG rarely claims responsibility for attacks that cause

civilian deaths. As an example, in a statement to the residents of Loy Paktiya

(Greater Paktiya),20 Hekmatyar admired his followers while also confirming

the sacrifices made by the people of Loy Paktiya in the jihad against the

Soviets. This typical HIG statement discussed three major issues: the need for

the public to support the Afghan insurgents and need for unity among them;

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

the encouragement for people to wage jihad; and instructions for avoiding

killing civilians and destroying public properties.

It should be noted, however, that HIG has also inconsistently claimed

responsibility for a number of attacks in which Afghan civilians have died.

One case in point is when HIG spokesmen claimed the deadly attack against

the Finest Supermarket in the heavily guarded Wazir Akbar Khan section of

Kabul on 28 January 2011. A suicide bomber detonated himself in the

crowded food store after engaging the armed security guards in a shoot-out,

killing eight people, including five Afghans from the same family.21

Similarly, HIG claimed responsibility for the high-profile execution of ten

Western aid workers traveling through a remote valley in northern

Afghanistan on 5 August 2010—as did the Taliban through their spokesman

Zabihullah Mujahid, although Taliban commanders from Nuristan later

denied that their fighters attacked the convoy of aid workers. A spokesman for

HIG contacted the Afghan media outlet TOLO News and said that the ten

medical workers were killed because they were “spies” who “had gone to the

province for espionage.”22 A similar statement was given to the Afghan media

outlet Pajhwok News by self-proclaimed HIG spokesman Qari Mansoor,

claiming that HIG killed the foreign aid workers on suspicion of their work-

ing for NATO forces.23 HIG and Taliban spokesmen regularly offer compet-

ing claims of responsibility for attacks for purposes of prestige and fear among

the populace.

Following a series of Taliban attacks on soft targets killing hundreds of

civilians across the country in March 2011, HIG published the statement

below:

Greetings to the pious and brave Mujahidin

HIG Leader Eng. Hekmatyar message to pious and patriotic Mujahidin [people]

of Loy Paktiya

In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

I pray for pious and heroic Mujahidin to further succeed. I hope Paktiya, Khost,

and Paktika’s heroic Mujahidin keep their courageous ancestors’ history alive and

transform this region into robust jihadi trenches once again. Increasing attacks and

resistance against the crusade armies indicate that God willing, our desires will turn

into reality. Hence, Mujahidin from Loy Paktiya will be recognized as the leading

people of Islamic jihad. In the past jihad, Loy Paktiya was an unbreakable active

trench. The predominant population had actively participated in Jihad and had

suffered martyrdoms and injuries. It is an honor and pride for the courageous pub-

lic to have actively contributed in the continuous Jihad. God grant martyrs higher

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

grades in paradise and grant victories to brave warriors. They certainly made all

Mujahidin proud and their turbans’ shamley up.24

I congratulate the pious and Mujahed nation of Loy Paktiya. I pray God to

empower your Jihad and make you victorious. Loy Paktiya’s Mujahidin are appreci-

ated because they have avoided internal disputes and maintained unity. They have

turned their attention toward real enemy and have avoided such military operations

that lead to civilian casualties and the destruction of public property. They have

ignored wrong and satanic fatwas25 of those abrasive clerics who justify internal

conflict and military operation causing civilian loss.

I wish success to the pious victors of Loy Paktiya. I wish glory to Loy Paktiya; a firm

trench of Mujahidin.

Hekmatyar26

Invading forces are losing the war in Afghanistan

Another primary focus of HIG’s IO involves HIG’s exaggerated claims of the

capabilities of its forces and the damage it “inflicts” on foreign forces. Their

websites, newspapers, and magazines consistently publish reports and analyses

of the “successes” of HIG fighters in their actions against foreign and Afghan

forces. This type of information is generally aimed at achieving three goals:

1) It boosts the morale of HIG supporters and forces.

2) It attempts to encourage financial supporters and donors to support its

political and military actions.

3) It demonstrates the power and influence of HIG and demonstrates the

strength of HIG’s position especially relative to the balance of power with

other insurgent groups.

These objectives are evident in the following HIG news articles.

Fighting between Mujahidin and invaders in Jowzjan: 13 foreign and

government soldiers killed Shaburghan, Jowzjan (Mujahidin News Sources)

13 foreign and domestic soldiers were killed. Reports from Jowzjan province

inform about fighting between Mujahidin and foreign forces. Yesterday, the battle

started around 10 am and continued for two hours. According to the report, during

this heavy fighting, Mujahidin’s RPGs destroyed 2 Tanks and 4 Ranger Cars

[Pickup trucks]. In addition to that, 13 foreign and domestic soldiers were killed.

Mujahidin also seized GPS, one box of dehshaka bullets and different types of

ammunition. It has to be mentioned that two Mujahidin were martyred during

these few hours of fighting.27

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

American forces withdrew from number of districts

03–01–2011 Asad Abad, Qalat (News Sources)

NATO forces led by the US transferred the authority of some districts to govern-

ment forces. Based on the reports from news agencies, the former deputy head of

NATO forces, Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, said that the security respon-

sibility of Arghandab, Maizan, and Dai Chopan are transferred to government

forces and foreign forces have left these districts. This was announced in a gathering

held in Qalat yesterday. According to another report, the spokesman for NATO

forces, Gen. Josef Blotz, announced in a gathering in Asad Abad of Kunar province

yesterday to reporters about the exit of their forces from Pechdar district and offi-

cially transferred security responsibility to government forces.

Gen. Blotz and Gen. David Rodriguez, however, didn’t say about the relocation of

these foreign forces. Anyhow, this is an excuse for fleeing and evacuating foreign

forces from Afghanistan because of Mujahidin attacks and fighting.28

Permanent Presence of the United States in Afghanistan

Afghan politicians are presently discussing and weighing the potential option

of US permanent bases in Afghanistan. HIG was among the first insurgent

group to react to this issue through its propaganda artifacts. For example, they

condemned such a plan and questioned the basic legitimacy of the Afghan

government for even raising the issue:

HIG Europe office statement and story on US permanent military presence

in the country

In the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate. As the US mili-

tary forces have been facing heavy resistance from our brave nation and suffer grow-

ing financial and human loss, they search for honorable exit of their forces;

however, there are rumors spread by the puppet government about their desire to

negotiate the permit for building permanent invading forces bases. It comes at a

time when neither the puppet government nor handpicked parliament has such

authority to take this shameful and dishonorable decision on the fate of our brave

and proud nation. HIG, on behalf of Mujahidin and the nation, will not allow

anyone to cut such a deal with invaders that will lead to lasting slavery and invasion

in order to stay in power. HIG is determined to continue its peaceful struggle until

all foreign invaders withdraw from Afghanistan and we regain independence of our

country.29

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Parliamentary and presidential elections

Parliamentary and presidential elections and the controversies surrounding

them have become a topic given considerable attention by the HIG propa-

ganda machine. Per their general narrative, HIG has taken a softer approach

to participation in elections. In fact, many HIG members have been elected

to the Afghan parliament. While HIG statements condemn such elections as

illegitimate, unlike Taliban propaganda, HIG does not warn the Afghan pub-

lic to refrain from participation in the election. It also criticizes defected HIG

leaders who officially operate under the new constitution and serve as part of

the government with a prominent presence in the Afghan parliament.

Although recent Afghan elections have been marred by widespread corrup-

tion and dispute among candidates, HIG is concerned that the continuity and

improvement of such events may eventually lead to increased government

legitimacy and public participation. HIG, on one hand, tries to delegitimize

and disrupt elections, while on the other hand it softens its communication

toward the ordinary people:

HIG is stronger, robust and a united Tanzim. Those [HIG members] who joined

the Kabul administration are just a handful of people. Their position does not

represent our code of conduct and objections to participation under the strangers’

hegemony. No honest and loyal member of HIG would participate in an un-Islamic

government supported by strangers. HIG officially reject such elections under the

authority of invading forces and does not participate in it.30

HIG peace proposal 31

Beginning with the anti-Soviet Jihad, HIG has historically been recognized as

one of the most violent and opportunistic groups among Mujahidin Tanzims.

In an apparent effort to deflect some of these negative views and restore the

group’s reputation as well as to differentiate itself from other insurgent net-

works such as the Taliban, HIG has expressed a certain level of flexibility in

their views toward negotiations, particularly in negotiating “peace” with the

Kabul regime. In the past, both the Taliban and HIG have offered similar

preconditions for peace talks—the complete withdrawal of foreign forces

prior to any negotiations. However, HIG has redefined its demand and appar-

ently accepted the announcement by the US of an expected withdraw as

opposed to the previous demand of the complete removal of foreign forces

before such talks could even begin. The Taliban, however, retain a rigid

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

demand of a complete withdrawal of foreign forces before meaningful discus-

sions can take place.

HIG devotes considerable effort to statements, articles and news reports

covering events concerned with peace talks, especially events involving their

own envoys. HIG senior officials have publicly appeared on numerous local

media outlets in Kabul discussing peace talks and negotiations.32 Such visits

with Afghan senior officials and politicians bring substantial attention to the

insurgent group by prominent Afghan media sources both inside and outside

the country. To engage with a wider audience in the Afghan community, HIG

official delegates even appeared in interviews with several Afghan television

channels targeting the Afghan diasporas in the West.33

A prominent narrative of these interviews is that HIG is not waging an

offensive war as much as resisting un-Islamic foreign forces that have invaded

Afghanistan. Hekmatyar and his followers have attempted to introduce HIG

as a more noble Islamic political organization as compared to the Taliban, in

an attempt to establish ties with the population and increase Gulbuddin’s

influence. Many of these efforts are also an attempt by HIG to rebuild

Hekmatyar’s public image and redirect blame away from him as the lead cul-

prit in the destructive Civil War battles that killed tens of thousands of civil-

ians, ruined Afghanistan’s infrastructure, and destroyed Kabul between 1991

and 1994.34

While the Taliban’s reputation has often been sul ied due to incidents tar-

geting civilians, HIG attempt to build momentum and public support by

focusing on negotiations and ending the conflict. The following are the key

points of the HIG peace proposal and call for negotiations with the Afghan

government and international forces:

HIG requests all political and civil society groups through its national contract

[peace proposal] to reach an agreement granting Afghanistan’s independence.

HIG will strengthen national unity and provide an opportunity for Afghans to

choose their preferred leadership and establish administration according to their

belief and trust. Foreign forces should begin withdrawing and complete the process

in 6 months. During this period, they should stay in the military bases and leave

population centers and cities.

Transfer all security responsibilities to the ANA and ANP. Foreign forces under no

circumstance have the right to carry out military operations, house searching and

arresting suspects.

Transfer power to an interim administration that is acceptable to all rival sides. If

other sides do not agree to establishing interim administration, there should be

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

reforms in the current government; however, the current government should avoid

having people who are controversial, corrupt, traitors, infidels or accused of war

crimes. Also, leaders of all three institutions [government, parliament, and justice]

should be neutral and avoid fighting in favor of any group.35

As suggested above, recent years have witnessed a political dialogue between

the HIG representatives and the Afghan administration (at various levels).

These discussions have become a major point of discussion in the local media,

including the HIG official newspaper Daily Shahadat (Martyrdom). It is also

interesting to note that many of these discussions have appeared in the adoles-

cent section of Daily Shahadat and associated website, possibly indicating that

a number of young HIG members were suspicious or unclear of their party’s

move toward political settlement with the Afghan administration.

To provide more details and inform its supporters, HIG leaders have articu-

lated arguments and narratives in support of the peace talks while stressing

their continued opposition toward foreign forces in the country. In an article

written by HIG member Mukhlisyar, he explained how HIG used this oppor-

tunity to introduce its organization as a peaceful movement.36 His article

included the following arguments:

1. Justifying HIG’s peace dialogue.

2. Portraying HIG as a peaceful and patriotic group.

3. Exercising HIG influence over the people.

4. Defending the HIG leadership stance on the Afghan conflict and indicat-

ing that US/ISAF is the primary enemy of HIG.

5. Attempting to sabotage US involvement through the discussion of the

prominence of US-caused civilian casualties.

6. Persuading Afghan National Security Forces to turn against ISAF and

suggesting that Afghan public support for ISAF/US forces no longer

exists.

Major religious and cultural themes of HIG propaganda and stories

HIG’s propaganda activities are focused on a number of religious and cultural

themes such as:

•  We are fighting crusaders;

•  Islamic government is our purpose;

•  Pashtunwali;

•  Afghan history.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Beside politically oriented messages, HIG propaganda is replete with reli-

gious and cultural stories and narratives. HIG focuses on disseminating reli-

gious messages, as does the Taliban, that involve terms such as “crusades.”

Branding the current insurgency as a religious war has been a fundamental

propaganda effort that insurgents have made against Coalition forces. The

following statement by Hekmatyar describes how HIG labels their fight as

jihad for God and Islam, cal ing coalition forces “crusader armies”:

My advice to Islamic Ummah (Nation) is to keep strengthening your patience. Do

not lose your trust in God’s indispensable victory. Do not follow other imperfect

paths but continue with [the perfect path of ] jihad. You should be confident that

God the al -powerful will grant us victory over Satan’s forces. The crusader armies

will face defeat.37

In another statement, an Islamic government is argued as the only solution to

honor and stability, while disapproving of the current government and cal ing it

un-Islamic and unelected. According to HIG, Islam will only come into exist-

ence and dominance when foreign forces leave the country: “Afghans will cele-

brate their independence day at the time when all the foreign invading forces

leave our beloved country, [when the] Islamic flag is waving over the country,

and [when] we have our elected Islamic government. Without Islam, neither

will one enjoy real freedom nor will he achieve honor and stability.”38

HIG also utilize Pashtunwali themes that are common across Afghanistan.

For example, consider the following HIG statement: “One who protects him-

self by others [strangers], his house keys are in possession of Pradai [strangers].

They are not ashamed of humiliating and disgraceful living under strangers’

airplanes wings. His Ghairat never arises when these forces [foreign troops]

kill his tens of innocent countrymen on a daily basis. They violate their

Namous and Ghairat.”39 Afghans across all ethnicities have some specific tradi-

tions in common: Namous, Ghairat 40 and strangers are key themes culturally

sensitive to all ethnicities in Afghanistan. HIG selectively choose these themes

to resonate with every Afghan citizen throughout the country.

HIG repeatedly uses the historical event in Maiwand41 in its narratives and

propaganda to evoke nostalgia among the Afghan population and to draw

parallels between its fighters and those Afghans who—during the second

Afghan-Anglo war—destroyed British forces in Maiwand in July 1880.

Conclusion

HIG is an influential insurgent group operating throughout Afghanistan and

its propaganda operation continues to address relevant Afghan issues. In the

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HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Typical HIG story: “Today, the crusader forces’ flags led by US and

Britain are waving in our country. They give us Paighour, they test our

Ghairat, and threaten our religion, sect, independence, and freedom.

Look, invaders transform their Afghan slaves into freedom and democ-

racy champions and these slaves praise their superiors as freedom fight-

ers and [people of ] reconstruction; likewise, they call rascals, thugs and

terrorists our freedom fighters, the Mujahidin. They speak to our nation

and Mujahidin exactly the same as Shah Shuja did 90 years ago and the

Russians did 22 years ago. History is repeating itself again and it puts a

heavy burden for a war of independence on our shoulders. It [history]

requires us to revive our memories of Maiwand and Jagdalak and pre-

pare for another great and historic jihad.”42

past decade, it has increasingly focused on many issues Afghans consider criti-

cal for their country’s situation. As suggested above, all of HIG’s information

operations are aimed at not only improving HIG’s image in the political arena,

but also building a direct connection to the Afghan people.

The manipulation of topics like avoiding civilian casualties and the promo-

tion of potential negotiations with the Kabul regime have been key elements

in HIG’s attempt to attract Afghan popular support. Their strong statements

on protecting the civilian population, condemnation of civilian loss, and the

focus on peace talks have attempted to gain HIG political advantages in the

Afghan war. HIG clearly understands the significance of propaganda and its

implications for its future.

In summary:

•  Throughout its history, HIG has specifically focused its Information

Operation on eastern and central Afghanistan by infiltrating universities,

schools, media, government institutions, as well as other “elite” institutions,

and establishing political associations within the institutions that are vehe-

mently supportive of HIG.

•  HIG’s statements and apparent primary political concerns have concen-

trated on permanent US military bases in Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s

Parliamentary and Presidential elections, and the HIG Peace Proposal.

•  Religious and cultural messages revolve around themes such as jihad, crusade,

Afghan history, and Pashtunwali that resonate with the Afghan public.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

•  HIG-produced videos depicting insurgent operations against government

and NATO forces have increased visibility on a variety of HIG-affiliated

websites and social media websites.

•  The daily newspaper Daily Shahadat (Martyrdom) regularly provides

updates concerning HIG activities. This information is regularly published

in other print media as well as on the internet, such as in HIG’s monthly

magazine Tanweer (Enlightenment) and online books.

216

10

THE UNITED STATES’ AFGHAN INFORMATION

AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN AND A COMPARISON TO

THE TALIBAN’S CAMPAIGN

Introduction

For the past sixteen years, the Unites States has striven to achieve an explain-

able victory for Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A),1 the

moniker given to the US government’s counter-terrorism campaign in

Afghanistan.2 Despite early success in the effort to overthrow the Afghan

Taliban regime, which, to the surprise of many, took only approximately eight

to ten weeks in late 2001, since then the US and its NATO al ies have strug-

gled to define the parameters of the war. In fact, many have argued that the US

has failed to define meaningful future strategies for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and

Central Asia.3 Another critical problem that has plagued US polices in

Afghanistan, as will be argued below, is that the US has never had a story or

narrative that would resonate with the Afghan population.

In 2009 the US adopted counter-insurgency (COIN) tactics in Afghanistan.4

One way to conceptualize COIN, as posited in Chapter 1, is that it is an

information war supported by military kinetics. Yet even before COIN tactics

were adopted in Afghanistan, where strategic communication efforts—includ-

ing information operations (IO) and psychological operations (PSYOP)—are

a critical component, US strategic communications efforts had been consist-

ently critiqued since the beginning of the war. The initial US strategic com-

munication effort during the onset of the war in October 2001 was the

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

deployment of millions of crudely made leaflets which were dropped all over

Afghanistan,5 but they soon suffered when resources were diverted to the US

mission in Iraq, beginning in 2003. The US IO leaflets campaign did improve

over the years, as we shall see below, but leaflets are only rarely productive and

may actually prove counterproductive. Afghans were often afraid to hold onto

them or pass them around in fear of the Taliban catching them with one.6

Most Afghans are illiterate: nationally 61.8 per cent and much higher in the

Afghan rural areas.7 Thus, for leaflets to be useful, they must be understand-

able in picture format alone. However, if the imagery is not properly vetted, it

can also be used as IO against the deployer if picked up by insurgents. The US

strategic communication efforts would continue to face serious challenges

throughout the campaign and struggled to compete with the often superior

master narrative and approaches by the Afghan Taliban (see Chapter 2),

which expertly maximized religious and cultural values.

The first portion of this chapter examines the genesis and permutations of

the US effort to communicate strategically with the Afghan population—the

most important target audience of the Afghan conflict. While this chapter

focuses on US strategic communication efforts in Afghanistan, it should be

noted that the Afghan battle space became more complicated when in

December 2001 the US-led Coalition became the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF): a NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan estab-

lished by the United Nations Security Council. Although the main purpose

of ISAF was to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and assist

Afghanistan in rebuilding key government institutions, ISAF elements also

engaged in armed conflict with the myriad of Afghan insurgents. The ISAF

mission, which concluded in December 2014, also employed a wide range of

strategic communication efforts, often in parallel to US efforts.

Additionally, this chapter compares the overall US effort with the robust

propaganda campaign employed by Afghan insurgents to counter US mes-

sages and the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. The US strategic com-

munications strategy in Afghanistan often lagged behind the effective and

powerful narratives consistently employed by Afghan insurgents, of which the

most effective master narrative belonged to the Afghan Taliban.8

The final objective of this chapter is to assess some actual US IO and

PSYOP artifacts and their associated stories (or lack thereof ).

The Afghan Taliban movement continues to view itself as a viable alternate

to the current Afghan government structure, and refer to themselves as the

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA): a strategic interpretation that we sus-

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

pect is meant to invoke a level of authority and legitimacy among its followers.

It must always be remembered that Afghanistan’s population is estimated to

be 99 per cent Muslim,9 and Islam plays a critical role in all Afghan life. This

therefore has an immense impact on the IO battle space in Afghanistan. So

the vast majority of Taliban stories and narratives are based on their vision of

Deobandi Islam and the jihad. This means that the US knows that it has no

credibility with the Afghans relative to these topics. Moreover, the Afghan

government has also been reluctant in countering the Taliban’s Islamic mes-

saging. Thus, the US and Kabul basically have conceded 90 per cent of the IO

battle space to the Taliban.

The Taliban’s strategic objectives are to evict foreign troops from

Afghanistan, to overthrow the US-supported Kabul government, to restore

the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and to implement Shar’iah law; for these

ends, the Taliban utilize a strategic communication toolkit designed to dele-

gitimize the current government and garner local support by demonstrating

the shortcomings and perceived failures of US and NATO policies in

Afghanistan. As will be seen below, the United States and NATO-ISAF have

had a very difficult time “countering” these narratives.

The US goes to war in Afghanistan

The US responded swiftly following the devastating and unprecedented terrorist

attacks in New York City and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. A

US-led Coalition attacked Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 to remove the

Afghan Taliban regime, which had refused unconditionally to hand over Osama

bin Laden, the mastermind of the 11 September attacks. The US-led Coalition

also sought to target and destroy the al-Qaeda network, a global terror franchise

that had used Afghanistan as its base for planning and operations.

During the onset of the war, the US employed conventional PSYOP, such

as dropping millions of crude leaflets with messages seeking to gain local sup-

port in overthrowing the Taliban regime and preparing the local population

for the presence of foreign troops.10 The messages were heavily influenced by

the 11 September terror attacks, and many of the PSYOP products even

incorporated images of the burning World Trade Center, shocking visuals that

were lost on many rural Afghans who had never seen such Western buildings.

A poll taken in September 2011 found that “Some 92 per cent, or 25 million

people, said they were unaware that terrorists had flown planes into the World

Trade Center on 11 September 2001, sparking the invasion of their country.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

They called it ‘this event which foreigners call 9/11’ and had no idea what it

meant.”11 This being the one central basis for the US Afghan military opera-

tions, the US information campaign was a non-starter. It meant nothing to the

Afghan population, who were the target of the US IO mission.

The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 further degraded the US effort

in Afghanistan and resulted in a substantial decline in the capability of the US

PSYOP Task Force (POTF) in Afghanistan during this time period.12

The US relied upon a fairly consistent set of strategic communication

themes between 2001 and 2006:

•  The War on Terror is right and just;

•  Coalition forces come in peace;

•  Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are enemies of the people of Afghanistan;

•  US forces are technologically superior (difficult to sell when it comes to

collateral damage);

•  There would be monetary rewards for providing information about Taliban

and al-Qaeda leaders;

•  There would be monetary rewards for turning in weapons;

•  The Afghan government is legitimate;

•  Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) serve the people of Afghanistan;

•  Democracy will benefit the people of Afghanistan.13

But the Afghan population, and especially the rural population, had little

knowledge of or interest in most of these themes. Also, importantly, these

themes were never couched in stories or framed in narratives that were coher-

ently presented to the Afghan population.

Much of the effort during this time was dedicated to messages intended for

the Afghan population, and even in 2007 the Afghan population remained

the most important target audience, yet the US did not seem to know how to

motivate their support. By contrast, senior insurgent leaders and rank-and-file

insurgents were, respectively, ranked seventh and eighth in terms of the most

important target audiences:14

1. Afghan population

2. Afghan government

3. Government and military of Pakistan

4. Pakistani population

5. Governments of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)

6. Populations of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)

7. Enemy leadership (AQ, Taliban, criminal networks)

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

8. Taliban rank-and-file

9. Governments of Central Asia

10. Central Asian populations

11. IGO and NGO community

12. US domestic audience

In 2007, the US in conjunction with NATO-ISAF revamped its effort to

streamline the strategic master narrative and emphasized the following themes

and stories:

1. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO-ISAF, and

the US are committed for the long term to ensuring a democratic, stable,

peaceful Afghanistan that is inhospitable to terrorism. The Afghan people

can rely on its al ies, including the US government and NATO, to stay the

course.

2. Success in Afghanistan over insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and

trafficking in narcotics is critical to the security of the Afghan people, the

United States, our NATO al ies, its regional neighbors, and the interna-

tional community.

3. Afghanistan’s security, reconstruction, and development needs remain

large but the country has come a long way since the overthrow of the

Taliban, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan con-

tinues to make progress.

4. Success requires a comprehensive approach that includes security and sta-

bility as well as reconstruction and development.

5. The Taliban are a destructive force that target innocent Afghan civilians.

They engage in criminal activity and brutal tactics for their own gain and

cannot offer long-term security, stability, or development for the people of

Afghanistan.15

The US strategy and these stories were problematic at various levels, including

an inability to present or articulate them to the Afghan population in an intel-

ligible manner. Most of the time, the stories and overall narrative failed to reso-

nate with a vast majority of the Afghan population; the narratives and messages

were seemingly tailored to the urban, educated, or elite elements of Afghan

society, rather than the rural population, which comprised 75 per cent of

Afghanistan’s overall population. Moreover, the United States was relatively

ignorant about Pashtun culture and cultural dynamics that would have greatly

enhanced US IO efforts.16 For example, the United States never came to grips

with what the term jihad meant to the average Afghan, especially among resi-

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dents in southern Afghanistan,17 for whom it meant broadly any defensive effort

to protect Islam from outside invaders and negative influences. While histori-

cally this often implied armed actions, in many instances it merely meant follow-

ing the faith and one’s personal Islamic virtue (“greater” jihad in Islamic

teachings) and supporting those who were battling for Islamic righteousness.

The US never understood these nuances. In a broader indictment of US IO

efforts, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, for

example, said that for “US efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere to send a posi-

tive message about US military action and development efforts, [it] hurt US

credibility when they do not coincide with what the populace sees on the

ground.” Mullen’s criticism came as US officials acknowledged that the US was

losing the war of ideas against its Taliban and al-Qaeda enemies.18

Recognizing that they were clearly losing the information war and the

“hearts and minds” of the Afghan population—to use an often-cited COIN

term—the NATO-ISAF Strategic Communications Framework for 2011

sought to reset the key communications themes as the US and NATO pre-

pared to move forward with the process of transition and developing a long-

term partnership between Afghanistan and NATO. The new objectives and

narratives included:

1. Communicate that stability in Afghanistan is crucial to global security and

that NATO-ISAF will never again allow Afghanistan to become a launch-

ing pad for international terrorism.

The stability of the country and the deaths of Afghan civilians had become a

major issue for Afghan President Hamid Karzai and became an important

point of contention between the United States and Karzai. In 2009, under the

command of US General Stanley McChrystal, the US and ISAF implemented

directives limiting the use of airpower to curtail the perception that coalition

airstrikes were causing a significant number of civilian casualties in

Afghanistan. Shortly after the directives were implemented, US Army Colonel

Francis Scott Main assessed that the “inability of PSYOP and strategic com-

munications to address this perception of excessive [casualties] had restricted

one of the most effective kinetic tools available to the coalition.”19

2. In coordination with the government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan, explain and gain support for transition.

Ten years into OEF-A and the Bonn Accords, the Afghan government was

still facing charges of massive corruption and lack of “democracy” and trans-

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parency. Transparency International produces a yearly “Corruption

Perceptions Index” (CPI), and Afghanistan has always been judged as one of

the most corrupt countries in the world, just behind North Korea and

Somalia.20 The Afghan rural population had become extremely antagonistic

to Kabul and this, in turn, had significant implications for US COIN efforts

throughout the country. US night raids, for example, became a rallying point

for not only Karzai but also rural Pashtuns throughout the country. These

operations had multiple layered effects. First, the operations offended the

village and its elders when men of military age were taken from the home

without a perceived reason. Second, entering the home of a Pashtun without

permission dishonors the owner. If his wife is home and another man enters,

Pashtun culture considers this rape, thus dishonoring the entire family. Third,

the district and provincial governments were often unaware of these opera-

tions. The inability of the Afghan government to notify or step in as an inter-

mediary both delegitimized the authority of the government which the US

was trying to strengthen, and set the people against their representatives.21

Finally, such operations presented crucial and important IO to the Taliban

every time they were conducted.

3. Generate the active support of the Afghan people, the GIRoA, Troop

Contributing Nations’ (TCNs) populations and international community

for the ISAF mission.

As suggested above, a variety of US tactics had disturbed the Afghan popu-

lation, especially those in rural Pashtun areas. Moreover, perceptions and the

exploitation of US col ateral damage had turned many Afghans against the

US and Kabul. Indeed, the death of Afghan innocents as a result of US, ISAF,

and Afghan security forces had become a major recruiting tool for the Taliban

and associated groups.

4. Promote NATO’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan in close coordi-

nation with GIRoA.

After decades of war and years of OEF-A, the populations of many NATO

countries started to question the wisdom of a continuing combat presence in

Afghanistan. The theme of NATO’s long-term commitment became an

important IO theme, but its ultimate resonance with the Afghan population

was questionable.

5. Communicate progress against ISAF campaign objectives and priorities,

articulated in theatre-defined measures of effectiveness.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Theatre-defined Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for IO and PSYOP were

a continuing problem for OEF-A. Much of this was due to the basic lack of

knowledge of Afghanistan and the Pashtuns, in particular, by members of the

US Coalition. The United States and its NATO-ISAF partners spent much

of their time in discussions with Afghan elites and Afghan technocrats at the

expense of listening to the needs and desires of rural Afghans. This was espe-

cially problematic considering the rural insurgency that this war represented.

6. Diminish support for the insurgents and criminal patronage networks that

are detrimental to the ISAF mission and effective Afghan governance that

commands public confidence.

Criminal elements and Afghan drug mafias quickly became associated with

the Taliban. Groups such as the Haqqani Network were as much criminals, if

not more, than the insurgents.22 These criminal networks preyed on the

Afghan population and helped to increase corruption in a wide variety of

ISAF and US development efforts and other policies.23

The core strategic message at this time emphasized the partnership between

the US, NATO-ISAF, and Afghanistan: “This mission is essential for our shared

security. Our strategy is sound, our long-term commitment is solid and with our

Afghan partners we will succeed.”24 Themes had also been redefined to help

promote and achieve the overall strategic communications objectives.

Following the conclusion of the NATO ISAF mission mandate in late

2014, the subsequent NATO-led Resolute Support Mission Afghanistan

(RSMA) began on 1 January 2015. Its objective was to “build on the achieve-

ments made by the now completed ISAF mission while officially and formally

recognizing Afghan Security Forces’ growing capabilities and their assump-

tion of full security responsibility for the future of Afghanistan.”25 But even

here the realities did not match the messages that the US were propagating.

Several tribal leaders we interviewed in Kandahar City in July 2008, for exam-

ple, suggested that the Afghan Nation Police (ANP) units operating in the

districts of Kandahar were generally “corrupt” and were viewed negatively by

local communities and travelers. The ANP, these leaders suggested, were

engaged in drug trafficking, drug use, abductions, rape, and “terrorism.”

The Resolute Support Mission operates under a training and advising direc-

tive that supports four Lines of Effort (LOE): Posture the Force, Protect the

Force, Complete Afghan Security Institutions/Afghan National Defense &

Security Forces (ASI/ANDSF) Development, and Support Political

Transition. The four LOEs are further focused on eight specific areas of con-

centration known as Essential Functions (EFs):

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

EF1: Multi-year budgeting and execution of programs

EF2: Transparency, accountability, and oversight

EF3: Civilian governance of the ASI

EF4: Force generation

EF5: Sustainment

EF6: Strategy and policy planning, resourcing, and execution

EF7: Intelligence

EF8: Strategic communication

The Resolute Support Mission EF8 comprises a train, advise, and assist

framework that seeks to create a consistent message among Afghan institu-

tions such as the Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense.

There are two components of the Resolute Support Mission EF8. One,

Public Affairs and Strategic Communication, combines government relations,

media communication, issue management, and information dissemination,

and is managed through the Government Media Information Center and the

Cross Ministry News Desk. The general Afghan population and Afghan gov-

ernment are most likely the intended audience for these efforts. The

Government Media Information Center serves as a means to coordinate,

produce, and distribute accurate and timely information, as well as providing

training for Afghan communicators and a venue for press briefings. The Cross

Ministry News Desk is an information nerve center comprising representa-

tives from the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the National Directorate of

Security (NDS), and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance

(IDLG). The Cross Ministry News Desk allows these representatives to coor-

dinate and disseminate press releases and official statements about Afghan

security operations and activities.

The second component of EF8 is EF 8.2 Information Operations and

Afghan Information Dissemination Operation/Special Information Forces,

which focuses on countering and disrupting insurgent communications

through messaging at the national level. This includes the relatively standard

message dissemination techniques such as billboards, leaflets, and radio and

TV spots that are most likely intended for insurgent leadership, insurgent

rank-and-file, and the local Afghan population.26

Strategic messaging to insurgents

US efforts at the tactical and operational level of strategic communications

were intended to influence targeted insurgents and insurgent leadership

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

nodes, with the most common desired effects including: undermine morale,

counter-propaganda, exploit fissures, disrupt wider support network, and

disrupt supply network. But most of these efforts proved ineffective. We have

seen no evidence that these efforts had any significant impact.

In order to understand the United States approach to information opera-

tions and strategic communications in Afghanistan, it is critical to assess these

approaches relative to strategies and means of IO communication used by the

Afghan Taliban and other insurgent/jihadi groups. IO strategies and tactics

cannot be viewed in isolation. All such communication is dyadic and it is criti-

cal not only to understand target audiences but also the IO approach used by

these actors to counter or inhibit US/NATO-ISAF efforts.

Taliban’s effective messaging and their insurgency/jihad as compared

with the US messaging and counter-insurgency

As suggested throughout this book, the Taliban have a concise, effective infor-

mation discipline that is in tune with the audiences they wish to influence. We

would submit that the US Coalition never totally understood this, and this

lack of understanding had a negative influence on what turned out to be an

ineffective counter-insurgency doctrine in the information domain. The

Taliban are not invincible on the information battlefield. They have weak-

nesses that could have been exploited by an aggressive information campaign,

but this was not to be. The US Coalition messaging system was primarily a

passive one that tried to discredit the Taliban among the Afghans through

ill-formed attempts to make Afghans realize the superiority of the Coalition

cause. This strategy did not work, in large part because the US had no message

or story to tell that made a case in a way that the Afghan population could

understand or believe.

In Afghanistan, as in most asymmetric conflicts, there is a marked differ-

ence between the motivation levels of the actors in conflict. When strong

actors decide to fight against weak ones, it is typically in pursuit of a limited

set of objectives relevant to national policy, but seldom viewed as vital to the

national interest of the stronger party. Even if such conflicts are viewed as vital

to the strong state, a protracted conflict will often change this view dramati-

cally. Thus the weaker but determined American Continental Army, Algerian

ALN, Viet Cong, and many others overcome their much stronger adversaries,

as the protracted conflict causes the strong actors to re-evaluate the overall

value they place on the object of the fight. Statistically, the weak actors in

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

asymmetric conflicts will win when the strong actor employs a conventional

strategy of direct military engagement against the weaker actor’s strategy of

attacking the fighting will of the strong actor. Using historical data of asym-

metric conflicts, Arreguín-Toft shows that the weaker forces win by a margin

of 28 per cent when this situation exists.27

In light of this “motivation disadvantage,” the task of the weak actor is to

remain credibly in the field while the strong actor’s determination wanes. To

remain in the field, the weak actor must have at least the tolerance, at best the

support and participation, of the people. And a stalemate is a victory for the

weaker state. Mao, the master of asymmetric warfare, built his guerrilla cam-

paign around the political mobilization of a disgruntled peasantry who gave

his irregulars shelter and sustenance. Similarly, Castro and Guevara were able

to aggravate the schisms between the people and the regime with only a hand-

ful of determined guerrillas.28 The weak actor will thus capitalize on the strong

actor’s impatience,29 while nurturing his vital shelter among the population.

This nurturing is achieved through an effective means of communicating with

the population that provides this support. The challenge for the US in

Afghanistan was to develop a strategy for defeating the insurgent narrative

just as decisively as the enemy’s capability. Unfortunately, this was never done.

A central purpose of information operations, as suggested throughout the

chapters of this book, is to influence the decision of a target or affect a deci-

sion in support of a given objective. This requires communication to a specific

audience. Moreover, in order for a messaging campaign to be effective, the

messenger must have an intimate understanding of the audience for the mes-

sage, as this group’s interpretation of the message will occur within the narra-

tive framework constructed by the group’s experiences and biases. Information

campaigns must be designed to communicate effectively to a wide range of

audiences. Each audience group should be approached and engaged with

unique tactics. As we have seen, since at least 2008, the Taliban have devel-

oped a sophisticated capability for IO directed at Western audiences, publish-

ing English language websites, complete with appropriate idiomatic

expressions that indicate participation by native English speakers.30

Communication lies at the heart of the insurgent effort in an asymmetric

conflict. In any conflict, two competing actors can attack the opponent’s capa-

bility through conventional operations, or they can attack the will of the

adversary through unconventional operations. The Taliban attack US and

their Coalition capabilities through guerrilla attacks against conventional

targets, but they must know that this will not bring victory. The Taliban’s only

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

hope of victory rests in attacking the Coalition’s will to fight. Attacking the

will happens through communication. This communication can take several

forms: it can often look like kinetic operations, like a terrorist’s car bomb, an

assassination, or roadside IED. This is communication to the adversary and is

designed to break the will of the enemy. Suicide attacks are designed to show-

case the difference in motivation that exists between the Taliban and the

United States. The message is perfectly tuned for the Western audience: “Do

you see how determined we are? You don’t want this nearly as much as we do,

so why not give up now?”

The Taliban messaging strategy seeks to recreate a national identity and

expand their political capital by tapping shared values and customs and

exploiting collective experiences of the past, such as the anti-Soviet jihad.

While it is difficult to counter the Taliban’s propaganda, it is not impossible

given the inherent vulnerabilities inherent in the Taliban’s overall strategic

communications strategy. Themes indicative of weakness in the Taliban’s strat-

egy include: insurgent attacks against civilians, or insurgent attacks that inad-

vertently kill and maim civilians, allegations of the Taliban abusing and

brutalizing the local population, the well-known ties between the Afghan

Taliban and foreign intelligence services (Pakistan’s ISI), and Islamic opposi-

tion to terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. Similarly, while the Taliban

messaging campaign is consistent, the strategy is primarily a negative one,

playing on the perceived failures of the international community and Afghan

government to restore law and order, enforce justice, and to complete con-

struction and development projects. The Taliban’s messaging campaign fails

to offer viable solutions or alternatives to the current situation, other than

threats of more violence and destruction—a strategy that promotes the

notions that the Afghan government, the United States and NATO are inef-

fective in governance and security; but it also limits how deeply public sup-

port can ultimately be reached.

Yet the US efforts have not significantly attempted to play on these vulner-

abilities with their messaging efforts. The US IO and PSYOP planners strug-

gled with crafting and processing an appropriate response, not only because of

bureaucratic red tape, but also because the quality of the message would not

have compared to that of the Taliban forces. It is highly unlikely that a large

part of the US IO or PSYOP forces would have an intimate grasp of Afghan

history or an understanding of the cultural nuances buried within references

to early rulers, in order to craft letters or poetry on a par with that of the

Taliban forces. In order to prepare work that resonates with a historically

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

aware population, message architects must have extensive and accurate cul-

tural intelligence and be fluent in the minutiae of Afghanistan’s history, poli-

tics, religion, society, and militant activity. Cultural intelligence is one aspect

that was much needed to lay the groundwork for an effective and powerful US

IO and PSYOP campaign.

There was a fundamental lack of cultural literacy among US military mem-

bers as a whole at the beginning of OEF-A. And, quite frankly, it has not

improved much since. Especially in the early stages of OEF-A, there were few

Afghanistan cultural and area “experts.” And until the US military’s Foreign

Area Officer (FAO) Program was expanded, there was little effort on an insti-

tutional scale to create a cadre of active duty military officers and enlisted

members who could master high-demand languages and cultural cognizance

and who could serve as capable message architects and advisors to construct

successful US messaging campaigns. In addition, the process of crafting truly

nuanced messages and stories proved to be impossibly demanding in this con-

text: the time crunch meant they were too rushed, and without a proper cul-

tural aptitude they failed to create clarity within the message and indirectly

sabotaged the campaign altogether. Finally, it took years after the start of

OEF-A for the Department of Defense to make the heavy investment needed

to create IO and PSYOP leaders who were culturally fluent, could speak

Pashto or Dari, master the political/social and historical aspects of

Afghanistan, and could make basic predictions of behavior that were accurate

and truthful. A lack of intelligence (cultural and operational) about the target

audience greatly hindered the OEF-A effort.

US messaging leaflets in Afghanistan31

Early IO efforts during OEF-A

The leaflet campaign conducted by Operation Enduring Freedom-

Afghanistan provides a useful case for comparing US messaging and IO strate-

gies with those of the Taliban. This section will examine cultural messaging

efforts used during the operation, especially during the early phases of OEF-

A. A general lack of cultural awareness and perspective, especially in the early

years of OEF-A, hindered the US IO campaign and created significant chal-

lenges for US PSYOP and IO personnel supporting the campaign. As we shall

see, leaflet messaging distributed throughout Afghanistan at the start of the

US invasion failed to resonate with the Afghan population and often resulted

in a muddied objective for military IO and PSYOP. And yet over 80 million

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

leaflets were dropped over Afghanistan from October 2001 until March

2002.32 Theoretically, that represents almost four leaflets per Afghan citizen!

The options for delivering messages depend on available means of transmis-

sion and other matters, including the target audience for the messaging.

Geographic barriers, linguistic diversity, and extremely low literacy rates chal-

lenged message architects during the run-up to OEF-A. This created a particu-

larly difficult challenge for cross-cultural communication. Messages would

have to be conveyed primarily through images on leaflets, simple written

phrases, or radio broadcasts. In order to convey behavior-generating commu-

niqués, message crafters would have to be particularly adept at employing

cultural symbols, frames, and recognition of behavior through still images. It

was believed that each part of the message delivery, from transmission to

reception, would have to be saturated with well-placed cultural imagery. In

order to prepare an effective leaflet campaign, OEF-A planners would have to

possess current and accurate cultural intelligence. In addition, a grasp of geo-

ethnic and linguistic distribution would be vital in order to get the right mes-

sage to the right group. The problem of low literacy rates and subsequent

watering down of OEF-A messaging would surface as a major problem for US

PSYOP planners when the Taliban responded with eloquent and culturally

indigenous night letters distributed to educated members of rural villages to

read to the illiterate members of the group.33

Putting the right message in the right place at the right time was a challenge

for IO and PSYOP campaigners. There were many cases of leaflets being

dropped into the wrong locations, which affected the resonance and impact

of PSYOP and IO efforts in the area. Moreover, there was little coordination

between the geographic targets and timing of maneuvers. Some Special Forces

(SF) teams reported complaints from rural Pashtuns as to why all the “litter”

was being dropped on their village and what it meant.34 Such Afghan senti-

ments clearly suggested that the US efforts were not persuasive and not having

their desired impact on the Afghan target audiences.

At the start of the conflict, there were few cultural advisors available to

preview leaflets, and close scrutiny by CENTCOM and Joint Special

Operations Task Force (JSOTF) created challenges to message architects.

Moreover, in the early stages of OEF-A there was limited US knowledge con-

cerning Afghan psyche and culture nuances.35 Most of the early data available

to US IO personnel on Afghan tribes, history, culture, and regional influence

came from books purchased prior to their deployment.

The hasty initial OEF-A IO and PSYOP campaigns were certainly detri-

mental to the overall goals of the war planners, primarily due to a failure in the

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cultural framing of the leaflet operation. The messages that OEF-A military

planners wanted to send were not overly difficult to incorporate into leaflets,

but the problem manifested itself primarily through a lack of effective cross-

cultural communication and inaccurate geographic targeting as well as lack of

knowledge as to how messages would be viewed and interpreted by the

Afghan target audiences. Military operations began on 7 October 2001, but

leaflets were not dropped until 15 October because of high winds.

The first leaflets of the campaign were dropped to prepare the Afghan

population for an impending US military invasion. Planners wanted to create

a message that told Afghans what to do when US forces arrived, how to avoid

harm during the bombing raids, and not to stand under food drops.36 Other

messages targeting the Taliban and co-located al-Qaeda operatives were

dropped without pre-testing and geographic coordination. The failure to

coordinate leaflet drops with military maneuvers became counterproductive

as the conflict wore on. Although the initial “blind” leaflet drops could have

had a limited effect on the Taliban, the progressive campaign began to run in

cross-purpose to the action on the ground.37

Time was not just a factor in the lead-up to OEF-A, but also hampered IO

and PSYOP efforts on the ground during the conflict. There were problems in

the product approval cycle between the JSOTF and the IO and PSYOP plan-

ners on the ground. When the PSYOP cadre prepared campaigns that needed

to be distributed quickly, either in response to a Taliban information operation

or in reaction to a US military maneuver, the “request–approval–delivery cycle”

did not even meet deliberate planning requirements.38 There was a distinct lag

on the part of the JSOTF to respond to tactical needs in the field.

Inadequate message crafting and the failure to grasp the nuances or, in many

cases, even the basics of Afghanistan’s culture became a major and significant

problem for the military and civilian IO and PSYOP:

Delivered as aerial leaflets (carpet bombing), [the leaflets] were recovered by local

Afghans, a great many of whom could not read. Often, the leaflets were presented

to the most educated local villager for interpretation, who would render a judg-

ment of the “rewards” and “threats” as stupid, and regarded them as an insulting

level of literature. The villagers, esteeming the educated villager, generally adopted

his interpretation and attitude. Westerners tend to be condescending toward non-

literature-based cultures. Cultures that do not primarily rely on written words often

compensate with poetry as a memory tool to retain narratives …[they] also inter-

preted the Western style of directness as flat, lacking social elegance and intellect.

Regardless, they were the intended audience, and our messages fell flat.39

The level of cultural intelligence prior to and even during the initial cam-

paign fell short of adequate and could not compete with the Taliban informa-

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tion campaign which made use of its indigenous grasp of local, provincial, and

national themes to render their messages more powerful to their audience. In

contrast to the elementary and cartoonish OEF-A IO campaign, the Taliban

IO operation was a strategic and effective effort to craft poetic diatribes that

appealed to the moral reasoning of Afghan villagers. The messages were

viewed as eloquent, impressive, and were subsequently more effective than the

US IO campaign.40

A major problem with the initial OEF-A leaflet campaign, as suggested

above, was a failure to absorb accurate and timely cultural intelligence. But

there where other significant problems: for example, there was a milieu of

expatriates and Afghan urban elite, especially Kabulis, serving as informal

advisors to IO campaign41 who had not lived in Afghanistan since the Soviet

invasion in 1979. Moreover, the targets for the bulk of this early IO campaign

were the rural Pashtun population or supporters of the Taliban and al-Qaeda,

and most of these Afghan expatriates had never been exposed to or had little

knowledge of this target population.

Additional problems involved the lack of pre-testing leaflet messages that

might inform relevant personnel as to messages probably failure or success. This

resulted in many of the messages being deployed that not only failed to resonate

with the target audience but, in some instance actually alienated or insulted the

target audience. There were also no formal feedback mechanisms or “measures

on merit” available to assess the success or failure of a particular message.

Early phases of OEF-A leaflets

A critical analysis of the initial OEF-A leaflet campaign exposes the key prob-

lem with the initial IO and PSYOP campaigns: the lack of knowledge con-

cerning Afghanistan’s people, society, and culture. It is important to note that

not all the leaflets dropped during the beginning phases of OEF-A were cul-

turally insensitive or insufficient; but most were, and a sample of these leaflets

demonstrates the US’s poor cross-cultural communication. The most glaring

factor, which hinders most cross-cultural dialogues, is that each communica-

tor assumes that the other looks at the world exactly as he or she does.42 That

is, while a message might make perfect sense to an American writing it, this

surely does not guarantee that the Afghan receipent will understand it at al .

It ultimately comes done to the point made in Chapter 1, that a person’s per-

spective will be intimately tied to the narrative that drives how they view and

interact with their environment and the stories that make sense to them.

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Figure 10.1: Partnership leaflet43

If the objective of the IO and PSYOP campaign is to induce or create

behavior, then the message should resonate culturally and communicate some

type of instruction to the recipient. The following samples of leaflets were

dropped in the initial OEF-A leaflet campaign and provide examples of suc-

cessful or unsuccessful cultural messaging.

Figure 10.1 shows one of the first leaflets dropped during OEF-A, leaflet

AFD10c, “Partnership.” The front of the message in Pashto and Dari reads,

“The partnership of nations is here to help,” while the back of the leaflet reads,

“The partnership of nations is here to assist the people of Afghanistan.” The

leaflet has an image of what appears to be a Coalition soldier shaking hands

with an Afghan male.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.2: Peace and partnership leaflet44

This is an example of an effective and somewhat neutral leaflet. There is no

specific behavior implied, only that the placement of the Coalition male in an

equal stance with the Afghan male as well as shaking hands creates the impres-

sion of a man-to-man bond between the two. The Afghan male garb is com-

parable to that which is found in parts of some rural Afghan provinces (a wool

pakul hat that is quite popular in Afghanistan), and the message is a fairly

simple one. The perception shaping strategy for this leaflet was simply to cre-

ate awareness and a sense of partnership between Coalition forces and the

Afghan population. An important aspect of this IO artifact is that it com-

municates the message visually: the message is clear from the image, regardless

of text.

Figure 10.2 shows a leaflet with text that translates as “A united Afghanistan

offers peace and prosperity.” This leaflet is an example of poor and even con-

fusing cultural messaging. Copies of these leaflets were brought to Coalition

forces by Afghans thinking that the dove was a type of chicken and that the

leaflet was a coupon that entitled them to a free bird from the “Partnership

of nations.”45 The symbol of the dove and olive branch originates from a

Biblical story of Noah and the ark and does not resonate with a large part of

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

the Afghan population. Although the dove and olive branch are widely

understood in the Arab Middle East as a symbol of peace, this is primarily

because of the history of interaction with the Christian minority.

Afghanistan has been overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim for centuries, and has

had no exposure to Christianity to relate the picture of the dove with the

concept of peace. The other problem with the leaflet is that the Afghanistan

flag in the backdrop has horizontal stripes, whereas the official flag has verti-

cal stripes. A crucial mistake such as this makes one doubt the amount of

basic research in preparing the leaflet. This was not the only instance when

the Afghan flag was depicted incorrectly, as will be seen below. There were at

least two other instances where a similar error was reproduced. Although

some Afghans may not have noticed the error, it is evident that any prepara-

tion and research done for this leaflet fell short. But most importantly, the

images have no cultural meaning for the audience.

Figure 10.3: Mullah Omar as a dog and bin Laden playing chess with Afghanistan,

#AFD-51c46

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.5 is a leaflet depicting Osama bin Laden in traditional Arab

clothing holding a chained leash attached to a dog with Mul ah Omar’s head.

The message on the front of the leaflet reads, “Who really runs the Taliban?”

The back of the leaflet depicts bin Laden playing chess on a board representing

Afghanistan and moving chess pieces with heads of Mul ah Omar. The text

reads, “Expel the foreign rulers and live in peace.” There are several aspects

culturally problematic with this leaflet. First, the fact that there is a dog in the

picture fosters a nearly inaccessible attitude among many Afghans. Dogs are

considered unclean by most Afghans, and depicting one near any Muslim is

an insult to Islam. When one Afghan calls another a “spay” or dog in Pashto,

it means a fight is soon to follow. The fact that the dog’s foot is resting on the

outline of Afghanistan sends an even more culturally insensitive message

about how the Coalition forces see Afghanistan. The vast majority of rural

Afghans have absolutely no knowledge of the geographical shape of

Afghanistan. Gilles Dorronsoro, author of Revolution Unending, opines that

this leaflet was definitely ambiguous when distributed by non-Muslim forces.47

The back of the leaflet is not offensive, but appears culturally irrelevant. The

Taliban banned chess during their rule, and although educated Afghans may

know how to play and enjoy the game, the more rural population would not

be familiar with the concept or follow the meaning of the leaflet. This side of

the leaflet does not send a message effectively, and appears for the most part

culturally misinformed. There is not any particular behavior being encouraged

by the document, but the intention was of perception management strategy

in persuading the Afghan people that Arab foreigners are controlling the

Figure 10.4: American family and Afghan family48

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Taliban. The cultural message from this leaflet is strategically ineffective and

possibly offensive.

Figure 10.4 depicts an Afghan family and an American family with the

caption “Friendship.” A total of 2,540,000 copies of this leaflet were dissemi-

nated throughout Afghanistan until September 2002.49

This leaflet is a regrettable example of cross-cultural miscommunication

and a counterproductive IO story. There are various significant problems with

it. First, the Afghan family depicted in the photo does not appear to be

Pashtun, the key center of gravity of the Afghan conflict, to use a

Clausewitzian term.50 The second and most damning problem with the leaflet

is that the vast majority of Afghan families would never take a photo of their

female members’ uncovered faces and show it to strangers. While such a leaflet

makes “perfect sense” to Americans, sharing a picture of a wife or daughter

would be an extremely dishonorable act for any rural Afghan, especially

Pashtun. As explained in Chapter 2, it would be inconceivable for an Afghan

to show a picture of a female family member, because this would ultimately be

a violation of an Afghan’s honor ( namus), pride, and esteem ( ghariat). As

demonstrated throughout this book, for an Afghan man to maintain his

honor as defined by Pashtunwali correlates directly with his ability to protect/

control his zan (women of his family).51 One possible cultural message seem-

ingly conveyed to an Afghan receiving this leaflet is that you and your family

should become like the American family. This creates the possibility of a mis-

perception by the Afghan population that Coalition forces are in Afghanistan

Figure 10.5: World Trade Center leaflet AFD 18952

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

to unveil Afghan women (many of whom who live in a state of purda) and

make everyone look like Americans. This is regrettably a culturally ineffective

message; in fact, the evidence is that this leaflet and its message were counter-

productive: it did much more harm than good.

Finally, as mentioned before, the leaflet originators are displaying their

ignorance of the Afghan flag: the stripes should be vertical with a gold crest

in the center. A new leaflet was eventually issued with the correct flag design,

but not before millions of these embarrassing leaflets had been dropped into

Afghanistan. To have such an IO artifact deployed without accuracy checks

by people with knowledge of Afghan culture highlights one of the central

problems the US faced with its intial IO campaign in Afghanistan. That is, the

US IO and PSYOP personnel had not taken time to learn about Afghan cul-

ture and what would resonate with the Afghan people.

Figure 10.5 is another example of an IO leaflet that may make sense to the

average American, but means virtually nothing to most Afghans. This leaflet

depicts the destruction of the World Trade Center and reads, “20 September

1380 (Persian Calendar). World Trade Center. The Coalition Forces came to

arrest those responsible for the terrorism against America. They also come to

arrest anyone that protects them. More than 3,000 people in the United States

of America were murdered in these attacks.”53 The major problem with this

leaflet is in the selection of the visual image: first, it is a rather abstract depic-

tion of the horrors of that day; and second, most Afghans have never seen a

skyscraper or could even understand its concept. How can they decipher a

billowing red flame as an attack on someone else’s 110-storey building?

Moreover, as noted above, polls in Afghanistan suggest that very few Afghans

had any knowledge of the 9/11 attacks and what they meant.54 Hence this

leaflet, which had the critical objective of trying to explain why the US and

NATO invaded Afghanistan, could never hope to convey the rationale for the

invasion in one rather indecipherable image.

Figure 10.6 depicts four men, three of which are identified and one that is

not. The front of the leaflet says, “The Taliban’s reign of fear” and continues

on the back, “…is about to end.” The men have writing on their head coverings

identifying them, although the fourth is an unknown Taliban male. The man

on the left, identified as [Mullah] Mutawakkil, was working with the US

forces and served as the Taliban’s foreign minister. As suggested by Gopal,

“Maiwand native Mul ah Mutawakkil … [s]urrender[ed] to US forces, making

him one of the highest-ranking Talibs in American custody. In fact,

Mutawakkil’s defection was only the latest in a rush of Taliban officials look-

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Figures 10.6: Front of leaflet, depicting Mutawakkil, bin Laden, Haqqani and

unknown Taliban male, AFD 5655 Back of leaflet, depicting the same men with faces

of death

ing to switch allegiances.”56 He had been identified by bin Laden as an enemy,

and picturing him in a leaflet as a target showed the lack of research conducted

about Mutawakkil and his position within the al-Qaeda/Taliban network.57

It was probably a mistake to identify someone working with the US as a target

for destruction and apparently an enemy of bin Laden.58 It appeared as though

the US were doing bin Laden a favor by targeting Mutawakkil for death.

The leaflet includes a fourth man with no identification, which would con-

fuse Afghans who could not know who he was. The black turban is often worn

by Taliban, but not in all cases. So any Afghan male wearing a black turban

who was not Taliban might expect from this message that he could be tar-

geted for killing.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

While urban Afghans with televisions might be able to recognize one or

two of the faces depicted on the leaflet, most rural Afghans, especially those

who could not read the leaflet’s written message, would not recognize them.

Moreover, the choice to show the four men’s skulls on the back of the leaflet

is bound to cause ambiguities. Some Afghans believe in mystical jinns who

have “fiery bodies [and] are intelligent and imperceptible” and are able to

appear in various shapes and colors.59 And maybe the developers of this IO

leaflet should have been aware of this possible cultural interpretation when

they made their assumptions of what a particular visual image would signify

to their intended audience.

Figure 10.7: Eid wishes and dates, a common food used to break the Ramadan fast,

AFD8960

Figure 10.7 is the last leaflet from the early phases of OEF-A that we will

present and analyze. This leaflet, unlike most of the previous leaflets assessed,

is actually an example of a positive and effective cultural message. The leaflet

states, “Noble people of Afghanistan, Eid Mubarak,61 We wish that God will

accept your prayers and fast. Have a blessed holiday. People of America.” Dates

are a common food used to break a Ramadan fast, and passing Eid wishes to

Muslims throughout Afghanistan is a positive message indicating that

Americans celebrate with Afghans and respect the religious traditions of

Islam. Dates were also air-dropped with the leaflets, to accentuate the well

wishes delivered with the document—a very creative IO tactic,62 because

although common in Afghanistan, dates are still a luxury item. The only trou-

ble was that many rumors ran through Afghanistan that “everything

Americans touched or ate was cooked in pork fat,” which is forbidden by

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Islam;63 so if indeed the dates were “tainted by pork,” they could not be eaten

and might actually be haram (“unlawful”).

While we only evaluated a small sample of the many IO leaflets used in the

early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, the leaflets assessed are fairly

representative of the ones created and deployed.64 The assessment of these IO

artifacts suggests a number of points that must have contributed to the relative

failure of this PSYOP and IO campaign. First, there appeared to be a funda-

mental lack of Afghan cultural literacy in the PSYOP and IO teams, as well as

among military members as a whole. During the early phases of OEF-A, there

were few cultural and area “experts” within the American military to be

deployed with US operational units in Afghanistan. During the years 2001–4

there was relatively little effort on an institutional scale to train up a cadre of

active duty military officers and enlisted members who could master appropri-

ate languages and cultural cognizance to write and design successful messag-

ing campaigns. In addition, the process for targeting hearts and minds to win

the trust and confidence of the Afghan people revealed itself to be strategically

shallow and culturally illiterate. Through shortage of time, message architects

without the appropriate cultural training will not understand how to frame a

succienct visual and textual document and thereby will indirectly sabotage the

campaign altogether. It is evident that a lack of intelligence (cultural and

operational) about the target audience hindered the early IO and PSYOP

effort in OEF-A.65 In summary, the initial leaflet campaign of OEF-A was

relatively unsuccessful at delivering informative and directive messages, much

less messages that were effectively persuasive.

Later phases of OEF-A leaflets and other IO artifacts

During 2008, the United States turned to counter-insurgency (COIN) as

their central tactic and objective in Afghanistan. Theoretically and consistent

with US doctrine,66 this new focus on COIN had significant implications for

the US IO and PSYOP campaign, because information operations is theoreti-

cally considered as the key COIN “component” tying together the “three

pillars of the COIN Framework: security, politics, and economics.”67 In 2009,

President Obama ordered a surge of US military forces into Afghanistan in

order to accomplish those counter-insurgency objectives. US and Coalition

forces in Afghanistan at this time were under the command of General Stanley

McChrystal. McChrystal tendered his resignation on 23 June 2010, two days

before a controversial article on his leadership and policies was published in

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

the magazine, Rolling Stone.68 He was replaced by General David Petreaus,

who in August 2010 issued his guidance for US counter-insurgency opera-

tions in Afghanistan, including the following two directives:69

Be first with the truth. Beat the insurgents and malign actors to the headlines.

Preempt rumors. Get information to the chain of command, to Afghan leaders, to

the people, and to the press as soon as possible. Integrity is critical to this fight.

Avoid spinning, and don’t try to “dress up” an ugly situation. Acknowledge setbacks

and failures, including civilian casualties, and then state how we’ll respond and

what we’ve learned.

Fight the information war aggressively. Challenge disinformation. Turn our ene-

mies’ extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against

them. Hang their barbaric actions like millstones around their necks.

The author was fortunate to receive the 345th TPS (A) “Product Book” for

2009 and other IO work products that can be utilized to assess US IO and

PSYOP during the height of the US COIN tactical approach in Afghanistan.70

The assessment of IO and PSYOP artifacts deployed during 2009–10 is

important for our analysis and comparison of US IO and Taliban IO for a

number of reasons. First, referring back to the definition offered above that a

counter-insurgency is basically an information war supported by military

kinetics, the assessment of IO and PSYOP during this time period will tell us

a lot about the overall success or failure of the US COIN tactics in

Afghanistan in general. Second, after the early phases of OEF-A, it was

assumed that PSYOP and IO efforts would gradually improve after years of

producing ineffective and, in many cases, counterproductive products. Indeed,

our preliminary examination of the PSYOP Product Book suggested that the

authors of the product book had made significant efforts to generate well-

crafted and colorful leaflets; however, most of the products were, in our opin-

ion, created with little attention to Afghan cultural nuances, just as we saw

above. For example, Afghans are generally practical and pragmatic people and

have a tendency to pay less attention to complex and wordy messages.71 If a

banner in a village or an US IO artifact presents a picture of road-building and

a message that says, “This is what the Government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan (GIRoA) does for you,” there should be explicit “ground evi-

dence” of roads being built in that area. In the absence of such, people will

hardly believe the “blank promises,” especially after nine or ten years of US

occupation of Afghanistan.

The first observation concerning this PSYOP Product Book is the fact that the

vast majority of the PSYOP and IO products appear not to be aimed at “persua-

sion” but rather “instruction” or the presentation of “information.” This is an

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

important finding that may suggest that US PSYOP and IO personnel had

learned by 2009 that they, quite frankly, were not very adept at producing and

deploying artifacts aimed at persuading the Afghan population or the Taliban

to take certain actions. Very few of these messages “[hung the Taliban’s barbaric]

actions like millstones around their necks,” as directed by General Petraeus’

guidance for US counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.

Table 10.1: 345th TPS (A) “Product Book” objectives

PSYOP objective

Number of

PSYOP/IO

artifacts

A: Increase support for Coalition partners

2

B: Decrease interference with CP (Command Post) operations

11

C: Increase support for GIRoA

26

D: Increase support for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

45

E: Decrease support for insurgents

28

F: Increase support for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)72

35

H: Decrease insurgent activity

27

I: Increase support and participation in education system

17

J: Decrease incidents involving explosive devices

34

K: Increase safety and hygiene practices

19

Table 10.1 presents the explicit PSYOP and IO objectives presented in the

PSYOP Product Book and the frequency of messages portraying each objec-

tive. We assume that the number of artifacts is an indicator of the priority of

the particular objective; hence, the highest number being for the objective of

increasing public support for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),

reflecting the priority of “Afghanization” of the war.

The next most “important” PSYOP and IO objective according to the

metric emanating from Table 10.1 is decreasing the incidents of explosive

devices. The years 2009 and 2010 saw a dramatic increase in IED fatalities in

Afghanistan (see Figure 10.8). This increase in IED fatalities compounded by

the public’s growing disapproval of the war in Afghanistan73 made it contin-

gent that the US counteract the growing IED threat. For a COIN strategy to

succeed, it is critical to have public support behind it. History has clearly

shown that once the public loses confidence in the war effort, the probability

of failure looms large.74 And the American public since at least the Vietnam

war has had little patience for increasing US casualties in a foreign war.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.8: IED fatalities, 2001–1175

Afghanistan IED Fatality Trends 2001–2011

400

372

350

300

280

250

250

200

169

150

100

91

58

50

0

0

9

7

14

21

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Fatalities

The leaflets and other products assessed below will, where relevant, be

related to the associated PSYOP and IO objective from Table 10.1.

A: Increase support for Coalition partners

The leaflet shown in Figure 10.9 is yet another PSYOP product that was not

well conceived. This leaflet shows an Afghan male dressed in usual attire—a

Figure 10.9: Hostilities will not be tolerated, AF09A02aaLF156976

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Figure 10.10: Report illegal weapons, AF09B02aaBB1063

shalwar kameez and woollen hat, or pakol—in the cross hairs of a weapon. While

the man is wearing a bandolier and carrying automatic machine gun, this is also

not uncommon in rural Afghanistan. There is nothing explicitly presented that

suggests that this person is a Taliban or other insurgent/jihadist. The picture

depicts a scene that is not necessarily threatening or hostile to the average rural

Afghan. Even the person in the forefront using binoculars is not overly rare or

unusual. Hence, the visual could be interpreted, based on the visual alone, as a

threat to an average, rural Afghan. Moreover, the leaflet’s message, “hostilities

will not be tolerated,” is very vague. What and whose hostilities are being refer-

enced, when an invading force is by definition bringing hostilities? This is yet

another example of a leaflet that had some purpose for the person who origi-

nated it, but the combination of selected image and pared down text creates too

many ambiguities. Finally it is not at all clear how this leaflet supports the

PSYOP objective of “increasing support for Coalition partners.”

B: Decrease interference with CP (Command Post) operations

Figure 10.10 would make perfect sense to a literate Afghan, but relies too

much on the text for an illiterate receiver of the leaflet. Had it been specifically

designed to target urban, literate Afghans it could serve as a fairly useful mes-

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.11: Working for the future of Afghanistan, AF09B02aaHB 1069

sage; but in rural areas, where the literacy rate is low, it would not have suffi-

cient impact because the meaning of the message is not completely clear from

the visual alone. The text gives the options of speaking to an elder, as illus-

trated in the photo; or cal ing a Tipline, which most Afghans would feel more

comfortable with, for security reasons, when conveying information about

dangerous issues such as IEDs or weapons caches. So arguably the visual

should have illustrated the second option.77

C: Increase support for GIRoA

The leaflet shown in Figure 10.11 straightforwardly presents the objective

intended, but with no “story” at all. The static image gives no pictorial evi-

dence of the message. The causes of Afghans’ current political frustrations are

the massive corruption associated with the Kabul government and Afghan

urban elite, the lack of security experienced by most Afghans on a daily basis,

the lack of a creditable justice system, the relative absence of good, long-term

jobs, the fact that many Afghans view the Kabul government as a puppet of

the occupying power (the US), and many other reasons.78 Hence, the official-

looking message probably fell on deaf ears: actions obviously speak much

louder than words, and most rural Afghans have not experienced a significant

improvement in their daily lives or standard of living. But these facts do not

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

exclusively apply to rural Afghans. Consider, for example, that Kandahar, the

second largest city in Afghanistan, after thirteen years of American occupa-

tion (2001–14) and billions of dol ars spent, still has only sporadic electric-

ity.79 Moreover, traditionally, local governments are much more important

and have a greater impact on the average Afghan than the “central” govern-

ment in Kabul. The majority of rural Afghans have never had much faith in,

or understanding of, the central government in Kabul. Finally, “most Afghans

feel increasingly frustrated with the term ‘future’.”80 They are much more inter-

ested in day-to-day survival for themselves and their families. Finally, the leaf-

let’s message is a very general statement that makes no specific promises. I

would argue that this leaflet does not follow General Petraeus’ instructions to

“avoid spinning, and don’t try to ‘dress up’ an ugly situation.” This message

should have been expanded with more explicit promises, e.g. “The

Government of Afghanistan and its local government partners are working to

answer your needs and improve your prosperity.”

D: Increase support for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

Figure 10.12 shows a leaflet that is purely instructional and warns Afghan

drivers to “approach the checkpoint slowly and stop when told.” While the

text of the leaflet is self-explanatory to those who can read, the image is con-

Figure 10.12: Transport control protocols, AF09B02aaHB1495

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.13: Billboard, AF09C01aaBB 1070

fusing and does not illustrate the text. The picture shows a car with an open

trunk and open door while the message instructs the driver to drive slowly to

the checkpoint. These types of errors that could easily be fixed with a better

understanding of the importance of visual literacy do not give one confidence

in the US PSYOP instructional campaign.

F: Increase support for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

Figure 10.13 shows a PSYOP billboard that was deployed throughout pro-

government areas of Afghanistan. Billboards, especially in the later phases of

the US occupation of Afghanistan, became a popular PSYOP/IO messaging

technique:

The US military currently assists the Afghan government in constructing billboards

aimed at undermining support to the insurgency… Billboards are a rarity in

Afghanistan and receive special notice. The primary weakness of this method of

dissemination is that billboards must be constructed in pro-Afghan government

areas where the population is already sympathetic to the message … from anecdotal

evidence presented by PSYOP personnel, it seems that billboards reinforce the

anti-Taliban sentiments of those who are already anti-Taliban and are ineffective in

swaying pro-Taliban sectors, as they are seen simply as government propaganda on

a big platform. Another possibility to consider is the effectiveness of billboards in

areas where the Taliban has established a shadow government. In such cases, they

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

would probably serve to underscore the local’s view of the government’s self-delu-

sion and inefficacy.81

The actual effectiveness of billboard messages has not been systematically

studied. The billboard message presented in Figure 10.13 is primarily infor-

mational; it is not a persuasive message. It gives a rather rather prosaic state-

ment that, “The Afghan National Army is protecting the citizens of

Afghanistan.” Part of the purpose might have been to counteract the fact that

while the ANA is professional, its units’ effectiveness are actually very une-

ven.82 But the other part of the purpose was presumably to convey “protec-

tion”, whereas the images of the two soldiers suggest hostility rather than

protection of citizenry.83 The choice of background pictures should have

conveyed this dual message more effectively.84

Figure 10.14 is a leaflet aimed at educating the Afghan people concerning

Article Twenty-Four of the Afghan Constitution, reproduced identically on

both the front and back of the leaflet. Although the goal may be laudable, its

practicality is questionable. As we have seen time and again with US PSYOP

leaflets, the message is wordy and difficult for rural people to understand.

Indeed, the interpretation and application of this constitutional article are

difficult for any educated person to grasp completely. But most importantly,

the majority of the Afghan population is more interested in the practicalities

of their livelihood than in the Constitution’s position on “liberty.”

Figure 10.15 portrays an anti-opium poppy message and involves a very

complex and controversial topic:

‘The opium economy of Afghanistan is an intensely complex phenomenon. In the

past, it reached deeply into the political structure, civil society and economy of the

country. Spawned after decades of civil and military strife, it has chained a poor

rural population—farmers, landless labour, small traders, women and children—to

the mercy of domestic warlords and international crime syndicates that continue

to dominate several areas in the south, north and east of the country. Dismantling

the opium economy will be a long and complex process. It cannot simply be done by

military or authoritarian means. That has been tried in the past, and was unsustain-

able. It must be done with the instruments of democracy, the rule of law, and

development.’85

This is clearly a very contentious issue for the US to address in their PSYOP

campaign because, as suggested in the quote above, Afghan peasant farmers

have long cultivated opium for agronomic advantages and to support their

family. It is estimated that Afghan farmers who grow opium make four times

their former income.86 While there is absolutely no argument concerning the

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.14: The Constitution of Afghanistan, AF09C08aaHB 1075

250

THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Figure 10.15: Poppy eradication, AF09C09hhHB1487

251

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.16: ANA continues to defeat Taliban

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

disastrous effects that opium and heroin have on people’s lives87 and that the

Taliban’s taxes on opium production as well as trafficking increase their finan-

cial resources, opium cultivation is absolutely critical to hundreds of thou-

sands of Afghan rural families’ livelihood and existence. In fact, one the

biggest concerns among rural Kandaharis interviewed in 2009 was the possi-

bility of the eradication of their crops.88 Hence, the leaflet’s message presented

in Figure 10.15 is not only extremely controversial and possibly counterpro-

ductive, it is also threatening, “The Islamic Government of Afghanistan will

not tolerate the growing of Poppy…We will destroy your field.” Afghan opium

will not be eradicated by threatening people through IO messages. The tone

of this message scarcely differs from many of the Taliban and other Afghan

insurgents’ intimidation campaigns, which have the effect of threatening and

terrorizing the Afghan people.

E: Decrease support for insurgents

Figure 10.16 also has a title, not shown here, saying “Leave behind TB

[Taliban] captured or killed.” The front of the leaflet shows ANA soldiers

firing at the Taliban with the message, the “ANA continues to defeat the

Taliban.” The back of the leaflet presents a lengthy message asking for Afghan

villages to support the ANA fight against the Taliban, and includes an “apol-

ogy” to the Afghan villagers if they were “frightened” by ANA actions against

the Taliban.

The leaflet has several purposes. The request in the title that the Taliban

leave their dead and fallen behind is a powerful message, especially consider-

ing Islamic burial traditions; and there is no reason given why this will support

the declared purpose of “decreasing support for insurgents.”

One question about the text superimposed on the front photo is whether

it is a reflection of reality or else “spin,” to use the term that General Petreaus’

COIN guidance warns against.89 In 2009–10, the Afghan National Army did

not have a string of victories against the Taliban. In fact, during this period

they rarely, if ever, played a forward role in fighting with the Taliban, and

achieved few victories over the Taliban; that role was reserved for US or

NATO forces, with the ANA serving as back-up force. A RAND study pub-

lished during the relevant time period suggested:

Evidence of operational proficiency is largely anecdotal, although there are some

quantitative indicators. Numerous anecdotes attest to the operational capability of

the ANA units. Quantitative ratings present a more restrained endorsement—for

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.17: Afghan National Police, AF09D02aaHB 1101

example, only seven of 42 infantry kandaks (17 per cent) have reached CM 1 [abil-

ity to operate totally independently]. Although progress is apparent, the ANA still

has a long way to go.90

The back of the the leaflet (Figure 16) is an extremely wordy message that

would only have a chance of being effective with literate Afghans. One inter-

esting aspect of the message is that it refers to the ANA as “Mujahidin” (an

254

THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Arabic term meaning one who is engaged in jihad). The ANA implicitly

describing their mission as a jihad has the potential of being ridiculed by the

audience of the leaflet, because at the time the leaflet was deployed the ANA

had not proven itself to be visibly effective or capable of confronting the

Taliban without the support of foreign forces. This was a fact recognized by

most Afghans. Moreover, jihad has a very specific meaning for Afghans and it

is hard to argue that the ANA was actually involved in a “jihad”.91

Figure 10.17 has a fairly simple and straightforward message: “[The]

Afghan National Police serve and protect the people of the Government of

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” The back of the leaflet suggest how to

join the ANP.

The problem with this leaflet is again one of spin versus reality. Does the

leaflet portray a reality that can be believed by the leaflet’s Afghan target audi-

ence? Specifically, many Afghans view the ANP as an extremely corrupt and

“extractive” organization. A US Institute of Peace “Special Report” published

in 2009 (the same year as this leaflet was deployed) described the ANA as:

riddled with corruption and generally unable to protect Afghan citizens, control

crime, or deal with the growing insurgency… Beyond funding the Taliban, the

explosion in Afghan narcotics production fueled widespread corruption in the

Afghan government and police. Drug abuse by police officers became increasingly

common as did other forms of criminal behavior.92

A variety of tribal leaders interviewed in Kandahar in 2008 and 2009 vali-

dated the USIP Special Report’s findings concerning the ANP when they

suggested that:

•  They saw little difference between the conduct of ANP and Taliban in

regards to extortion; some cited the ANP as being worse than the warlords

of 1990s.

•  The local ANP units continued to be viewed negatively by local residents

and communities. Although some measures have purged violent and abu-

sive officers, problems remain. Accusations of robbery, extortion, rape, drug

trafficking, abductions and bribery were rampant.93

Whether or not these accusations could all be substantiated is in this con-

text irrelevant; the perception among the locals was that the ANP were extrac-

tive predators, and in some cases the Taliban had exploited these grievances

and bolstered their manpower and expanded recruitment efforts. Kandahari

tribal leaders also suggested that serious consideration should have been given

to the idea that ANA units should take the lead in protecting Kandahar City

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.18: Poster: The Taliban are cowards, AF09E02aaPS 1269

and other vital/critical areas. Although not all Kandaharis viewed the ANA

positively, far more communities had pleasant experiences and respectful

exchanges with ANA units when compared to the ANP, according to the

leaders interviewed. The ANA had a reputation for fairness, respecting

women, and resisting bribes.94

It is clearly difficult to produce and deploy a PSYOP or IO artifact asking

for public support, much less recruiting, for an institution that is viewed as

corrupt and held in disdain by the majority of a targeted audience. If it was

even one of the most “hated” organizations in many areas of Afghanistan, then

the “aspirational” purposes of the leaflet were maybe a step too far.

E/H: Decrease support for insurgents and their activities

Figure 10.18 is a PSYOP poster with the text: “The Taliban are cowards. They

look and fight like women.” And below, “The Taliban hide like women.”

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

While there have been rumors of Taliban fighters being caught trying to

travel clandestinely dressed in burqas, the authenticity of these rumors has been

challenged, especially such images being posted on social media.95 However,

those who challenged these rumors were Pakistani media sources, and it is no

secret that the Pakistani military and especially its Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI) directorate have supported, protected, and given refuge to the Afghan

Taliban for decades.96 This would suggest that the Pakistani media’s attitude to

the Taliban has to be questioned. The ISI have been accused of attempting to

influence certain Pakistani media outlets and journalists, especially concerning

issues of the Afghan Taliban and state-sponsored terrorism.97

The design of the poster in Figure 10.18 is cartoonish in style; but to those

unused to graphic images, the sequence of action could be confusing. For a

start, a Pashtun Afghan man seen dressing as a woman would seem devastating

and a direct assault on Pashtunwali, bringing great shame ( sharam) to the

man’s honor ( nang), and extremely negative to his bravery and courage

( ghairat).98 But there is an additional implied slight on women as well: the

poster suggests that Taliban are not actually very good fighters—they are as

cowardly as women. So the audience should not respect their supposed brav-

ery in the field. And a further accusation: they hide in a cowardly fashion, so

the women’s dress is synonymous with lack of courage.

Overal , the poster appears to be delivering a double negative of meaning.

The Taliban are cowardly fighters; in fact so cowardly that they can be com-

pared to women; and then they escape in the guise of women. This seems

hardly the finest way to make a case against the insurgent Taliban.

Finally, Figure 10.19 has a similar objective but an opposite message: it

derides the Taliban for their brutality, rather than their cowardice.

Part of this leaflet was originally designed by the author during the initial

phase of OEF-A, and was discussed in the Preface of this book. The front of the

leaflet carries the message, “The Taliban were annoying and beating with cables

and whips. Do you want to receive the same fate or destiny?” While the picture

seems self-evident, the message (at least in this English version) seems poorly

worded. Is beating from the Taliban merely “annoying”? And why is the initial

sentence in the past tense? Are the Taliban no longer practising such beatings?

And if they are not, how will one experience this fate or destiny? Even allowing

for mistranslations between the original text and this English version, the tex-

tual message is not as incisive as the image—a lost opportunity.

The back of the leaflet is a much better IO instrument, as the sequence of

brutal images tell a powerful story; they are photos, suggesting authenticity;

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Figure 10.19: Counter Taliban, AF09E01abHB1396

and the text is purely ancillary for anyone without a command of written

language. The interrogative style draws in the reader to find answers. How can

beating a person because of the length of his beard, or whipping a father or

mother be Islamic? Also, the statements are personalized, referring to my

father or mother.

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Summary of US Afghan PSYOP and IO campaign in later phases of OEF-A

A critical analysis of the OEF-A leaflet campaign exposes a major shortfall in

cultural awareness among leaflet preparers. It is important to say that not all

the leaflets dropped during OEF-A were culturally deficient; however, a sig-

nificant number ignored Afghan cultural nuances and thus demonstrated

poor cross-cultural communication by US PSYOP and IO campaigns.

As noted, the US PSYOP and IO operations included artifacts other than

leaflets, billboards, and posters: for example, radio broadcasts. Yet leaflets,

billboards, and posters were the PSYOP/IO instruments that Afghans have

seen most commonly over the course of the war. The radio messaging that we

have heard seems more nuanced and effective than some other US PSYOP

products; but even here the messages became problematic when the US

attempted to address issues involving Islam or the Taliban’s version of Islam,

which many of them did. The US has little credibility in addressing these

issues and many of the radio messages we have heard confirmed this.99 The

United States’ inability to address issues of Islam has basically meant, as sug-

gested above, that the US has had to concede a major portion of the IO and

PSYOP battle space because this is an area, especially issues concerning the

jihad, which is a primary focus of Taliban IO. And of course this is an issue

not just of messaging; it is symptomatic of the US’s struggle to justify their

presence within this alien culture.

An IO or PSYOP campaign that relies heavily on leaflets, posters, or bill-

boards suffers from the fact that it is geographically demanding to distribute

them across the entire country, as the US did during the early phases of the

war and also in later phases but not with the same frequency. Such instru-

ments should be region-specific, reflecting the culture and lifestyle of that

region, because Afghanistan is so culturally diverse. What works in one area,

district, village or even valley will not necessarily work in an adjoining one. In

fact, an IO artifact that may be effective in one area might be counterproduc-

tive in another because of ethno-linguistic, political, social, or other dynamics.

For instance, some of the PSYOP and IO artifacts that we saw deployed in

southern Afghanistan used photos or illustrations from the eastern regions of

the country; it was evident that the people portrayed clearly did not come

from the south. This can have a severe impact in how the message is viewed or

interpreted by southern Afghans.

But the value of focusing on local concerns and matters is not only relevant

with leaflets, posters, and billboards. Consider, for example, an ODA100 IO

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

initiative known as the “mobile mul ah program” that used Afghan mul ahs to

address the Afghan population through a variety of means, including especially

radio programs. Initial assessments suggested that the mobile mul ah program

suffered from a lack of willing participants, due to constant threats directed at

the program. One mul ah, for example, was fired for refusing to visit a particu-

larly hostile village in Kandahar. Another mul ah in the program who was to

participate primarily in Kandahar was from Nangarhar and spoke a different

dialect of Pashto, thus making it difficult to build trust among Kandahari

Pashtuns who suspected his involvement with American PSYOP.101 Hence, the

mobile mullah program and network effectiveness suffered significantly

because the vast majority of participating mul ahs were perceived by Afghans

as lackeys of the Americans. Moreover, the few mul ahs who participated in the

program were hesitant to travel to certain areas in fear of their life.102

The use of use local media can be very important. The US should have

recruited local advocates, i.e. governors, district leaders, shura leaders, police

chiefs, mul ahs, who were involved with the local community and could pre-

sent and could present Taliban counter-narratives.

Also, for many Afghans the leaflets’ effectiveness relied heavily on people

being able to read the textual messages. A stronger focus on selecting more

appropriate visuals and more succinct texts would have helped convey mes-

sages in the rural battle space. “Less is more” is always the best message for

punchy visual advertising or propoganda. For example, while serving as a

COIN advisor to the Canadian Kandahar Task Force and spending consider-

able time in the Dand, Kandahar village, Deh-e Bagh— the initial village loca-

tion of the Canadian’s COIN operation Kalay (village) program103—during

foot patrols, I witnessed on numerous occasions Afghans staring at the images

of US PSYOP/IO leaflets which made no sense without the written mes-

sage.104 This was definitely an observation to relay to the troops.

Leaflets are in fact only rarely a productive format. They can easily be coun-

terproductive if not effectively designed and vetted to reflect Afghan culture

through a proper trial and review process. Moreover, many Afghans inter-

viewed suggested they were afraid to hold onto them fearing the Taliban

catching them with one. Finally and critically important, since the US lacked

the linguistic competence to address Afghanis in their own language, they

needed even more sophisticated skills to address them through images alone.

And if they failed in this measure, they demonstrated publicly, in front of the

insurgents, their inability to communicate why they were there at al .

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Conclusion

The war in Afghanistan has always been a war of stories and narratives. The

US has seemingly recognized this, with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen emphasizing the importance of strategic com-

munication in an era where “the lines between strategic, operational and tacti-

cal are blurred beyond distinction.”105 However, the US military and the

Afghan government have continually failed to offer a credible narrative or

stories that resonate with the Afghan people. This has been the basic failing of

the United States and al ies’ operations in Afghanistan, in my opinion. The

Taliban, on the other hand, have crafted a strong, simple, and culturally rele-

vant IO campaign to energize, coerce, and control the Afghan populace, fully

recognizing that perceptions of strength and progress have always been crucial

to determining the trust and confidence of Afghanistan’s tribes and power

brokers. The Taliban fluency in the Afghan linguistic and cultural space, in

addition, has afforded them the opportunity to produce messages that reso-

nate emotionally and shape the responses of their target audience, especially

rural Pashtuns.

Above, we assessed a wide variety of US PSYOP/IO leaflets, posters, and

billboards, and few of these products had enough substance to present a story

that would resonate with the Afghan population. It is instructive to compare

these leaflets to the only Taliban leaflet we know of and presented in Figure 2.2

(Chapter 2). This leaflet included enough vernacular text to offer an explicit

story which would clearly resonate with the rural Afghan population.

In 2009 the author was invited to address a large meeting of professional

personnel from military, intelligence, and diplomatic organizations intimately

involved in US PSYOP and information operations in Afghanistan. At the

conclusion of my presentation concerning Taliban IO, I asked the participants

to name the main themes, stories, or narratives of their efforts in Afghanistan;

to my utter disbelief, the large and senior crowd went silent. They could not

offer me a single PSYOP or IO theme that they thought was critical to US

efforts in Afghanistan. This vividly demonstrated to me that our efforts in

Afghanistan were destined for failure. How could we succeed in our objectives

if we did not have a single meaningful story to relate to the Afghan people as

to why we had invaded and occupied their country?

In Iraq and especially Afghanistan, the US military was given the mission

of persuading and influencing foreign audiences, but struggled to achieve

viable and measurable success. Christopher Lamb’s critique of the PSYOP

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

operations of OEF-A and Operation Iraqi Freedom cited four main problems

with PSYOP performance: first, the lack of national-level themes to guide

message formulation; second, a slow product approval process that rendered

some products irrelevant; third, questionable product quality with uncertain

effects; and fourth, an overall lack of resources, including insufficient force

structure.106 Each of these four problems plagued PSYOP and IO personnel

throughout OEF-A. This resulted, in part, in a failed persuasion campaign

that targeted both short- and long-term Afghan behavior. Behavior psycholo-

gists advise that there is more success found in short-term persuasive cam-

paigns than long-term, primarily because long-term persuasion requires logical

versus emotional messages.107 Human behavior pivots on reward cues and can

change quickly, based on emotional triggers. Emotional arguments are more

effective because most people want short-term gratification. Long-term per-

suasion efforts require an established relationship or at least a sophisticated

understanding between the message transmitter (PSYOP/IO personnel) and

receiver (Afghan target population).108 A basic and fundamental misunder-

standing of the Afghan target audience marred the US PSYOP and IO cam-

paign. As has been suggested several times, the US is excellent at producing

messages and pursuing strategies that make sense to those of similar language

and culture, but not to an audience used to oral rather than written language,

and Islamic values rather than military values.

All of Lamb’s suggested problems could have been at least partially solved

in Afghanistan if the Department of Defense (DoD) had invested heavily

during the early stages of the war in making PSYOP and IO leaders and

personnel competent speakers of the relevant target languages, and knowl-

edgeable of about the cultural, political, social, and historical aspects of

Afghanistan. Later in the war, the expansion of the military’s Foreign and

Regional Area Officers Program brought an improvement in the US mili-

tary’s knowledge of Afghan cultures and languages; but the damage caused

by earlier uninformed PSYOP/IO personnel could not be overcome.

Meanwhile, the Taliban dominated the strategic communication battle space

and created a discourse due to their language and cultural familiarity, speed

of information dissemination, and insider knowledge of how to conduct

their information operations.

A coordinated IO campaign in Afghanistan would have had to account for

the various tiers and factions within the insurgent network and carefully craft

its message toward the demographics of particular areas. The local politics and

local disposition of the people in an area are very important. With any IO

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THE US’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP CAMPAIGN

campaign, a nuanced picture of the local tribal, political, and anthropological

dynamics is very important. Withput a clearly developed picture, the US

should have stuck to simple and clear messages that resonated especially

within rural, Pashtun culture. The US should have used very narrow, simple,

but resonating themes, filtered through local Pashtuns.

Possibly most damning for US information operations was the fact the US

and their PSYOP and IO personnel did not have an adequate understanding

of the Afghan discourse or narrative in their community context. As was

argued in Chapters 1 and 2, narratives are a system of cognitive standards that

allow messages to be interpreted. Narratives are the means by which humans

interpret and prioritize information. Hence, a narrative becomes a lens through

which people view their world; it can represent foundation beliefs that are

often told and recalled as stories. Dupree’s seminal work on Afghanistan sug-

gests that such “framing” instruments performed a variety of significant func-

tions to include “social control,” where individuals are told by illustration what

they should or should not do and what rewards or penalties they will incur for

not following these norms.109 This discourse or narrative primarily involved the

Afghans’ view of a defensive jihad and the Afghans’ perceived obligation to

support this defense of Islam and the Afghan way of life.

Nearly all Taliban communication—night letters (Chapter 5), sermons in

mosques, public announcements, and the critical oral tradition (Chapter 2)—

works as a cohesive whole to create an al -encompassing discourse of jihad or

religious struggle. As we saw in earlier chapters and will be discussed in depth

in the concluding chapter, the Taliban narrative and stories supporting it

included:

1. Afghans and their religion/way-of-life are under attack by the international

community, which is led by the United States.

2. Only the Taliban are fighting the oppressors of Islam.

3. If you are not supporting the Taliban, then you are supporting the infidel

oppressors and apostates.

4. Afghans, as Muslims, must join with the Taliban to evict the invading army

so that Shar’iah law can be re-established under the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban government).

The US basically had to surrender to Taliban dominance within this dis-

course, meaning that the US efforts essentially refused to accept the cultural

reality, especially of the Afghan peasant mental space, within which the US

had to do battle in order to compete in the real world of ideas in rural

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Afghanistan. And for a rural counter-insurgency this was devastating, because

IO messages which did not fit within this discourse or narrative of how the

struggle in Afghanistan was perceived by the peasant villager, who we earlier

argued was the center of gravity of the war, were dismissed as nonsensical. The

US could not credibly message in the jihadi narrative, for its messages were

secular; so for the most part their messages were rejected as meaningless.

In order to message effectively within this discourse or message frame, four

elements would have to be taken on board:

1. Language manipulation using Dari, Pashto, Urdu, and Arabic to convey

certain emotions and select/mobilize target audiences.

2. Exploiting collective memory themes to evoke a strong sense of national-

ism, an innate characteristic, as we saw earlier in Taliban messaging.

3. The critical role of the warrior poet in shaping respected cultural values as

we saw in Chapter 7.

4. The nature of Pashtun folk tale transmission and the value system it reflects

in cultural messaging.

But is it actually possible or pragmatic to adopt another country’s culture

to this degree?110

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11

CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen throughout the previous chapters, the Taliban maintain sim-

ple objectives in their strategic communication, such as “forcing the invaders

to withdraw” and re-establishing Shar’iah throughout Afghanistan. The

objectives remain simple, for both the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent

groups such as HIG, even if to Western perceptions the messages themselves

look complex. In fact, it is these simple objectives that have helped Afghan insur-

gents avoid convoluted messaging campaigns; they know that their target audi-

ence are typically rural, more adept in spoken than written communication, and

conflict-fatigued. The simplicity of their strategic aims was key to to their suc-

cesses early on after their political creation in 1994, when they vowed to

accomplish (and largely achieved) two highly desired objectives: establishing

security and instilling law and order through swift Islamic-based justice.1

The Taliban’s messaging spectrum and narrative universe is finite. The num-

ber of objectives, messages, and narratives can be identified and framed within

a given outline. The Taliban are able to draw upon this information–mes-

sage–narrative treasure chest and “plug it in” to the range of delivery systems

available to them. Despite early misunderstandings of some technology, such

as cell phones and the internet, the resurgent Taliban and other Afghan insur-

gent groups have keenly adopted modern communication and technology to

their advantage. Video productions, internet web pages, text messaging,

Twitter, Bluetooth dissemination of audio and video files are some of the

modern delivery systems the Taliban now use to spread their views and state-

ments, as we have seen, in addition to DVDs and CDs.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

However, despite an aggressive effort from Afghan insurgent groups to

exert control over territory, groups like the Taliban still lack the manpower

and material needed to impose a large-scale occupation of territory inside

Afghanistan. In 2008, the International Crisis Group suggested that the

Taliban “still puts out contradictory messages that indicate internal rifts and

the diffuse nature of the insurgency.”2

The Taliban have been greatly aided in spreading their messages by the lack

of significant government counter-attacks and the proliferation of jihadist

messages through local and international media outlets. The Taliban have

capitalized on this groundswell by producing multilingual websites as well as

numerous militant publications that enable the Afghan insurgents to operate

as a competitor for the “hearts and minds” in the general IO battle space.

The basic thesis of this book is that the war in Afghanistan represents a battle

of narratives, and that the Taliban have been extremely successful in promoting

a message to the Afghan people and the international community that the

present as well as the future are theirs. As suggested above, the group has mas-

terfully and consistently spread strong, simple, and culturally appropriate sto-

rylines that appeal to the deeply religious, cultural, and political sensibilities of

tribal rural and many urban Afghans. Meanwhile, the Taliban have also

strengthened their claim to legitimacy and demonstrated their potential for

governance by creating administrative and legal bodies that now easily outper-

form the inefficient, corrupt, or absent institutions of the Kabul government.

Finally, the Taliban has refocused its operations on the ground to demonstrate

relentless resolve toward threatening Afghanistan’s capital and surrounding

areas, while also tempering and reforming their behavior toward Afghan villag-

ers who have always been critical of the Taliban’s brutal tactics and strict social

restrictions. All these approaches combined have revealed that the Taliban are

now telling all their various audiences that their return to power is imminent

after US combat troops withdraw from Afghanistan, and that they will imple-

ment an Islamic regime that is inclusive and tolerant of all Afghans.

While the US military and the Afghan government have consistently failed

to present a competitive narrative to the Afghan people since the rise of the

Taliban insurgency, the chance to turn the tide has now expired. Nevertheless,

as the United States prepares to draw down its forces and return the complete

control of Afghanistan to its government and military, the time and the

opportunity have never been more appropriate for the Afghan government to

create a strong narrative of its own. After al , the storyline of the Taliban is full

of inconsistencies and flaws that signal weaknesses in the group’s true ability

266

CONCLUSIONS

to overcome the Afghan government and the security forces, to remain a cohe-

sive organization, and to move beyond their past brutality to form a govern-

ment that is moderate and truly representative of the most commonly-held

Afghan values. For Afghanistan to move forward, the government must focus

on themes of real economic development and job creation, nationalism, rec-

onciliation, unity, and hope; this could send a strong message that the Afghan

government will someday provide a stable, peaceful, and prosperous future for

its country.

In the introductory chapter of this book, a range of questions were raised

that we believed would be useful in assessing the utility of Taliban narratives,

such as:

1. Do Taliban narratives and stories provide an insight into the conceptual

metaphors and other rhetorical techniques that are common in

Afghanistan?

2. Does an analysis of Taliban narratives reveal some of the major contours of

the Afghan/Taliban (Pashtun) worldview?

The answer to both of the questions as suggested by the data and analyses

presented in this book posed above is “yes.” For example, consider the Taliban’s

information operations and narratives in the important province of Kandahar

(basically the Taliban’s home province), where they address a wide variety of

issues including the important dynamic of civilian casualties. And more often

than not, these messages are grounded in language and terms that Kandaharis

thoroughly understand and can relate to. The use of historical examples, poems,

and chants—to name but a few—that Afghans can easily relate to is the modus

operandi of Taliban information operations. The Taliban also have a basic mes-

sage that they abhor civilian casualties and “col ateral damage,” but from their

perspective this is less important ultimately than repelling the “crusaders” and

“infidels” who want to destroy Islam and Afghan life.

It is important to note that many Afghans believe that the US is responsible

for most civilian casualties in southern Afghanistan. Yet all reputable studies

of civilian casualties suggest that the Taliban are responsible for the vast

majority of civilian deaths.3 The Taliban’s messages to the Kandaharis suggest

a very different story. For example, consider the terrible evening attack in

Kandahar that killed dozens of people in the month of Ramadan in 2009; it

was clearly carried out by the Taliban, according to knowledgeable American

sources on the ground. And yet numerous interviews with Afghans reveal that

they believe that the Americans carried out most of the attacks that caused

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

civilian deaths. In regards to the Ramadan massacre of 2009, interviews clearly

suggested that Afghans believe that US forces carried out the attack: they

believe that a plane dropped a bomb or a cruise missile that killed the inno-

cent civilians. When asked why they think so, the Afghans interviewed pro-

vided several reasons:

1. Some people “saw” a US plane flying over the area during the time of the

massacre.

2. Some people saw a “big rocket with flames behind it,” probably fired from

the US base at the Kandahar Air Field (KAF).

3. They argued that the US and Kabul helped pay families of the dead, prov-

ing that the US was responsible for the civilian deaths.

4. No parts of a truck/tanker (the truck bomb that US and Kabul believe was

the perpetrator of the attack) were found to prove it was a tanker loaded

with explosives.

5. The Taliban did not claim responsibility for it.4

These interviews, in part, clearly demonstrate how Taliban messaging can

have an impact that extends far beyond the initial message or story. That is,

Taliban messaging can significantly impact on the perceptions of the Afghan

population. As suggested by the numerous studies cited in Chapter 1, stories

and narratives have a tremendous impact on how people view their environ-

ment, and this could be one explanation as to why Kandaharis have this seem-

ingly incorrect view of US military actions.

Similarly many Afghans believe that the assassinations of prominent tribal

elders and influential government officials who have considerable support

among the public are the work of the US. For example, Abdul Majeed Babai,

a famous Afghan poet and prominent figure in Kandahar, as well as head of

the culture department, was assassinated in February 2010 while he was walk-

ing to his office.5 Although most evidence suggested a Taliban assassination,

his family believes that the Taliban did not carry out this attack because the

Taliban went to his Janazah (ceremony or gathering after the funeral cere-

mony) and shared their condolences with his family. The Taliban also explic-

itly rejected any involvement in his killing.

According to interviews, there are other interesting conspiracy theories and

counter-narratives concerning the US6 that we believe are significantly influ-

enced by the repetition of Taliban narratives and stories; for instance:

•  Many Kandaharis, including many who are educated, believe that the 9/11

attacks were a plot by the US to give an excuse to expand its domination in

the world.

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CONCLUSIONS

•  People believe that the US has massacred people in numerous Afghan vil-

lages. For example, one interviewee suggested that the US arrested around

160 people in Shahwalikot district and had “bags (hoods) placed over

their heads.” Many were later released (around 130, according to the inter-

viewee), but the rest were killed (“blown up”) while they were imprisoned

in a house/room controlled by the Americans.

•  Another interviewee suggested that when US forces come into an Afghan

village, they “red stamp doors and later carry out raids during nights target-

ing these houses with killer dogs.” We found this story was very common

among students at schools—especially girls’ schools in Kandahar. We found

it surprising that even Afghan educated women’s perceptions were influ-

enced by Taliban propaganda.

This notion of messaging and narratives impacting on a person’s percep-

tions, such as those presented above, is supported by those studies that posit

that “information” such as that portrayed through Taliban messaging can

impact on a person’s motivations, judgment, attention, and thoughts.7 “People

use narratives to understand how their world works.”8

Other discussions with Kandahar residents suggested that some mul ahs in

the city mosques and many mullahs in the village mosques were preaching

against the government and in defense of the Taliban. We did not find this

overly surprising because we recognized that the Taliban in the south got the

mul ahs to coordinate with their weekly messages, especially at khutba (Friday

sermons and prayers).9 One interviewee recalled a mul ah in a mosque just a

block away from UNAMA preaching against the Afghan government and the

Americans. He also suggested that a mullah preaching a Friday prayer sud-

denly cried out that “yellow and white Taliban are fighting and martyring

themselves for their religion”; he then said, “God swears that this is the time

of jihad because red infidels have captured our soil.”10

The examples above suggest that the Taliban are well aware that some of the

most important messaging techniques are person-to-person interactions and

whisper campaigns. Taliban mullahs play a prominent role in these tech-

niques, and since religious and cultural themes are powerful among the public,

the Taliban play this fact to the maximum. This is a testament to the success

of the Taliban’s shabnamah, taranas, poetry, circulars, radio messages, text

messages, social media, and websites. Moreover, slickly produced DVDs

showing interviews with Taliban commanders, battle footage, and misdeeds

carried out by foreign forces and the Afghan government are widely available

for sale in Afghanistan’s urban cities and bazaars.

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

A summary of the stories, themes and vocabulary used by the Taliban

The Taliban stories

The ultimate goal of the Taliban since the US invasion has been the discredit-

ing and removal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and the re-establishment

of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Associated with this

narrative is the Taliban’s consistent position over the years that they will never

negotiate or reconcile until the foreign forces leave the country: “I will say

very clearly, if they substitute their law with Islamic law and push out non-

Afghan troops from our country, after this we will start negotiations with the

government.”11 This has been a major component of their stories and narra-

tives since 2002. What has not been part of their stories, however, has been a

clear plan of governance for a future Afghanistan, other than the imposition

of Shar’iah law.12

A second component of Taliban stories is their clear intention to confront

and defeat the foreign, infidel invaders, just as their forefathers did earlier with

the English and Soviets. The past history of Afghanistan is an important

theme that the Taliban use for recruitment as well as to increase their popular

support. We saw this explicitly in the Taliban leaflet presented in Chapter 2

(Figure 2.2). The inability or failure of the British and Soviet forces to conquer

or subjugate Afghanistan is a common theme that is often emphasized: that

the US and the international Coalition will share the same fate as those who

invaded Afghanistan earlier. The Taliban’s view of their own invincibility por-

trays the conflict as not one that the US will inevitably lose in the future, but

one that they have already lost. Following Ramadan in 2008, Mul ah Omar

even urged the foreign forces to leave Afghanistan because he argued that in

seven years they had failed to establish an effective government or make any

significant progress.13 In addition, the Taliban stories suggest that the longer

the conflict draws on, the better off their fighting forces will become. For

example, “the Mujahidin are becoming stronger by the passing days, and are

gaining more experience in the fields of military, media, social issues and oth-

ers.”14 They complement this sentiment with their belief that Afghanistan has

never been, and in fact cannot be, conquered. Moreover, the Taliban view the

conflict as a cosmic battle between “the just and unjust” that they must win;

losing is not an option.15

A third component of Taliban stories is that they are selfless heroes who will

do anything to protect Afghanistan from foreign infidels and Afghan apostates

who are committed to destroying Afghanistan and the Afghans’ way of life. Part

270

CONCLUSIONS

of this trope is that the Taliban are patient, whereas the US and NATO’s attrib-

utes are impatience and vanity. They speak of fighting for generations as an

honor and a reward from Al ah. The Taliban have ascribed shaheed, or martyr-

dom, to any of their fighters killed in combat against international or Afghan

government forces, not just those who commit suicide bombings.

A fourth component of Taliban stories, of absolutely critical importance,

relates to Islam and the supreme obligation of every Afghan to join, or at least

support, their righteous jihad.16 As we saw above and in numerous Taliban IO

artifacts, Islam plays a central and explicit role in Taliban stories. Enfolding

the Taliban’s message in religion allows them to attract support from a variety

of sources. Not only does it rally the Muslims of Afghanistan to their banner,

but also perhaps more importantly it crosses borders and appeals to the inter-

national Muslim Ummah. By suggesting there is a threat against Islam, the

Taliban are able to call for a defensive jihad that obliges all Muslims to support

them against the international forces. As stated above, we conceive of the

Taliban’s war as basically an insurgency wrapped in the narrative of a jihad.

The Taliban view themselves as fighting a noble battle against fassād-e edāri

(administrative corruption), fassād-e akhlāqī (moral corruption), occupation

( eshghāl), and oppression ( zolm).

A fifth element of Taliban stories is the blatant corruption of the apostate

Kabul government. Questioning the legitimacy of the Karzai government

(and Ghani government) is also a common theme of Taliban stories. Hence

the Kabul regimes are often portrayed as a puppet of the United States and the

West. One statement compared the Karzai regime to past controversial

regimes: “No difference between Shah Shuja, Babrak Karmal, and the rulers

of the present Kabul administration. It is clear that all are equal when it comes

to national and Islamic betrayal and treason and in their servitude to the inter-

ests of the occupiers and colonists.” The statement goes further to derail the

elections, declaring them to be nothing but a lie with the outcomes predeter-

mined by the United States. It says these elected rulers are only figureheads

and the power of action and decision lies in Washington; the expectation that

these rulers could do anything other than what is in the interest of the US is

pointless.17 A statement by the late Mul ah Omar not only urged employees

of the Afghan government to stop serving the Afghan government and the

occupation, but also threatened to kill any who rejected his warning.18 This

was the narrative that we saw in a number of the night letters assessed in

Chapter 5. This sentiment, coupled with the rise of the Taliban’s shadow gov-

ernments and its ability to provide justice, further helps give their propaganda

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TALIBAN NARRATIVES

credence. Moreover, the Taliban have implemented Hezbol ah-type strategies

in areas of eastern Afghanistan and the south. That is, the Taliban offer social

services that the government has for years failed to do. This was seen most

clearly in their makeshift justice systems coordinated under shadow govern-

ments that provided “justice” in a matter of hours. During Afghanistan field

research, the author also heard stories of the Taliban distributing medical

supplies to villagers in need.19 Such a practice undermined the US and Kabul

policies of attempting to “impose” the legitimacy of the Afghan government

on the people in these areas.

A sixth component of Afghan stories is the corruption of the ANSF, and

especially the Afghan National Police (ANP). Local residents and communi-

ties viewed many local ANP units that we witnessed in southern Afghanistan

very negatively.20 Although some measures purged some violent and abusive

officers, problems remained. Accusations of robbery, extortion, rape, drug

trafficking, abductions, and bribery were rampant. Whether or not all these

accusations could be substantiated was basically irrelevant; the perception

among the local Afghan population was that the ANP were predators, and the

Taliban exploited these grievances, bolstered their manpower, and expanded

recruitment efforts. Corruption and the incapacity of local forces also make

the population receptive to Taliban messages couched in local cultural terms.

The Taliban play upon the suspicions and fears of the Afghan population by

questioning the motives of the international forces as well as the Kabul gov-

ernment. Their stories portray the international military forces as imperialist

invaders of Afghanistan with colonialist ambitions. Even immediately after

the attacks of 11 September, statements attributed to Mullah Omar ques-

tioned the motives of the United States: “The United States’ target is not

Osama but the Taliban. The trouble started when we refused to cooperate

with an American company for the gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan

to Pakistan.”21 Other Taliban statements have mirrored this view, such as, “the

occupying enemy does not want negotiations that’ll end with Afghanistan’s

freedom and an end of the occupation, but they want negotiations that’ll

guarantee them the everlasting dirty occupation of Afghanistan.”22 The

Taliban then take the threat one step further and imply that the United States’

intentions are not only directed at Afghanistan but toward the entire region.

For example, “The plans for expansionist imperialism in the region are being

applied, and these plans have been facilitated in the name of economic assis-

tance”;23 and “it is a strategy of colonialism aimed at securing interests of the

American capitalists and it seems America has vast and protracted but wicked

272

CONCLUSIONS

and hostile plans not only for Afghanistan but for the whole region.”24 They

also described the metaphorical Global War on Terror (GWOT) as “imperi-

alistic terminology” that the US used to justify its actions.

A seventh and extremely important component of the Taliban’s narratives

and stories is the col ateral damage created by the international forces and the

ANSF. The Taliban are well aware of the fact that if indirect fire or an errant

bomb by the US or ANSF or their al ies kills an innocent woman or child,

that village is lost to Kabul forever. Such deaths play directly into Pashtunwali

and the revenge society found throughout Afghanistan. In fact, it can be

argued that a major combat strategy of the Taliban has been to “force” the

Americans and others to make such mistakes:

Particularly problematic has been the careless use of U.S. air power, which

has killed scores of civilians, and the apparent lack of sensitivity by U.S. troops

to local perceptions, laws and customs. According to reports in the Afghan

press, “U.S. Special Forces, during routine sweeps of Afghan villages searching

for weapons and members of resistance groups, have physically abused villag-

ers, damaged personal property, and subjected women to body searches, a

major affront on a family’s honor.”25 UN officials have commented that “This

doesn’t help us at all … the people are basically pro-America. They want

U.S. forces to be here. But American soldiers are not very culturally sensitive.

It’s hardly surprising that Afghans get angry when the Americans turn up and

kick their doors in.”26

There have been multiple episodes of U.S. and NATO counterinsurgency

actions that have resulted in the death and injury of Afghan innocents. The

implications of this are profound.27 As suggested by the International Crisis

Group (ICG) “when a child is killed in one of these villages, that village is lost

for 100 years. These places run on revenge.”28

Col ateral damage and civilian casualties are common themes in the Taliban

stories that further attempt to discredit the international military forces.

Civilian deaths carry enormous repercussions, especially when considering the

importance of honor and revenge within Pashtun and Afghan society in gen-

eral. It is often stated that one innocent death creates ten future enemies. The

Taliban aims to turn the Coalition into enemies by making provocative state-

ments that incite these base ideals. For example, “the deceiver wants to carry

out big bloody bombings in the name of martyrdom operations, in places of

crowdedness like religious centers, and mosques and the likes,”29 or “thousands

of innocent Afghans have been killed in Nangarhar, Urozgan, Herat, Fara,

Kunduz and Paktya provinces as a result of American and NATO blind bom-

273

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

bardment.”30 The crossing of cultural boundaries is also an important aspect

of col ateral damage stories. For instance, international forces primarily consist

of men and when they search houses or areas that are reserved for women in

purda or physically search women themselves, it is a major cultural faux pas

and creates reactive animosity among the Afghan population (again, see

Figure 2.2 for an explicit example).

Finally, many Taliban stories are stories of intimidation and threat. Here the

Taliban warn Afghans to join their jihad and quit working for or associating

with the infidel Americans and the apostate Afghan government. A common

trope of these stories is that “the Americans will not always be there” to pro-

tect those who choose to cooperate. Such stories deal with a litany of issues,

such as the education of girls, the role of women (or lack thereof ) in society,

and many others.

Taliban themes and vocabulary

While analyzed in detail in earlier chapters, below we summarize the main

themes and the vocabulary used by the Taliban in their messages and stories

in a concluding effort to define the group’s narratives and demonstrate how

they attempt to influence or control the behavior of its primary indigenous

audience, the rural Pashtuns, by appealing to their religion, culture, and tradi-

tion. Based on the data and analyses presented in previous chapters, the fol-

lowing tables summarize the main themes used by the Taliban (Table 11.1)

and the most important vocabulary and its symbolism found in their messag-

ing and narratives (Table 11.2).

Table 11.2 offers a list of terms used by the Taliban, which are very different

from the Western meaning of these words.

In earlier chapters the importance of Afghan collective memory was ana-

lyzed; Table 11.1 presents a similar and valuable concept that is critical in

assessing information operations in Afghanistan, especially those campaigns

aimed at Afghan Pashtuns: the notion that Pashtuns represent a memory-

based society. For example, for the average Pashtun the war against the Soviets

is still very present in their minds, and the Afghan-Anglo wars are equally

vivid; so it is not unusual to hear Americans referred to as both “Soviets” and

“British.” Pashtuns have a tendency to perpetuate memories of battles and

inter-tribal or inter-clan fights and disputes. The relationship between the

different sub-tribes and clans within the Pashtun confederacy as well as the

relationship between the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups is thus affected

importantly by past events.

274

CONCLUSIONS

Table 11.1: Themes used in Taliban narratives and stories

Theme

Detail/Explanation

Pashtunwali ( badal and izzat)31

Refers to the Pashtun code of conduct used

across Afghanistan. It is more than a set of rules

to follow: it enables the Pashtuns to exist as a

group and perpetuate their tribal structure. Its

main concepts are: badal (revenge or retalia-

tion), nenawati (protection or mediation), and

melmastia (hospitality). The Taliban rely mainly

on the concept of badal and izzat for the group’s

narrative. Izzat means honor, and Pashtuns

follow the Pashtunwali to maintain their honor

and resolve conflicts.

Historical events/Appeals to

The Taliban draw upon the fact that the

Pashtuns as a memory-based

Pashtuns are a memory-based society. By

society

systematically referring to the British and Soviet

invasions when describing the US-led Coalition

and the col ateral damage caused by the

Coalition forces, the Taliban ensure that the

group will appeal to the population and thereby

alter their interaction with foreign security

forces or aid workers.

Religious rhetoric

The Taliban use extensively religious references

to build their narrative. The group see the war

against the US-led Coalition as a war of religion,

which is expressed as a cosmic battle between

the just and unjust. The role of Muslims is to

reject the infidels and cooperate with the holy

fighters, and Afghans have an obligation to join

the jihad. The Taliban also use religious rhetoric

to control the Afghans’ behavior by designating

what is Islamic or un-Islamic.

The Taliban, being part of this Pashtun society, are well aware of the attach-

ment that Pashtuns and Afghans in general feel to the past. Consequently, the

Taliban use this to their advantage, as can be seen in many of their information

operation artifacts. In the shabnamah, for example, the Taliban sometimes

make references to the Soviet invasion: “[A]s we and you rose against the

Russian[s] with great manliness and passion, and with great fervor we extin-

guished their army from Afghanistan.”32 The Taliban represent the jihad

275

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Table 11.2: Terms used in Taliban narratives and stories

Terms

Symbolism

Honor and manhood

The Pashtuns follow Pashtunwali to maintain their

( izzat)

honor, which is defined as the ability to control zar

(gold), zan (women), zamin (land).33 For the Taliban,

honor and manhood are partly but importantly expressed

by Afghans’ willingness to col aborate with the Taliban

fighters, join the jihad, seek revenge against the Coalition

forces and reject any influence that the Taliban considers

un-Islamic.

Revenge ( badal)

According to Pashtunwali, in the case of murder or an

offence to a woman, the family, clan and tribe are

responsible for taking revenge by killing the offender or

someone in his family, clan or tribe. The responsibility for

implementing badal is collective, as is the punishment of

the offender and his people. The Taliban uses the concept

of revenge to push Afghan people to join the fight against

the Coalition forces, as a result of the latter’s un-Islamic

influence and practices, aggression on the Afghans’ holy

land and religion, and col ateral damage.

Jihad

The Taliban has a particular and puritanical interpreta-

tion of the Qur’an: for the Taliban, armed jihad is the

most important duty for the Muslim and it is the only

response in the context of the war. In the Qur’an, there

are two types of jihad: the “greater jihad” which is the

personal striving that Muslims go through to follow the

way of God; and the “lesser jihad” which refers to the

armed action that Muslims are allowed to take only after

the authorization of a religious leader.

Mujahidin

This refers to fighters in a holy war or jihad. The term

usually al udes to the Afghan resistance fighters who

fought the Soviets. The Taliban call their fighters

Mujahidin and believe that they serve as an example that

the Afghan people should follow.

Infidels

In Taliban messaging, they refer to the security forces

(foreign and Afghan) and foreign humanitarian workers

as infidels and apostates.

Christian crusaders

The Coalition forces.

Slaves

Usually refers to the Afghan government and Afghan

security forces, and also to any Afghan who col aborates

or interacts with the infidels.

276

CONCLUSIONS

Personal and collective

The notion of collective responsibility is important in

responsibility

badal. Individuals have to comply with Pashtunwali or

else they will expose their family or clan to the revenge of

the person they offended. When the Taliban threaten an

individual, they consider that the punishment or

retaliation could be applied to the entire family or village.

Also, once a person or village has been warned, that

person is responsible for his own life. And if he gets hurt

or killed by the Taliban, the person or his family has no

right to complain.

against the US-led Coalition as a repetition of the jihad against the Soviets.

There is little doubt that the resistance against the Soviet invasion was massive

and is still present in the memories of many Afghans. This is not only because

of the atrocities resulting from the war of attrition that the Soviets fought

against the Afghan insurgency, but also because of the memories of past

Afghan victories against invading and occupying forces. The Taliban use this

reference strategically, hoping that it will encourage people to join the jihad

and again defend their country from “infidel invaders.” This is reinforced by

the vocabulary used to designate the Coalition forces as congruent to the

Soviets. As suggested above, the Taliban regularly refer to the US as “invaders,”

which strengthens the link between the Soviet invasion and American-led

occupation of their country.

As suggested above, the Taliban also play on this aspect of Pashtun society

when they denounce collateral damage caused by the Coalition forces:

“[M]any time[s] they [Coalition forces] have placed the civilian areas under

attack, and have killed a large number of our defenseless people including

men, women, children, and have caused calamity and scar[s] […] to many

families […] the filthy hands of the Christian invaders have been contami-

nated with our people’s innocent blood.”34 The Taliban’s narrative is aimed at

influencing, arguably even control ing, the population’s behavior by feeding

propaganda through the loss of innocent lives caused by the “invaders.” This

ensures that people will remember these events and will consequently alter

their interactions with foreign forces and workers. The Taliban, as suggested

above, also use col ateral damage to appeal to the most important aspect of

Pashtun culture: Pashtunwali, and more specifically badal or revenge.

The information strategy of the Taliban was designed to degrade the will of

the US Coalition to fight by remaining in the field despite exhaustive efforts

to remove them by the Coalition. For the Taliban to remain in the field, sup-

277

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

port from the Afghan populations and external support from Arab and

Pakistani populations was necessary. This support was cultivated through

information campaigns directed at the Afghan people and at Arabs and

Pakistanis. To succeed, the Taliban were adept at communicating with the

Afghan population, and derived active or at least passive support from their

local population. To achieve this, the Taliban needed a clear, concise “political

objective, based on firm moral and ideological grounds that can be under-

stood and accepted by the majority as the overriding ‘cause’ of the insurgency,

desirable in itself and worthy of any sacrifice.”35

The key to success for the Taliban lay in its ability to craft a resonant and

persistent narrative in the minds of the Afghan and external populations. In

2005–6, the Taliban made information operations their main effort. Their

campaign repeated five simple slogans in combination with the major themes

presented in Table 11.1:

•  Our party, the Taliban

•  Our people and nation, the Pashtun

•  Our economy

•  Our constitution, the Shar’iah

•  Our form of government, the Emirate

These simple slogans provided the Taliban with a political platform that

spoke to the norms and apprehensions of their audience. They spoke to the

themes of Pashtun nationalism, economic independence, and a deep-seated

paranoia at foreign interference. “The Taliban’s key strength mirrored the

Coalition’s key weakness—the capacity to synchronize physical activity in

support of a unified information strategy.”36

An effective method for communicating with the Afghan population is

through direct intimidation. Chapter 5 described how night letters, a popular

Taliban means of direct communication with the target Afghan audience to

convey the insurgent narrative, dwelled on:

•  Characterizing the Coalition as foreign invaders.

•  Characterizing the Karzai or Kabul regime as a “puppet” of the West.

•  Characterizing the Coalition as Crusaders.

•  Glorifying the martyrdom concept.

•  Saving the honor of the Afghan people.

•  Prohibition against any Afghan supporting the enemy.

The first three themes are particularly problematic for the US and its

Coalition because they are part of a narrative based on the reality of Afghan

278

CONCLUSIONS

modern history. At least two generations of Afghans have lived in an

Afghanistan destabilized by foreign influence and “puppet” governance, and

the memory of the Soviet and Anglo-Afghan wars are not too remote to

remain alive in oral folklore, as suggested above.

The Taliban also capitalize on the perceived injustices done to Muslims by

the United States. The US detention center at Guantanamo Bay is a popular

subject of Taliban propaganda, often with alleged letters from Taliban prison-

ers in Guantanamo appearing in popular Taliban magazines, as well as numer-

ous poems and songs.37

Summary of Taliban information targets

The Taliban know the audience for their messages well. The two primary pil-

lars of Taliban messages, as suggested above, have been Islamic jihad and

Pashtunwali, and very often they are intertwined, so that the Pashtun custom

of sanctuary is occasionally referred to as a Muslim custom. The two themes

used to be mentioned in equal measure before the American-led invasion, but

now Islam and jihad are given primacy in garnering support, whereas “Afghan-

ness” or Pashtunwali take a back seat.

Almost all of the original Taliban leadership was Pashtun, with much of the

original senior leadership of the Quetta Shura coming from the large Ghilzai

tribe.38 Inter-Pashtun tribal politics play into much of the Taliban’s rhetoric,

especially against the Karzai government. Clan and tribal politics in

Afghanistan have been well analyzed in other works, but it is important to

emphasize the rivalry between the late Mul ah Omar’s more numerous Ghilzai

tribe and ex-President Karzai’s more elite Durrani tribe. The modern origins

of the conflict lie in the eighteenth century, when the Ghilzai briefly held

power in Afghanistan, conquering as far as Isfahan in Persia, before the

Durrani supplanted them as hereditary kings of Afghanistan.39 This is not to

suggest that many Durrani have not joined the Taliban, e.g. Mullah Abdul

Ghani Berader, once head of the Taliban’s Military Commander’s Council, is

a Popalzai Durrani; rather it is to suggest that tribal rivalries and dynamics are

important in assessing the underlying structure of the Taliban and some of

their narratives.

Table 11.3 summarizes the target audiences for Taliban messages and nar-

ratives, from Pashtuns to the global Ummah (community of Muslims), with

their main emphases and lines of attack; although extremely rare, some narra-

tives have even targeted non-Muslim support for the Taliban.40

279

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Taliban transmissions can be loosely broken down into three periods, with

three different sets of goals, obstacles, and religio-cultural references. The first

period is roughly the period from the Taliban capture of Kabul until 9/11. The

second period refers to the time between 9/11 and early 2004, when the Taliban

insurgency in Afghanistan began to garner more support within Afghanistan

and large swaths of the country became unsafe for Coalition forces and foreign

aid organizations. The third period is ongoing, from early 2004 to the present.

Table 11.4 summarizes the different goals, rhetorical devices, historical refer-

ences, and methods of transmission transmission (see Chapter 3).

Table 11.3: Taliban narrative targets

Target Audience Emphasis

Attacks

Ghilzai

Historical memory

Karzai and his family and

clan/tribe

Pashtun

Pashtunwali

Karzai and the former

Northern Al iance

Afghan

Recent history of foreign

Foreign presence; “so-called

invasions

Afghans,” apostates

Ummah

Pan-Islamism; the flight of

“Crusaders”

Mohammed from Mecca to Medina

and his return

Global

Human rights, self-determination

Western troop presence

Coalition forces Divisions; desire to avoid a pro-

Americans specifically

tracted and dangerous deployment

This follows the general trend of conflict in Afghanistan: before 9/11, the

main enemy of the Taliban was the ethnic Uzbek and Tajik Northern

Alliance. By appealing to a nationalist or ethnic solidarity through

Pashtunwali-styled rhetoric, the Taliban hoped to marginalize the Northern

Alliance and identify them with regimes generally hostile to the Taliban in

Tashkent and Dushanbe, as well as Moscow by proxy. The continued pres-

ence of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan was often explained with reference

to the hospitality clause of Pashtunwali.41 Many of the transmissions were in

audio format, through radio or cassette.

After 9/11, as a new enemy entered Afghanistan, the Taliban were tempo-

rarily rendered relatively speechless. Taliban proclamations became relatively

few compared to those during their time in Kabul. Since significantly re-

emerging in late 2003,42 however, new Taliban missives have appeared, show-

280

CONCLUSIONS

ing a distinct shift in cultural markers, although keeping with a consistent

chronology regarding the divine mission of the Taliban.

Shortly after 9/11, while waiting for the American military to invade

Afghanistan, Mul ah Omar was quoted as saying “the promise of God is that

my land is vast. If you start a journey on God’s path, you can reside anywhere

on this earth and will be protected … The promise of Bush is that there is no

place on earth where you can hide that I cannot find you. We will see which

one of these two promises is fulfilled.”43 This is “typical” of the Taliban mes-

sages immediately after 9/11: the accusation that Coalition forces, and

American forces in particular, are directly opposed to the will of God.

Table 11.4: Temporal differentiation of Taliban messaging

Pre-9/11

9/11 to early 2004

Early 2004–

Primary enemy

Northern Al iance Coalition troops American soldiers and

the “puppet” regime

in Kabul

Favored means of Audio

Night letters,

Video, magazines,

transmission

poetry

internet, social media,

poetry, taranas, night

letters, etc.

Primary target

Fellow Afghans

Fellow Pashtuns Fellow Afghans,

audience

and Pashtuns

and Ghilzais

Muslims, and

wavering coalition

partners

Primary emphasis Tribal, nationalist Religious

Religious

Historical

The reign of Abdur Russian invasion, Crusades

reference

Rahman (“the Iron British invasions,

Amir”)

Durrani triumph

over Ghilzai

Desired outcome

Total control of

Local support,

Broad Muslim

Afghanistan, the

creation of

support; fracturing of

existence of the

insurgency

US-led Coalition

Islamic Emirate

groups

Interestingly, even before 9/11 the Taliban had begun to equate the

Americans with kafiri and not simply Al-i-kitab or non-Muslim friends. In

December 2000, as the Taliban regime found itself again prevented from

taking Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations, it called for a jihad against all

the “atheists” on the Security Council, singling out the United States.44

281

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

After President Bush was inaugurated, the Taliban seemed to take a more

friendly tone towards the US and sent out at least two conciliatory messages to

the new American president.45 Not long after, however, the Taliban adopted a

harsher tone. Speaking in Islamabad, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan stated

that the then current international call for bin Laden to be extradited was simply

a way to cripple Afghanistan so that the US could more easily impose a pro-

Western government. This also marks the first direct correlation between the

Soviet Union and the US.46 During the speech it was alleged that the US’s goals

in Afghanistan were twofold: to defeat the Soviet Union, and then to install a

pro-Western government, a plan that the US was in 2001 still pursuing.

That this came out within a month of calls for renewed dialogue with the

US is perplexing. In our opinion, there are two possible explanations. First,

that the Taliban very quickly (especially for a nation with at that time very

rudimentary access to media outlets) came to the conclusion that the Bush

administration’s policies toward the Taliban were not going to differ signifi-

cantly from those of the Clinton administration. Or second, that perhaps the

release of the speech (delivered on 25 January, but not published until a full

three weeks later) was delayed until a more in-depth analysis of the Bush

administration’s Afghan policy could be undertaken. Regardless, the parallel

drawn between the invasion of the Soviet Union and American activity in

Afghanistan was one that would become extremely apt by the end of the year.

Much of the speech was also spent criticizing the Russian government’s

actions in supporting the Northern Al iance and trying to keep fundamental-

ist Islam out of Central Asia. The greater Muslim world was also appealed to

for assistance in rebuilding Afghanistan. This appeal for assistance from fellow

Muslims is something that the Taliban would use later in fighting the

American-led Coalition forces, just as it had during the Soviet war.

In that same month, February 2001, the Taliban announced its decision to

destroy the Bamiyan Buddhas. Originally it was announced that the decision

had been made by the ulema (Islamic body of jurists),47 but later in response

to pressure from foreign governments and derision from other Islamic schol-

ars, Mullah Omar used his trump card: the decision had come to him in a

dream. Dreams are very important in both Islam and Pashtun culture, and one

ignores a dream, at least according to Omar, at one’s own peril. In Mullah

Omar’s dream, Al ah chastised him for not removing false idols.48

Mul ah Omar had used dreams before, such as when handling the cloak of

the Prophet in Kandahar in 1996.49 Through a dream, he said, he was invested

with the authority to handle the cloak, and by so doing he invested himself

282

CONCLUSIONS

with a greater authority than had been seen since Ahmad Shah Durrani origi-

nally brought the cloak to Afghanistan centuries before, while uniting the

nation. Many, especially the Pashtuns, saw this as divine sanction for Mul ah

Omar’s government.50

In summary, the Taliban’s IO campaign had and has much strength. First,

the Taliban created a simple, yet powerful narrative that resonated with the

Afghan people. The use of songs and poetry played into the historical beliefs

of many Afghans. Second, the Taliban were able to exploit cultural and tribal

nuances because their insurgency was composed of Afghan locals who were

intimately familiar with the language, culture, and people in their villages.

Third, the Taliban found the most effective means to communicate their mes-

sages that were suited to the rural populace in the difficult geographic terrain

of Afghanistan. Fourth, the Taliban could quickly get their message out to the

media to exploit attacks, ambushes, and civilian casualties. Often it is the side

that gets their story out first that is believed and can set the agenda, regardless

of the facts. Fifth, the Taliban showed an increasing level of sophistication and

use of technology to convey their narrative. Finally, the Taliban backed up

their messages with credible threats to intimidate the population if they did

not support their cause.

The Taliban’s IO campaign also had many weaknesses that could have been

exploited. First, the Taliban lacked broad genuine support in Afghanistan.

Their initial basis of popular support was in the rural Pashtun population in

eastern and southern Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Yet even-

tually the Taliban gained support among other ethnic groups in other parts of

the country. Second, the Taliban generally lacked a broad strategic overview

with specifics as to how they would govern. The original Taliban leader

Mul ah Omar once even said, “Al ah will take care of everything,” when asked

about how the Taliban would rule. Third, while the Taliban proved adept at

spreading propaganda at the local Afghan level, they clearly lacked an under-

standing of how Western public opinion was formed, and consistently failed

to exploit the international media at a strategic level. Finally, the Taliban

consistently put out contradictory messages on issues such as attacking

schools, poppy cultivation, and suicide bombings.51 Some of this can be attrib-

uted to their decentralized organizational structure, with much of their IO

depending on multiple spokesmen sending out different and confusing mes-

sages. More importantly, this showed up serious contradictions in the core

beliefs of the Taliban narrative.

Overall, the Taliban’s information campaign generated the perception,

especially in the rural Pashtun areas, of a growing, unstoppable insurgency.

283

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

The Taliban narrative and stories have many strengths, as suggested through-

out this book, and appealed to the common Afghan, but their stories also had

some significant weaknesses which the US and Afghan government failed to

exploit. In the end, the battle of the story was an important part of the Taliban

strategy to retake Afghanistan, and they have proved adept at shaping local

Afghan perceptions. And once perceptions are influenced, as Jowett and

O’Donnell suggest, one can manipulate and control the environment.52

In conclusion, the Taliban’s information operations as well as the process by

which they were distributed, as witnessed by the author in Kandahar City in

June 2009, represent almost a kind of metaphor for the problems that the

United States and NATO/ISAF have faced in Afghanistan. That is, the West

has attempted to apply methods and pursue policies in both military and

civil–political domains without understanding the impact on individual

Afghans. The West has clearly not understood the influences that sway and

inspire Afghan behavior. The US and its NATO al ies developed objectives

based on their views and desires for Afghanistan, not based on the views and

requirements of the common Afghan who represents the “center of gravity”

for this conflict. The US and NATO then made promises that they did not

deliver, at least in the eyes of Afghans (a disastrous and dangerous situation in

Afghanistan). As a villager from Sperwan Ghar, Panjwayi district of Kandahar

province suggested to the author, “they [the Coalition forces] promised to

build, but they destroyed instead.”

The US and NATO would have been well advised during the initial stages

of Operation Enduring Freedom to ask simple questions about what

Afghans—not just the elites in Kabul, technocrats, and expatriates—really

wanted from the West’s engagement. What are the messages and frames that

motivate and influence Afghans? What is the best way to spread a message?

Such questions were never systematically asked, resulting in many policies as

well as strategies being misapplied in the eyes of the Afghan population. Many

of the Taliban’s information artifacts, on the other hand, appear to be deeply

rooted in the Afghan psyche. They appeal to emotions that the West do not

and have not tried to understand. This lack of understanding, in part, has

ultimately doomed Western engagement in Afghanistan and contributed to

the West losing the battle of the story in Afghanistan and, therefore, the war.

284

APPENDIX A

COMMUNAL STANDPOINTS: HOW AFGHANS IDENTIFY

THE TYPES OF TALIBAN

Introduction

The intention of this Appendix is to provide an analytical snapshot of the

Taliban’s organizational construct, in theory and in practice, using captured

Taliban documents and documents wilfully published by the militant organi-

zation, to help gain insight into how the Taliban view themselves. In particu-

lar, several of the Taliban’s published “rules and regulations for Mujahidin”, or

layeha or code of conduct (see Chapter 8), have been cross-analyzed to help

explain how local Afghan communities view and differentiate the many strains

and types of Taliban operating throughout Afghanistan.

The elements presented in the appendix must be understood in the context

of how local communities view and accept the Taliban. The framework indi-

cates varying levels of involvement among individuals who engage in anti-

government activities, nearly all of whom are designated “the Taliban” by

Western sources and “enemies of Afghanistan” by Afghan government offi-

cials. Some of these groups, whether true Taliban, local gunmen, or begrudged

tribesmen, are viewed with a sense of legitimacy and moral righteousness;

others are viewed as criminal bandits and murderers. The following frame-

work helps explain this seemingly complicated concept and helps identify

different subtypes of Taliban fighters in a given community.1

285

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

Taliban Subtypes

Narzar (Disaffected)—

Majburi (Forced)—Those

Taliban-e duzd (Thief Taliban)—

Those who feel isolated,

individuals or clans abused

Some are considered zalam (cruel)

marginalized or excluded from

or harassed by the central

and abusive to locals.

the current politcial process.

goverment, forced to leave

their community. Are fighting

Taliban-e Khana-neshin

Taliban-e jangi (Fighting Taliban)—

for anti-government/revenge

front-line fighters, full time

(Sitting at home Taliban)—

motives; also known as

insurgents, “addicted” to jihad.

Inactive, former Taliban

“anti-corruption” Taliban.

regime members. Typically

found in Quetta, Helmand,

Taliban-e mahali

Kandahar, or Peshawar.

Makhtabi—Ideological, schooled

(Local Taliban)—fighters

Taliban.

from the community, usually

voluntary but can also include

Taliban-e asli (real Taliban) or

“blue collar” insurgents.

Taliban-e pak (clean Taliban)—

those considered “uncorrupted”

and ideologically motivated.

Taliban subtypes and criteria for group solidarity (reconcilable)

Naraz (Disaffected)—Those

who feel isolated,

Sense of fear, hatred, moral outrage, revenge.

marginalized or excluded

Group is viewed as preserving the local way of life.

from the current political

Provides physical security against another armed group.

process.

Taliban-e Khana-neshin

(Sitting at home Taliban)—

Sense of fear, hatred, moral outrage, revenge.

Inactive, former Taliban

Social status (honor/prestige).

regime members. Typically

Admired leader/figure.

found in Quetta, Helmand,

Physical danger/threat from the group if support is withheld.

Kandahar, or Peshawar.

Taliban-e mahali

(Local Taliban)—fighters

Group has local, tribal or ethnic ties.

from the community, usually Group is viewed as indigenous and acceptable.

voluntary but can also

Group is viewed as preserving the local way of life.

include “blue collar”

Provides physical security aginst another armed group.

insurgents.

Group may fulfill need for agression/adventure.

Taliban subtypes and criteria for group solidarity (reconcilable)

Majburi (Forced)—Those

Need for justice/moral clarity/ideals.

individuals or clans abused or

Sense of fear, hatred, moral outrage, revenge.

harassed by the central

Social status (honor/prestige).

government, forced to leave

Sense of honor, identity, self-esteem.

their community. Are fighting

Provides physical security against another armed group.

for anti-government/revenge

Group has local, tribal or ethnic ties.

motives; also known as

Group is viewed as indigenous and acceptable.

“anti-corruption” Taliban.

Group is viewed as preserving the local way of life.

Need for social relatedness; sense of belonging, loyalty.

286

APPENDIX A

Taliban subtypes and criteria for group solidarity (irreconcilable)

Group pays for assistance in conducting violent

Taliban-e duzd (Thief Taliban)—

attacks.

Some are considered zalam (cruel)

Group shares resources and profits from criminal

and abusive to locals.

activities with members.

Physical danger/threat from the group if support

is withheld.

Friends or family are already members or

encourage joining.

Need for aggression/adventure.

Social status (honor/prestige).

Taliban-e Jangi (Fighting Taliban)—

Physical danger/threat from the group if support

front-line fighters, full time

is withheld. Group inspires members and provides

insurgents, “addicted” to jihad.

deeper meanings to their lives.

Group uses religious justifications for violence to

overcome social norms against it.

Group promises salvation to members who die

for the ideology or religion.

Taliban subtypes and criteria for group solidarity (irreconcilable)

Social status (honor/prestige).

Physical danger/threat from the group if

support is withheld. Group inspires members

Taliban-e asli (real Taliban) or

and provides deeper meanings to their lives.

Taliban-e pak (clean Taliban)—thouse

Group uses religious justifications for violence

considered “uncorrupted” and

to overcome social norms against it.

ideologically motivated.

Group promises salvation tom members who

die for the ideology or religion.

Makhtabi— Ideological, schooled

Group has local, tribal or ethnic ties.

Taliban.

Group is viewed as indigenous and acceptable.

Provides physical security against another

armed group.

Need for justice/moral clarity/ideals.

287

APPENDIX B

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF A FEW TALIBAN NIGHT LETTERS, 2008–10

(Data on all 279 Night Letters are available online at www.hurstpublishers.com/book/taliban-narratives) Letter No.

Date

Location

Language

From

To

Purpose

Message

Audience

1

April 2008

Kunar Province,

Pashto

Mudir Muasib

Residents of

To warn residents working Counter-collaboration

Undecided

Kandi Village

Bin Umair

Kandai

for Govt or Internationals

population

Vil age

to quite

2

Unspecified

N/A

Pashto

Mujahedeen of

Said Usman

Avoid activities and

Counter-stability

Local

Islamic Emirate

Baba

propaganda against

personality

Taliban

3

Unspecified

N/A

Pashto

Islamic Emirate

All Muslim

1-Do not uncover

Counter-stability and

Govt workers

of Afghanistan

Brothers

Mujahidin wherever you

Counter-collaboration and undecided

see them. 2-Do not take

population

tools related to Mujahidin

3-People who work for

the Americans should quit

their jobs.

4-People should keep

quiet during the night

operation by Mujahidin;

otherwise that person will

become the main target.

4

May 2008

Kundoz City,

Pashto

Amir-ul-

All Muslim

Stop any kind of support

Counter-collaboration

Undecided

Kundoz

Momineen

Brothers

and friendship with the

Population

(Mul ah Umar)

Western forces

5

June 2008

Murgha village

Pashto

Mujahedeen of All Countryman 1-All those who work for Counter-collaboration

Undecided

Islamic Emirate

and brothers

the puppet government,

Population

such as Army, Police or

Intelligence, should quit

their jobs.

2-All mul ahs should stop

doing the funeral

ceremony for those who

die supporting the

government.

6

Unspecified Khost Province

Pashto

Khost military

Khost Province 1-Tribal leaders should

Counter-

Undecided

jihadi brigade

population

not pass declarations

collaboration,

Population

against Mujahidin.

Counter-mobility,

2-All those who work for

Counter-stability

the puppet government

and the US should quit

their jobs.

3-Do not stay close to the

government and infidal

army.

4-Secure yourself during

the assault on infidels and

government army, and do

not scream in support of

their soldiers.

5-Our landmines and

IEDs are live. We do not

permit them to kill

civilians, but you should

not show them to our

enemies.

6-Stay away when you see

our enemies’ carvans and

do not move forward.

All mul ahs should avoid

participating in the

funeral ceremonies of

National Army, Police,

Frontier Police and

Intelligence personnel.

APPENDIX C

HIG OFFICIAL PEACE PROPOSAL

AND TRANSLATION, DECEMBER 2010,

TANWEER, VOL. 16

293

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

294

APPENDIX C

Translation 1

National Convention of Rescue/Salvation

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The high peace council of the Kabul government requested HIG (Hezb-e-

Islami Gulbuddin) to send them their proposal for ending war/conflict. HIG

has told them that negotiations will be productive only when United States

grants Kabul officials the authority of negotiating [US] forces’ withdrawal.

Also, the White House should respect all the decisions made by Afghan

[peace talks] parties. We have clearly stated to them that HIG will never agree

to the foreign forces remaining [in Afghanistan] until 2014. However, in

order to highlight HIG stance to them [Afghan government] and the Afghan

nation, we have sent them the National Convention of Salvation proposal

with subtle changes and [here is] the new version [of the proposal].

Representing the Afghan nation and our political parties, we take an oath on

the name of the great Al ah that we will help each other to rescue our country

from the ongoing heartbreaking situation, to end the conflict forever, to main-

tain security, to build an Afghanistan free of foreign forces and foreign interfer-

ence, to strengthen our national unity, to provide an opportunity to this nation

to choose their leadership and to build a state according to their beliefs.

To reach these holy objectives, we have agreed on the proposal below:

1. Foreign forces should begin withdrawing from the country starting from

July 2011, and should complete the withdrawal process within 6 months.

295

TALIBAN NARRATIVES

2. Within this period, they [foreign forces] should withdraw from cities and

populated areas and settle in military bases.

3. Security responsibilities should be immediately transferred to national

army and national police. Foreign forces have no right to conduct unilat-

eral military operations, house search, and arresting people in any corner

of the country in any type of circumstances.

4. Power should be transferred to an interim government which is accepta-

ble to all sides. If other parties do not accept this offer, changes should be

brought to the current government that are acceptable to all sides.

However, controversial, corrupt, traitor, infidel, and alleged war criminals

should not be part of the [proposed] government.

5. With the consensus of all sides, there should be a national council which

consists of 7 members that has the ultimate power of decision. The office

of this council should be in a province over which Afghan forces have

complete control and [the province] has no presence of foreign forces.

6. After the withdrawal of foreign forces, there should be presidential, par-

liamentary, and provincial council elections simultaneously.

7. In this election, members of the government cabinet and governors can

only participate if they resign from their jobs three months ahead of the

election.

8. In the first elected government, the role of each party should be based on

the number of votes gained. These parties should receive a vote of confi-

dence from the national council. In future elections after this one, the

winning side is not obliged to form a coalition government.

9. Only those political parties or groups have the right to participate in the

next election who have received over 10% of votes in the first election.

10. During this period [of peace negotiations], there should be a complete

ceasefire among rival groups. All the political prisoners will be released.

All sides will promise that neither use illegal ways to attain power, nor

they will use weapons to defeat their rivals.

11. The first elected council will have the right to study constitutions pre-

sented by three sides and make the final decision on the country’s

constitution.

12. No foreign nation has the right to have prisoners in Afghanistan, to try

or punish an Afghan citizen or transfer him abroad for trial and imprison

him in other places.

13. All the alleged corrupt people, drug traffickers, illegal land seizers, and

alleged war criminals should be taken to the Shar’iah court. No side

should back them [criminals] secretly or in public.

296

APPENDIX C

14. After the withdrawal of foreign forces, no foreign fighters must stay in

Afghanistan.

15. If any domestic or foreign players are against this peace convention and

insist on the continuation of war, we will together confront these war-

lords until we rescue our country and nation.

God is the witness for what we have said

By now, it should be clear to all that neither foreign force can bring the security or

the government under the shadow of foreign forces. Illegitimate elections, corrupt

and minority representation parliaments, past illegitimate and wrong elections have

shown that this does not solve problems, but creates more problems. Under the

wing of occupying forces’ jets, elections have no value to any free and wise human

being. We saw that a limited number of people participated in the recent elections.

According to the official announcement of the election commission, the total votes

of all candidates were 1,200,000, meaning only 1 person out of every 30 Afghans.

Does this type of election have any value? This election has no legitimacy based on

Shar’iah, because it is similar to gambling. It depends entirely on expenses. People

who sell themselves to rich foreign forces for their election expenses win the parlia-

mentary election. Later, these people sell their integrity, beliefs, and nation in the

parliament. Such joke elections are always accompanied by fraud and corruption.

In particular the election result in Ghazni was clear evidence [of such fraud]. The

Hazara were a minority even when Dai Kundi province was part of Ghazni prov-

ince. The Hazara population fell below 20% after the establishment of Dai Kundi,

a new province created by Americans. However, the electoral commission

announced 11 Hazara candidates as winners and not even one Pashtun was among

the winners. All the winners belong to the Hazara minority. HIG will not partici-

pate in an election held under occupation and under the wings of foreign forces’

jets. It also does not agree with an election proven to have bad consequences.

297

pp. [xxv–xxx]

NOTES

PREFACE

1. The views expressed in this book are the author’s own and should not be construed

as an official position or policy of the US Government, Department of Defense,

Department of the Navy or Naval Postgraduate School.

2. For an image of this leaflet, see Herbert A. Freeman, “Psychological Operations in

Afghanistan,” http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html or http://www.psy-

warrior.com/afghanleaf04.html

3. I am well aware that this is a generalization and not all Afghans are xenophobic,

but my experience in the rural Pashtun areas suggests that many of these commu-

nities, for geographic and historical reasons, have an initial, basic, and real distrust

of foreigners and “outsiders.”

4. This leaflet was dropped throughout the first year of the war in a variety of loca-

tions in Afghanistan. It is my understanding that it was intially dropped near

Jalalabad and then in the Shomali Plain, north of Kabul.

5. Rzehak Lutz, “Doing Pashto: Pashtunwali as the ideal of honourable behavior and

tribal life among Pashtuns,” Afghanistan Analyst Network, p. 1, https://www.afghan-

istan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20110321LR-Pash-

tunwali-FINAL.pdf

6. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

7. Herbert A. Friedman, “Psychological Operations in Afghanistan, ” http://www.psy-

warrior.com/Herbafghan.html, describes the leaflet and validates the usefulness of this IO story: “On October 23 [2001], the Taliban showed that the leaflets and

radio messages were having a result. A senior militia official announced from Kabul

that the Afghan people in the eastern city of Jalalabad were burning [this] propa-

ganda leaflet and radios being dropped by U.S. planes to turn the population against

the Taliban. [This] leaflet [was] also reportedly dropped on the western neighbor-

hoods of Kabul. Some Afghans said that they were afraid to pick up the leaflets and

risk punishment by the Taliban.”

299

pp. [xxx–2]

NOTES

8. DOD Directive 3600.01.

9. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with PSYOP officer, November 2015. He sug-

gested a significant confusion between IO and PSYOP, as evidenced in many arti-

cles, white papers, and other research papers. Here are some examples: http://

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a575201.pdf http://www.rand.org/content/

dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf, http://usatoday30.

usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012–02–29/afghanistan-iraq-military-

information-operations-usa-today-investigation/53295472/1

10. Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with numerous Afghans as well as Taliban com-

manders in Kandahar, August 2008 and September 2009.

11. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with US Army PSYOP officer, November 2015.

12. See the 2006–9 Afghan Field Research Trip Reports in Thomas H. Johnson,

“Afghanistan Field Research Notebooks 3–6” (Monterey, CA, 2006–9).

13. Tim Foxley, “The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities: How Well is the Afghan

Insurgency Communicating and What is it Saying?” (Stockholm: SIPRI project

paper, June 2007), p. 10; Azam Ahmed, “Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Official

Afghan Courts Fail,” New York Times, 31 January 2015, http://www.nytimes.

com/2015/02/01/world/asia/taliban-justice-gains-favor-as-official-afghan-

courts-fail.html?_r=0

14. Typically, Pashto, Dari, Arabic, Urdu, and English.

15. Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002), p. 12.

16. Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet, “Inside the Surreal World of the Islamic State’s

Propaganda Machine,” Washington Post, 20 November 2015, https://www.wash-

ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda-

machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6–11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html

1. INTRODUCTION

1. http://9–11domorethenneverforget-stopislam.blogspot.com/2011/05/taliban-

and-muslims-use-social-media-to.html

2. Helio Fred Garcia, The Power of Communication: Skills to Build Trust, Inspire,

Loyalty, and Lead Effectively (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.,

2012), p. 20.

3. T. E. Lawrence, quoted in B. H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence of Arabia (New York:

DeCapo, 1989), p. 399.

4. Marshall McLuhan, The Medium is the Message (Berkeley, CA: Gingko Press, 2005).

5. Some information on other Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, will

be presented, but such groups are not a major focus of the research presented here.

The Tora Bora group is a Taliban offshoot that operated in eastern Afghanistan’s

Nangarhar and Kunar provinces between 2006 and approximately 2010. The Tora

Bora Military Front was created in 2006 and led by Anwar-ul Haq Mujahid, son of

300

NOTES

p. [2]

the late Maulana Yunis Khalis, Emir of Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis faction, or HIK).

Mujahid was reportedly arrested by Pakistani authorities in late 2009, other Afghan

insurgents such as the Dadul ah Front and Fidai Mahaz (Taliban splinter groups)

will not be assessed.

6. See Daniel G. Bates and Fred Plog, Cultural Anthropology, 2nd edn (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 7.

7. “Taliban” will be used as a plural noun (possessive form “Taliban’s”) throughout

this book, because the Afghan insurgent/jihadist organization is not homogenous

and consists of a variety of “types” of members, as well as units. See Appendix A for

a description of the various types of Taliban.

8. For some general studies of the Taliban, see William Maley, Fundamentalism

Reborn? (London: Hurst & Co., 1998); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam,

Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press; 2010); Wahid Muzhda, Afghanistan va panj sal-i sultah-i taliban [Afghanistan

Under Five Years of Taliban Sovereignty] (2003); Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan:

The Taliban Years (London: Bennett & Bloom, 2006); Husayn Ibn Mahmud,

“Al-Rajul al-‘Amlaaq: The Giant Man, ” 2005, http://www.archive.org/details/

TheGiantMan; Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After

the Taliban, reprint edn (London: Penguin Books, 2007); Iftikhar Murshed,

Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 1st edn (London: Bennett & Bloom, 2006); Robert

D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds), The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding

the New Taliban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Abdul Salam Zaeef, My

Life With the Taliban (London: Hurst & Co., 2010); Hassan Abbas, The Taliban

Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan–Afghanistan Frontier (New Haven,

CT: Yale University Press, 2014); Graeme Smith, The Dogs Are Eating Them Now:

Our War in Afghanistan (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2013); Mufti Rasheed Ludhianvi,

Obedience to the Amir (Berlin: First Draft Publishing, 2015); Anand Gopal, No

Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan

Eyes (London: Picador, 2015); Mufti Rasheed Ludhianvi, ed. Michael Semple, trans.

Yameema Mitha, Obedience to the Amir: An early text on the Afghan Taliban

Movement (Berlin: First Draft Publishing, 2015); V. Sahay Comdt, Taliban, Militant

Islam and Afghanistan (Delhi: Neha Publishers & Distributors, 2015); Mohammad

Akbar Agha, ed. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, I am Akbar Agha:

Memories of the Afghan Jihad and the Taliban (Berlin: First Draft Publishing, 2014);

Sandy Gal , War Against the Taliban: Why It All Went Wrong in Afghanistan (New

York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy

We Created: The Myth of the Taliban–Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan (London,

Hurst & Co., 2012); Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of

Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (London, Hurst & Co., 2013).

9. See David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996).

301

pp. [2–3]

NOTES

10. Mark Turner, The Literary Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 1.

11. Edwards, Heroes of the Age.

12. Turner, The Literary Mind, p. 1.

13. See, for example, Alicia Juarero, Dynamics in Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,

1999); Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Casebeer, and William D. Kiser, Warlords

Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,

2005); Troy S. Thomas and William D. Casebeer, “Violent Systems” (INSS

Occasional Paper 52, 2004); A. C. Graesser and G. V. Nakamura, “The impact of

a schema on comprehension and memory,” in H. Bower (ed.), The Psychology of

Learning and Motivation 16 (London: Academic Press, 1990), pp. 59–109; Maybel

Chau-Ping Wong, “The effects of story schemata on narrative recall, ” https://

repository.ust.hk/dspace/handle/1783.1/1337 (2004); Daniel Dennett, “The Self as Center of Narrative Gravity,” http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm

(1992); William D. Casebeer, “Military Force and Culture Change: Systems,

Narratives, and the Social Transmission of Behavior in Counter-Terrorism

Strategy” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006).

14. See D. A. Snow and R. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant

Mobilization,” in B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tarrow (eds), From Structure

to Action, Vol. 1 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), pp. 197–217; Nick Paton

Walsh, “Analysis: Afghanistan must recognize Taliban are winning,” CNN,

21 April 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/20/asia/afghanistan-escalation-

analysis/

15. For example, see Aish Ahmad and Roger Boase, Pashtun Tales from the Pakistan–

Afghan Frontier (London: Saqi Books, 2003); Margaret A. Mills, Rhetorics and

Politics in Afghan Traditional Storytelling (Philadelphia, PA: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1991); Amina Smith, Tales of Afghanistan (London: Octagon

Press, 1982); Akram Osman, trans. Arley Loewen, Real Men Keep Their Word:

Tales from Kabul, Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Henry

George Raverty, trans., Selections from the Poetry of Afghans: From the Sixteenth to

the Nineteenth Century (London: Forgotten Books, 2008).

16. This is particularly relevant to the Taliban’s expansion into several districts includ-

ing northern Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badghis, Jawzjan, Ghor, parts of Herat,

and Nimroz.

17. This takes into account that Afghan insurgents often employ and entice members

of society through financial and ideological means. Civilians willing to engage in

militant activity are typically convinced through self-motivators like grievances,

ethnic, tribal or business rifts, religious ideology, or opportunistic financial

incentives.

18. The analyses reported in this book represent research in the spirit of Edwards’

Heroes of the Age. Using oral narratives and other documentation, Edwards exam-

ined the lives of a variety of important Afghan figures, including Sultan Muhammad

302

NOTES

pp. [4–8]

Khan (a tribal chief ), Amir Abdur Khan (the “Iron Amir” of Afghanistan),

Najmuddin Akhundzada (the Mul ah of Hadda), as well as the “the mad Fakir of

Swat.” His sophisticated and fascinating use of narratives and stories to uncover

cultural artifacts and the underlying structure of the “moral systems” of these

Afghan characters has served as the impetus and guide for the research presented

here.

19. Anthony Trollope, An Autobiography (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 147.

20. Stephen King, On Writing: A Memoir of the Craft (London: Hodder and

Stoughton, 2000), p. 184.

21. For more information see her website: www.wayofstory.com

22. Catherine Ann Jones, The Way of Story: The Craft and Soul of Writing (Ojai, CA:

Prasana Press, 2004), p. 3.

23. Annette Simmons, The Story Factor: Inspiration, Influence, and Persuasion through

the Art of Storytelling (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p. 108; idem, Whoever Tells

the Best Story Wins: How to Use Your Own Stories to Communicate with Power and

Impact, 2nd edn (New York: AMACOM, 2015).

24. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand

Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1986), p. 16.

25. Ibid., pp. 153–4.

26. See Chapter 5.

27. William Safire, Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History (New York:

W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), pp. 21–2.

28. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1980), p. 3. See also Murray Knowles and Rosamund Moon,

Introducing Metaphor (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 31–2.

29. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 5.

30. Casebeer, Military Force and Culture Change, pp. 34–5.

31. Ibid., p. 36.

32. Patrick Colm Hogan, The Mind and its Stories (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2003), p. 83.

33. Ibid., p. 88.

34. Ibid., p. 94.

35. Ibid., p. 98.

36. Ibid., p. 204.

37. Ibid., p. 205.

38. Donald E. Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences (Albany,

NY: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 11.

39. Ibid.

40. Scott W. Ruston, COMOPS Journal (September 2009), http://comops.org/jour-

nal/2009/09/03/understand-what-narrative-is-and-does/ This online journal provides an interesting background on the concept of strategic communications,

narratives, and audiences.

303

pp. [8–11]

NOTES

41. Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodal , A 21st Century Model

for Communication in the Global War of Ideas (Consortium for Strategic

Communication, Arizona State University, 2007), p. 4.

42. Ibid., p. 7.

43. John T. Cacioppo and Richard E. Petty, “Effects of Message Repetition on

Argument Processing, Recal , and Presuasion,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology

10:1 (1989): 3–12; see also George E. Belch, “The Effects of Television Commercial

Repetition on Cognitive Response and Message Acceptance,” Journal of Consumer

Research 9:1 (June 1982): 56–65; George E. Belch and Michael A. Belch, “An

Investigation of The Effects of Repetition on Cognitive and Affective Reactions

to Humorous and Serious Television Commercials,” Advances in Consumer

Research 11 (1984): 4–10; Arie W. Kruglanski, Eric P. Thompson, and Scott

Spiegel, “Bimodal Notions of Persuasion and Single-Process ‘Unimodel’,” in Shelly

Chaiken and Yaacov Trope (eds), Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (New

York: Guilford Press, 1999), p. 308; Lawson Abinanti, “Positioning Depends on

Repetition and Consistency” (10 January 2016), http://www.messagesthatmat-

ter.com/positioning-depends-on-repetition-and-consistency/

44. Jared Lewis and Demand Media, “Repetition as a Persuasive Strategy,” Houston

Chronicle, http://smal business.chron.com/repetition-persuasive-strategy-26001.

html

45. Gerald R. Miller, “On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions,” in James Price

Dillard and Michael Pfau (eds), The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory

and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002).

46. Ibid., p. 4.

47. Ibid, p. 6.

48. H. C. Kelman, “Processes of Opinion Change,” in Public Opinion Quarterly 25

(1961): 57.

49. Miller, “On Being Persuaded,” p. 5.

50. Ibid.

51. Edgar Schein, Coercive Persuasion: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of the

“Brainwashing” of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese Communists (New

York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961).

52. Martyn Carruthers, Prevent Coercive Persuasion and Mind Control, Systemic

Coaching, http://www.systemiccoaching.com/coercion.htm (6 June 2011).

53. Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass

Inc, 1972), p. ix.

54. Edward L. Fink, Stan A. Kaplowitz, and Susan McGreevy Hubbard, “Oscillation

in Beliefs and Decisions,” in James Price Dillard and Michael Pfau (eds), The

Persuasion Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002), p. 18.

55. David R. Roskos-Ewoldsen, Laura Arpan-Ralstin, and James St Pierre, “Attitude

Accessibility and Persuasion: The Quick and the Strong,” in James Price Dillard

304

NOTES

pp. [11–15]

and Michael Pfau (eds), The Persuasion Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE

Publications, 2002), p. 39.

56. Ibid., p. 42.

57. Steven Col ins, “Mind Games,” NATO Review online edn (2003), p. 1, http://

www.iwar.org/uk/psyops/resources/iraq/mind-games.htm; R. Brown,

“Information Operations, Public Diplomacy and Spin: The United States and the

Politics of Perception Management,” Journal of Information Warfare, 1:3 (2013),

http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/32/JIW1_32.pdf#page=46

58. Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent

Operational Experience (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2005),

p. 17; Arturo Munoz, “U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan:

Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010,” National Defense Research

Institute (2012), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono-

graphs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf

59. Carnes Lord, “Psychological–Political Instruments,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and

James M. Ludes (eds), Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), p. 220.

60. Ibid., p. 222.

61. Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations, p. 10.

62. See James Watson, Media Communication: An Introduction to Theory and Process

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 14–24, 184–7, 199–203.

63. Albert C. Gunther, The Persuasive Press Inference: Effects of Mass Media on Perceived

Public Opinion (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998), http://crx.sage-

pub.com/content/25/5/486.ful .pdf+html

64. Richard E. Petty, Joseph R. Priester, and Pablo Brinol, “Mass Media Attitude

Change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion,” in

Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann (eds), Media Effects: Advances in Theory and

Research (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), http://crx.sagepub.

com/content/25/5/486.ful .pdf+html

65. Ibid., p. 126.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., p. 127.

68. Ibid., p. 128.

69. See Mao Tse-tung (Samuel B. Griffith, trans.), On Guerrilla Warfare (University

of Il inois Press, 2000; first published 1937).

2. AN OVERVIEW OF TALIBAN AND OTHER AFGHAN INSURGENT

STORIES AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR MASTER NARRATIVES

1. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big

One (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 31.

2. Ibid.

305

pp. [15–22]

NOTES

3. Tim Foxley, “The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities: How Well is the Afghan

Insurgency Communicating and What is it Saying?” (Stockholm: SIPRI Project

Paper, June 2007), p. 1.

4. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p. 31.

5. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/04/taliban-app-removed-

from-google-play-store; James Titcomb, “Google bans Taliban app for hate speech,”

Daily Telegraph, 4 April 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/

04/04/google-bans-taliban-app-for-hate-speech/

6. See Chapters 4–9 for an in-depth discussion of Taliban delivery systems.

7. This is particularly relevant to the Taliban’s expansion into several districts in

northern Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, Badghis, Jawzjan, and Sar-i-Pul

and other provinces in the north as well as the west. This was vividly seen in Kunduz

in late September 2015, when they took control of the city for over two weeks.

8. Mul ah Akhtar Mansour confirmed in July 2015 that leader Mul ah Omar had

been dead for more than two years. The news was kept secret by a handful of

Taliban leaders, apparently on tactical grounds. See Rod Nordland and Joseph

Goldstein, “Taliban Leader Mul ah Omar Died in 2013, Afghans Declare,” New

York Times, 29 July 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/asia/

mullah-omar-taliban-death-reports-prompt-inquiry-by-afghan-government.

html?_r=0; “Mul ah Omar: Taliban choose deputy Mansour as successor,” BBC

News, 30 July 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33721074

9. Rohan Joshi, “The Taliban after Mul ah Omar and the battle for Afghanistan,”

Business Standard, 11 August 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/

punditry/the-taliban-after-mullah-omar-the-battle-for-afghani-

stan-115081000751_1.html

10. https://www.khaama.com/taliban-announce-summer-offensive-under-the-name-

of-omari-operations-0622 and http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?

q=cache:eLwcru8SUh8J:shahamat-english.com/

statement-by-leadership-council-of-islamic-emirate-regarding-inauguration-of-

spring-offensive-entitled-operation-omari/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk

11. Throughout the book we will present the explicit stories, as we perceive and inter-

pet them, associated with the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent IO artifacts.

We will make every effort to make these interpretations as Afghan-centric as

possible.

12. This takes into account that insurgents employ and entice members of society

through financial and ideological means. Civilians willing to engage in militant

activity are typically convinced through self-motivators like grievances, ethnic,

tribal or business rifts, religious ideology, or opportunistic financial incentives.

13. Literally “way” or code of the Pashtun; Pashtunwali is an informal and unwritten

social code based around a series of various social identifiers and values, including

merana (willpower and tenacity), melmastia (hospitality), namus (honor/reputa-

306

NOTES

pp. [22–26]

tion), himmat (ambitiousness), sharam (shame), and badal (literally “exchange,”

but also used to refer to one seeking revenge), nenawati (the provision of sanctu-

ary), ghairat (bravery/courage), nang (honor, esteem). For sources on the Pashtun

generally, see James W. Spain, The Way of the Pathans (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1972); James W. Spain, The People of the Khyber, the Pathans of Pakistan

(New York: Praeger, 1962); Akbar Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society (London:

Routledge, 1980); Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans and Society (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1958); Brent Glatzer, “Being Pashtun–Being Muslim: Concepts

of Person and War in Afghanistan,” in Brent Glatzer (ed.), Essays on South Asian

Society, Culture and Politics II (Berlin: Zentrum Moderner Orient, 1998),

pp. 83–94; T. H. Holdich, “Swatis and Afridis,” Journal of the Anthropological

Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 29 (1899), http://links.jstor.org/

sici?sici=0959–5295(1899)29%3A1%2F2%3C2%3ASAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2–2; Niloufer Qasim Mahdi, Pukhtunwali: Ostracism and Honor Among the Pathan

Hill Tribes (New York: Elsevier, 1986), p. 1.

14. Ben Brandt, Mullah Omar’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,

CTC Sentinel 4:6 (June 2011): 19–23; Gilles Dorronsoro, Counterintelligence

and Hill Tribes U.S. Needs to Wise Up, US News, 20 February 2009, http://www.

usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/02/20/

taliban-strategy-in-afghanistan-is-smart-politics-so-us-needs-to-wise-up

15. “Da Kufar sara Jang dai” (Fight with Infidels) was credited to a singer named

Shaheed Samiul ah Shahid, http://alemarah-iea.net/Taranee/

16. Thomas H. Johnson, with Mumtaz Ahmad and Dietrich Reetz, Who Speaks for

Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia, NBR Special

Report #22 (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2010).

17. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with Canadian Military Intelligence Officer,

September 2009.

18. This is not to suggest that ethnic and religious friction is non-existent in contem-

porary Afghanistan. Hazara and Pashtun divides, for instance, are particularly

acute in areas where Pashtun nomads (Kochi) interfere with Hazara-owned pas-

tures, namely in Ghazni, Wardak, Uruzgan, and Daikundi provinces.

19. Rod Nordland and Jawad Sukhanyar, “Taliban Are Said to Target Hazaras to Try

to Match ISIS’ Brutality, Afghans Declare,” New York Times, 22 April 2015, http://

www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/world/asia/taliban-are-said-to-target-hazaras-

to-try-to-match-isis-brutality.html; Mohammad Radmanesh, “Taliban violence reaches new peak after Hazara murders,” France 24 The Observers, 11 November

2015, http://observers.france24.com/en/20151111-taliban-murder-women-

children-hazara

20. “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007),” UNAMA (9 September 2007),

p. 68. See also Thomas H. Johnson, “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations,” Small

Wars and Insurgencies 24:1 (January 2013): 3–27.

21. During field research in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1986–7, numerous Afghan

307

pp. [27–32]

NOTES

families approached the author to write compilations and stories about family

members martyred during the anti-Soviet jihad.

22. Waigal district was attacked and overrun by insurgents in March 2011.

23. “Nick Paton Walsh reports on the reappearance of the Taliban to control one

Afghanistan town near the Pakistan border,” CNN, 22 June 2011.

24. See note 13 in this chapter.

25. See Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence

in Afghanistan,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly 5:2 (2007): 93–129.

26. A US intelligence analyst found this Taliban leaflet in eastern Afghanistan in 2006,

and gave it to the author in January 2007. The Taliban’s use of leaflets is very rare;

this is one of the few that I have ever seen.

27. Namus refers to a Pashtun man’s responsibility to uphold the honor of his wife or

wives, daughters, and his unmarried or widowed sisters. Importantly, the honor

of an Afghan man and the honor of all females he is responsible for are interde-

pendent values. Ghairat refers to the fundamental pride of an Afghan man’s cour-

age. If a person’s courage is in question, he may no longer be called a man until he

can prove it by showing it to people in practice. It could be participation in war,

protection of village, family, and property or other activities that benefit people

in the community. Paighour refers to taunting one’s honor; it is a provoking

reminder to a person whose acts have crossed or will cross the limits of commu-

nity-accepted behavior.

28. In August 2009, the author was told that many Kandahari businessmen, the last

people one would expect to support the Taliban, regularly went to Zangabar,

Panjawyi to have water and land disputes resolved by the Taliban court and judges.

The Karzai judicial system was viewed as slow, corrupt, and ineffectual.

29. During the Taliban’s retreat and reconstitution phase, 2001–3, messaging primar-

ily targeted Pashtun communities with threats against “col aborators” in the south

and east as a way to re-establish influence, sympathy, and support among the locals.

The years 2003–6 saw an increase in messaging that targeted Pashtun communi-

ties, in search of able-bodied recruits and helping to exploit communal grievances

against the Afghan government and Coalition/NATO forces, including issues of

tribal marginalization/isolation and losses from errant military strikes; it also

tapped into the large pool of poor farming communities who were targets of the

forced poppy eradication campaign.

30. “Taliban Strikes Back,” CBS, 31 March 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/sto-

ries/2003/04/03/attack/main547507.shtml

31. “Taliban chief calls for unity against U.S. troops,” Reuters, 6 November 2005,

http://www.redorbit.com/news/general/296445/taliban_chief_calls_for_unity_

against_us_troops/index.html

308

NOTES

pp. [45–56]

4. TALIBAN AND AFGHAN INSURGENT MAGAZINES, CIRCULARS,

AND NEWSLETTERS

1. Riaz Khan, “Pakistan arrests former Taliban spokesman,” The Independent, 4 January

2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan-arrests-former-

taliban-spokesman-1224489.html

2. Muttaqi was the first Minister of Information and Culture before he was later reshuf-

fled to serve as the regime’s Minister of Education.

3. Joanna Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the

New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press,

2009), p. 30.

4. Ibid., pp. 30, 40.

5. Ibid., p. 30.

6. Ibid., p. 30.

7. “Mukhbat biography,” Daily Shahadat, http://dailyshahadat.com/mujale-show-

page.php?id=340

8. “Selection List: Review of Pro-Taliban, Islamist Publications Oct/Nov 09,” Open

Source Center, SAP20091130950058, Caversham BBC Monitoring in English,

30 November 2009.

5. THE TALIBAN’S USE OF SHABNAMAH (NIGHT LETTERS)

1. This section is based, in part, on Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and

an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18:3

(September 2007): 317–44.

2. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 129.

3. While many shabnamah are hand-written, typically in nearly illegible bad gram-

mar, some shabnamah are typed and printed using modern computer and printer

capabilities. Many of these are produced in Pakistan.

4. See Table 5.1 and its expanded definitions.

5. Appendix B (available online at www.hurstpublishers.com/book/taliban-narra-

tives) presents a unique summary of 279 Taliban night letters/ shabnamah from 2008–10 which the author and colleagues collected during field trips to Afghanistan,

especially southern Afghanistan. Some of these letters were sent unsolicited to the

author from US government personnel.

6. See Appendix B for night letters elaborating on these themes.

7. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 114.

8. For example, see Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds),

Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing

Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);

Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, “Toward an Integrated Perspective

on Social Movements and Revolution,” in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman

(eds), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge:

309

pp. [56–58]

NOTES

Cambridge University Press, 1997); Scott Mann, “Combat Story Telling,”

Narrative Strategies, 2 January 2016, http://www.narrative-strategies.com/scott-

mann/combat-story-telling

9. The use of oral narratives for transmitting instructions and legends is crucial, espe-

cially in rural Afghanistan, considering that the vast majority of the rural popula-

tion is illiterate. Night letters are generally posted at mosques or delivered to a

literate village member and read to the community during a mass meeting.

10. See Chapter 7.

11. Hafizullah Emadi, Culture and Customs of Afghanistan (London: Greenwood

Press, 2005), p. 98.

12. Sandy Gal , Afghanistan: Agony of a Nation (London: Bodley Head, 1988), p. 99.

13. Nelofer Pazira, A Bed of Red Flowers: In Search of My Afghanistan (New York: Free

Press, 2005), p. 102.

14. For an example of a media account of night letters posted near the Spin Boldak

border, see Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: U.S. Investigates Taliban ‘Night Letters’

Threatening Villagers,” RadioLiberty, 10 March 2004, http://www.rferl.org/fea-

turesarticle/2004/03/c47dc6f9–5e79–4213–8c0e-2430cf0557b5.html; also Jon Rabiroff, “Chilling ‘night letters’ from Taliban intimidate Afghans,” Stars and

Stripes, 30 November 2010, http://www.stripes.com/news/chilling-night-letters-

from-taliban-intimidate-afghans-1.127043; and “Desperate Afghans pin asylum hopes on Taliban threat letters,” Dawn, 15 September 2015, http://www.dawn.

com/news/1207786

15. Aryn Baker, “Deadly Notes in the Night: How the Taliban are using a new kind

of terrorist threat to intimidate Afghans,” Time Magazine, 5 July 2006.

16. Ibid.

17. PYSOP officer interview by Captain Keely M. Fahoum, 14 June 2006. US PSYOP

personnel have expressed frustration at their inability to respond to Taliban night

letters in a timely, effective manner. While the Taliban could hand-deliver their

communiqués to strategic points of contact within rural villages, US PSYOP plan-

ners have limited physical access or intimate knowledge of village politics and

social structure. During Operation Enduring Freedom, PSYOP personnel and

analysts struggled with bureaucratic red tape, which made it next to impossible to

respond to Taliban propaganda efforts in a timely manner. (Personal communi-

cation with two PSYOP officers at the Naval Postgraduate School, May–July

2006.)

18. I would like to thank former NPS student Captain Keely M. Fahoum, USAF, for

her outstanding support of the Taliban night letter analysis presented here. Captain

Fahoum’s earlier conceptualizations of Taliban shabnamah have been critical to

my thinking on the subject.

19. This particular night letter was distributed and provided to the author in May

2006 by a government analyst returning from an Afghanistan deployment.

310

NOTES

pp. [61–63]

20. Translation provided from Amin Tarzi interview, 14 July 2006 and Farid

Mohammad, September 2006.

21. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Afghanistan (London: Macmillan, 1940), p. 367.

22. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 314.

23. Ibid., p. 314.

24. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958),

pp. 15–19.

25. Caroe states that Ghilzais are descendants of Khalaj Turks who came with Attila

and the Huns. Caroe also states that after several centuries these tribes became

Pashtunized and they formed a unique dialect of Pakhtu with a heavy Turkish

vocabulary. He also states that the word Ghilzai comes from Khalaj, which evolved

through time from Khalaj to Khalji to Ghalji to Ghalzai or Ghilzai. Ibid.,

pp. 15–19.

26. See Thomas H. Johnson and W. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and

Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 51:1 (2007).

27. James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1963),

pp. 41, 57; Caroe, The Pathans and Society, pp. 15–19.

28. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 322–5; Frank Clements, Conflict in Afghanistan: A

Historical Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 94.

29. The only period when the Pashtuns did not hold power in Afghanistan was briefly

in 1929 when Habibul ah Ghazi, a Tajik, took power until he was overthrown and

Durranis returned to power Mohammad Najibul ah Ahmadzai, who was a Soviet

puppet during the USSR occupation of Afghanistan. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Tajik

leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami, was an ineffectual Mujahidin president of pre-Tali-

ban Afghanistan from June 1992 until the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996,

and the present Afghan President Ashraf, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. It is interest-

ing to note that since becoming Afghan president in 2014, he is officially refered

to as Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, dropping the name Ahmadzai, referring to his

tribe from the Ghilzai conferation.

30. The competition and distrust between the Ghilzai and Durranis played a major

role in the split of the PDPA when the Khalq (the people or masses) led by Nur

Mohammed Taraki represented Ghilzai Pashtuns and the Parcham (Banner) led

by Babrak Karmal represented the Durrani Pashtun, See Henry S. Bradsher,

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 2nd edn (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1985).

31. From the hundreds of resistance groups which emerged to challenge the Soviet

invasion and occupation, the Pakistani directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI), who played a central role arming and training Afghan resistance groups, rec-

ognized seven Sunni parties and established offices for them through which to

channel covert support. Although most of these resistance groups had a strong

religious ethos, the groups were organized primarily along ethno-linguistic and

tribal lines. Significantly, while three parties were explicitly led by a Ghilzai, all

311

pp. [64–69]

NOTES

the “leaders” of the Peshawar parties except for one had Ghilzai tribal connections.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, and Nabi Muhammadi were

Ghilzais; Younis Khalis was from a neighboring eastern Pushtun tribe (the

Khugiani); Pir Gailani and Sibghatullah Mujaddidi were from immigrant Sufi

families whose religious and political links are largely with Ghilzais. Only

Burhanuddin Rabbani has no intimate connection with Ghilzais. None of the

Peshawar parties was led by the Durranis, who were deliberately marginalized by

the ISI.

32. See Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

33. Gailani’s NIFA party often stood in for the royal family, partially because of the

anomalous position of former King Zahir Shah.

34. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 314.

35. Steve Col , Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden,

from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004),

p. 238.

36. Jeffery J. Roberts, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (Westport, CT: Praeger

Publishing, 2003), p. xiii.

37. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2005), p. 83.

38. Night letter provided by a government analyst deployed in Afghanistan in 2003,

translated by Amin Tarzi and Farid Mohammad, October 2006.

39. Translation provided by Farid Mohammad, October 2006.

40. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and

Insurgency in Afghanistan.”

41. Anna Badkhen, “Afghan government failure reopens door to the Taliban,” San

Francisco Chronicle, 17 September 2006, p. A4; David Jolly, “Afghanistan’s

Crippled Power Grid Exposes Vulnerability of Beseiged Capital,” New York Times,

17 February 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/world/asia/afghani-

stan-hardship-taliban-bombings.html?_r=0

42. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly

Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: 30 July 2014).

43. See especially ch. 8 of Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global

Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd edn (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,

2003).

44. See Bruce Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin

Laden (London: Verso, 2005); also “Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN,”

BBC News, 3 November 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/

media_reports/1636782.stm; “Transcript of Bin Laden’s October interview,”

CNN World, 5 February 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/

south/02/05/binladen.transcript/; Bernard Lewis, “License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad,” Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1998, https://www.for-

312

NOTES

pp. [70–74]

eignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/1998–11–01/license-kill-usama-bin-ladins-

declaration-jihad; Doug Bandow, “Terrorism: Why They Want to Kill Us,”

Huffington Post, 25 May 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/

terrorism-why-they-want-t_b_631942.html

45. Source: http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/education/letter8.htm

46. Source: http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/education/letter8.htm

47. A term of Persian origin, meaning an army, a camp; or one belonging to an army,

a soldier.

48. Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 453.

49. Gerges, The Far Enemy, p. 83; “Taliban expands fight beyond Afghanistan’s

Kunduz,” Aljazeera, 1 October 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/

taliban-expands-fight-afghanistan-kunduz-151001172158686.html

50. He reportedly started the Taliban after a dream in which Al ah came to him in the

shape of a man, asking him to lead the faithful. In 1996 he made a risky but bril-

liant propaganda move, which again supports the notion of him being a charis-

matic leader, by taking the garment which Afghans believe to be the Prophet

Mohammed’s shroud or cloak out of Kandahar’s royal mausoleum for the first time

in sixty years and wearing it at a public rally as a way of identifying himself with

the Prophet (Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 1st edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 2001), p. 20.) The cloak is believed by many of the 90 per cent of Pashtuns

who are illiterate to contain supernatural and mystical powers. This action also

represented Omar’s absolute faith in his perceived divine right to rule, and gave

him legitimacy in his role as leader of the Afghan people ordained by Al ah; soon

after Omar was named Amir-ul Momineen or leader of the faithful, not just of

the Afghans but of all Muslims. The cloak of the Prophet Mohammed had been

folded and padlocked in a series of chests in a crypt in the royal mausoleum at

Kandahar: “myth had it that the padlocks to the crypt could be opened only when

touched by a true Amir-ul Momineen, a king of the Muslims.” See Joseph A. Raelin,

“The Myth of Charismatic Leaders,” March 2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/

articles/mi_m0MNT/is_3_57/ai_98901483

51. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (eds), Afghanistan Country Study

(Washington, DC: American University, Foreign Area Studies, 1986), http://

www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/Family.html

52. Miles Bredin, “Class war: battle to educate Afghan girls and boys hindered by fear

of Taliban retribution,” The Independent, 12 September 2006; Simon Tomlinson,

“Hundreds of Afghan girls poisoned by toxic gas at two schools in suspected attacks

by Taliban militants opposed to their education,” Daily Mail, 3 September 2015,

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3221073/Hundreds-Afghan-girls-

poisoned-toxic-gas-two-schools-suspected-attacks-Taliban-militants-opposed-

education.html; Abdul ah Saljoqi, “Taliban burn down girls’ school in Afghanistan,”

France 24 The Observers, 4 November 2015, http://observers.france24.com/

en/20151104-taliban-shut-down-girls-school-afghanistan; for a similar type of attack by the Pakistani Taliban, see Sophla Salfi and Greg Botelho, “In Pakistan

313

pp. [75–84]

NOTES

school attack, Taliban terrorists kill 145, mostly children,” CNN World, 17

December 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/16/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-

school-attack/

53. Source: Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/

education/letter5.htm

54. Noor Khan, “Militants behead Afghan principal for educating girls: Taliban

assaults cited in closing of schools,” Boston Globe, 5 January 2006.

55. Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/education/

letter3.htm

56. Source: Humans Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/

education/letter3.htm

57. Esther Pan, “Afghanistan’s New Security Threat,” Backgrounder, Council on Foreign

Affairs, 14 February 2006. See also Griff Witte, “Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens in

Afghanistan, Violence in South is Seen as Message to NATO,” Washington Post

Foreign Service, 17 January 2006, p. A11.

58. See Thomas H. Johnson, “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations,” Small Wars and

Insurgencies 24: 1 (January 2013): 3–27.

59. For a chronology of suicide bombings in Afghanistan, compiled by Radio Liberty,

see http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/9ac36a59-d683–4189-a2b9–

94fe5fbf32ad.html

60. Griff Witte, “Afghans Confront Surge in Violence: Foreign Support Seen Behind

Attacks that Mimic Those in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 November 2005,

p. 1; Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Are Militants Copying Iraqi Insurgents’ Suicide

Tactics?” Radio Free Europe Radio Library, 17 January 2006, http://www.rferl.

org/content/article/1064791.html

61. Associated Press, “Top Taliban military commander dismisses NATO casualty

reports, warns journalists,” International Harold Tribune (Asian and Pacific edi-

tion), 4 September 2006, internet version, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/

2006/09/04/asia/AS_GEN_Afghan_Taliban.php

62. Thomas H. Johnson, “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations.”

63. Source: Humans Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/

education/letter9.htm

64. Source: Humans Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/campaigns/afghanistan/2006/

education/letter9.htm

65. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “In search of the Taliban’s missing link,” Asia Times Online,

16 September 2006, http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI16Df01.html

66. Together these stories (frames) become an important Taliban narrative.

67. Charles Lindholm. “The Segmentary Lineage System: Its Applicability to Pakistan’s

Political Structure,” in Ainslie T. Embree (ed.), Pakistan’s Western Borderlands:

The Transformation of Political Order (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977),

p. 60.

314

NOTES

pp. [87–92]

6. THE TALIBAN’S USE OF THE INTERNET, SOCIAL NETWORKING,

VIDEOS, RADIO STATIONS, AND GRAFFITI

1. For instance, the 92,000 US military intelligence files “leaked” in the notorious

Wikileaks controversy in the summer of 2010 denoted Pakistan’s involvement in

the Afghan conflict, namely the state-provided support for the Taliban and the

Haqqani Network. See also Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship

Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” Discussion Paper 18 (Carr Center

for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,

June 2010); Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal

Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers, 1st edn (New York: Public Affairs, 2011);

Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War

through Afghan Eyes (London: Picador, 2015); Carlotta Gal , The Wrong Enemy:

America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York: Harcourt, 2014).

2. Some interviews include Taliban former “shadow” governors such as Qari Omar

Farouq (Faryab 2009), Mauluvi Raz Haider (Balkh), Nur Mohammad (Wardak),

Mawlawi Muhammad Muhsin Hashimi (Takhar), Mullah Shahabuddin Ghori

(Herat, 2010), and Qari Mohammad Ismail Siraji (Jawzjan), among a few.

3. Ian Traynor, “NATO Afghanistan mission in doubt after Dutch withdrawal,”

Guardian, 22 February 2010; “Dutch government falls over Afghanistan mission,”

rnw media, https://www.rnw.org/archive/dutch-government-falls-over-afghani-

stan-mission. Italy, Spain, and Germany have all suffered national political crises stemming from their NATO participation in Afghanistan.

4. International Crisis Group, “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?”

Asia Report 158 (July 2008): 15.

5. Internet World Stats: Afghanistan Country Profile, http://www.internetworld-

stats.com/asia/af.htm; Index Mundi, Afghanistan: internet users, http://www.

indexmundi.com/facts/afghanistan/internet-users; World Bank Data: Internet users (per 100 people), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2

6. Policy statement, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, H. E. Mr Amirzai Sangin,

Minister, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT),

http://www.itu.int/plenipotentiary/2010/statements/afghanistan/sangin.html

7. “SEAF-AGF & RANA Technologies Enterprises Partner to Expand Internet Service

in Afghanistan,” 24 January 2011, http://www.afghangrowthfinance.com/detail.

asp?CatID=18&ContID=44

8. The official Taliban Twitter account is http://twitter.com/#!/alemarahweb and of this writing was last updated 19 June 2011.

9. Anecdotal reporting suggests that in 2006 the Taliban scattered hundreds of DVDs

around the village of Niyazi, which is less than 3 miles from the center of Kabul.

Ivan Watson, “Taliban Enlists Video in Fight for Afghanistan,” NPR,

2 November 2006, http://www.wbur.org/npr/6423946/taliban-enlists-video-in-

fight-for-afghanistan

315

pp. [97–104]

NOTES

10. Ibid., p. 11.

11. Amir Shah, “Ministry: Taliban Spokesman Arrested,” Associated Press,

27 September 2007. Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS)

claimed in May 2011 that Zabihul ah Mujahid is the nom de guerre of Haji Ismail,

a 42-year-old resident from Chaman Pakistan. Ray Rivera and Carlotta Gall,

“Rebutting Afghan Spy Agency, Taliban Say Their Leader Isn’t Dead,” New York

Times, 23 May 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/asia/24omar.

html

12. “Taliban Threatens to Kill Captured US Soldier,” NBC News, 16 July 2009.

“Taliban Dismisses Top Leader Mansoor Dadul ah,” Associated Press, 30 December

2007.

13. While conducting field research in southern Afghanistan in the summer of 2008,

the author found it quite easy to make telephone contact with the Taliban spokes-

men designated for southern Afghanistan (Qari Yousaf Ahmadi) and eastern

Afghanistan (Zabihul ah Mujahid) and spoke to them on two occasions.

14. Amin Tarzai, “Taliban radio back on the air,” Asia Times Online, 11 March 2005,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GE11Ag01.html

15. “Afghanistan: Taliban Launch New Radio Station in South,” Xinhua, 8 August

2009, republished at http://www.amicaltmedia.net/headlines-archive.php?pid= 

316&year=2009. The Taliban were also reported to have broadcast three-hour programs in Ghazni as well.

16. Radioinfo.com.au, https://www.radioinfo.com.au/news/taliban-launch-secret-

radio-station

17. Excerpt taken from OSC: Caversham BBC Monitoring in English (originally filed

as SAP20091002950045).

18. Yochi J. Dreazen and Siobhan Gorman, “Pentagon James Web, Radio Links of the

Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, 18 April 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/

SB124001042575330715

19. Sher Ahmed Haider, “In Ghazni, Taliban FM radio goes on air,” Pajhwok Afghan

News, 8 August 2009, available at http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=

eng&id=79248

20. See http://www.shahamat.org/

21. Ibid. Claire Truscott, “‘Gooooood mornin’ Afghanistan!’ US fights Taliban on

airwaves,” AFP, 6 October 2009, available at http://www.google.com/hosted-

news/afp/article/ALeqM5gygBjOcD9BhvtVR38JWQJFPS8PcA

22. Charles Lindholm. “The Segmentary Lineage System: Its Applicability to Pakistan’s

Political Structure,” in Ainslie T. Embree (ed.), Pakistan’s Western Borderlands:

The Transformation of Political Order (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977),

pp. 41–66.

23. Early reports from the time when the Taliban were created indicated that the

movement did not seek wider political authority than the re-establishment of law

and order in Kandahar province.

316

NOTES

pp. [105–114]

24. International Crisis Group, “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?”

Asia Report 158, 24 July 2008.

25. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

7. THE AFGHANS’ AND TALIBAN’S USE OF POETRY AND TARANAS AS

AN EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION TOOL

1. This chapter is based in part on Thomas H. Johnson and Wali Ahmed Shaaker,

“The Taliban’s Use of Poetry,” unpublished manuscript, 2008).

2. See http://www.jahromchalipa.blogfa.com/cat-6.aspx

3. Louis Dupree, The Afghans Honor a Muslim Saint (New York: American

Universities Field Staff, 1963), p. 12.

4. For the authoritative work on Taliban poetry, see Alex Strick van Linschoten and

Felix Kuehn (eds), Poetry of the Taliban (London: Hurst & Co., 2012).

5. “A leader in Afghanistan must be a poet. It establishes his intellectual legitimacy.

Without poetry, a man who aspires to leadership will be disregarded as intellec-

tually inferior.” Interview with an Afghan poet, 27 August 2009.

6. Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational

Analysis,” Military Review (May–June 2008): 59; Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in

Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4 July 2014, http://www.cfr.org/

afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551

7. For a more in-depth analysis of why poetry resonates so strongly with Afghans,

see Wali Shaaker, “Poetry: Why it Matters to Afghans,” Culture and Conflict

Studies Occasional Paper Series (Monterey, CA: Department of National Security

Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, August 2009).

8. As mentioned above, see van Linschoten and Kuehn (eds), Poetry of the Taliban.

9. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2005), p. 3.

10. Raymond Ibrahim (ed. and trans.), The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway

Books, 2007), pp. 198–208.

11. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious

Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), p. 10.

12. Bernt Glatzer, “Being Pashtun–Being Muslim: Concepts of Person and War in

Afghanistan,” Essays on South Asian Society: Culture and Politics II (Zentrum

Moderner Orient Arbeitshefte, 9) (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1998), pp. 83–94.

13. A more detailed account of this event may be found in Sir Ewen Martin,

Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics (New York: Harper Col ins,

2002).

14. All of the Taliban poems examined here can be found at http://www.toorabora.

com/

15. Takfir is an Arabic word derived from the term kufr meaning impiety. In Islamic

doctrine, this is a very serious accusation: that one who is or claims to be Muslim

317

pp. [114–139]

NOTES

is declared to be impure, is excommunicated in the eyes of the Community of the

Faithful, may no longer benefit from the protection of the law, and is condemned

to death. As per Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 31–2.

16. Glatzer, “Being Pashtun–Being Muslim,” pp. 83–94.

17. Aisha Ahmad and Roger Boase, Pashtun Tales from the Pakistan–Afghan Frontier

(London: Saqi Books, 2008), p. 16.

18. Nimrod was the builder of the tower of Babel. He was said to have subverted the

people away from honoring God in favor of honoring him. In the Book of Genesis,

God punishes Nimrod and his people by sowing many languages in them so that

they can no longer understand each other, thereby breaking up Nimrod’s kingdom

into many smaller multilingual factions. The idea conveyed by the poet is that the

multilingual peoples of the world are all coming now to Afghanistan.

19. Forgiveness from God.

20. Belal lived 578–622. He was a slave from Abyssinia, whom Abubakr bought and

released from slavery. He joined the army of Prophet Mohammad and, and as a

committed Muslim and warrior, fought many wars. He was also the Mo’azen—

the caller to prayers.

21. The third Khalifa of Islam.

22. The second Khalifa of Islam.

23. Reference to Khaled Ebni Walid, the conqueror of Spain.

24. The poet’s last name.

25. The actual word is Malang, referring to a hermit, poor type of person.

26. The lover of Laila from the Laila and Majnon Afghan love story.

27. Born in the Khogyanai district of Nangarhar, he was the leader of the Islamic Party-

Khalis—one of the Peshawar-based resistant parties during the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan. He died in 2003.

28. People of religious authority and respect.

29. Western attire.

30. Not permissible according to Islamic law.

31. A clerical decree.

32. A cautionary reminder: due to the vast number of poets and diversity of opinions

among the moderate poets, it could prove erroneous to categorize the moderates

as pro- or anti-government. That the moderates do not encourage people to take

up arms against the government does not necessarily mean that they support the

government. However, a vast number of poets, essayists, and novelists are highly

critical of the state. They often criticize institutional corruption, and accuse the

government of inefficiency and incompetence in serving the public. It seems that

what they aim to accomplish is to generate awareness among the general public,

and initiate a discourse on social, economic, and political issues within the intel-

lectual community. However, this does not necessarily translate into an attempt

318

NOTES

pp. [141–144]

to encourage a revolt against the government. What it does mean is that they are

despondent regarding certain aspects of the current political and or economic

state of affairs, and that they wish to contribute to positive social, political, and

economic change in Afghanistan.

33. This section is based, in part on Thomas H. Johnson and Ahwad Waheed,

“Analyzing Taliban Taranas (Chants): An Effective Afghan Propaganda Artifact,”

Small Wars and Insurgencies 22:1 (March 2011): 3–31. For an interesting and one

of the few analysis of Taranas see: Michael Semple, “The Rhetoric of Resistance

in the Talibans’ Rebel Ballads,” Carr Center Working paper, Harvard Kennedy

School, March 2011.

34. Loy Kandahar is a common term used by Afghans to describe the contemporary

provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, and Zabul.

35. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with Kandahar City resident, June 2009.

36. See Hiromi Lorraine Sakata, Music in the Mind: The Concept of Music and Musician

in Afghanistan (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1983).

37. Hafizul ah Emadi, Culture and Customs of Afghanistan (Westport, CT: Greenwood

Press, 2005), p. 103.

38. A particularly important type of Afghan folk song is known as nakhta, usually

sung by women to mourn death or in honor of heroic figures.

39. For overviews of Sufi history and philosophy, see Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam:

An Introduction to Sufism (New York: New York University Press, 1989);

Annnemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill, NC: University

of North Carolina Press, 1975); and J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders of

Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

40. During the Afghan Mujahidin regime of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992–6), music

was heavily censored and discouraged. Musicians had to apply formally for spe-

cial licenses, and only men could perform at private indoor ceremonies or gather-

ings. See John Baily, “The Censorship of Music in Afghanistan,” http://www.rawa.

org/music.htm

41. By 2009, analysts estimated that nearly 500 shops selling music CDs and cassettes

had been burned and looted in the Swat region of Pakistan alone. Khushal

Yousafzai, “Music has died in the Swat valley,” Freemuse, 23 April 2009; “Taliban

group issues new ban on sale of music,” Freemuse, 23 August 2007.

42. Abubakar Siddique, “Understanding the Taliban’s Campaign Against Music,”

Freemuse, http://www.freemuse.org/sw34252.asp; “British Ethnomusicologist,

‘It Isn’t Actually Correct to Say Taliban Have Banned Music’,” Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty, 22 June 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/British_Ethno-

musicologist_Discusses_Talibans_Campaign_Against_Musicians/1753865.html

43. John Baily “‘Can you stop the birds singing?’ The censorship of music in

Afghanistan,” Freemuse, April 2001, http://www.freemuse.org/sw1106.asp

44. The Taliban usage of poetry follows the boundaries of Ghazal, which is arguably

319

pp. [144–148]

NOTES

the most popular classical form of poetry. We suspect that the Taliban use similar

techniques in their creation of taranas.

45. Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with Kandahari residents (urban and rural), June–

July 2009.

46. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with Kandahar City resident, August 2010.

47. Numerous conversations between Thomas H. Johnson and US government and

military personnel in 2009 and 2010.

48. For Taliban magazines, see “Morchal Monthly Magazine,” Alemarah, http://

ia360709.us.archive.org/4/items/morchal-june-201/morchal-june-2010.pdf;

“Shahamat,” Alemarah, http://www.alemarah-iea.com/website/; “Sarak Monthaly Magazine,” Alemarah, http://www.alemarah-iea.com/website/; “Taliban Tarana,”

http://www.getalyric.com/listen/sOZf78NLS00/taliban_tarana

49. For Taliban websites, see “Alemarah Taliban Poetry Section,” Alemarah, http://

www.alemarah-iea.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=

7&Itemid=15; “Alemarah Taliban Tarana Section,” Alemarah, http://www.ale-

marah-iea.com/

50. For a couple of YouTube examples, see “Taliban Pashto Nasheed Al ah u Akbar,”

You Tube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAvz0g_e04Q&feature=related;

“2010 Pashto Taran Taliban,” You Tube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ryo

8mCMyKhk&feature=related

51. We are indebted to Alex Strick van Linschoten for graciously sharing CDs of

Taliban chants, June 2009, Kandahar City.

52. All taranas were translated by Ahwad Waheed.

53. See Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978);

Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990).

54. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p. 242, defines a qawm as a “com-

munal group, whose sociological basis may vary. It may be a clan (in tribal zones),

a village, an ethnic group, an extended family, or a professional group.”

55. David Isby, Afghanistan: A New History of the Borderland (New York: Pegasus

Books, 2010), p. 47, my emphasis.

56. We are interested in how the chants relate to Pashtun values, and we use Hofstede’s

definition of value as “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over oth-

ers.” Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-

Related Values (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1980), p. 18.

57. Ibid.

58. For a discussion of “cosmic threats,” see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind

of God (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

59. For statements concerning an analysis of anti-US sentiments among the Afghan

public, see for example: “NATO Forces in Afghanistan Can’t Deny They Killed

Civilians in Sangin Anymore,” You Tube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E4

m6tQudSpI&feature=player_embedded; “TIME’s Cover, the CIA and Afghan 320

NOTES

pp. [150–158]

Women,” Firedoglake, http://firedoglake.com/2010/08/06/times-cover-the-cia-

and-afghan-women/; Sayed Salahudin, “Karzai orders probe into Afghan civilian deaths reports,” Reuters, 5 August 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS-

TRE6741KP20100805; Carlotta Gal , “Afghans Want a Deal on Foreign Troops,”

New York Times, 25 August 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/26/world/

asia/26afghan.html

60. Based on interviews by Thomas H. Johnson in Kandahar City and the Dand and

Panjwayi districts of Kandahar province, August 2010.

61. Based on discussions with Thomas H. Johnson and residents of Kandahar City,

June 2010 and August 2010.

62. For example, Afghanistan qualified to play in the Cricket World Cup (ICC) World

Twenty20 Tournament after achieving first position in a qualifying round in Dubai

in February 2010. Afghanistan and Oman shared the Asian Cricket Council

(ACC) Twenty20 Cup in November 2007; in winter 2007, Afghanistan partici-

pated in the Asian Winter Games held in Changchun, China; in 2007 the Afghan

cricket team were finalists in the ACC U-19 Elite Cup; in 2008, Afghanistan com-

peted at the Summer Olympics in Beijing, China. Rohul ah Nikpai made history

by winning Afghanistan’s first Olympic medal. He defeated world champion Juan

Antonio Ramos of Spain to take the bronze in the men’s under 58-kilogram

Taekwondo competition; in 2010, Afghanistan defeated Nepal to win for the first

time the ACC Trophy Elite competition. In 2011 the Afghanistan Rugby

Federation (ARF) was formed, and is registered with the National Olympic

Committee and approved by the government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan. In 2015 Afghanistan held its first marathon; among those who ran

the entire marathon was one woman, Zainab, age 25, who thus became the first

Afghan woman to run in a marathon within her own country.

63. This chant is very different from others in referring to themselves not as Taliban,

but rather Mujahidin. The Taliban initially did not use the term because of the

perception it carried: it harkened back to the dark days of 1992–4 when the

Mujahidin destroyed Kabul and killed thousands of Afghans. Now the Taliban

openly refer to their loyalists as Mujahidin in an attempt to expand their base to

include “all Afghans resistant to the Afghan government and ISAF” and proba-

bly encompasses independent factions as well, such as al Fath, Hezb-e-Islami, for-

eign fighters, Haqqani loyalists, Tora Bora Military Front, the Islamic Emirate of

Nuristan fighters led by Sheikh Dost Mohammad, etc.

64. Jason Straziuso, “The Kabul Quagmire,” Associated Press, 17 October 2009; Abdul

Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (London, Hurst & Co., 2010).

65. Based on the Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with numerous Kandaharis, June

2009, Kandahar City.

66. Thomas H. Johnson, “Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern

Afghanistan,” Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular

321

pp. [160–172]

NOTES

Preachers in South Asia, NBR Special Report 22 (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of

Asian Research, February 2010), p. 52.

67. It is interesting to note that “gul,” meaning flower, is a common component in

many Afghans’ names, especially Afghan men (e.g. Gul Agha Sherzai, Gul

Mohmand, etc.)

68.  http://www.twincities.com/national/ci_15424622?source=rss&nclick_check=1;

Thomas H. Johnson, “Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern

Afghanistan,” p. 52.

69. Mul ah Dadul ah Mansour was also known as Shah Mansour Dadul ah and Mul ah

Bakht Mohammad, and is the younger brother of slain Taliban strategist and

“southern zone” commander Mul ah Dadul ah. Shah Mansour replaced his brother

as southern zone commander following the latter’s death in May 2007, and was

later expelled from the Taliban movement following a public disagreement with

the Taliban’s supreme leader Mul ah Omar in late 2007. Mul ah Dadul ah Mansour

was subsequently shot and arrested by Pakistani authorities as he crossed into

Baluchistan on 12 February 2008.

8. THE LAYEHA, THE TALIBAN CODE OF CONDUCT

1. This chapter is based in part on Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew DuPee, “Analysing

the new Taliban Code of Conduct ( Layeha): An Assessment of Changing

Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban,” Central Asian Survey 31:1

(March 2012): 77–91.

2. For example, on the rise of the Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam,

Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

2001); Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in

Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001); Stephen Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret

History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to

September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin Books, 2004); William Maley (ed.),

Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York

University Press, 1998). On the Taliban generally, see citations in Chapter 1 foot-

note 8.

3. For an exception, see Kate Clark, “The Layha: Cal ing the Taleban to Account,”

Afghanistan Analysis Network Thematic Paper, 4 July 2011, https://www.afghan-

istan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/the-layha-cal ing-the-taleban-to-account/

4. Since the Layeha is published in Pashto, it is not strikingly apparent that the inten-

tion of the document was to convey messages solely to Western audiences.

5. For an assessment of the Taliban as an organization, see Abdulkader H. Sinno,

Organization at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 2008).

6. On the post-2001 organization and how the Taliban evolved as an effective

322

NOTES

pp. [172–173]

insurgent force, see Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The

Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly 5:2

(2007): 93–129; Emma Sky, “Increasing ISAF’s Impact on Stability in Afghanistan,”

Defense and Security Analysis 23:1 (March 2007): 7–25.

7. For a comparison of actual events pursed by the Taliban and the Layeha, see

Afghanistan-Pakistan Center, Taliban Violations of their Code of Conduct (Tampa,

FL: United States Central Command, 1 March 2011).

8. In late Mul ah Abdul Rauf Alizai’s 2014 pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS).

See Dan Lamothe, “Meet the shadowy figure recruiting for the Islamic State in

Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 13 January 2015.

9. The 2010 Layeha was published (and became “operational”) on 9 May 2010. The

copy assessed here was recovered by Coalition forces in the Sangin Valley, Helmand.

Just how many fighters have a copy of this document on their person in Afghanistan,

how many Taliban operators can even read the doctrine, and what implications

this manual has for the overall insurgent infrastructure in Afghanistan is difficult,

if not impossible, to ascertain. It is pertinent, however, to understand what the

Taliban leadership is saying and how they are communicating within their own

chain of command.

10. Berader was reportedly released by the Pakistanis in Fall 2010; see Syed Saleem

Shahzad, “Pakistan frees Taliban commander,” Asia Times, 16 October 2010,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LJ16Df02.html; Praveen Swami,

“Taliban deputy chief in high-stakes peace gamble: analysis,” Daily Telegraph,

20 October 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghani-

stan/8076284/Taliban-deputy-chief-in-high-stakes-peace-gamble-analysis.html

11. Numbers cited in Matthias Gebauer, “Special Forces Ratchet up Fight against

Taliban,” Der Spiegel, 28 August 2010.

12. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “This Mul ah Omar Show,” Newsweek, 8 August

2010.

13. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with retired senior Pakistani official, October

2010; several reports widely circulated claimed Omar’s detention. Afghan

Television channel ToloTV, citing unnamed Pakistani government sources, also

reported Omar’s detention on 6 July, although the Taliban strongly denied the

claims.

14. See J. Nathan, “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” Asia Report

158 (International Crisis Group, 2008), www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/

south-asia/afghanistan/158-Taliban-propaganda-winning-the-war-of-words.aspx; also J. Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,” in A. Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New

Taliban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 23–42. Also consult earlier

chapters of this book.

15. Territorial disputes, personality and ideological differences, cronyism, corruption,

and even the presence or allegiance to foreign fighters is causing rifts among some

323

pp. [174–177]

NOTES

local Taliban fronts. Even among the much-vaunted Haqqani Network of eastern

Afghanistan, ideological differences and corruption cause significant cleavages

among various cells and commanders. Nevertheless, the extent of these differences

and their significance is still open for judgment. For examinations of cleavages

among Taliban factions, see Martine van Bijlert, “The Battle for Afghanistan

Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative

Policy Paper, New America Foundation, September 2010; Nasim Hotak, “Imam,

rebel killed in Zabul,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 November 2010; Ahmad Qureshi,

“Commander killed in Taliban infighting,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 10 March 2009;

“Infighting leaves 5 Taliban dead, wounds 7 in W Afghanistan,” Xinhua,

25 September 2009; Sher Ahmad Haider and Saboor Mangal, “Infighting leaves

eight Taliban dead in Ghazni,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 28 March 2008; Abdul Latif

Ayubi, “Taliban infighting leaves one dead, four injured,” Pajhwok Afghan News,

11 December 2008; Matthew C. DuPee, “Badghis Province: Examining the

Taliban’s Northwestern Campaign,” Culture and Conflict Review 2:4 (December

2008); “Commander wounded as Taliban groups clash,” Pajhwok Afghan News,

5 March 2006.

16. Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and

Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of

International Affairs, December 2010), pp. 20–22; Griff Witte, “Taliban estab-

lishes elaborate shadow government in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 8 December

2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/07/

AR2009120704127.html

17. It is important to note that different analysts translated the Pashto of the 2009

and 2010 Layeha, and where discrepancies in the language were found, an addi-

tional, senior translator was used to assess whether the translations were accurate.

To receive copies of the 2009 and 2010 Layeha used in this analysis, please con-

tact Thomas H. Johnson.

18. This Layeha comprised 29 rules of conduct.

19. The 2009 document had 13 chapters and 67 rules or laws.

20. Chapter 10, Health-Related Issues. The Islamic Emirate Health Commission has

its own work plan for carrying out and coordinating its activities. Treatment of

the Mujahidin will be done according to that work plan. Provincial representa-

tives are bound to obey instructions of the commission in carrying out tasks related

to health issues.

21. Michael Williams, “How the British presence in Sangin restored trust in govern-

ment,” Guardian, 20 September 2010; Robert Johnson and Timothy Clack, At

the End of Military Intervention: Hisotrical, Theoretical, and Applied Approaches

to Transition, Handover, and Withdrawal (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2015),

p. 331.

22. Chapter 1, rule 4 of the 2009 Layeha states, “If a person breaks his ties to the infi-

324

NOTES

pp. [177–180]

dels, and the Mujahidin gives him guarantees for full protection and this person

is killed by a Mujahid or harmed in some way, then the person who committed

the crime will not be supported by the Islamic Movement, and he will be dealt

according to the laws of Shar’iah.”

23. See note 13 in Chapter 2.

24. The Taliban beheaded six security personnel following a raid on their checkpoint

in the northern province of Baghlan on 21 July 2010. Villager Lal Mohammad

was mutilated (ears and nose cut off ) in Daikundi for participating in the 2009

elections. For more, see “Taliban Behead Six Afghan Police,” CNN, 22 July 2010;

“Taliban behead 11 Shia Afghans,” Press TV, 26 June 2010; and “The Man Who

had His Ears and Nose Cut Off for Daring to Vote,” Mail Online, 1 September

2009.

25. Reza Shirmohammadi, “Taliban Execute a Woman in Badghis,” ToloTV, 9 August

2010; “Taliban publicly flog, execute pregnant woman for alleged adultery,” France

24 The Observers, 9 August 2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20100809-

aghanistan-taliban-publicly-flog-execute-pregnant-woman-alleged-adultery

26. “Commander of the Faithful.”

27. In the 2009 Layeha, Mul ah Omar is referred to as Imam in the document; Mul ah

Berader is referred to as Imam’s Assistant.

28. The Emergency NGO runs several clinics in Afghanistan; however, the clinic in

Lashkar Gah is directly tied to two controversial events in Afghanistan. The first

was the mediation role that Emergency played in the prisoner exchange of five

Taliban leaders in exchange for the kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele

Mastrogiacomo in 2007. The Afghan doctor working at Emergency,

Dr Rahmatul ah, was imprisoned briefly for his role in the incident before being

released. His two Afghan assistants, Sayed Agha and Ajmal Nasqbandi, were

beheaded by militant Taliban fighters. The second incident occurred in April 2010

when Afghan authorities broke up a suspected assassination plot against Helmand’s

governor, which allegedly used the Emergency clinic as a logistics and facilitation

hub for the attack. Afghan and British soldiers confiscated small and medium arms

and explosives from the clinic following a tip-off. Zainullah Stanikzai, “Italian

medics accused of complicity in murder,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 17 April 2010.

29. Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation

Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008),

pp. 222–3.

30. Chapter 12, Recommendations, rules 59–60, 63.

31. Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (London: Hurst & Co., 2010); Jason

Straziuso, “The Kabul Quagmire,” Associated Press, 17 October 2009.

32. Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli bara-yi Nijat-i Afghanistan, or the United

Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, is most commonly known in the

West by its simplistic moniker “the Northern Al iance.”

325

p. [181]

NOTES

33. The children abused for sexual relationships are referred to widely as halekon,

ashna, or bacha bereeshs. While recent media efforts have focused attention on this

heinous battlefield ritual, mostly confined to reports of bacha bauzi occurring in

northern Afghanistan, this practice occurs widely throughout Afghanistan and

among Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic make-up. For more, see Rustam Qobil, “The

sexually abused dancing boys of Afghanistan,” BBC World Service, 7 September

2010; “The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan,” PBS Frontline TV documentary,

20 April 2010; “Afghan boy dancers sexually abused by former warlords,” Reuters,

18 November 2007.

34. Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central

Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 25.

35. Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with Afghan citizenry in Kandahar province,

Afghanistan, August 2010.

36. The New America Foundation claims that the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan

have adopted kidnapping as a means to raise capital. Between 2008 and 2009, kid-

nappings in Pakistan increased two and half fold, and by 6 per cent in Afghanistan.

Although only 10 per cent of kidnappings in Pakistan are attributed to the Taliban,

the ransoms they receive are between $60,000 and $115,000, significantly more

than what other insurgent groups receive in Pakistan. It is unclear how the money

is distributed between Pakistan’s Taliban network and Afghanistan’s Quetta Shura.

See Catherine Col ins with Ashraf Ali, “Financing the Taliban: Tracing the Dol ars

Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Counterterrorism Strategy

Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, April 2010, p. 6; and National

Counterterrorism Center, “2008 Report on Terrorism,” 30 April 2009, p. 30; and

National Counterterrorism Center, “2009 Report on Terrorism,” 30 April 2010,

p. 21.

37. Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with Afghan citizenry in Kandahar province,

Afghanistan, August 2010.

38. Both Zabul and Ghazni provinces, hostile insurgent bastions south of Kabul, are

prime examples of such activities. The Taliban in Zabul are frequently referred to

as “thief Taliban” by Afghan observers, because they are viewed to be less moti-

vated by ideology than they are by economic gain. For instance, an infamous dis-

pute between two Taliban commanders in the Shah Joy district of Zabul erupted

after a dispute over territory from which each commander wanted to collect taxes.

Similar anecdotes have also occurred in Ghazni, Farah, and Badghis provinces, to

name a few. Christoph Reuter and Borhan Yunus, “The Return of the Taliban in

Andar: Ghazni,” in A. Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insight from the

Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 101–18; Abdul

Awwal Zabulwal, “Taliban in Zabul: A Witness’s Account,” in A. Giustozzi (ed.),

op. cit., pp. 179–89; Martine Van Biljert, “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy

and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan,” New American Foundation, Counterterrorism

Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, September 2010, p. 16.

326

NOTES

pp. [181–184]

39. Ron Moreau, “America’s New Nightmare,” Newsweek, 3 August 2009; Rupert

Hamer, “In bid to win Afghan hearts Taliban issue ‘code of conduct’,” Mirror,

28 January 2012, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/in-bid-to-win-

afghan-hearts-taliban-419862

40. “Commander of the Faithful,” Mul ah Mohammad Omar.

41. Rules 2, 4, 8, and 9 respectively of the 2009 Layeha; and rules 2, 6, 7,10, 12 of the

2010 Layeha.

42. Generally, see Louis DuPree, Afghanistan (New York: Princeton University Press,

1980).

43. However, if the culprit is accused of something serious such as murder, the vic-

tim’s family are usually obliged to fulfill their duty of Qisaas, a retaliatory form of

condoned vigilante justice. International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws

of Afghanistan (2004), p. 10.

44. Rule 5 of 2010 Layeha.

45. Rule 6 of 2010 Layeha.

46. Rule 7 of 2010 Layeha.

47. The defecting group burned down their police post and left with their weapons,

ammunition, food, and police truck. Dexter Filkins and Shariful ah Sahak, “Afghan

Police Unit Defects en Masse to Taliban Side,” New York Times, 1 November 2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?_

r=1&ref=dexter_filkins; Julius Cavendish, “Afghan police unit defects after cutting deal with the Taliban,” The Independent, 2 November 2010, http://www.

independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghan-police-unit-defects-after-cutting-

deal-with-the-taliban-2123564.html

48. As Filkins and Sahak suggest, “In the decades of war in Afghanistan, armed groups,

whether fighting for the government or for someone else, have often changed sides

to join the one they believe is winning.” Rule 14 of the 2010 Layeha states: “Those

soldiers or police who surrender to the Mujahidin or repent will not be killed, and

if these soldiers bring some weapons with them or accomplish an achievement,

then they should be praised.”

49. Associated Press, “Afghanistan: Taliban Attack NATO Fuel Convoy, Killing 3,”

New York Times, 23 October 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/

asia/23briefs-ATTACK.html; Nick Schifrin and Habibul ah Khan, “US Supply Line at Risk along Pakistan Border,” ABC News, 10 November 2008, http://abc-

news.go.com/International/story?id=6221453

50. See Warlord, Inc. Extortion and Corruption Along the US Supply Chain in

Afghanistan, Report of the Majority Staff, Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair-

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight

and Government Reform, US House of Representatives, June 2010.

51. Rule 11 of 2010 Layeha.

52. Rule 19 of 2010 Layeha.

327

pp. [184–192]

NOTES

53. Rule 20 of 2010 Layeha.

54. Rule 25 of 2010 Layeha.

55. Rule 26 of 2010 Layeha.

56. Rules 15 and 16 of 2010 Layeha.

57. Rule 22 of 2010 Layeha.

58. Rule 27 of 2010 Layeha.

59. Ibid.

60. Rule 29 of 2010 Layeha.

61. During Thomas H. Johnson’s research trips to Afghanistan in August–September

2008, May–June 2009, and July–September 2010, community leaders, village

elders, and ordinary citizens confirmed the Taliban’s creation of this parallel legal

system and its popularity. Interviews with elders suggested that the shadow legal

system organization and functions match the 2010 Taliban code of conduct rule

on justice exactly.

62. The Taliban Court after being attacked by US Special Forces was moved from

Zangabad to a location in the Zhari district.

63. Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with Afghan citizenry in Panjwayi, Kandahar,

August 2010.

64. Based on Section 7, Internal Issues of the Mujahidin, rule 40: details how the chain

of command works for the Taliban military force structure.

65. 2009 Layeha, article 2.

66. There is some debate as to whether the slaughter of ten aid workers on 5 August

was carried out by the Taliban or if it was carried out by bandits, foreign fighters,

or members of another insurgent organization. On 7 August, the Taliban spokes-

person Zabihul ah Mujahid claimed responsibility on Aljazeera through a writ-

ten statement, accusing the medical team of proselytizing, although he later

redacted the proselytizing claim and accused the NGO workers of spying. Hezb-

e-Islami also claimed responsibility for the attacks, whereas local Nuristani and

Badakhshi Taliban deny responsibility. The sole survivor claims that the attackers

had spoken Pashaye, a dialect common in Nuristan, and at least one used Pakistani

words that are not common to Badakhshan. If the massacres were carried out by

thieves, the subsequent massacre of foreign personnel is difficult to explain, as is

the temporary kidnapping and release of the sole survivor. The ambush was car-

ried out efficiently, which points away from simple criminal opportunists.

67. Afghan NGO Safety Office, 3rd Quarter Report 2010, p. 15.

68. Rupert Hamer, “In bid to win Afghan hearts Taliban issue ‘code of conduct’,”

Mirror, 28 January 2012, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/in-bid-to-win-

afghan-hearts-taliban-419862; Ron Moreau, “America’s New Nightmare,”

Newsweek, 25 July 2009.

69. The Taliban continue to operate an uneven “shadow government” structure, which

varies widely in the strength given to regional differences. For instance, the Taliban

328

NOTES

pp. [195–200]

shadow government in the Andar and Deh Yak districts of Ghazni province

remains robust, as “the Taliban runs 28 known schools; circulates public state-

ments by leaflets at night; adjudicates land, water-rights and property disputes

through religious courts; levies taxes on residents; and punishes Afghans labeled

as col aborators.” C. J. Chivers, “In Eastern Afghanistan, at War with the Taliban’s

Shadowy Rule,” New York Times, 6 February 2011.

9. HEZB-E-ISLAMI GULBUDDIN (HIG) PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

1. I would like to thank Ahmad Waheed for his assistance in preparing this

chapter.

2. BBC, “Afghan Hezb-e-Islami militants hold peace talks in Kabul,” 22 March 2010,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8579380.stm; “Special Representative Meets with Hezb-e-Islami Delegation in Kabul,” United Nations Assistance Mission in

Afghanistan, 25 March 2010, https://unama.unmissions.org/special-representative-

meets-hezb-e-islami-delegation-kabul

3. Ron Moreau, “The Jihadi High School,” Newsweek, 24 April 2011, http://www.

newsweek.com/2011/04/24/the-jihadi-high-school.html

4. Moreau, “The Jihadi High School.” See also Ch. 4.

5. ISI is the premier military-operated intelligence service of Pakistan.

6. Thomas H. Johnson conversations and correspondence with Ambassador Peter

Tomsen, 27 and 29 April 2016. Ambassador Tomsen served as the US Special

Envoy to Afghanistan 1989–92.

7. The pro-Hekmatyar Afghan News Agency does not exist today. It was most likely

shut down by ISI after the Taliban overran Kabul and Hekmatyar fled to Iran. It

was clear in 1994 that HIG was not the solution for Afghanistan, and Islamabad

as well as the ISI shifted all its propaganda cadre and resources to the Taliban.

8. Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and

the Failures of Great Powers, 1st edn (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p. 510.

9. Thomas H. Johnson’s interviews with Afghan immigrants at the refugee camps in

Pakistan, August 1986, September 1988.

10. Greg Bruno, Eben Kaplan, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign

Relations, 3 August 2009, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/

p10551#p2

11. See original vernacular at http://www.tanweer.blogfa.com/post-2006.aspx

12. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of additional HIG magazines and printed media:

Mesaq-i-Esaar (Covenant of Sacrifice), Ihas (Feelings), Resalat (Duty), and Zamir

(Conscience).

13. HIG makes efforts to communicate with specific regions by using the appropri-

ate dialect and language. For example, in Tanweer vol. 16, December 2010,

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar issued a statement “Message to Panjshir Mujahidin from

329

pp. [200–209]

NOTES

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,” in Dari to target the Dari-speaking audience in Panjshir

province.

14. BBC, “Afghan Hezb-e-Islami militants hold peace talks in Kabul,” BBC, 22 March

2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8579380.stm; “Special Representative Meets with Hezb-e-Islami Delegation in Kabul,” United Nations Assistance Mission in

Afghanistan, 25 March 2010, https://unama.unmissions.org/special-representative-

meets-hezb-e-islami-delegation-kabul 15. Abdul Mueed Hashmi, “Militants overrun remote district in Nuristan,” Pajhwok

Afghan News, 25 May 2011, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/05/25/militants-

overrun-remote-district-nuristan

16. Abdul Moeed Hashmi, “Fuel trucks come under attack,” Pajhwok Afghan News,

15 December 2009, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2009/12/15/fuel-trucks-come-

under-attack

17. Khan Wali Salarzai, “A commander among 4 fighters killed in Kunar,” Pajhwok

Afghan News, 31 October 2010, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/10/31/

commander-among-4-fighters-killed-kunar

18. “Shaheed Habibullah Shabab Hekmatyar” video was uploaded to YouTube on

4 June 2011 by user Ghazy66: http://www.youtube.com/user/Ghazy66#p/u/17/

Tbm0yP2GrIo. Habibullah Shabab Hekmatyar was the son of Gulbuddin’s brother, Shabuddin, and died after a US airstrike hit a militant position in the

Nerkh district of Wardak province on 22 April 2011. Mohammad Farid Karimi,

“Hekmatyar’s nephew killed in NATO-led raid,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 22 April

2011. http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/04/22/hekmatyars-nephew-killed-

nato-led-raid; “How large is the caravan we have?” video was uploaded to YouTube on 21 August 2011 by user Ghazy66: http://www.youtube.com/user/

Ghazy66#p/u/4/d5Kn2xLUPkU

19. Oqab, “statement to Loy Paktiya.”

20. It includes Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost provinces of Afghanistan.

21. It is important to note that the Taliban also claimed credit for the attack. “We

claim responsibility for the attack, and it was carried out at a time when foreign-

ers were shopping, including the head of a security company,” Taliban spokesman

Zabiul ah Mujahid was quoted as telling Reuters.

22. “Hezb-e-Islami killed 2 Afghans and 8 foreigners,” TOLO News, 7 August 2010,

http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/235-hezb-e-islami-killed-2-afghans-and-

8-foreigners

23. Jafar Tayar, “HIA claims killing medics,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 7 August 2010,

http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/08/07/hia-claims-killing-medics; Jason Motlagh, “Will Aid Workers’ Killings End Civilian Surge?” Time, 9 August 2010,

http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2009399,00.html

24. It is a traditional Pashtun expression used to indicate pride in the individual, fam-

ily, or tribe.

330

NOTES

pp. [209–215]

25. Religious verdict by clerics.

26. HIG statements, Oqab.

27. Original vernacular can be found here: http://www.oqab1.com/index.php? 

option=com_content&view=article&id=273:2011–02–24–06–12–

36&catid=18:2010–11–09–19–39–36&Itemid=108

28. http://dailyshahadat.com/showstory.php?id=7658

29. “Afghan Election,” Oqab, http://www.oqab1.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=267:2011–02–15–02–12–19&catid=22:2010-11-

09-19-47-37&Itemid=110

30. “Afghan Election,” Oqab, http://www.oqab1.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=91:2011-01-04-23-28-11&catid=22:2010-11-09–

19–47–37&Itemid=110

31. See Appendix C for the original form of the HIG peace proposal as published in

Tanweer, December 2010, vol. 16.

32. Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar delegates interviews and debates during their visit to

Kabul, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MjPiypmAytE&feature=related,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89gf VkER34Y&feature=related, http://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqZuc1QZ5IY&feature=related

33. Arian TV interview with Daoud Abedi, uploaded 13 August 2010, http://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=M5udzTSdhP4, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-

Du8c29CBp8

34. HIG senior official interview with an Afghan TV channel operating in the US,

uploaded 3 May 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SxHriMK5lJs&featu

re=related

35. “Hezb-e-Islami National Agreement,” Oqab, http://www.oqab1.com/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267:2011-02-15-02-12-19&

catid=22:2010-11-09-19-47-37&Itemid=110

36. Mukhilsyar, “Proud of the youth emotions and devotions,” Daily Shahadat,

21 April 2010, http://dailyshahadat.com/safha_e_jawanan-story.php?id=40

37. See original vernacular at http://www.tanweer.blogfa.com/post-2006.aspx

38. http://dailyshahadat.com/mujale-show-page.php?id=345

39. See original vernacular at http://www.tanweer.blogfa.com/post-2006.aspx

40. See note 13 in Chapter 2.

41. Maiwand as suggested above, is one of the major historical locations where the

fight between the Afghans and the British Empire forces took place during the

nineteenth century. Most Afghans refer to it as a symbol of Afghan resistance

against foreign invading forces and the sacrifice of men and women to gain their

country’s independence.

42. http://dailyshahadat.com/mujale-show-page.php?id=345

331

pp. [217–218]

NOTES

10. THE UNITED STATES’ AFGHAN INFORMATION AND PSYOP

CAMPAIGN AND A COMPARISON TO THE TALIBAN’S CAMPAIGN

1. The Afghan operation was intially called “Operation Infinite Justice,” but was

changed when it was brought to the planners’ attention that the concept of “infi-

nite justice” was, according to Muslim experts, a prerogative of God, and not of

man. The name was changed to Operation Enduring Freedom. This was a precur-

sor of mistakes in information operations that would soon follow.

2. OEF-A lasted from 7 October 2001 to 31 December 2014 and was part of the over-

all Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). OEF-A was succeeded by Operation

Freedom’s Sentinel.

3. For example, see Anthony H. Cordesman, “Losing the ‘Forgotten War’: The Need

to Reshape US Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia,” (Washington

DC: Center for and International Studies, 6 October 2014), http://csis.org/files/

publication/141006_Losing_the_Forgotten_War_Final.pdf; and Gian P. Gentile,

“A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters

(Autumn 2009): 5–17.

4. For general works on counter-insurgency (COIN) and US COIN tactics in

Afghanistan, see David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2010); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the

Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Thomas H. Johnson

and Barry Zellon (eds), Culture, Conflict and Counterinsurgency (Palo Alto, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2014); The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency

Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), http://permanent.

access.gpo.gov/lps79762/FM_3–24.pdf; Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes (New York: Henry

Holt & Co., 2014); Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan,

2001–2014 (New York: Harcourt, 2014).

5. For an example of some of these leaflets, see http://www.psywarrior.com/

Afghanleaflinks.html and below.

6. Thomas H. Johnson interviews with various Afghans in Kandahar City and Panjwayi

district in Kandahar province, August 2009.

7. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact-

book/geos/af.html. The illiteracy rate has significantly improved since 2002, but not in many rural, hinterland areas of Afghanistan.

8. For an excellent discussion of “narratives” and war, see Jill Lepore, The Name of War:

King Phillip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1998); and Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco (New York: Farrar, Straus and

Giroux, 2005). For Afghan narratives, see Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban

Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” Small Wars and

Insurgencies 18:3 (September 2007): 317–44 and Chapter 1 of this book.

332

NOTES

pp. [219–224]

9. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact-

book/geos/af.html

10. See note 2 in Preface.

11. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2035160/Most-Afghans-know-9–11-

according-disturbing-pol .html#ixzz47doJf7yp

12. Col. Francis Scott Main, US Army Reserve, Psychological Operations Support to

Strategic Communications in Afghanistan, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War

College, strategy research project, 24 March 2009, p. 2.

13. Arturo Munoz, US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness

of Psychological Operations 2001–2010, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National

Defense Research Institute, 2012), p. 33, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/

rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf

14. US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Implementation of the DOD Strategic

Communication Plan for Afghanistan, 12 September 2007.

15. Ibid.

16. Based on Thomas H. Johnson’s field research in Afghanistan, 2006–10.

17. Thomas H. Johnson, “Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern

Afghanistan,” Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular

Preachers in South Asia, NBR Special Report 22 (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of

Asian Research, February 2010), pp. 41–65.

18. Originally written in Joint Forces Quarterly and cited in Daniel Nasaw, “Mullen

blasts US ‘strategic communication’ efforts in Afghanistan,” Guardian, 28 August

2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/28/mullen-afghanistan-

communication

19. Col. Francis Scott Main, US Army Reserve, “Psychological Operations Support

to Strategic Communications in Afghanistan,” 2009, p. 5.

20. http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview

21. During a research trip to Afghanistan in 2008 (July–August), I heard countless

complaints from the provincial council and governor of Nangarhar, Gul Agha

Sherzai, about how they felt powerless and even willing to resign if they were not

put into the authorizing loop when it came to night operations.

22. For an extensive review of the Haqqani Network and its criminal activities, see

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: the Haqqani Nexus, 1973–

2012 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Thomas Ruttig, “The

Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding

the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2009), pp. 57–88; and Matthew DuPee, “Afghanistan’s Conflict Minerals:

The Crime-State-Insurgent Nexus,” CTC Sentinel, 12 February 2012, https://

www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/

afghanistans-conflict-minerals-the-crime-state-insurgent-nexus

23. Consult the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR)’s

numerous reports for specific details.

333

pp. [224–234]

NOTES

24. Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO/ISAF

Strategic Communication 2011, https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-

STRATCOM-Afghanistan.pdf

25. http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2015–03–13/?s_cid=standto

26. RSM Fact Sheet, “Essential Function 8: Maintain Internal and External Strategic

Communication Capability, ” http://www.rs.nato.int/article/rs-news/rsm-essen-

tial-function-8-strategic-communication.html

27. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 45.

28. Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2002), p. 19.

29. A common Afghan Taliban statement is that “the US may have the watches, but

we have the time.”

30. Joanna Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,” in A. Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New

Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press,

2009), p. 25.

31. This section, especially the discussion of early US OEF-A leaflets, is partially based

on Thomas H. Johnson and Keely M. Fahoum, “Successes and Failures of the

United State’s Initial Leaflet Campaign in Operation Enduring Freedom,” unpub-

lished research paper (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 2006), and

Thomas H. Johnson’s direct experience with the very early OEF leaflet campaign

(see this book’s Preface).

32. Philip M. Taylor, “Psychological Operations During Operation Enduring

Freedom,” Paper presented at the University of Leeds, UK, 2002.

33. See Chapter 5.

34. Keely M. Fahoum, personal communication with PSYOP officer involved in ini-

tial OEF-A leaflet campaign, 14 June 2006, cited hereafter as “PSYOP officer

interview.”

35. Keely M. Fahoum interview with Bruce Clingman, member of 1st IO command

FST during the start of OEF, 13 June 2006.

36. “‘Solo’ Tells Afghans They Aren’t Alone,” Indian Express, 19 October 2001.

37. PYSOP officer interview, 14 June 2006.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 14 June 2006. See Chapter 7 for an elaboration of this argument.

40. PYSOP officer interview, 14 June 2006.

41. The author witnessed this while working in OSD on the intial OEF-A IO

campaign.

42. Craig Storti, Cross-Cultural Dialogues: 74 Brief Encounters with Cultural Difference

(Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1994), p. 4.

43. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

44. http://www.psywarrior.com/afghanleaf31.html

334

NOTES

pp. [234–241]

45. Personal anecdote relayed to Herbert Friedman by PSYOP officer, http://www.

psywarrior.com/Herbafghan02.html

46. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

47. Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New

York: Columbia University Press, 2005), footnote 10, p. 340.

48. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

49. Ibid.

50. General Carl von Clausewitz, On War: The Complete Edition (Wildside Press,

LLC, 2009).

51. See Chapter 2 footnote 13.

52. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

53. Ibid.

54. See footnote 11.

55. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

56. Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through

Afghan Eyes, p. 104.

57. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

58. In an interview concerning bin Laden, Mutawakkil stated, “Osama bin Laden has

been hated because he is accused of killing innocent people.” Yasmin Jiwani,

“Col uding Hegemonies: Constructing the Muslim Other Post-9/11,” in Jasmin

Zine (ed.), Islam in the Hinterlands: Muslim Cultural Politics in Canada ( Toronto:

UBC Press, 2012), p. 127.

59. Jan Ahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982),

pp. 140–41.

60. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

61. Eid is an important Islamic religious holiday marking the end of Ramadan, the

Islamic holy month of fasting ( sawm).

62. The Prophet Muhammad recommended that Muslims break their fasting during

Ramadan ( iftar) with dates.

63. http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html

64. For a fairly robust analyis of the IO leaflets used by the US during the early phases

of Operation Enduring Freedom, see Herbert A. Friedman, “Psychological

Operations in Afghanistan,” http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html or

http://www.psywarrior.com/afghanleaf02.html

65. Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent

Operational Experience (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2005).

66. The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

67. See David J. Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” Remarks delivered

at the US Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC,

28 September 2006, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_

counterinsurgency.pdf

335

pp. [242–249]

NOTES

68. Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone, 22 June 2010, http://

www.rol ingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622

69. COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, 1 August 2010, http://www.stripes.

com/polopoly_fs/1.113197.1280774784!/menu/standard/file/

COMISAF%27s%20COIN%20Guidance%2C%201Aug10.pdf

70. All the leaflets examined in this section are from the 345th TPS (A) “Product Book,”

May 2009, as well as other IO work products given to Thomas H. Johnson by

senior officers of the Combined Joint PSYOP Task Force (CJPOTF), Bagram

Airforce Base, May 2009. All these materials are unclassified and unrestricted.

71. Based on numerous interviews by Thomas H. Johnson with Afghans living in the

east and south of the country, 2006–10.

72. This objective is obviously mislabled in the Product Book because it is a repeat of

objective D. Most of the PYSOP/IO artifacts associated with this objective, in

fact, relate to “wanted posters” of various Taliban insurgents, propositions con-

cerning the evil of Taliban, and the need for the Afghan population to support

the ANSF. Also note that the copy of the Product Book received had no objective

G.

73. A 25-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in June 2009 found that the

war in Afghanistan was unpopular in most nations and that most publics wanted

American and NATO troops out of Afghanistan. See “25-Nation Pew Global

Attitudes Survey,” http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/264.pdf

74. Generally, see, David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).

75. Ian S, Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index” (Washington, DC:

Brookings Institute, 24 April 2012), p. 12, http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-

policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

76. All the written messages associated with the PSYOP/IO leaflets or other prod-

ucts will be presented in English. The actual deployed leaflets’ messages were writ-

ten in either Pashto or Dari, or both.

77. Thomas H. Johnson interview with Kandahari Afghan, August 2009.

78. Generally, see Graeme Smith, The Dogs Are Eating Them Now: Our War in

Afghanistan (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2013).

79. For example, see Jennifer Glasse, “Ice cream and dreams melt as Kandahar’s elec-

tricity falters,” AlJazeera America, 23 June 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/

watch/shows/compass/articles/2015/6/23/kandahar-electricity.html

80. Ibid.

81. Arturo Munzo, U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness

of Psychological Operations 2001–2010 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,

2012), pp. 103–4.

82. For an excellent assessment of the Afghan National Army, see Antonio Giustozzi,

The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution (London: Hurst

& Co., 2016).

336

NOTES

pp. [249–257]

83. Thomas H. Johnson interview with Kandahari Afghan, August 2009.

84. Ibid.

85. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An Inter-

national Problem (New York: United Nations, January 2003), my emphasis.

86. Sean Carberry and Sultan Faizy, “Afghan Farmers: Opium is the Only Way to

Make a Living,” NPR Morning Edition, 14 November 2013, http://www.npr.org/

sections/parallels/2013/11/14/245040114/

afghan-farmers-opium-is-the-only-way-to-make-a-living

87. “The United States estimates that there as many as 1.6 million drug users in Afghan

cities—about 5.2 percent of the population—up from 940,000 in 2009. As many

as 3 million more are believed to be in the countryside.” Pamela Constable, “Heroin

addition spreads with alarming speeds across Afghanistan,” Washington Post,

8 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/heroin-

addiction-spreads-with-alarming-speed-across-afghanistan/2015/01/06/2cbb6

1ea-94e7–11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html

88. Thomas H. Johnson interview with Panjwai Afghan farmers, August 2009.

89. See note 69 in this chapter.

90. Obaid Younossi et al., The Long March: Building an Afghan Army (Santa Monica,

CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 48.

91. See Thomas H. Johnson, “Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern

Afghanistan.”

92. Robert M. Perito, “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector

Reform,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 227 (Washington, DC:

USIP, August 2009), p. 1.

93. Thomas H. Johnson interview with Tribal elders in Kandahar, June 2008 and

August 2009.

94. Ibid.

95. Kashif Aziz, “Waziristan Taliban caught in Burqa? Social Media Propaganda

exposed,” Chowrangi: Pakistan Politics, Current Affairs, Business and Lifestyle,

7 July 2014, http://www.chowrangi.pk/waziristan-taliban-caught-burqa-social-

media-propaganda-rise.html

96. Among many sources available, generally see Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy:

America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York: Harcourt, 2014); Peter Tomsen,

The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of

Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), pp. 517–58. Hassan Abbas, The

Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014); Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan, Taliban

and the Afghan Quagmire” (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 24 August

2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/26-pakistan-influ-

ence-over-afghan-taliban-riedel; Aleem Maqbool, “Pakistan helping Afghan Taliban—NATO,” BBC News, 1 February 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-asia-16821218

337

pp. [257–263]

NOTES

97. Malik Siraj Akbar, “Mounting Tensions Between Pakistan Media and Military,”

Huffpost Media, 24 June 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-

akbar/mounting-tensions-between-press-freedom_b_5195628.html; Jon Boone,

“Geo TV’s face-off with the ISI spy agency—a subplot of a larger tussle in

Pakistan,” Guardian, 27 April 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/

apr/27/geo-tv-isi-spy-agency-pakistan-military; Declan Walsh, “Press battle in Pakistan feeds into larger conflict: Government vs. Military,” South Asia Media

Net: A News and Views Website of South Asia, 25 May 2014, http://www.south-

asianmedia.net/sam-monitors/pakistan-media-crisis/press-battle-in-pakistan-

feeds-into-larger-conflict-government-vs.-military-story; Neha Anssari, “Not Fit to Print: An Insider Account of Pakistani Censorship,” Foreign Policy: South

Asia Channel, 20 November 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/20/

not-fit-to-print-an-insider-account-of-pakistani-censorship/

98. See Chapter 2 and note 13.

99. See 345th TPS (A) “Product Book,” May 2009.

100. ODA is Operational Detachment-Alpha, the standard 12-member teams of US

Army Special Forces operators once known as A-Teams.

101. Thomas H. Johnson interview with ODA personnel, Camp Bastion, Afghanistan,

June 2006.

102. Ibid.

103. An innovative Canadian counter-insurgency program that deployed a company

of Canadian soldiers to live in an Afghan village and work with the villagers on

a daily basis to improve the Afghans’ daily lives and security through repairing a

Dand District Center that resided near the village, make improvements to the

village bazzar, build new irrigation canals for the village, repair and improve vil-

lage mosques, and various other humanitarian and agricultural programs. A key

objective of the program was to improve the security of the village and reduce

the appeal of the Taliban to the villagers. See Gerald Meyerie, Megan Katt, and

Jim Gavrillas, On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice (CAN

and Marine Corp University Press, 2012), pp. 156–60.

104. Observation of Thomas H. Johnson, Deh-e Bagh village, Dand, Kandahar, June–

August 2009.

105. Arturo Munoz, US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness

of Psychological Operations 2001–2010, p. 4.

106. Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from

Recent Operational Experience, p. 3.

107. Gerald R. Miller, “On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions,” in James Price

Dillard and Michael Pfau (eds), The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory

and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002).

108. Ibid.

109. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

338

NOTES

pp. [264–268]

110. Further research is needed to evaluate successes, failures, and measures of effec-

tiveness for PSYOP and IO campaigns; more specifically, it is vital to evaluate

the degree to which PSYOP and IO planners can be integrated into short-notice

military operations on the ground. Some research has been conducted into one

measure of effectiveness, Value Focused Thinking (VFT), but it would behoove

the DoD to apply studies such as VFT to cultural messaging within IO and

PSYOP operations in order to craft the most effective and powerful tactics to

meet military and strategic objectives. There are endless possibilities for future

research into this area, but the bottom line remains clear: persuasion strategies

must be viewed within an anthropological context and not a Western context of

creative advertising. The PSYOP campaign should focus on themes and stories

that are vetted by and make sense to Afghans. A value model captures the con-

cerns (values) of a decision-maker in a particular situation, and then requires a

decision to capture quantitative results (from qualitative information), enabling

analysts to measure whether or not a particular campaign met the goals of a

PSYOP Detachment Commander. The Value Focused Thinking method pro-

vides one strategy to measure the effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign. Captain

Philip M. Kerchner, Dr Richard F. Deckro, LTC (Retd) Jack M. Kloeber, Jr,

“Valuing Psychological Operations,” Military Operations Research 6:2 (2001):

45–65.

11. CONCLUSIONS

1. Early reports from the time when the Taliban were created indicated that the move-

ment did not seek wider political authority than the re-establishment of law and

order in Kandahar province.

2. “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” International Crisis Group,

Asia Report 158, 24 July 2008.

3. For example, see Gulabudin Ghubar, “Rights Body Slams Taliban for High Civilian

Death Toll,” Tolo News, 15 February 2016, http://www.tolonews.com/en/

afghanistan/23793-rights-body-slams-taliban-for-high-civilian-death-toll; David Jolly, “Afghanistan had Record Civilian Casualties in 2015, UN Says,” New York

Times, 14 February 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/world/asia/

afghanistan-record-civilian-casualties-2015-united-nations.html?_r=0

4. Ahmad Waheed’s interviews with numerous Kandaharis, Spring 2014.

5. BBC, “Afghan official killed by gunman,” 24 February 2010, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/8533629.stm; Keith B. Richburg, “Kandahar slides into lawlessness as Taliban attacks force government to retreat,” Washington Post, 14 March 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/

AR2010031300574.html

6. Ahmad Waheed’s interviews with numerous Kandaharis, Spring 2014.

339

pp. [269–272]

NOTES

7. See Jonathan R. Zadra and Gerald L Clore, “Emotions and perception: the role

of affective information,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews, Cognitive Science 2:6

(November–December 2011): 676–85.

8. See note 40 in Introduction.

9. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with a Taliban commander in Kandahar City,

September 2008.

10. Ahmad Waheed’s interview with Kandaharis, Spring 2014.

11. Thomas H. Johnson’s interview with Taliban commander in Kandahar City, July

2009.

12. The parts, components, and/or themes of the Afghan stories are not necessarily

presented in their order of importance to the Taliban.

13. Open Source Center, “Terrorism: Taliban Chief Mullah Omar Offers Foreign

Forces Safe Exit from Afghanistan,” Jihadist websites: OSC Summary in Arabic,

30 September 2008, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/

PTARGS_0_0_200_217_51_43/content/Display/GMP20080930479002

14. NEFA Foundation, “In Celebration of Eid al-Adha,” released 25 November 2009,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_mul ahomar1109.pdf

15. Generally, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 2000).

16. Tim Foxley, “The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities: How Well is the Afghan

Insurgency Communicating and What is it Saying?” (Stockholm: SIPRI project

parer, June 2007), p. 6; Abdulhadi Hairan, “A Profile of the Taliban’s Propaganda

Tactics,” World Post, 25 May 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/abdulhadi-

hairan/a-profile-of-the-talibans_b_442857.html.

17. Open Source Center, “Terrorism: Taliban Leader Congratulates Muslims on Id,

Urges Boycotting ‘Deceptive Elections,’” Jihadist websites: OSC Summary in

Arabic, 7 December 2008, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gate-

way/PTARGS_0_0_200_217_51_43/content/Display/GMP20081209054013

18. Open Source Center, “Al-Jazirah: Mul ah Omar Urges Afghan Employees Not to

Serve Govt, ‘Occupation,’” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television in Arabic, 1419

GMT 12 October 2007, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/

PTARGS_0_0_200_217_51_43/content/Display/GMP20071012640001; Golnar Moteval i, “Taliban targeting Afghan women and government workeres,

UN report finds,” Guardian, 19 February 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2013/feb/19/taliban-targeting-women-un-report

19. Thomas H. Johnson interviews with Kandaharis in Kandahar City, August and

September 2009.

20. Observations of Thomas H. Johnson in Kandahar, August–September 2008 and

May–August 2009. See 2006–9 Trip Reports in Thomas H. Johnson, Afghanistan

Field Research Notebooks 4–6 (Monterey CA, 2008–9); Catherine Norman, “What

do Afghans want from the police? Views from Helmand province,” CNA (January

2012), p. 5.

340

NOTES

pp. [272–279]

21. Open Source Center, “Afghanistan: Mul ah Omar Claims US After Taliban, Not

Usama,” Islamabad Ausaf in Urdu, 27 September 2001, https://www.opensource.

gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_217_51_43/content/Display/

SAP20010928000057

22. NEFA Foundation, “In Celebration of Eid al-Adha,” 25 November 2009, http://

www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_mul ahomar1109.pdf

23. Ibid.

24. NEFA Foundation, “Regarding Obama’s New Strategy,” 2 December 2009, http://

www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_talibanobamasurge1209.pdf

25. Jim Loney, “Civilian deaths undermine West’s Afghan mission,” Reuters, 22 May

2007, http://in.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&

storyID=2007–05–22T184642Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_India-

299435–1.xml&archived=False

26. Luke Harding, “Heavy Hand of America Fans the Taliban Embers into Life,”

Guardian, 18 June 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/

0,1284,979617,00.html

27. Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in

Afghanistan,” China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly 5:2 (2007): 123–4.

28. International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation,”

ICG Asia Report 62, August 2003.

29. NEFA Foundation, “In Celebration of Eid al-Adha,” released 25 November 2009,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_mul ahomar1109.pdf

30. NEFA Foundation, “Taliban: Obama, Following in Bush’s Steps,” released

8 December 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaTaliO-

bamaBush1209.pdf

31. See note 13 in Chapter 2.

32. A Taliban night letter from 2009.

33. Vern Liebl, “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View,”

Small War and Insurgencies (September 2007): 498.

34. A Taliban night letter from 2010.

35. Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2002), pp. 154–5.

36. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a

Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 50–58.

37. Joanna Nathan, “Reading the Taliban,” in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the

New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2009), p. 35.

38. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and

Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 51:1 (2007).

39. Brent Glatzer, “Afghanistan: Ethnic and tribal disintegration?” in William Maley

(ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New

York University Press, 1998).

341

pp. [279–283]

NOTES

40. One message from 2006, apparently originating from the late Taliban spokesman

Mul ah Dadul ah, was aimed at North Korea. Matthew DuPee, “The Specter of

Mullah Dadullah,” Afgha.com, 13 June 2006, http://www.afgha.com/?q=

node/520

41. “Taliban Deny Osama Granted Afghan Nationality to Move,” Islamabad Al-Akbar

(Urdu language), 29 September 1998; Tim McGirk, “On bin Laden’s Trail,”

National Geographic, December 2004, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/fea-

tures/world/asia/pakistan/pashtun-text/1

42. See generally Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban

Resurgence in Afghanistan.”

43. “Mul ah Omar—in his own words,” Guardian, 26 September 2001, http://www.

guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,558076,00.html

44. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Islamic/Aegean Terrorism Review,” Daily

London Bureau Roundup, 17 January 2001; Guillaume Debre, “Taliban asks:

What does it take to join the UN club?” Christian Science Monitor, 26 September

2000, http://www.csmonitor.com/2000/0926/p7s1.html

45. “Press Release,” Afghan Islamic Press News Agency, 22 January 2001; Zahid

Hussain, “Taleban offers US deal to deport bin Laden,” Times of London, 5 February

2001, http://www.newsint-archive.co.uk/pages/main.asp?T=1

46. “Afghan Ambassador’s 25 January Speech on Sanctions, Usama,” Islamabad Khabra

(Urdu language), 15 February 2001.

47. “Afghan Taliban leader orders destruction of ancient statues,” Agence France-Press,

26 February 2001, http://www.rawa.org/statues.htm; Ahmed Rashid, “After 1,700

years, Buddhas fall to Taliban dynamite,” Daily Telegraph, 12 March 2001, http://

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1326063/After-1700-

years-Buddhas-fal -to-Taliban-dynamite.html

48. Robert Marquand, “The Reclusive Ruler who Runs the Taliban,” Christian Science

Monitor, 10 October 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc.

html; Brenda Shaffer, The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 286.

49. Norimitsu Onishi, “A Tale of the Mul ah and Muhammad’s Amazing Cloak,” New

York Times, 19 December 2001, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?re

s=F00E1FFA395A0C7A8DDDAB0994D9404482&n=Top%2fReference%2

fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fO%2fOmar%2c%20Muhammad

50. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Kevin Sieff, “A fight for

Afghanistans most famous artifact,” Washington Post, 29 December 2012, https://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-fight-for-afghanistans-most-famous-artifact/

2012/12/29/ab2dc394–51cb-11e2–835b-02f92c0daa43_story.html

51. Tim Foxley, “The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities: How Well is the Afghan

Insurgency Communicating and What is it Saying?” (Stockholm: SIPRI project

342

NOTES

pp. [284–295]

paper, June 2007), pp. 13–16; International Crisis Group, “Taliban Propaganda:

Winning the War of Words?” Asia Report 158 (July 2008): 25–8.

52. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand

Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1986), p. 16.

APPENDIX A

1. Adopted from Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from

the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

APPENDIX C

1. Translation by Ahmad Waheed, January 2016.

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364

INDEX

345th TPS (A) “Product Book” : 242–3

130, 136, 140–2, 144–5, 147, 151,

155, 157, 159–61, 163, 169, 175,

Abdul ah, Ghazi: 156

183–4, 191–3, 202, 204, 208, 220,

Abedi, Mohammad Daud: 200, 202

224, 226–7, 235, 238, 240–1, 245,

Afghan Interim Government (AIG):

262, 265–6, 280, 283–5, 295–7;

197

Arghistan, 66; borders of, xxii, xxviii,

Afghan Islamic Press: 99–100

56, 74, 86, 179; Civil War (1992–6), Afghan National Army (ANA): 28, 83,

xxi, xxvii, 22, 104, 180, 197, 212;

128, 183, 197, 249; public image of, Constitution of, 249; Cross Min-

254–6; use as reserve force, 253–6

istry News Desk, 225; Dai Kundi

Afghan National Police (ANP): 28,

Province, 297; Farah Province, 102,

128, 255; corruption amongst, 224,

273; Ghazni Province, 68, 76, 78,

272

99, 101–2, 297; government of

Afghan National Security Force

(GIRoA), xx, xxiv, xxviii, xxxiii, xxxv,

(ANSF): 220, 224, 243, 247–8, 273;

2, 16, 25, 33, 37, 50, 89, 91, 100, corruption amongst, 247, 272; train-

111, 119, 133, 149–51, 162, 167,

ing of, 218

183, 190, 195, 198, 210, 221–3, 225, Afghan National Security Office: Third

228, 242, 246–7, 266–7, 274, 276,

Quarterly Report (2010), 190–1

284; Hazara population of, 297;

Afghan National Security Force: per-

Helmand Province, 45, 68, 99–100,

sonnel of, 41

102, 166, 176–7, 179; Herat Prov-Afghan National United Government

ince, 273; High Peace Council, 191;

(NUG): shortcomings of, xviii

Independent Directorate of Local

Afghanistan: xix, xxi, xxiv, 2–3, 10,

Governance (IDLG), 225; Kabul,

13–15, 17, 24–5, 27, 30–1, 35, 39,

xviii, xx–xxi, xxiii, xxvi, xxviii, xxxiii,

41, 43, 46, 48, 51–3, 61, 63, 65–6, xxxv, 18, 21, 26, 28, 30, 33, 46, 48,

68–9, 71–3, 79, 82, 85–6, 88–9, 92,

55, 58, 66, 68, 83–4, 89, 91, 107,

96–9, 102, 108–10, 113, 122–5,

114, 155, 172–3, 186, 195, 197, 200, 365

INDEX

202, 211–12, 219, 223, 246–7, 266,

Ahmadi, Qari Muhammad Yousaf: 97;

268, 271–3, 278, 280, 284, 295; account manager for Alemarah, 91;

Kandahar City, xxxii, 25, 58, 79,

leader of Al Emarah, 93; spokesper-

93, 99, 102, 138, 141–2, 165, 181,

son for Taliban, 97

224, 247, 253, 255, 269; Kandahar Ahmadzai, Ashraf Ghani: 22

Province, 3, 66, 177, 186, 260, 267, Ahmedi, Mostafa: account manager for

284; Kapisa, 74; Khogyani, 95;

Alemarah, 91

Khost Province, 94, 99, 101; Kunar

Aka Khel (tribal confederation): 63

Province, xxxiv, 101–2, 202; Kunduz

Akhund, Mul ah Berader: 45

Province, 273; Lashkar Gah, 102,

Alam, Mul ah Mushki: 73

179; Logar Province, 68; Loya Kan-

Alemarah (website): 31, 37, 44, 46–7, dahar, xxxi–xxxii, 18, 100, 141, 144;

87–90, 95, 98; account managers,

Ma’ruf, 68–9; Ministry of Defense,

91; affiliates of, 96; language sections

225; Ministry of Education, 74;

on, 85–6; political cartoons in, 86

Ministry of Interior, 225; Nangha-

Alexander the Great: 33, 37–8, 68

har Province, 95, 202, 273; National

Algeria: People’s National Armed

Directorate of Security (NDS),

Forces (ALN), 226

225; Nuristan Province, 27, 101–2;

Ali Khel (tribe): 63

Operation Enduring Freedom-Af-

Alizai, Abdul Rauf: 172

ghanistan (OEF-A)(2001–14), xviii,

Amal, Ghazi: alleged founder of Tora

xx, xxiii, xxv, xxviii–xxx, 20, 25, 32,

36, 54, 57, 65, 87, 89, 113, 197–8,

Bora Magazine, 46

217–18, 222–4, 229–33, 238,

Amanzoi: 135

240–2, 248–9, 257, 259, 261–2, American Continental Army: 226

270, 272, 284; Oruzgan Province,

Amin, Hafizul ah: role in Saur Revolu-

68; Pachir Agam, 95; Paktia Prov-

tion (1978), 64

ince, 94, 99, 101, 273; Paktika Prov-Amu Darya: xxiii

ince, 26, 68, 94, 99, 101; Pashtun Arab Spring: 89

population of, xxi, xxvi–xxvii, xxix,

Arabic (language): xxvii, 37, 41, 44, 98,

4, 43, 257, 263, 297; Pol-e-Charkhi

264; media produced in, 85–8

Prison, 118; Qalat, 76; Shinwar, 95;

Arreguín-Toft, Ivan: 227

Soviet Invasion of (1979–89), xvii,

Aristotle: Rhetoric, 7

xx, xxii–xxiii, xxvi, 25–6, 31, 33, 36,

53–4, 56–7, 62–6, 105, 109, 113,

Baba, Ahmad Shah: 156

117, 121, 147–8, 155–6, 163–4, bachabauzi: Taliban view of, 181

168, 180, 196–7, 207, 232, 270, Baheer, Dr Ghairat: 202

275, 277, 282; Spin Boldak, 102;

Baryal, Qari: 46

Urozgan Province, 273; Wardak

Baryali, Mul ah Abdul Salaam: 45

Province, 68–9, 94; Zabol Province,

Battle of Yarmouk (636): 19

68, 76, 181

Belal: 131

Afghanistan’s Islamic Cultural Society:

Boas, Franz: 2

47

Bonaparte, Napoleon: xvii

366

INDEX

Bonn Agreement (2001): 65, 222–3

ceptualization of, 217; Framework,

Bot-Shikan: 93

241–2; terminology of, 222

Brinol, Pablo: ‘Mass Media Attitude

Corman, Steve R.: messaging models,

Change’, 12–13

8–9

British Empire: 147, 163

Cuba: Guantanamo Bay, 118, 279

Burma: 2

Bush, George W.: 122; inauguration of

Dadul ah Mansour, Mul ah: 79, 164–6

(2000), 282

Dadul ah, Shah Mansoor: 97

Daily Shahadat: 199, 216; adolescent

Canada: 108; Kalay program of, 260

section of, 213

Canadian Kandahar Task Force: per-

Daoud, Mohammed: removed from

sonnel of, 260

power (1978), 63, 197

Caroe, Sir Olaf: 62

Dari (language): xxix, 16, 35, 37, 44, Carruthers, Martyn: 10

47–50, 85, 93, 98–9, 144, 200, 229, Casebeer, William: narrative strategic

233, 264; media produced in, 88, 93;

principles of, 7

poetry, 113, 202

Castro, Fidel: 227

Dawood, Abu: 26

Chechnya: 96

Demobilization, Disarmament and

China, People’s Republic of: opposi-

Reorganization (DDR): 65

tion to continued US presence in

Diem, Ngo Dinh: administration of,

Afghanistan, xxiii

xviii

Dorronsoro, Gilles:

Christianity: 36, 39–40, 54, 61–2, 65,

Revolution Unend-

ing, 236

83, 146–7, 235; Bible, 125, 234

Dostdaraan-e-Watan (weblog): 202

von Clausewitz, Carl: 237

Duond Jokanyanam: launch of (2005),

Clinton, Bill: administration of, 282

100

Coakley, Thomas: 7

Dupree, Louis: 53, 56, 62, 107, 263

Coalition: xvii, xix, xxxv, 32, 35–8, 40,

Durand Line: 52

49, 51, 69, 82, 102, 111, 117, 128–9, Durrani (tribal confederation): 63–4,

141, 175, 178, 190, 192, 214, 219,

279; Popalzai (tribe), 279

226–8, 237, 245, 276–8, 281–2; Durrani, Ahmad Shah (Abdali): 110,

military forces of, xxiii; targets of

156; influence of, 58–9, 61–2, 283

suicide bombing campaigns, 44; use

Durrani Empire (1747–1826): 58–9,

of image in IO, 234

156

Cold War: xxii, 8

Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS):

Edwards, David: 2

101

Elham: xix; editorial staff of, 47

Committee for the Promotion of

Elif Media: 96–7

Virtue and the Prevention of Vice:

Al Emarah Jihadi studio: American

members of, xxviii

Reconstruction, 93; production and

Counter-insurgency tactics (COIN):

dissemination of Taliban videos,

217, 223, 241–3, 253, 260; con-

92–3; use of social media, 93

367

INDEX

Facebook: xxxii, 16, 38, 40, 50; use by xxiv; selected as new emir of Taliban

HIG, 204; use by Taliban, 88–90

(2016), 18

Al-Fajr Media Center: media produced

Hakimi, Mufti Latiful ah: 99–100

by, 50

Haq, Abdul: xx–xxi

al Farooq, Khalif Omar: 19

Haqqani, Jalauddin: 45, 51

Farsi (language): 85; media produced

Haqqani Network: xviii, xxii, 43, 97, in, 93

207, 224; affiliates of, 51; media

First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42):

produced by, 94; suicide bombing

33, 279

campaigns of, xxiii, 51

Foxley, Tim: 15

Harakat-e-Iniqilab-e-Islami: 73

France: Revolution (1789–99), xxi

Harakat ul-Mujahidin: xix

Hazaras (ethnic group): xxiv, 25; terri-

Genghiz Khan: 33

tory inhabited by, 297

Gerges, Fawaz: 73–4

Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin: xviii–xix, xxii,

Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf: xxiii;

48, 50, 195, 199; CIA and ISI sup-administration of, 271; electoral vic-

port for, xx; escape to Iran (1994),

tory of (2014), 63

197; family of, 207; influence of,

Ghani, Mul ah Abdul (Berader): 173,

212; Islam pa Rana Ki (Bible in

178, 279; arrest of (2010), 178, 187

the light of the Qur’an), 199–200;

Ghariat (esteem): 257; concept of,

leader of HIG, 196

Helal, Qutbuddin: Deputy Political

28–9

Director of HIG, 202

Ghaznavid Empire (977–1186): 62

Hewad: 52

Ghaznawi, Mahmood: 61; influence

Hezb-e-Islami (HIK): xxvii, 50, 178,

of, 62

196; media produced by, 95; mem-

Ghilzai (tribal confederacy): 63; rise to

bers of, 46

power, 63

Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis): 73

Ghilzai, Mir Wais: 63; rise to power

Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG):

(1721), 63

xviii, xxii, xxxv, 2, 38–9, 43, 95, 195,

Ghuri, Shahab al-Din: 61; influence

198–9, 211, 214–15, 265, 295; HIG

of, 64

Central Zone Kabul, 49; ideology

Ghurid Dynasty (1173–1206): 64

of, 211–12; media produced by, 3,

Google, Inc.: Google Play, 16

48–50, 95, 197–200, 202, 204, 207,

Government Media Information

216; members of, 48–9, 195–7, 200,

Centre: 225

202, 213; peace proposal from, 212–

Graffiti: culture of, 102, 104; Taliban,

13, 215, 295; propaganda produced

102

by, 197, 213–14; Shamshato camp,

Guevara, Ernesto ‘Che’: 227

50, 195; statements released by,

209–10; suicide bombing campaigns

Habib, Malim Abdul: murder of

of, 208; use of IO, 195, 198, 207–9,

(2006), 76

215; use of social media, 204; Zawan

Haibatul ah Akhundzada, Mul ah:

Islami Tanzim, 49, 204

368

INDEX

Hezbol ah: 185, 272

226; establishment of (2001),

al Hijrat: affiliates of, 96; production

218; Troop-Contributing Nations

and dissemination of Taliban videos,

(TCNs), 220, 223

92

Iran: xxiv, 64, 85–6, 108, 197; opposi-Hogan, Patrick: Mind and its Stories,

tion to continued US presence in

The, 7–8

Afghanistan, xxiii

Hotak (tribe): 63

Iraq: 2, 73–4; Abu Ghraib Prison, 118;

Hotaki, Mirwais Khan: 73

insurgency activity in, 25; Operation

Human Rights Watch: 74

Iraqi Freedom (2003–11), 25, 218,

262; Karbala, 130

Ihsas: 49–50

Islam: xxviii, 16, 24, 26, 30, 32, 38, 57–

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs): 3,

8, 61–2, 64, 69, 81–2, 111–14, 117,

21, 79, 126, 129, 228, 246; fatalities,

121–2, 126–7, 129–30, 135, 141,

243; remotely denoted, 129; vehicle-

148, 157, 159–61, 164–5, 167–8,

borne (VBIEDs), 79

214, 236, 259, 266, 271; Deobandi, In Fight: xix, 44, 88; potential target

22–3, 27, 219; Eid, 109, 126–7, audience of, 47

148, 198, 200, 240; five pillars of, India: xxiv, 52, 65

xx; Qur’an, xxi, 79, 81, 99, 102, 123,

Information Operations (IO): xxv,

157, 276; radical, 27; Ramadan, 240,

xxvii, xxxiii–xxxv, 8–10, 13, 217,

268, 270; Shar’iah, xxviii, xxxiv, 17,

20, 26–7, 31, 39–40, 72, 104, 128,

220–3, 226–8, 230–1, 235–8,

150, 171, 186, 263, 265, 270, 278,

240–3, 253, 256, 259–60, 262–3,

296; Shi’a, 25, 180, 183; Sufism,

266; aims of, 10, 233; focus of,

xxvii, 27, 137, 143, 162; Sunni, 131

xxviii–xxx; HIG efforts, 195, 198,

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

207–9, 215; issues with product

(IMU): 207

approval cycles, 231; leaflets, xxvi,

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

218, 231–7, 244–8, 257–8, 260–1;

(ISIS): xxxvi; spread of, xxiii

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs),

Islamism: xxiii, 24–5, 66, 73, 88, 196;

224; perception management, 11;

radical, xxiv

personnel, xxxiii; persuasion in,

Italy: Rome, xxi

10–11; products, xxx; shortcomings

Ittihad-i Islami: 44–5

of, xxxiii, xxxv, 231, 259, 261; Taliban efforts, xxxiii–xxxv, 9, 12–13,

Jahani, Abdul-Bari: 138

15–18, 55, 174, 177, 182–3, 187,

Jaish-i-Mohammed: xix

195, 218, 227, 231–2, 259, 261–2,

Jalali, Abdul ah: spokesman for Mau-

264, 271, 283–4

luvi Sangeen, 97

International Crisis Group (ICG): 105,

Jalali, Mawlawi Saiful ah: 46

266, 273

Jamal, Qudratul ah (Hamed Agha):

International Security Assistance Force

founder of Al Somood, 44; Taliban

(ISAF): xxxii, 14, 36, 38–9, 49,

Minister of Information and Cul-

94, 147–8, 168, 213, 221, 223–4,

ture, 44

369

INDEX

Jamiat-e-Islami: 180

King, Stephen: On Writing, 4

Jihad: 24, 27, 72–3, 81–2, 112, 134,

166, 214, 219, 221–2, 255, 276; bin Laden, Osama: xxii, 219, 239, 272, defensive, 263; narrative, 55; Taliban

280; assassination of (2011), xxiii;

conception of, 23

rhetoric of, 69; use of image in IO,

Jihadism: 2, 18, 95; publications, 88

236

Johnson, Thomas H.: Narratives, xviii,

Lakoff, George: Metaphors We Live

xxiv

By, 6

Joint Special Operations Task Force

Lamb, Christopher: critique of PSYOP

(JSOTF): 230; issues with product

campaigns of OEF-A and Operation

approval cycles, 231

Iraqi Freedom, 261–2

Jones, Catherine Ann: 4–5

Lashkar-e-Taiba: xix

Jowett, Garth: Propaganda and Persua-

Latif, Haji: xx; assassination of (1989),

sion, 5, 284

xx–xxi

Juergensmeyer, Mark: observations of

Libya: 74

role of religious tropes in narratives,

Likwal: 51

69

Jyllands-Posten cartoon controversy

Madrasas: xix, 61, 159

(2005): 129–30

Mafton: 133–4

Mahajir, Muhibul ah: spokesperson for

Kandahar Air Field (KAF): 268

Shah Mansoor Dadul ah, 97

Karim, Mohammad Amin: 202

Main, Colonel Francis Scott: 222

Karmal, Babrak: 33, 64; as target of

Maiwandi, Abdul Satar: 88

folk poetry, 56–7

Malang Jaan: 137

Karzai, Hamid: 22, 54, 222–3; admin-

Manba-ul Jihad (The Source of Jihad):

istration of, 57, 64–6, 68, 79, 161, affiliates of, 96; production and dis-

183–4, 271, 278; background of, 63

semination of Taliban videos, 92, 94

Kelman, H. C.: 10

Mansour, Mul ah Akhtar: 18; death of

Kenya: US Embassy Bombing (1998),

(2016), xxiii–xxiv, 18

xxii

Mao Zedong: 13

Khabroona: 52

Marshall Plan (1948): 68

Khalis, Yunas: family of, 95; leader of

Martyr Asadol ah Jihadwal Cultural

HIK, xxvii, 46

Centre: 50

Khalilzad, Zalmay: as target of taranas,

Marxism: 63, 197

166

Masood, Ahmed Shah: xx; expulsion

Khan, Ismael: xx–xxi

from Kabul (1996), xxi

Khan, King Amanul ah: 73

Mazar Uprising (1997): sectarian

Khan, Nadir: 73

warfare following, 25

Khatak, Khoshal Khan: 110

McChrystal, General Stanley: 222;

Khototi (tribe): 63

resignation of (2010), 241–2

Kilcullen, David: Accidental Guerrilla,

Mesaq-i-Esaar: 49, 202; founding of

The, 15

(2007), 49

370

INDEX

Military Information Support Opera-

xxxii–xxxiii, xxxvi, 1–3, 13–14, 17, tions (MISO): xxx–xxxi; training,

83; Afghan, 4; analysis, 7; counter-

xxxi

narratives, 4, 6; definitions of 7–9;

Mohammed, Prophet: 23, 26, 71, 101,

historical, 6; insurgent/jihadist, xxxv,

120; cloak of, 282–3

4, 55; master, 21, 218; message influ-Momand, Lutful ah: 45

ence model, 8; message repetition,

Moshtaq, Fatima: as target of shabna-

9; pragmatic complexity model, 9;

mah, 76, 78

religious tropes, 69; Taliban, 3–4, 6,

Mujahid, Anwur-ul Haq: founder of

18–19, 29–32, 38–40, 104–5, 108,

Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz, 95

147, 169, 218, 267–9

Mujahed, Mul ah Kabir Ahmad: editor

Nasir (tribe): 63

of Murchal, 48

National Unity Government: xxiii

Mujahid, Zabihul ah: 97, 100, 208;

Nationalism: 31–2, 132; Afghan, xx,

account manager for Alemarah, 91;

30; Pashtun, xx, 44

leader of Al Emarah, 93; spokesper-

NATO-ISAF Strategic Communica-

son for Taliban, 97

tions Framework (2011): aims of,

Mujahidin: xxi, xxiii, xxvii, 32, 39–40,

222

64, 67, 90, 96, 111, 117, 121, 123–4, Naval Postgraduate School: xxx; stu-

126–7, 156–7, 179, 183, 185, 187,

dents of, xxxii

196, 254–5, 270; Afghan, xx, xxvi,

Nawa-i Afghan Jihad: 51

71–2, 124; aims of, 66; folk songs

Nawa-i-Waqt: 101

of, 57; moderates, xxi–xxii; use of

Netherlands: government of, 87–8

shaheed concept with, 26; use of

Noah: 234

shabnamah, 56

Non-governmental organizations

Mukhbat, Mohammad Asif: death of

(NGOs): 36, 68, 79, 81–2, 84, 179,

(2011), 49; editor of Tanweer, 48–9

221; international, 190; targeting of

Mullen, Admiral Mike: US Chairman

personnel, 190

of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 222, 261

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Murchal: xix, 48; editorial staff of, 48

(NATO): xxxii–xxxiii, 13, 21–2, 37, Mutawakkil, Mul ah: defection of,

41, 46–7, 87, 93–4, 142, 155, 158,

238–9; Taliban Foreign Minister,

177, 198, 208, 210, 216, 219, 221,

238

223–4, 226, 228, 238, 253, 273–4;

Muttaqi, Mawlawi Amir Khan: 45

col ateral damage of, 31; counter-

insurgency efforts of, 84, 91, 273;

Nabi, Mohammad: 73

members of, 41–2; personnel of, 44;

Najibul ah, Mohammad (Najib):

supply lines, 184

regime of, xviii, xxi, 197; removed

North Korea: 223

from power (1992), xxiii, 104, 197

North Vietnam (Democratic Republic

Namus (honor): 237; violation of, 29

of Vietnam): xviii

Nang: concept of, 28

Northern Al iance: members of, xxiv,

Narrative: xx, xxv–xxvi, xxviii, xxx,

280

371

INDEX

Nowmir, Fed Muhammad: 138

3, 25, 28, 30–1, 35, 51–2, 65, 83,

111, 114, 118, 127, 137–8, 145, 164, Obama, Barack: 115, 241

167, 183, 221, 263, 273–5, 282;

O’Donnell, Victoria: Propaganda and

Durrani, 63; folklore of, 56, 264;

Persuasion, 5, 284

historiography of, xx; nanawati,

Omar: 130–1

183; Pashtunwali, xxvii, xxix, 12, 22, Omar, Mul ah Mohammad: xxi–xxii,

27–8, 65, 74, 84, 112, 114, 117–18,

18–20, 32–3, 63, 109, 173, 181,

141, 149, 171, 191, 214, 237, 257,

190–1, 282–3; background of, 63;

276–7, 280; rural, xxvi–xxviii, 4, 29, death of, xxiv, 172; references to in

173, 223, 230, 232, 283–4; territory Layeha, 178, 181; rhetoric of, 25–6,

inhabited by, xix, xxi, xxvi, xxix–xxx,

74, 270–1, 281–3

4, 43, 162, 257, 297

Operational Detachment Alpha

Pazira, Nelofer: A Bed of Red Flowers,

(ODA): Mobile Mul ah Program,

57

259–60

People’s Democratic Party of Afghani-

Oqab (website): 195, 202

stan: Khalq faction of, 64; members

of, 63

Pajhwok: 101–2

Peroz, Mawlawi Mohammad Ghafoor:

Pakistan: xviii, xxiv, 31, 41, 51, 64–5,

131–2

85–6, 92, 99, 102, 108, 175, 191–2,

Persian Empire: 63

Persuasion: 10; attitudes, 11–12; coer-

272; Afghan refugees in, xviii, 196;

cive, 10; in IO and PSYOPS, 10–11

Baluchistan, xxiii; borders of, xxii,

Petraeus, General David: guidance for

56, 179; Federally Administered

US counter-insurgency operations in

Tribal Areas (FATA), 48, 84; Inter-

Afghanistan (2010), 242–3, 247

Services Intelligence (ISI), xviii–xx,

Petty, Richard E.: ‘Mass Media At-

xxii, xxiv, xxvi, xxxv, 18, 173, 196,

titude Change’, 12–13

228, 257; Islamabad, xxii, 282; Ka-Poetry: 3, 16, 37–8, 40, 44, 46, 56, rachi, 178; Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa

85, 101–2, 107–9, 118–25, 132–5,

(NWFP), 143; Lahore, 162; military

137–8, 140–1, 143–4; Dari, 113, of, 50; North Waziristan, 26;

202; folk symbolism in, 115, 137,

Pashtun population of, xix, 162; Pe-

139; moderates, 139–40; Pashto, 51,

shawar, 44, 48, 50–1, 63–4, 195–6,

109–10, 135–6, 138; politicization

199; Quetta, xxii; South Waziristan,

of, 110–11; Talib, 109; Taliban, 16,

26; Swat, 143

26, 108, 112–18, 126, 128, 130–2,

Palestine: 65

139–41, 269; use in news, 109; war-

Pashto (language): xxix, 16, 35, 66, rior, 26, 110

85, 93, 98–9, 144, 200, 229, 233,

Polkinghorne, Donald: Narrative

236, 260, 264; media produced in,

Knowing and the Human Science,

44, 46–52, 88, 101; poetry 51, 113,

8–9

135–6, 138

Priester, Joseph R.: ‘Mass Media At-

Pashtuns (ethnic group): xxviii–xxix,

titude Change’, 12–13

372

INDEX

Propaganda: xx, xxii, xxx–xxxii, xxxvi,

Resalat: 50

3, 11–12; analysis of, 5; armed, 15;

Reuters: 100

concept of, 5, 11–12; dissemination

Revolutionary Association of the

of, xix; production of, xix; Taliban,

Women of Afghanistan (RAWA):

xxi, xxiv, 5–6; use of conceptual

xxviii

metaphor, 6

Roberts, Field Marshal Frederick: xxi

Protection of the Islamic Culture in

Rolling Stone: 242

Afghanistan: media produced by, 50

Russian Federation: xxiv; Moscow, 280

Provincial Reconstruction Team

Ruston, Scott W.: definition of narra-

(PRT): radio broadcasts, 101;

tive, 8

schools constructed by, 76

Psychological Operations (PSYOP):

As-Sadeqin: 95

x, xxx–xxxi, xxxv, 2, 9–10, 13, 217, Saeed, Ustad Qareebyr Rahman: 200

219, 228, 230–1, 238, 241–3, 245,

Safire, William: Lend Me Your Ears:

248, 256; Afghan insurgents, 9; aims

Great Speeches in History, 6

of, 10, 233; Al ied, xxxiii; infor-

Salafism: 23, 27

mational, xxii; issues with product

Sangin, Amirzai: Afghan Minister of

approval cycles, 231; leaflets, 231–3,

Communications and Information

244–9, 253, 260–1; posters, 256–7;

Technology, 89

perception management, 11; Mea-

Sangin, Mauluvi: 94

sures of Effectiveness (MOEs), 224;

Saudi Arabia: xix

persuasion in, 10–11; shortcomings

Saur Revolution (1978): 63–4

of, xxxiii, 222, 231, 244–5, 259,

Sayyaf, Abdul al-Rasul: 44–5

261–2; Taliban efforts, xxxiv, 2, 9, Schein, Edgar: concept of coercive

13; training, xxxi, 58

persuasion, 10

Second Anglo-Afghan War (1879–81):

al-Qaeda: xix, xxv–xxvii, 37, 46, 90,

xxi, 33, 113, 279; Battle of Maiwand

97, 222, 239; affiliates of, xix, 50; (1880), 214

members of, 92, 220; rhetoric of, 73;

Second World War (1939–45): 68

Al-Sahab Media, 92–3, 95

Shah, King Zahir: 57

Qutb, Sayyid: xx

Shabnamah (night letters): 16, 39,

53, 56, 61–2, 65–6, 73, 82, 198; as Radio Garmsir: 100

armed propaganda, 15; collections

Ramadan Massacre (2009): 268

of, xxxiii; magazines, 196; position

RAND Corporation: 253

in Afghan folklore, 53; targets of

Resource Support Mission Afghani-

intimidation in, 75–6, 78; thematic

stan (RSMA)(2015): 224; Essential

lines of, 55, 83; tropes of, 54–5; use

Functions (EFs), 224–5; Lines of

by Mujahidin, 56; use by Taliban,

Effort (LOE), 224–5

53–4, 56–8, 64–5, 69, 74, 82–4,

Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam):

112–13, 263, 269, 275

Saigon, xviii

Shah, King Zahir: xxi, 64

373

INDEX

Shahadat: xix, 196

Tajikistan: 85; Dushanbe, 280

Shahamat: xix, 46–7; website, 99

Tajiks (ethnic group): xxiv, 183, 280

Shaheed (martyrdom): as subject of

Taliban: xviii–xix, xxii, xxv, xxxii, 2–5,

music/poetry, 26; concept of, 26,

13–14, 17, 27–9, 35, 39, 43, 61,

271

63, 66–7, 73–4, 85, 87, 89–90, 92, Shaib, Hazarat (Bazar, Mul ah Shor):

94, 96, 98–100, 108, 122, 151–4,

influence of, 73

158–9, 162–3, 166–7, 183, 185–7,

Shar’iah Zhagh (Voice of Shar’iah):

192–3, 197, 207, 227–9, 237, 239,

100–1; online presence of, 99;

253–4, 263–7, 270, 276–8, 280–1,

Pashto broadcast, 101; re-launch of

283–4; addition of criminals to

(2005), 99, 101; webcasts, 102

( Taliban-e duzd), 173; Afghan,

Shar’iaht Voice: 85

xviii–xix, 226, 257; Baitul Maal,

Shuja, Shah: 33

185; as Islamic Emirate of Afghani-

Shura-ye Nazar: 180

stan (IEA), 16–17, 20–1, 23, 39–40, Simmons, Annette: Story Factor, The, 5

44, 48, 61, 69, 72, 82, 85, 91–3,

Sohail, Salim: editor of Elhan, 47

218–19, 263, 270; Capture of Kabul

Somalia: 97, 223

(1996), xxi; Convoy of Martyrs, 26;

Al Somood: xix, 41, 44–5, 47, 87; edito-defection of ANP personnel to,

rial staff of, 45; founding of (2002),

184; Destruction of Bamiyan Bud-

44

dhas (2001), 282; development of,

Soviet Union (USSR): 163, 282; Inva-

xxvii, 104; graffiti culture of, 102,

sion of Afghanistan (1979–89), xvii,

xx, xxii–xxiii, xxvi, 25–6, 31, 33, 36,

104; ideology of, 3, 16–17, 21–7,

53–4, 56–7, 62–6, 105, 109, 113,

30–2, 35–6, 74–5, 111, 143, 160–2,

117, 121, 147–8, 155–6, 163–4,

211–12, 218–19, 259, 269–71; in-

168, 180, 196–7, 207, 232, 270, 275, fighting amongst, 173–4; insurgency

277, 282; Moscow, xviii; Red Army,

activity of, 83, 133, 165–6, 208, 280;

xxiii; weaponry supplied by, xviii

Invitation Council, 45; ISI support

Srak (pamphlet): 45–6; editorial staff

for, xxi; Layeha (code of conduct),

of, 45

21, 171–87, 189, 191–3, 285; maj-Strategic communication: American,

buri, 28; master narrative of, 21–2;

16, 21, 217–18, 220; HIG, 198;

media produced by, 3, 43–8, 92–3,

Taliban, 26, 30, 104, 171, 219

97, 141–3, 145–7, 204, 265, 269;

Sulaiman Khel (tribe): 63

members of, xxx, 11, 21, 32, 40, 42, Sun Tzu: xvii

45, 79, 88–9, 92, 172, 175–8, 184, Sykes, Sir Percy: History of Afghanistan,

189, 191–2, 279, 285–7; Mili-

62

tary Commander’s Council, 279;

Syria: 2, 74

Military Commissioner, 19; moral

systems of, 2–3; narratives of, 3–4, 6,

Taheri, Shokrul ah: 136

18–19, 29–32, 38–40, 104–5, 108,

Taifetul Mansura (Victorious Sect): 96;

147, 169, 218, 267–9, 274–5; Op-members of, 96

eration Azm, 20; Operation Omari,

374

INDEX

19–20; Pakistani support for, xxiii–

Tayi, Malawi Hatem: 46

xxiv; presence in Pakistan, xxii–xxiii,

Thieu, Nguyen Van: administration

97; propaganda campaigns of, xxii,

of, xviii

5–6; Quetta Shura, 18, 45, 97, 173,

Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919): 33,

187, 190, 193, 279; radio broadcasts

73, 109, 147, 168, 279

of, 99; Rahbari Shura, 191; regime

Third Reich (1933–45): 32

of (1996–2001), xxi, xxiv, xxvii–xx-

Tokhi (tribe): 63

viii, xxxv, 63; removed from power

TOLO News: 208

(2001), 32, 99, 197–8; ‘Rules and

Tora Bora Magazine: 46, 95; editorial

Regulations for Mujahidin’, 171;

staff of, 46

spokespeople for, 97–8; taranas

Tora Bora Nizami Mahaz (Tora Bora

produced by, 24, 141–2, 147–50,

Military Front): 43, 46; formation

152–3, 155–6, 158–62, 164–8, 269;

of, 95

use of IO and PSYOPs, xxxiii–xxxv,

Transparency International: Corrup-

2–4, 9, 12–13, 15–18, 55, 174, 177, tion Perceptions Index (CPI), 223

182–3, 187, 195, 227, 231, 259, 261, Turkey: 96–7

264, 271, 283–4; use of poetry, 16,

Turki, Suraka: 96

26, 108, 112–18, 126, 128, 130–1,

Turner, Mark: 2–3; Metaphors We Live

140–1, 269; use of shabnamah,

By, 6

53–4, 56–8, 64–5, 69, 74, 82–4,

Twitter: xxxii, 16, 38, 40; use by Tali-

112, 263, 269, 275; use of social ban, 88–90, 105, 265

media, 89–92, 105, 265; view of

bachabauzi, 181

Ulema: 74–6, 81, 122, 282

Tanweer (weblog): 48–9, 196, 199–

Ummah: 25, 73–4, 199, 271, 279

200, 216; editorial staff of, 48–9

United Islamic Front for the Salvation

Tanzania: US Embassy Bombing

of Afghanistan: formation of, 180;

(1998), xxii

members of, 180

Tanzim Party: 196

United Kingdom (UK): 165, 215;

Taraki (tribe): 63

military of, 32

Taraki, Nur Mohammed: 63; role in

United Nations (UN): 118, 281;

Saur Revolution (1978), 64

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

Taranas: xxxiii, 15, 85, 141, 143, (UNAMA), 269; Security Council,

145–6, 151–2, 154–7, 204; collec-

218, 281

tions of, xxxii; ‘Da Kufar sara Jang

United States of America (USA): xviii,

dai’ (Fight with Infidels), 23–4; role

8–9, 11, 14, 21, 36, 39, 52, 54, 69, of qawms in, 145; symbolism in,

71, 79, 84, 92–3, 108, 117–18,

150–2, 160–1, 165; Taliban, 141–3,

121, 124–5, 142, 165, 210, 215,

147–50, 152–3, 155–6, 158–62,

221–2, 225–8, 231, 246, 260, 269,

164–8, 269; targets of, 166

272–4, 281; 9/11 Attacks, xx, xxii,

Tariq, Azam (Dr Tariq): account man-

xxv, 219–20, 238, 268, 272, 280–1; ager for Alemarah, 91

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

375

INDEX

xx; Department of Defense (DoD),

Vietnam: xvii; Hanoi, xvii–xviii; Me-

xxxi, 229, 262; Foreign Area Office

kong Delta, xviii

(FAO) Program, 229; Foreign Ter-

Vietnam War (1955–75): xvii, xxiii,

rorist Organization (FTO) list, xix;

226, 243; Fall of Saigon (1975), xviii

Fort Leavenworth, xxxi; govern-

Virgil: Aeneid, xxii

ment of, xxx, 183, 221; military

of, xix, xxxi–xxxii, 144, 155, 215, Wahdat: 51

229, 231–2, 262, 266, 268; New War on Terror: 220, 273

York, 219; Office of the Secretary of

Washington Post: xxxvi

Defense (OSD), xxv–xxvi, xxx, 29;

Washington Times: xxix

Pentagon, xxv; US Brigade Combat

Writers Society of Afghanistan: 107

Team (BCT), xxxi; US Central

Command (CENTCOM), 230;

Yasir, Ustad Mogammad: 44–5; impris-

Washington DC, 184, 219, 271

onment of (2005–7), 45

Urdu (language): 41, 85–7, 98, 264; Yemen: USS Cole Bombing (2000), xxii

media produced in, 44, 50–1, 88

Yosofzai, Ajmal Attak: 137–8

US Institute of Peace (USIP): Special

YouTube: xxxii, 16, 38, 40, 88, 144; use Report (2009), 255

by HIG, 204; use by Taliban, 91

US PSYOP Task Force (POTF): 220

Usman: 130–1

Zaeef, Mul ah Salaam: Taliban Ambas-

Uzbekistan: Tashkent, 280

sador to Pakistan, 156, 180

Uzbeks (ethnic group): xxiv, 25, 280

Zaker: 132–3

Zakir, Mul ah Abdul Qauyum: 172

Vance, General Jonathan: Commander

Zan: 237

of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan,

Zarghoon, Haroon: 200

xxxii

al Zawahiri, Dr Ayman: speeches of, 92

Viet Cong: 226

Zer, Ebu (Serdal Erbashi): 96

376

Document Outline

Cover

Half-title

Title

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

List of Figures and Tables

Foreword

Preface

1. Introduction

2. An Overview of Taliban and Other Afghan Insurgent Stories and an Assessment of their Master Narratives

3. Target Audiences of Afghan Narratives and Stories

4. Taliban and Afghan Insurgent Magazines, Circulars, and Newsletters

5. The Taliban’s Use of Shabnamah (Night Letters)

6. The Taliban’s Use of the Internet, Social Media Video, Radio Stations, and Graffiti

7. The Afghans’ and Taliban’s Use of Poetry and Taranas

8. The Layeha, the Taliban Code of Conduct

9. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) Propaganda Activities

10. The United States’ Afghan Information and PSYOP Campaign and a Comparison with the Taliban’s Campaign

11. Conclusions

Appendix A: How Afghans Identify the Types of Taliban

Appendix B: Summary of Taliban Night Letters, 2008–10

Appendix C: HIG Official Peace Proposal and Translation

Notes

Bibliography

Index